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This dissertation explores the role of Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD)
program and its deterrent effect upon North Korean behavior. A mixed-methods approach
is employed to analyze the topic. Empirical quantitative data included tabulated monthly
cooperative-conflictual behavioral interaction between Japan and North Korea spanning a
22-year timeframe (1990-2011). In addition, a strategic profile developed from deterrence
theory provided essential qualitative background to compliment the quantitative analysis.
Japan’s BMD program was divided into four periods reflecting decision points or phases
of program development. Results indicated varied BMD deterrence effectiveness, with
two periods indicating Japan’s BMD program strengthened deterrence, one period
indicating it undermined deterrence, and one period it had no effect.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The threat from North Korea is daunting: there are large numbers of offensive
ballistic missiles; possible possession of missile-capable nuclear weapons; and, a
propensity for risky behavior such as export of nuclear and missile technology. In
Northeast Asia, North Korea’s large stockpile of missiles can, in a matter of minutes,
endanger military, civil, and economic targets in neighboring countries like Japan. But
while North Korean possession of ballistic missiles provides it cover for a wide variety of
coercive behavior short of war, Japanese possession of missile defenses could offset the
North Korean ballistic missile advantage and, in part, deter North Korea’s coercive
behavior. The key question, then, is Does Japan’s BMD deter North Korea’s behavior?
Or, does Japan’s BMD undermine it? Are these deterrence effects seen in any specific
periods of Japan’s BMD program?
As a way to familiarize the reader with the research undertaken to address this
question, this introductory chapter is outlined as follows. First, a brief review of the
research findings will be presented. These findings are a short summary of those provided
later in the dissertation. Second, a short section of background material is provided
briefly describing the setting, including the nature of the North Korean threat as well as
Japan’s BMD program. Third, theoretic ideas will be described along with key gaps.
Fourth, the dissertation’s subsequent chapters will be summarized. Lastly, some closing
thoughts will be providing as a segue to Chapter Two: History.
General Findings
The mixed-methods research and analysis explored the question of whether
Japan’s BMD deterred North Korea and whether other alternative factors, such as the role
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of the U.S. or China, contributed to North Korea’s behavior toward Japan. In reference to
the direct question of Japan’s BMD, the research indicated that Japan’s BMD was
correlated with cooperative North Korean behavior toward Japan in some circumstances
and conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan in others. This was consistent with
the missile defense-deterrence literature.
First, Japan’s BMD program during the period immediately following North
Korea’s 1998 TD-1 launch (September 1998 – November 2003), marked by a high
commitment in Japan to BMD research and development, had a positive effect upon
North Korean cooperative behavior toward Japan. Using identified deterrence
effectiveness criteria, these results suggest Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against
North Korea in this period. Second, Japan’s BMD program in the period surrounding
(and following) North Korea’s TD-2 missile launch (February 2009 – December 2011),
when Japan’s leadership operationally employed their BMD to the field (manned and
ready to shoot), reduced North Korean conflictual behavior toward Japan. Using the
deterrence effectiveness criteria, these results suggest Japan’s BMD strengthened
deterrence against North Korea also during this period. Third, Japan’s BMD program in
the period following Japan’s initial deployment of its first operational BMD capabilities
(March 2007 – December 2011) increased conflictual North Korean behavior toward
Japan. Using the criteria identified, these results indicate the initial deployment of Japan’s
BMD undermined deterrence against North Korea in this period. Fourth, Japan’s BMD
program in the period following the formal decision by Japan’s leadership to acquire and
field its own BMD system (December 2003 – February 2007) did not reflect statistically
significant cooperative or conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan. These results
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indicate Japan’s formal decision period had no deterrence effect against North Korea in
this period. Japan’s BMD, therefore, varied in deterrence effectiveness, an outcome
generally supported across the totality of deterrence literature.
More broadly, given their historical interaction, increasingly conflictual
interaction between North Korea and Japan was expected to characterize their overall
relationship. However, this was not reflected in the analyses. Significant cooperative
interaction was revealed in the data and analysis and the patterns of interaction do not
appear to yield large swings of either reductions to cooperative North Korean behavior
toward Japan or increases to conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan. BMD did
not appear to be a contributor to any worsening of the Japan-North Korea relationship
generally. Japan’s BMD did, however, appear to be correlated with favorable shifts in
provocative and coercive North Korean behavior toward Japan with ballistic missiles in
the later (TD-2) BMD period.
Given the hostile relationship between North Korea and the U.S., and the alliance
between the U.S. and Japan, increasingly conflictual interaction between North Korea
and Japan was expected. However, the statistical analyses did not support this
expectation. None of the models with U.S. behavioral variables significantly affected
either cooperative or conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, nor did they
change any of Japan’s BMD-related variables in any significant way.
The expectation that China’s influence over North Korea would affect North
Korea’s behavior toward Japan was supported by the statistical analyses. This was
reflected with cooperative PRC behavior toward North Korea indicating an increase in
North Korea’s cooperative behavior toward Japan. Cooperative Chinese action toward
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North Korea, possibly including inducements, predictably strengthened North Korea’s
cooperative interaction with Japan. Such an outcome would generally support China’s
strategic interests. While cooperative Chinese behavior toward North Korea was
statistically significant in cooperative North Korean behavior toward Japan generally, the
analysis did not indicate correlation of Chinese behavior toward North Korea and Japan’s
BMD program variables.
Background & Setting
The North Korean Threat
Within the scope of all the security problems facing the world today, few are
more important than the challenges of the state of North Korea. Much has been written
addressing the military threat, its development of nuclear weapons, prospects of conflict
on the Korean Peninsula, its reclusiveness, its pariah status, and its leaders and their
peculiar ways. Western observers generally see North Korea only as a threat to security.
For example, Gavan McCormack claimed that of the 600 books written about North
Korea since the 1990s, nearly all portrayed North Korea as “virulently hostile” (Shin,
Park, & Yang, Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The
Korean Experience, 2007).1 To be sure, the modern regime in North Korea is today a
threat to Japan, with ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and
provocative behavior.2 Indeed, North Korea regularly parades its ballistic missiles
through the center of Pyongyang, not only for domestic audiences, but as a source of
confidence in their coercion strategy.3 However, North Korea is also a relational actor
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In his chapter, “Difficult Neighbors: Japan and North Korea.” Page 155.
Politically, North Korea has been described with exasperation as an “impossible state” (Cha, 2012).
3
On North Korea’s strategy of coercion, see, for example: Sugio Takahashi (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile
Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation, 2012), page 23; Paul French (French, 2007),
2
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and the threat it poses to Japan today is but the latest chapter in a two-millennia-long
story of conflictual and cooperative interaction. Little research or writing, however, has
addressed Japan’s relationship with North Korea in the modern context of Japan’s
development of BMD.
North Korea’s ballistic missile program began in the early 1960s and has become
an integral part of the North’s security motivations and overall coercion strategy. North
Korea’s offensive ballistic
missile program has
flourished and includes
large numbers, types, and
ranges of missiles and it
has become a major
exporter of missiles and
related technology,
though this activity has
declined in recent years.
Today, North Korea possesses short-range Scud, medium-range Nodong, intermediaterange Musudan and, under development, intercontinental-range Taepodong missiles.

pages 223-4 and 228; in Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North
Korea’s Strategic Culture” (Schneider & Post, 2002), pages 129-30, where Baird indicates, for example, the
August 1998 missile test that overflew Japan was a “nuanced” method of pressure or coercion, implying
the threat of worse action in the future if regional actors did not provide North Korea needed; Keith
Payne (Payne K. B., 1996), pages 30-5; Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic
Campaign Strategies: Continuity versus Change” (Pollack, 2004), pages 59-62; Kerry Kartchner (Kartchner,
2002), pages 2-4; Rex Kiziah (Kiziah, 2000), page 6; Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman (Wilkening &
Watman, 1995), page 32; and, DoD (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 2010), page iii. Generally,
North Korea’s past behavior has included violent acts on the order of the sinking of the Cheonon, artillery
strikes into South Korea, political assassinations, bombings, acts of terror, kidnappings, and missile and
nuclear weapons related provocations.
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Figure 1 shows some key North Korean missiles that threaten Japan and others (Public
Affairs Office, 2010).4 Hundreds of North Korea’s offensive ballistic missiles are within
range of Japan, some of them assessed to be capable of carrying weapons of mass
destruction (Pinkston, 2008).5 Tokyo, as the center for Japan’s economic and political
activity, is especially vulnerable. See Figure 2 for a map depicting North Korean ballistic
missiles that could threaten Japan and their ranges.6 These offensive missile systems
provide a backdrop for North Korea’s coercive, and sometimes provocative and violent,
behavior. Effectively countering ballistic missiles could potentially influence (deter)
North Korea by moderating its behavior in its regional strategy toward Japan.
Theoretically, some doubt missile defenses can deter adversaries.7
BMD and Japan
The principal purpose of missile defense is to provide crisis or wartime kinetic
intercept and destruction of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft in flight.8 In
general, though, it is argued that missile defenses are used to dissuade the development of
ballistic missiles, deter their use if developed, and defeat their use in attack (Department
of Defense, 2010).9 Missile defenses provide opportunities for other benefits to nations
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Figure taken from page 11.
Pages 2-30.
6
A figure copied from the DoD Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (2010); page 5.
7
Barak Mendelsohn argues, for example, that Israeli possession of missile defenses did not Iraqi Scud
attacks in the Persian Gulf War. See, “Israeli self-defeating deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War,” Journal of
Strategic Studies, 26:4, pp. 83-107, 2003. Stephen F. Cimbala argues adversaries will simply develop
technical countermeasures to missile defenses or simply develop non-standard methods of attack. See,
“Deterrence and Friction: Implications for Missile Defense, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp.
201-220, 2002.
8
BMD has been used defensively, though not always with sterling results. For example, the U.S. Patriot
was used in 1991 against Iraqi missiles; the U.S. PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability) was used against Iraq
again in 2003; the U.S. used a modified SM-3 (Standard Missile) from an Aegis-class BMD ship in
Operation Burnt Frost in 2009 to shoot down a failing satellite; and, the Israeli Iron Dome was used
against short-range missiles in 2011 and 2012.
9
See page 11.
5
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under missile attack, including damage limitation to military forces, population centers,
industry, leadership, and critical infrastructure.
Japan has begun to emerge somewhat quietly from a strict “pacifist” nation, a
consequence of its World War II defeat (Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin, Japan's Nuclear
Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, 2009).10 To the surprise of some,
Japan has reinterpreted portions of its postwar constitution for the sake of addressing
national security concerns like North Korea. It has also modernized its military, including
the purchase of 42 F-35
stealth fighters from the
U.S. (Takenaka, 2011).
Further, in 1998 North
Korea tested a Taepodong1 ballistic missile over
Japan, an event that
frightened Japan’s
population and surprised
its leadership. This event stirred Japan’s leaders toward BMD, a program demanding
significant financial and political commitment.11 Having cost $12 billion so far, Japan’s
missile defense system is now the second best in the world, behind the United States’
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Page 1.
Japan’s economy struggled in the late 1990s (Kaihara, 2008). Despite this, after the 1998 TD-1 launch
over Japan, the government of Japan committed large resources to BMD. On the other hand, BMD was
good, if not essential, for Japan’s defense industry. There was an economic angle to pursing BMD as well
as a long-term consideration for maintaining the health of the defense industry with both technology and
capacity in order to hedge against emerging and future threats. In 1995, prior to the start of Japan’s heavy
investment in BMD following the 1998 North Korean TD-1 launch over Japan, “the survival of the defense
industry” in both Japan and the U.S. was an “urgent” issue (NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN, 1995).
11
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(Dawson, 2012).12 For Japan, BMD represented a strategic choice, not only for defense of
Japan in potential wartime contingencies, but also for deterring North Korea’s coercive
behavior in peacetime.
Japan possesses a multilayered missile defense system capable of engaging
ballistic missiles at various distances and altitudes. This includes sea-based Aegis
midcourse defenses that use SM-3 missiles capable of intercepting short, medium, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Japanese system also includes land-based
Patriot or PAC-3 missiles capable of engaging incoming missiles in the terminal phase of
flight. Tokyo is the primary area of defense (Kang & Lee, 2009).13 Japan’s BMD system
is a very capable one. Twomey suggests, “The United States and Japan deploy the most
successful area defense program,” adding, “the existing system already enables Japan to
protect its home islands against a North Korean threat with only one or two Kongo-class
ships ‘on station.’ Japan’s current fleet of six ships allows for adequate coverage and
continual time on station, if Tokyo chooses” (Twomey, 2011).14
Japan’s BMD is comparable to the early U.S. antiballistic missile (ABM) system
as well as the more recent U.S. national missile defense in terms of its technological
development and emergence overall in a small number of key programmatic phases.
There were also similarities in the life-saving potential given the nature of the threat.15
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The number two ranking was based on system sophistication, not numbers of interceptors deployed.
The commitment accounts for about 15% of Japan’s entire defense budget (O'Donogue, 2000); pages 811.
13
See also Masako Toki (Toki, 2009).
14
Page 62. Japan’s own BMD capabilities were first deployed in March, 2007 two and one-half years after
the initial operational deployment of U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defenses (GMD) interceptors in
September, 2004 (Samson, 2010); page 45. Samson points out that initial operational fielding by the U.S.
was rushed and was followed by systemic failures.
15
In the early Cold War period, for example, the U.S. ABM system was once considered simply as a
defensive system that would save lives in a nuclear conflict, perhaps as many as 50 million (Adams, 1971);
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However, there are key national security related differences between the two systems. For
example, in their discussion of geopolitics and deterrence, Patrick Morgan and George
Quester state that the U.S. strategy adopted to address regional security problems
following World War II was extended nuclear deterrence—an approach to deterring
conventional attack on an ally by threats of punishment, not by “denial” deterrence with
vast defensive capabilities (Shultz, Drell, & Goodby, 2011).16 For Japan, the problem
with this approach was that North Korean ballistic missiles could attack Japan directly
with conventional or WMD payloads, meaning Japan’s hope for its security would be
dependent on others: the U.S. and North Korea. First, Japan would depend upon North
Korea believing U.S. post-attack punishment threats provided in extended deterrence
would be credible to avoid the initial North Korean attack in the first place. Any benefitdenial capability of U.S. national missile defense, developed later, was sufficient only for
protecting the United States from attacks; they simply could not cover Japan against
North Korean missiles like the Nodong.17 The second problem with this approach was
that Japan would need to depend upon the U.S. actually carrying through with punishing

page 150. Later, both the U.S. and USSR came to see defenses more as a means for protecting their
nuclear strike forces.
16
In Chapter 1, “How History and the Geopolitical Context Shape Deterrence.” Page 8.
17
In May, 1993, North Korea tested four missiles including a Nodong-1launched toward a buoy between
North Korea and Japan, an event deemed threatening by Japan’s leaders (Burns, 2010); page 97. Reducing
the “coercive influence” of Iran’s ballistic missiles is one of the purposes of U.S. BMD expressed by the
U.S. Department of Defense (Fact Sheet: The Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe,
2009); page 2. Influencing Iranian behavior with missile defenses, despite U.S. overwhelming conventional
and nuclear offensive power, is remarkable in that it supports the notion that regional “rogue” actors like
Iran and North Korea are less likely to be deterred by U.S. nuclear weapons and, instead pursue
asymmetric capabilities, including ballistic missiles and WMD, both to deter others and undergird coercive
behavior. Japan’s BMD, likewise, was intended to have a comparable effect on North Korean behavior by
diminishing the value of their ballistic missiles to coerce in peacetime or achieve operational benefits in
crisis or conflict.
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an attacker if deterrence failed. Unfortunately, U.S. credibility with Japan has waned.18
With deterrence depending on U.S. credibility and North Korean willingness to
acquiesce, Japan chose to acquire its own BMD capability which not only contributes to
conflict deterrence through defense of wartime missile attacks, but deterrence of North
Korean coercive behavior toward Japan in pre-conflict conditions through perceptual
effects on North Korean decision factors that U.S. nuclear retaliation forces cannot
provide.19
Literature Gaps
In general, deterrence literature in recent years has begun moving beyond basic
questions of Cold War nuclear deterrence, comparing strategic forces, international
relations issues such as arms control, and cases involving the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). More recently, for example, the literature provided additional
insight into expansion of deterrence concepts beyond merely fear of cost-imposition to a
broader idea of “influence” of an adversary’s perceptions (U.S. Department of Defense,
18

Regarding wartime contingencies and the prospects of U.S. punishment of regional adversaries who
would attack Japan, doubts have emerged within various circles inside Japan that helped fuel the need to
acquire and deploy an autonomous Japanese BMD capability. Frank Miller, for example, suggested “The
US must recognize the huge shift in Japanese political circles on nuclear weapons that has occurred as a
result of generational change and Chinese and North Korean programs. Senior Japanese officials and
politicians are uncertain whether the US has the political will and/or nuclear capability to extend
deterrence. While the deterrent may be credible in aggressors’ eyes, we have a major assurance problem”
(Murdock, et al., 2009); quote by Frank Miller in a briefing to the CSIS Workshop (June 2009); page 46. But
the problem of Japanese uncertainty over U.S. extended deterrence commitments—and Japan’s decision
to acquire BMD—goes years further back from this workshop described by some as more of a problem of
trust. Even as Japanese leaders were contemplating the decision to acquire Japan’s own BMD system, one
of the considerations in their calculus was supposedly “a certain level of distrust vis-à-vis the credibility of
the U.S. nuclear umbrella” (Urayama, 2000); page 618. These factors moved Japan toward BMD
acquisition and deployment—of little surprise when considered together.
19
See also Colin S. Gray on how BMD deters an adversary’s freedom of action either to intimidate or
attack (Peoples, 2010); pages 186-9. Borrowing from Clausewitz’s notion that war is an instrument of
policy, and citing cases of defensive-dominated conflicts, Gray argues that technology and defenses in
general have been lost in modern deterrence theory, caught in Cold War logic of parity. Several pros and
cons of Japan pursuing BMD emerged. It was clear to Swaine, et al, that Japan’s BMD program would
“exert a significant influence” on its relations with regional actors (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001);
pages 4-8. See also Lars Abmann for a summary of BMD pros and cons (Abmann, 2007).

11

2006) and recent recognition of deterrent implications (both positive and negative) of
missile defenses. However, very little deterrence literature involves Asia and most
missile defense-deterrence literature addresses U.S. national missile defense issues, with
most of those relative to deterring nuclear war. Of the 30+ missile defense related books,
and several similar articles located and reviewed on missile defense-deterrence, none
were devoted to the deterrence effect of Japan’s missile defenses toward North Korea
over time under general deterrence conditions.20 Further, of the 54 specific arguments
identified on whether missile defenses strengthen or undermine deterrence, none of the
arguments were based upon research of the Japan-North Korea case and there simply is
not definitive discussion of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in the Japan-North Korea
case under general deterrence conditions over time using empirical data.21
One problem was the limitation of the traditional view of general deterrence,
described in the 1980s by Patrick Morgan as a purposeful managing of an existing
adversarial relationship between two states under relatively peaceful, status quo
conditions. Theoretically, general deterrence fails when one of the two parties creates a
crisis by considering an attack on the other (called immediate deterrence) with a view that
war may be imminent (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).22 The theoretic options were
peacetime, crisis, or war, with no meaningful levels of fidelity to the range of peacetime
20

A small sample: Michael W. Simon, “Rogue State Response to BMD: The Regional Context,” in Defense
& Security Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2002, pp. 271-292; Palmore, Julian, and Francoise Melese, “A Game
Theory View of Preventive Defense Against Ballistic Missile Attack,” Defense & Security Analysis 17, no. 2
(August 2001); Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot,” International
Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 119-171.
21
Relations between the two states during this period existed loosely in general deterrence conditions;
that is, marked predominantly by peacetime conditions where the threat of war has not been placed in
jeopardy by threatening behavior by one side. Traditional views describe the sub-conflict period between
two antagonists as either general deterrence or an escalated situation of acute crisis (immediate
deterrence) where war is possible if not intended (Huth and Russett, 1993); pages 61-73.
22
Pages 372-3.
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interactions between two states in this type of interstate relationship. There also was not
much attention paid to positive, cooperative interaction that could happen even between
two otherwise adversarial parties under general deterrence conditions. As described,
general deterrence was lacking somewhat as a theoretic frame for exploring a more
detailed, behavioral approach to the Japan-North Korea case and the deterrent effects of
Japan’s BMD over time. According to Stephen Quackenbush in his recent book on
general deterrence, “formal theories of general deterrence have never been subjected to
direct empirical testing” (Quackenbush, Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and
Application, 2011).23 But he, too, was very constrained in his approach to general
deterrence and the type and level of empirical analysis conducted. For example, he used
only single, annual data entries for observing events, and these events were limited to
binary outcome decisions by states to either attack or restrain; he did not consider the
Japan-North Korea case.24 Greater fidelity was needed within general deterrence. This
was provided in the dissertation, in part, by using empirical monthly data summaries, an
intensity weighting scale for behavioral interaction between states, and “stretching”
general deterrence to include both cooperative and conflictual behavior.
Complicating the literature on general deterrence is the common creation of a
theoretic bridge between general deterrence and extended deterrence. Extended
deterrence refers to a three-way situation in which a state power, like the U.S., threatens
retaliation upon an adversary who would attack an ally of the state threatening the
retaliation (Huth P. K., 1988).25 Cases of extended deterrence—like the provision of
security guarantees provided Japan by the U.S. through extended deterrence—usually
23

Page 41.
Pages 4 and 51-5.
25
Pages 1 and 15-6.
24
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refer to cases of deterring conflict and threats of nuclear retaliation. Many suggest
effective extended deterrence maintains a stable, general deterrence environment.
However, North Korean provocative and coercive behavior, which occurs under general
deterrence conditions but has included many things (i.e., ballistic missile tests,
development of nuclear weapons, tests of nuclear devices, and violence and loss of life),
is not deterred or prevented by the overwhelming power that is threatened via extended
deterrence. This tension creates false theoretic expectations of general and extended
deterrence as well as “gray areas” or gaps for policymakers. For example, Sugio
Takahashi pointed out that U.S. extended deterrence commitments would not trigger U.S.
retaliation of North Korean “cheap-shot strike” missile raids in small numbers (1-2
missiles or more) conducted upon Japan (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan:
Deterrence and Military Transformation, 2012).26 Such sub-conflict behavior by North
Korea is but one possible example of North Korean coercion toward Japan placing the
onus for the defense—and deterrence—of such behavior upon Japan. Since North
Korea’s ballistic missiles provide the threatening foundation for its coercion strategy with
regional actors, Japan’s BMD—as a check upon that source of power—play an
instrumental role in Japan’s deterrence strategy toward North Korea.
Subsequent Chapters
The dissertation research was oriented around the central question of whether
Japan’s BMD deterred North Korea under general deterrence conditions. Unpacking the
Japan-North Korea relationship, and the specific question dealing with the role of Japan’s
BMD in deterrence, put a spotlight on the troubling international security and theoretic
issues described in the preceding paragraphs. The dissertation, therefore, is organized in
26
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the following manner: Chapter Two: History sets the stage for analysis of the deterrence
effects of Japan’s BMD by considering how the historical interaction between the two
actors informs their modern security challenge; Chapter Three: Literature Review, lays
the groundwork for understanding deterrence, how missile defenses might contribute—or
undermine—deterrence, and identifying core factors of an adversary needed to aid in
deterrence strategies; Chapter Four: Research Design, developed the details of how to
pursue researching the question and strengthening the confidence of the results; Chapter
Five: Strategic Profile – Part I, builds upon the information found in the literature review
for identifying core factors that matter in adversary decision-making and explores the
first two of three major sections including North Korea’s identity and cultural factors,
followed by KJI’s personal factors; Chapter Six: Strategic Profile – Part II, looks at the
third major section of North Korea’s core factors—environmental factors—and breaks
these into various internal environmental factors, such as economic and military
elements, and external environmental factors, such as diplomacy, trade, and relations
with other actors; Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis, provides statistical analysis
using empirical data for the entire 22-year period being examined and incorporates
qualitative data from the preceding chapters to aid analysis; and, Chapter Eight:
Conclusions, summarizes the research and analysis and its contributions to the literature,
and offers closing views for the future of Japan-North Korea relations and Japan’s
emerging threat—China. Each of these components was an essential piece to the research
and is introduced below, beginning with historical background.
Chapter Two: History
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Chapter Two: History provides essential background to the lengthy political
relationship between Japan and North Korea. The more recent post-Cold War dynamics
should be viewed in context of this long historical relationship, leading to the current
deterrence challenge. This chapter shows that cooperative, positive interaction has
occurred in their past as well as negative, conflictual interaction. This range of interaction
in the research provided early indications of what would need to be some rethinking on
general deterrence in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis. The dataset and
measurement criteria for Japan-North Korea behavioral interaction used in Chapter Seven
relied upon a wide scale of cooperative and conflictual interaction, contrary to the
traditional view of general deterrence, but much closer to the realities of the historical
relationship. Chapter Two also described briefly Japan’s imperial past and some of the
connections with the people of Korea. Beyond military occupation of the territory,
Japanese imperialism affected Korean culture, law, government, education, and involved
abuses of the people that affected their social and national psyche. Together, a deep and
abiding distrust of Japan developed that resonates among Koreans on both sides of the
border to this day and impacts both cooperative and conflictual interaction in their broad
political relationship.
This chapter also captures the divide of the peninsula and the beginnings of the
North Korean state led by its anti-Japanese fighter, Kim Il-Sung. Connections to Soviet
and Chinese communism aided the development of North Korea and the outcome of the
Korean War in the 1950s. The breakup of the Soviet Union—and loss of political and
financial support—around 1990 came in a period of North Korean decline. Increasingly
isolated, North Korea turned to a strategy of developing its own nuclear weapons
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capability to thwart would-be invaders and regime-changers (e.g., the U.S.) and a
coercive strategy aimed primarily at regional actors to maintain if not improve North
Korea’s regional position. The regional changes, and the U.S. preoccupation in the
Middle East, contributed to Japan’s political evolution from defeated and disarmed World
War II antagonist, to pacifist ally of the U.S, to its more recent rise in autonomy and
military capabilities including choices for its BMD program. These themes demonstrate
that the relationship between Japan and North Korea today is a continuation of the past in
many ways. This relationship includes cooperative and conflictual interactions,
suggesting a need to better understand one another—a need addressed, in part, in
Chapters Five and Six. These themes also describe the sources of their mutual distrust,
North Korean needs for strengthening its political sovereignty, and the North Korean
value of ballistic missiles. This background, then, set the scene for Japan’s BMD program
to emerge as in integral part of its deterrence relationship with North Korea and the
theoretic situation to be explored in the next chapter.
Chapter Three: Literature Review
Chapter Three: Literature Review is an important feature of the dissertation. It
begins by describing the evolution of deterrence thought and how deterrence has
experienced several “waves” of theoretic development. It was expected that since the
Japan-North Korea relationship over the past 20+ years being researched in the
dissertation was a general deterrence case, then unfolding general deterrence theory
would provide a clear framework to aid in understanding the Japan-North Korea
deterrence relationship and analytic ways to research the problem. But while some ideas
were found, the dissertation research intended to delve into behavioral interaction that
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could be counted, measured, and analyzed statistically to consider whether BMD affected
change in North Korean behavior indicative of deterrence being strengthened or
undermined. Even current writings on general deterrence were not of much utility. This
chapter also mapped the evolution of deterrence in context of changes in technology and
military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and missile defenses.
Doing so helped understand how the U.S. missile defense program evolved in primary
phases and informed identification of the four Japanese BMD periods address in Chapter
Seven: Quantitative Analysis. The nature of deterrence literature changed dramatically
with the end of the Cold War.27 This period was marked by the rise of regional actors—
including North Korea. One significant highlight was the regional conflict between a
U.S.-led coalition and Iraq in 1991 involving use of ballistic missiles and missile
defenses, thus reshaping the missile defense-deterrence reference point from arguments
solely about superpower balance of power to utility of missile defenses in conflict.
In addition to changes in weapons and warfare, scholars (and policymakers) once
free from the dominance in deterrence theory of the bipolar Cold War U.S.-Soviet
nuclear rivalry, recognized the need to provide greater fidelity in understanding of an
adversary, in recognition that deterrence had failed in some unexpected cases and that
individuals making national security decisions were informed in their decision-making by
emotions and other psychological factors not considered important by most who used the
simple, rational actor model of the Cold War era. Through this literature review, the
ingredients and organization of a deterrence-related adversary strategic profile emerged
27

See Stephen Cimbala’s study in 1989 on the debate of offenses versus defenses and implications for
deterrence. Like many other authors in this period no attention was provided to the contributions or
distractions of missile defenses to deterrence or to the impact of defenses in Asia, or implications for
individual states such as Japan (Cimbala, Strategic Impasse: Offense, Defense, and Deterrence Theory and
Practice, 1989).
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and was developed in Chapter Five: Strategic Profile – Part I and Chapter Six: Strategic
Profile – Part II, which were applied to offer insights in Chapter Seven: Quantitative
Analysis. These linkages are described further in Chapter Four: Research Design.
Chapter Four: Research Design
Chapter Four: Research Design showed how the research was ordered to try to
isolate the Japan-North Korea case and the research question under consideration. As
outlined in the design, this involved a brief review of the Japan-North Korea relationship,
including periods of Japanese interactions with peoples and kingdoms of the Korean
peninsula spanning over two millennia. This was done to provide context for the
dissertation’s research and analysis of the more recent period since the end of the Cold
War (found in Chapter Two: History). It also involved a thorough theoretic examination
of deterrence, missile defenses, and the interaction of the two (see Chapter Three:
Literature Review).
In order to answer the question of whether deterrence “worked” on North Korea
requires measuring change in the object of the deterrence strategy. In the case of the
dissertation—the subtleties of general deterrence conditions, having relatively modest
relational changes in the sub-conflict, even sub-crisis, situation between Japan and North
Korea—a measurable object was the behavior of North Korea toward Japan. This was in
keeping with Chapter Three: Literature Review which indicated deterrence was to be
aimed at influencing a state leadership as that state’s decision-maker, but that the
outcomes of their perceptions, thinking, and choices would be reflected primarily in their
state-level behavior. This type of behavior was captured using media reports of empirical
events and technologies for converting those reports into measurable data between Japan
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and North Korea. This technique allowed four basic criteria for deterrence effectiveness
to be identified that reflected the behavioral measures captured from the data, proving to
be an effective methodology. The results yielded some statistical findings indicating
Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence and undermined deterrence of North Korean
behavior in different BMD periods and in different ways. Qualitative data from the
strategic profile in Chapters Five and Six were then considered to help interpret the
statistical findings.
Chapters Five and Six: Strategic Profile
Contemporary deterrence literature strongly recommends a deeper understanding
of the one to be deterred and, to the degree possible, tailor your deterrence strategy the
things that matter to them in their decision-making. One approach to such an
understanding is through development of an adversary strategic profile, a qualitative
research endeavor that explores national, personal, and environmental factors important
to deterrence. The strategic profile was developed based upon the insights gleaned in
Chapter Three: Literature Review. Non-essential material dealing on North Korea was
not included. What remains is a detailed assembly of deterrence-related qualitative data
that, when properly ordered into its various factors and described, provides a broad
understanding of North Korea, its leaders, and their personal and national values. Thus,
one’s understanding of an adversary is not only internally consistent, but can be used
more effectively in helping to better understand the statistical results in Chapter Seven:
Quantitative Analysis. Research of the North Korea leadership indicates a pragmatic and
rational regime that ascribed to a value system consistent with its national history,
culture, and ideology. Unfortunately, the North Korean value system used by its leaders
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sees its people and neighbors instrumentally for the benefit of the regime and state.
Central to this view is securing state sovereignty and protection from intervention and
occupation—enduring problems of the past, including Japan’s imperial rule over Korea.
The military forces, particularly ballistic missiles and WMD, came to play a dominant
role. KJI responded to environmental influences—at least in his relations with Japan—
including the deterring effect of Japan’s BMD. The qualitative data in the strategic profile
provide many of the sources of KJI’s decisions and behavioral actions of North Korea
toward Japan.
A consequence of theoretic review of literature in Chapter Three, the strategic
profile organized the data on North Korea into three main categories: (1) North Korea’s
national identity and cultural values; (2) the personal factors of Kim Jong-Il (KJI); and,
(3) internal and external environmental factors. Because of the length of the material,
these three categories were divided into two separate chapters: Chapter Five: Strategic
Profile – Part I includes the first (identity and culture) and second (KJI) categories;
Chapter Six: Strategic Profile – Part II includes the environmental factors. Chapter Five
provides historical insights to North Korean national values and how those values might
inform the security-related beliefs of North Korea’s top leaders. Chapter Five also
provides the cognitive and psychological factors that informed KJI in the 22-year period
explored in the dissertation. Chapter Six examines the many internal and external
environmental factors of the North Korean state and the North Korean behavior that may
have resulted from KJI’s interpretation of those factors.
Importantly, these three categories do not simply describe division of material.
Rather, the categories are also related one with another: KJI, as the leader and decision-
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maker in North Korea, made decisions, in part, based upon his own style, worldview, and
psychological makeup (KJI’s personal factors); however, KJI was also a reflection of the
people, and the face of North Korea’s culture, history, and national values (identity and
culture); and, KJI was the one who ultimately interpreted the internal and external
environment and changes within environmental factors. For example, a North Korean
strategy that includes punishment of Japan for past grievances, such as terrorizing Japan
with ballistic missiles, exploiting Japanese citizens through capture and military utility, or
making demands for reparations, is also a reflection of national values and satisfies
emotive needs of North Korean people.28 Japan’s BMD, however, was a challenge to
North Korea and KJI personally. As interpreter of changes in the environment, KJI led
the North Korean responses to Japan’s BMD. These key relationships among the North
Korean factors, either separately or in combination, are reflected in North Korean
behavior resulting from the decisions made by the North Korean leader. And it is this
behavior that is captured as North Korean directional events toward Japan in the dataset
and used in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis.
Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis
The preceding chapters lead to Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis which
provided the statistical analysis of North Korean behavior toward Japan over a 22-year
period. When North Korea lost its Soviet sponsorship when it dissolved at the conclusion
of the Cold War, North Korea’s new security reality shaped its strategy trajectory for the
period since then. For this reason, and because statistical data were available, the dataset
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Reportedly, the North Koreans stipulated the need for a minimum of $10 billion, and possibly as much
as $20 billion from Japan. For its part, Japan may be willing to pay $5-10 billion (Manyin, 2002); page 3. By
comparison, the 1965 deal between Japan and South Korea was the equivalent of $3.4 billion to $20
billion, depending on just how one applies various calculations for inflations, etc. (page 5).
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started in 1990. The dataset was acquired from Dr. Doug Bond and VRA (Virtual
Research Associates) and included monthly data of state-level events for the period
January, 1990 through December, 2011. These data indicated: events that were
directional (for example, data were tagged as coming from North Korea and oriented
toward Japan); whether the events were cooperative/positive or conflictual/negative in
nature; the weight, or intensity of each cooperative-conflictual event using an event scale
provided by Joshua Goldstein; and, a total count of directional events each month for
each country. Thus both cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan
could be measured as either increasing or decreasing over time. North Korean
cooperative and conflictual behaviors toward Japan were the two dependent variables
assessed in the statistical analysis. Starting in 1990 not only captured North Korea’s
behavior after the Cold War era when it experienced greater independence, it also
allowed for a substantial period of time before Japan began its BMD program and,
therefore, an adjoining period absent BMD programmatic decisions in which statistical
comparison can be made.
The literature review of Chapter Three helped identify key BMD periods to
analyze, stemming from the similarities of the Japanese and U.S. missile defense systems
in terms of overall program development. These periods were then devised as key
independent variables used in the statistical analyses. Other control variables were also
developed to isolate the statistical effects of Japan’s BMD. These control variables
included: the cooperative and conflictual behavior of the U.S., China, and South Korea
toward North Korea, taken from the dataset; the periods of rapprochement between Japan
and North Korea; and, political parties in the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Various
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regression models were employed using these variables which analyzed Japan’s BMD.
Four criteria for deterrence effectiveness were created. These criteria reflected the four
possible outcomes of change in North Korean behavior toward Japan (increase or
decrease in cooperative behavior; increase or decrease in conflictual behavior)—that is,
North Korean behavioral change was conceived as either strengthening or undermining
deterrence in general deterrence conditions.
Though a few differences were noted, the qualitative data, mainly from Chapters
Five and Six, generally affirmed the statistical analysis. For example, the statistical
analysis suggested Japan’s BMD in the TD-2 period (early 2009 to the end of 2011)
correlated to reduction of conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, an effect also
suggested by the qualitative data including changes in North Korean ballistic missile
testing patterns in this time period. The findings indicated Japan’s BMD was a significant
factor in North Korean behavior toward Japan. This is not a surprise, given that BMD can
undermine the primary source of North Korea’s coercion strategy—its ballistic missiles.
What was interesting was how BMD affected North Korean behavior: it strengthened
deterrence in two periods, undermined deterrence in one period, and did not matter
statistically in one period; and, the two periods where deterrence was strengthened were
reflected in two different ways (increased cooperative, positive behavior toward Japan in
one period; decreased conflictual, negative behavior toward Japan in another period).
This shows the value of the models and the deterrence effectiveness criteria created for
applying these data to general deterrence situations. Other important findings were the
lack of impact of the U.S. in affecting either cooperative or conflictual North Korean
behavior toward Japan in any of the BMD periods, and only a modest role of China.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions
In Chapter Eight: Conclusions, the preceding analyses are summarized and
distilled further. Analysis of the four Japanese BMD periods, for example, portray
evolution of Japan’s BMD, but also changes in Japan’s capabilities over time and Japan’s
increasing political commitment, and national security stake for its own defense. The
results from the dissertation analysis indicate Japan’s BMD did deter North Korea. The
statistical analysis did not support BMD as strengthening deterrence in all four BMD
periods—indeed it was not significant at all in one of the four periods. This suggests, as
the missile defense-deterrence literature generally indicated, BMD can create both
positive and negative deterrence effects under different circumstances. It also showed that
deterrence effectiveness, as a reflection of North Korean cooperative and conflictual
behavior toward Japan, is not simply a binary question—did the adversary do undesirable
action X or did he refrain—as suggested by a DoD concept (U.S. Department of Defense,
2006). Nor is deterrence effectiveness simply a question of whether the adversary’s
conflictual behavior moderated. Rather, it can include increases or decreases in
cooperative behavior in addition to decreases in conflictual behavior. This addressed one
of the thornier theoretic and analytic gaps in deterrence: whether deterrence, as an
influence activity, can be evaluated in any way as to the success or positive impact of its
activities or, as Handberg argues, can only be “measured by its failure” (Handberg,
2002).29 Further, the period preceding Japan’s BMD program (1990-98) indicated
relatively low intensities of interaction between Japan and North Korea, suggesting the
North Korean priority was on developing nuclear weapons first, and then employing its
coercion strategy further. Chapter Eight also provides a brief review of many of the
29
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missile defense-deterrence theoretic arguments through the lens of the Japan-North Korea
case and the analyses provided in the mixed-methods approach. This review indicated
that many of the arguments were germane to the Japan-North Korea case.
Chapter Eight also revisits some of the deterrence-related IR theoretic challenges
or gaps, suggesting the dissertation played a role in narrowing those gaps somewhat. For
example, the challenge of deterring a regional “rogue” adversary was taken from a
completely different perspective. Rather than taking a U.S.-centric position, the
dissertation approach explored deterrence from Japan’s position, with its BMD as the
focus, in day-to-day conditions. The pervasive deterrence theoretic element of threat of
military retaliation was not of significant importance in this case. Secondly, the
dissertation provided a strategic profile of North Korea that incorporated and
consolidated the many ideas in the past 25 years on improving one’s understanding of an
adversary, not only to help explain his behavior, but to help deter and influence that
behavior in ways that include both cooperative and conflictual interactions. Third,
empirical analyses of general deterrence emphasized adversary decisions to go to war and
lacked granularity of adversary behavior over time. Empirical analyses of general
deterrence also lacked granularity in the role of BMD over time to contribute to general
deterrence. The dissertation addressed both of these through use of a mixed-method
approach. From this approach, four new criteria of assessing deterrence effectiveness in
general deterrence emerged, providing a repeatable methodology for assessment of
general deterrence over time. Having researched the Japan-North Korea deterrence
relationship, Chapter Eight also provides ideas for Japanese security in light of the key
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regional dynamics of uncertainty over North Korea’s future, a rising China, and
increasing Japanese autonomy. Japan’s BMD will play a central role in the future.
Conclusions
Japan has become more assertive and confident in regional affairs, a reflection of
greater autonomy for its own interests and security (Takesada, 2001).30 This autonomy,
or greater freedom of action, included such things as the sinking of a North Korean spy
ship in 2001 (Chanlett-Avery, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, 2011),31 pursuit of a UNSC
permanent seat, and a space program that could, with its BMD technological capacity,
provide Japan the option of converting its missiles into offensive ballistic missiles. For
Japan, rising autonomy may not be a choice as it projects into the future: the fate of the
North Korean regime, its weapons of mass destruction, even Korean unification, are also
serious concerns for Japan; disputes with China over territory rich in energy resources
adds significant risks to Japan; and, long-term projections indicating Japanese and U.S.
overall decline in the wake of the rise of China and India suggest the need for greater, not
less, Japanese autonomy in the out-years (National Intelligence Council, 2012). Japan’s
strategic choice of BMD provides a hedge against such weighty uncertainties.
Understanding the role of Japan’s BMD to deter North Korean behavior contributes to
the knowledge of North Korea and its behavior, missile defense-deterrence literature, and
the application of a mixed-methods approach to deterrence effectiveness in general
deterrence conditions over time employing empirical data. This could also aid in
exploring the future of Japan’s BMD in light of other regional challenges not too distant
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See the section entitled, “CHINA’S AND NORTH KOREA’S OPPOSITION.”
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on the time horizon—including deterring Chinese behavior—and the possible effects of
other BMD programs being considered in other regions of the world.32
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The U.S. sees ballistic missile proliferation worsening (Missile Defense Agency, 2012); see the first
paragraph; NATO does as well (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012); see Section I, paragraph 4.
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY
Japan’s missile defense is an essential instrument of Japanese power and
influence. Further, this recent development must be considered in light of its increasing
independence and in the historical context of regional and global international relations.
Below is a brief review of the highlights of regional events and considerations intended to
acknowledge some of the larger and recurring issues in Northeast Asia security as context
for the dissertation topic.33
Regional History
Imperialism
In the thread of Northeast Asia security, one of the more significant factors that
emerged in modern history is the impact of imperialism within broader Asia. According
to Dower, imperialism “defined” 20th Century Asia, and Japan’s imperial exploits
followed that of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States (Dower, 1999).34
For example, from 1839-42, Britain battled with China in the Opium War gaining special
privileges (which expanded later to the U.S. and France) and control over key Chinese
ports along it coast including Hong Kong. In 1854, the U.S. forced Japan to open trade
relations (Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics: People's Power,
Preferences, and Perceptions, 2003).35 Japan, likewise, pursued its own imperial path
including the colonization of Korea.
Japan’s Imperial Past.
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Japan’s imperial conquest was expansive and impacted many regions.36 The
empire covered, often by military force and war, much of Northeast Asia, including
Korea, the islands of Hokkaido, Okinawa, and Sakhalin; Southeast Asia, including
Taiwan, Micronesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma; and parts of
Manchuria, eastern China. China was large but its military was no match for Japan’s
organized, trained, and modernly equipped forces (Masselos, 2010).37 However, its
encroachment upon its subjects went beyond material exploitation to attempts at cultural
transformation. One of the most profound areas of impact was Korea—an historical
period that influence Japan-North Korea relations to this day.
The two key slogans for Japan’s imperial period, also known as the Meiji
Restoration, lasting from 1868-1945, were: “a rich country, strong army;” and, “Japanese
spirit, Western techniques” (Masselos, 2010).38 The former connected the need for
economic cooperation with Japan’s colonies, if not outright theft of their resources and
forcible use of their people for labor, to growth of Japan’s military forces. The latter
connected Japan’s unique position as an Asian imperialist power with selective practices
observed by Western powers in Asia.
Part of the impact of Japan’s imperialism was its smothering effect politically,
culturally, and militarily. In 1875-6, Japan forced the Korean government to sign the
Kanghwa Treaty, the beginning of the end of Korean sovereignty, through “gunboat
diplomacy,” a type of action Japan copied from the United States. As Japanese
imperialism over Korea expanded, Japan justified its actions, including extensive

36
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assimilation practices, by “protecting” Korea from China, teaching Korea, and serving as
Korea’s cultural “doctor.” Over time, Japan replaced Korea’s cultural and political
institutions, their religious symbols, language, formal dress attire, food, and education
(Caprio, 2009).39 Japanese troops assassinated the Korean queen in Seoul in 1897 (Shin,
Park, & Yang, Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The
Korean Experience, 2007).40
One of Japan’s greatest grievances during this military buildup was the forcible
taking of thousands of young women, including Koreans, as “comfort women” to provide
sex to Japan’s military personnel (Dower, 1999).41 Many of these women were raped in
proximity to the battlefield or brought to military quarters and kept as sex slaves. A
reasonable total number of such women is 50,000 (higher estimates go to 400,000). The
number of just Korean women is in the tens of thousands, all facilitated by Japan’s
colonial presence and force (Soh, 2008).42
Japan also forced military mobilization of Korean and Formosan subjects during
its preparations for World War II (WWII). Hundreds of thousands of Koreans were
brought to Japan during WWII, not only for “comfort women,” but to serve in Japan’s
armed forces and as a labor pool for Japan’s industries. By war’s end over two million
stateless Koreans resided in Japan, though this number fell significantly as many returned
to Korea after war. It took decades to overcome loss of rights, insurance, and veterans’
pensions. Racial friction with Japan’s “expatriate community” continues (Ryang,
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Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin, 2000).43 Japan’s reach included
takeover of Korea’s judiciary system, police, and prison system, and included extensive
use of flogging prisoners (Dudden, 2006).44 Japan’s imperialist practices also included
censorship and use of locals, including artists, for its rampant propaganda measures
(Mayo & Rimer, 2001).45 One of the most notorious and violent events of Japan’s
imperial action to control China (ultimately proving unsuccessful) was its 1937 “Rape of
Nanjing” where Japanese soldiers captured the capital of rebel Chiang Kai-shek and
killed 200,000 people in a large-scale atrocity (Masselos, 2010).46
World War II and its Aftermath
Imperialism intertwined the economic, political, and military forces of East and
West, ultimately leading to World War II and the end of the imperial era in Asia. As the
war ended, new realities, including the rising Communist threat and the Cold War,
emerged concerning regional security, resulting in long-term U.S. commitment in the
region and the Korean War. A few historical events are highlighted below along with
post-Cold War issues.
United States.
U.S. commitment to South Korea included leadership in the Korean War and
placement of nuclear weapons on South Korean soil (later removed) in response to
threats it perceived from Communist nations. Following the Cold War, the U.S.
redirected its regional commitments as regional threats, such as Iraq, dominated U.S.
attention. This included addressing the rising ballistic missile threat by North Korea and
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others. However, this has not been a smooth security transition as the U.S. sought to
address ballistic missile threats, rising proliferation and maintain regional alliances. For
example, Burns argued the U.S. national missile defense system was focused on
defending against North Korean and Iranian missile threats and, therefore, dissuading
them from ballistic missile proliferation. However, this strategy failed with North Korea
as it continued to pursue a nuclear weapons capability and missile technology did not
abate, possibly fearing regime change. North Korean nuclear and missile tests ensued,
leading to Japanese choices on BMD (Burns, 2010).47 In other words, Japan was most
afraid of aggressive U.S. actions initiated toward North Korea in its new post-Cold War
power projection role that could embroil Japan as a potential target of North Korean
ballistic missiles. However, in recent years the trend has been toward allied uncertainty
over U.S. credibility.48
Russia.
Russia’s role in Northeast Asia has been less prominent especially since the Cold
War ended. According to Victor Cha, Russia has the least amount of influence over North
Korea of all regional actors, sharing a common border of only 12 miles. At one point,
Russia represented North Korea’s top trading partner. A former Communist sponsor of
47

Pages 95-6. To avoid the same outcome as North Korea, U.S. missile defense strategy in Europe,
therefore, would need to present the U.S., through NATO, as a “bigger” defensive influence over Iran’s
emerging nuclear and ballistic missile threats.
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For example, the new NATO Strategic Concept may have been viewed by Japan “as another example of
the American retreat from its global commitments.” Japan was following NATO deterrence development
closely apparently fearful that perceptions of U.S. weakness or retreat in Europe might suggest Japan take
a greater role for its own security. The IFPA report also notes that President Bush and his National
Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, both affirmed U.S. nuclear weapons use was not an acceptable policy
response to Iraqi use of WMD (Davis, Pfaltzgraff, Perry, & Schoff, 2009); page 18. This, too, may have
reduced U.S. credibility both in the eyes of North Korea and Japan, incentivizing Japan to develop
increased defense and deterrence capabilities of its own. See page 15 and footnote 9. Further, according
to Swaine, et al, Japan’s pursuit of BMD has implications for the “reliability of U.S. deterrence” and the
U.S.-Japan alliance, especially since Japan strongly desires a more autonomous role (Swaine, Swanger, &
Kawakami, 2001); pages xiv-xv and xvii.
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North Korea, economic aid from Russia (then the Soviet Union) ended around 1987.49 As
the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union retracted its security guarantees over North Korea,
all but ceased trade and economic aid, and in 1990 normalized relations with South Korea
and began economic ties with the ROK (Kawashima, 2005).50 North Korean leader, Kim
Jong-Il (KJI) viewed this as a breach of trust and, in his discussions with Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Pyongyang, threatened to develop his own nuclear
weapons in lieu of an alliance-based deterrent from Moscow. Eleven years later KJI
traveled to Moscow and smoothed over relations with President Putin, reportedly turning
back to the idea of trust and sincerity over diplomacy and partnerships between the two
countries, stating “I don’t want to be a ‘partner.’ You don’t say ‘partner’ with friends”
(Cha V. , 2012).51 Today, Russia holds nearly $9 billion of North Korea’s total $12.5
billion debt load (Cha V. , 2012).52 Relations with North Korea center on the prospects of
railway connections and a gas pipeline from Russia across the Korean Peninsula (Cha V.
, 2012).53
China.
While China did not develop industrially or technologically as fast as the Soviet
Union did following WWII, China had rising interests in the region. With the collapse of
imperialist strongholds, and having fought its own civil war, China was keen to avoid any
use of the Korean Peninsula as a path to invasion again as Japan had done. Having a long
border with North Korea, and much of its industrial capacity centered near that border,
China was willing to pay significant costs to prevent adversaries from positioning
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themselves on its border in North Korea. For this reason, it was willing to embroil itself
in the Korean War. As evidenced by its normalization of relations with Japan and South
Korea, China is interested in balancing its support to North Korea with stable relations
with the U.S. and Japan, though it has used its increasing regional and international clout
to pressure the U.S. and others (Clough, 1976).54 Today, China provides North Korea aid
to try to maintain a semblance of stability. However, China’s primary motivation to
continue a large-scale economic predator-like “extraction” policy of North Korean
natural resources and minerals to facilitate Chinese development. One study places the
value of North Korean mineral deposits—which include iron, copper, coal, limestone,
molybdenum, and magnesite—as 140 times its GDP (Cha V. , 2012).55
Republic of Korea.
The Republic of Korea (ROK), also named South Korea, rose from the events of
WWII weak, ideologically separate from the North, and fraught with internal instability.
Democracy and economic strength did not emerge for nearly three decades. More
recently, ROK has emerged strong and confident, reflecting a greater sense of
nationalism as it considers its own security interests (Perry & Yoshihara, The U.S.-Japan
Alliance: Preparing for Korean Reconciliation & Beyond, 2003).56 For example, under
President Kim Dae-Jung, South Korea pursued a “sunshine policy” with North Korea in
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the 1990s, seeking to moderate its behavior (Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy:
Japan and the Great Powers, 2006).57
The threat from North Korea, including vast numbers of ballistic missiles,
however, remains a key security concern for South Korea. Victor Cha, for example,
suggests in wartime the ROK could be faced with a threat of 600 Scud missiles attacking
various targets in the South with chemical weapons, including airports, train stations, and
sea ports to deny civilians escape routes from Seoul and other metro areas (Cha V. ,
2012).58 South Korean strategy has been to advance its BMD capabilities and, unlike
Japan, deploy and strengthen its offensive ballistic missile force capable of reaching
most, if not all, targets in North Korea. Proximity of Seoul, the ROK capital, to North
Korean territory and threatening missiles places great stress upon the ROK government
and pursuit of technical remedies to defend itself.59 Today ROK is in a similar situation to
Japan in some respects, such as maintenance of an alliance with the United States.
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Japan normalized relations with ROK in 1965 and pledged $500 million in
colonial period restitution payments over a 10-year period (Kawashima, 2005).60 Because
of the dual alliances the U.S. has with Japan and ROK, Japan seeks to maintain favorable
relations with ROK (Rozman, Togo, & Ferguson, Japanese Strategic Thought toward
Asia, 2007).61 Without question a complex relationship, Japan’s BMD activities could be
viewed as an important avenue for military-related information or training exchanges
between Japan and ROK as both face ballistic missile threats from North Korea.
North Korea.
Ironically, it was North Korea that emerged from WWII as “the most
industrialized and urbanized Asian country” stemming in large part to Japan’s industrial
foundations laid in its occupation of Korea prior to the war. When the war ended, the vast
majority of mining, heavy industry, and electricity capacity lie in the North. Liberated by
the U.S. and USSR, Korea split between camps loyal to each. As a leader of the antiJapanese guerilla campaign, Kim Il-Sung became the leader of the North, having aligned
himself with the Soviet Union. In the South, many of those who collaborated with Japan
were utilized in the U.S. occupation and administration of the South, a fact not lost on
North Korean propagandists. Many of the advantages disappeared following the Korean
War and the toll taken on North Korea. Soviet infusion of funding and technology helped
keep North Korea ahead of the South until the 1970s when technology and trade began to
pass Communist trading partners. By the 1980s South Korean modernization took hold
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and key indicators reversed (Cha V. , 2012).62 By the 1990s military capabilities, too,
began serious decline in North Korea.
North Korea emerged in the early post-Cold War period facing near-complete
isolation, unlike South Korea with normalized relations with the Soviet Union in 1990
and China in 1992. North Korea sought to avoid such isolation and rebalance itself by
seeking to establish ties with the U.S. and Japan. Mutual mistrust among the parties
involved left North Korea in a political stalemate (Rozman, Togo, & Ferguson, Japanese
Strategic Thought toward Asia, 2007).63
Japan.
Japan, too, was looking ahead to its security interests, even before the end of the
war. For example, as WWII progressed, Japan began negotiations with the U.S. for a
peace agreement, instead of unconditional surrender, in which Japan would retain its
imperial control over Korea and Taiwan. Its strategy was not only to retain its external
sources of power, but to convince the U.S. and the West that a strong Japan was essential
to thwarting Soviet and Communist expansion, a worry shared in Washington. The
Soviets objected to such negotiations and this strategy proved futile in the end (Chol,
2004).64 Like others, Japan suffered significant losses by war’s end including: 2.7 million
dead (3-4% of Japan’s wartime population); millions more wounded or injured; loss of
65% of Tokyo’s homes; and, destruction of a third of the national wealth (Dower,
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1999).65 Further, after years of rethinking in the postwar period many in Japan’s political
circles ask, “Can Japan survive?” (Curtis, 1999).66 It is also not surprising the worth
Japan ascribes to defenses.
Ralph Clough, in his reassessment of the security situation in Northeast Asia
following the conclusion of the Vietnam War, reminded readers that U.S. forces,
including its tactical nuclear weapons, were placed in South Korea principally as a
deterrent against Chinese, not North Korean, military intervention (Clough, 1976).67
However, and importantly for the dissertation, he also stated, and U.S. and Japanese
leaders publically declared, that U.S. forces were needed in South Korea principally
because of the U.S. need to address Japanese security concerns. Japan has sensed
insecurity stemming from Korea since the time Japan engaged in conflict with China and
Russia and occupied the Korean peninsula near the turn of the 19th century. This
insecurity persisted if not increased after Japan’s surrender following World War II.
Under those circumstances, Japan was unable to influence the regional security
conditions in its favor, in part due to constitutional limitations on its use of military forces
imposed by the U.S. as occupier. Japan viewed its alliance with the U.S. as designed to
prevent a hostile power from threatening Japan through Korea. In other words, Japan
supports South Korean defense as a way to protect its own homeland (Clough, 1976).68
The increasing threat from North Korea later on, coupled with a heightened need
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domestically for greater autonomy in providing security for its own sovereignty, led
Japan to pursue other avenues of “influence” including BMD capabilities.
Neighborhood Dangers
Ballistic Missiles and WMD
Proliferation of ballistic missiles by regional actors is problematic as they develop
or acquire them as a new technological military tool to span great distances in which
parties are often separated by oceans or great distances. The ballistic missile proliferation
problem is a significant one. For example, in 1972, there were nine countries with
ballistic missiles (including the U.S.). By 2006 that number had swelled to 25 states with
ballistic missiles (Missile Defense Agency, 2009).69 Further, there are now nearly 6,000
ballistic missiles in the world (not even counting those in the U.S., NATO, Russia, and
China), with over 1,200 ballistic missiles fielded just since 2006 (Missile Defense
Agency, 2012).70 North Korea may have as many as 800 ballistic missiles in the field or
ready to be deployed (Scobell & Sanford, North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's
Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 2007).71
Further, North Korea continues to be the world’s leader in ballistic missile proliferation
(Samson, 2010).72
The Japan-North Korea relationship also lies in context of the advent and
proliferation of nuclear weapons following WWII, as well as chemical and biological
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weapons in the region. Of the key players in the Northeast Asia region, several, including
the U.S., Russia, China, and more recently, North Korea all possess nuclear weapons
though the number of weapons North Korea possess is relatively low, perhaps less than
twenty. Other regional states, including Taiwan and South Korea have explored the
development of nuclear weapons in the past. Further, nuclear use by the U.S. was
potentially a decision factor in the Korean War, and the prospect of nuclear weapons
being introduced in wartime scenarios is an ever-present danger. While Japan and U.S.
territory is separated from the other regional actors by bodies of water, the proximity and
potential stakes of these actors raises the risks of escalation stemming from North Korean
provocation or miscalculation.73
North Korea’s Pattern of Provocation
For years, both during the Cold War and in the two decades since its end, North
Korea has engaged in behavior, sometimes using violence, that many describe as
provocative, to serve its domestic purposes or incite reactions of some kind. Kawashima
characterized North Korean behavior as “destabilizing” (Kawashima, 2005).74 The
following is not a comprehensive list, but illustrative of the political and military nature
of North Korean provocations, including some affecting Japan. Some examples include:
(1) withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and (2) cruise missile
tests over the Sea of Japan (Perry & Yoshihara, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Preparing for
73
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Korean Reconciliation & Beyond, 2003);75 (3) development of a variety of ballistic
missiles; (4) development and possession of nuclear weapons and other forms of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD); (5) the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel killing
dozens; (6) artillery attacks on South Korea; (7) conducting nuclear tests, with
radioactive debris falling near Japan; (8) ballistic missile flights toward/over Japan; (9)
proliferation of missiles, nuclear technologies, and other military capabilities; (10)
abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s (Kawashima, 2005);76 (11) armed
naval intrusions into Japanese territorial waters (Kawashima, 2005);77 (12) North Korean
capture and imprisonment of two Japanese fishermen in the mid-1980s (Kawashima,
2005);78 and, (13) the sinking in 2001 of a North Korean ship by the Japanese Coast
Guard (Chanlett-Avery, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, 2011).79
Security strategies have been tried, and are ongoing, to try to modify North
Korean behavior, such as: Six-Party Talks to curb North Korean nuclear weapons
development; the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to curb external proliferation
activity; and trade, finance, and direct investment sanctions and carrots. Ballistic missiles
present one of the biggest threats as they offer North Korea a cover for other
provocations. Japan’s response has been the development and deployment of missile
defense capabilities to offset North Korea’s extensive ballistic missile threat as a strategic
choice to deter North Korea, influence its pattern of provocative behavior, and defend
itself if needed.
Consequences
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Sentiments of Japan’s imperial legacy in the region remain, often in raw
exhibition such as arguments or demonstrations over textbook historical interpretations or
Japanese leadership visits to shrines to honor its war dead. Japan was a source of
imperialism and the conflict that it wrought in WWII. Today, both North Korea and
Japan are living with these consequences. As the Cold War ended, North Korea found
itself isolated and in decline; Japan found itself on the rise and increasingly autonomous.
As Japan steadily grew in autonomy in the post-Cold War period, one consideration is the
effect of Japan’s autonomy with respect to stable relations with North Korea and the
threats North Korea presents.
Japan-North Korea Relations80
The role of Japan’s missile defenses upon North Korean behavior lies in context
of their broader political relationship. Domestically, philosophical perspectives shape
Japan’s views on its security. Japanese pacifists argue Japan has only been invaded once
(12th Century) and reject the notion of deterrence, whether it relies on the U.S., Japanese
forces, or a mix of the two. Realists, on the other hand, argue lessons of European history
suggest Japan must take its security seriously, and effective deterrence and stronger
military capabilities are best. National polls favor the latter (Kawashima, 2005).81
Generally, Japanese perceptions of the North Korean threat have risen steadily. Polling
showed rising animosity among Japan’s population toward North Korea, from 44% in the
1990s to 79% in 2005 (Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis:
Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States, 2011).82

80

Much more on North Korean perspectives will be covered in Chapters Five and Six, two entire chapters
dedicated to understanding North Korea, as the deterree; emphasis here is upon Japan as deterrer.
81
Page 9.
82
Page 172.

43

Politically, Japan has addressed the security challenges posed by North Korea on
various levels: bilaterally, including the prospects of normalization; trilaterally, in
conjunction with the U.S. and ROK; and multilaterally with many players such as the
Six-Party Talks (Armstrong, Rozman, Kim, & Kotkin, 2006).83 Recently, Victor Cha
argued that, despite the dangers, Japan exhibits a guarded optimism in nurturing a
cooperative relationship with North Korea as opposed to a heavy-handed one. Further,
Japan seeks a peaceful outcome on the Korean Peninsula with a state friendly to Japan. A
proactive approach appears its best alternative and, if successful, has the potential to
provide a long-term hedge against China (Sokolski, 2005).84 Japan’s BMD plays a
prominent role in “effective” deterrence and has strengthened its hand diplomatically
with North Korea, China, and others.
Historical Interaction
Japan has had a long, historic relationship with the peoples of the Korean
Peninsula. Like its modern relations with North Korea, Japan’s relations with Korea have
been marked by both cooperative and confrontational, or conflictual interactions. Cultural
and economic interaction has existed between various regional leaders of Japan, China,
and Korea for two millennia. Japan was essentially on the outer periphery of an
international trade network between China and others. Interaction, especially trade,
gradually shifted from simple assimilation of foreign techniques, to importation, to heavy
exports by the 14th Century (von Verschuer, 2006).85 Trade included an extensive amount
of silver from Japan’s Tsushima district to Korea for their use in trade with China—an
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activity described as a “Silver Road” (Kim Y. , Korea and Japan: The Clash of
Worldviews, 1868-1876, 2006).86
Japan attempted to invade the Korean Peninsula in the 16th Century, a fact not lost
on Korean views of Japan to this day. On the other hand, the Kingdom of Korea
maintained cooperative relations with Japan for nearly 300 years following that event.
With modernization efforts in mind, and observations of imperialism of others in the
region, Japan’s Meiji government began movement toward Japanese imperial expansion.
Militarily armed, Japan clashed with China over Korea in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War
and later, in 1904, with Russia over Korea and Manchuria. This led to Japan’s annexation
of Korea in 1910 and years of Korean humiliation (Kawashima, 2005).87 The Cold War
was the dominant framework for the years following WWII and the end of imperial
domination. As the Cold War ended, significant shifts occurred and it is at this juncture
the dissertation begins emphasis.
Post-Cold War Period
While the Cold War came and went, repatriation of Koreans living in Japan back
to North and South Korea occurred in context of “Asia’s Cold War,” something not yet
settled. For example, in the 2002 summit between North Korea and Japan in Pyongyang,
one part of the forthcoming Pyongyang Declaration was agreement to “sincerely discuss
the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan.” Furthermore, there was the more
recent issue of 13 Japanese civilians captured by North Korean agents in the 1970s and
1980s and taken there to train their spies. This issue did not unfold until the late 1990s.
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The summit acknowledged this issue but it remains unsettled and a great source of
consternation in Japan (Morris-Suzuki, 2007).88 More broadly, Japan has not yet settled
its imperial past with North Korea despite having done so with Taiwan in 1952, ROK in
1965, and China in 1972 (Shin, Park, & Yang, Rethinking Historical Injustice and
Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience, 2007).89
As Japan’s security evolved, it was faced with three overall policy choices: rely
wholly upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella to manage threats; depend increasingly upon its
own capabilities, including BMD; or, develop its own offensive nuclear weapons
capability (Perry, Davis, Schoff, & Yoshihara, 2004).90 Yutaka Kawashima argued
another option was available: present North Korea with a “grand bargain” of peace in
exchange for supporting the regime, an option not palatable by many (Kawashima,
2005).91 Following the 1998 surprise North Korean missile launch over Japan, Japan’s
approach was to acknowledge the threat and address it methodically through BMD and
other activities, but also to engage North Korea politically in a positive way to reduce
danger (Rozman, Togo, & Ferguson, Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia, 2007).92
Japan chose BMD, at least for the near-term.
The Japan-North Korea relationship intersects important factors summarized
below. These security factors also resonate with Japan’s thinking in terms of choices
made for research, development, acquisition and production, and deployment of its BMD
system. They include: (1) the U.S.-Japan Alliance; (2) Japan’s increasing sense of
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independence and autonomy; (3) efforts between Japan and North Korea at political
rapprochement; and, (4) the rise of the North Korean threat to Japan.
U.S.-Japan Alliance.
Japan struggles to define itself from a strategic culture perspective. Most seem to
desire to guide Japan toward becoming a “normal country” free from its historical past,
particularly its colonial, occupation, and wartime records. To do that, some, such as
conservatives, justify militarization with regional threats, content to follow U.S. political
leadership within the alliance structure—for now. Liberals within Japan, however, think
it best to normalize political relations with North Korea and pursue regional
reconciliation (Pollack J. D., Korea: The East Asian Pivot, 2004).93 Without doubt, BMD
strategies can serve both interests.
The Alliance between the U.S. and Japan is important to both parties. The mutual
security arrangement between the U.S. and Japan in the form of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty provides for Japan’s defense by the United States. The treaty, which provides for
access of U.S. military forces to Japan, is limited to U.S. aid in the event of “armed
attack;” Japan carries no such commitment to aid the U.S. in case the U.S. was attacked
(Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1960).94 The treaty was
principally an outcome of the Cold War and anti-Soviet expansion though potential
adversaries were not named in the treaty. With the Cold War’s end, the security focus
shifted to regional threats like North Korea and WMD (Kawashima, 2005).95
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Redefining the post-Cold War threat by the U.S. and Japan, Japan experiencing
partial freedom from its war guilt, and Japanese maturation (including its own economic
and military capabilities) have placed the security relationship under some stress and
raised some question as to the future role of the formal defense treaty. For example, in the
1990s, when Japan’s economy was rapidly expanding, some suggest the U.S. began to
view Japan with suspicion and as a threat to the U.S. (Rozman, Togo, & Ferguson,
Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia, 2007).96 Additionally, gaps in security
affiliation were revealed in the financial (not military) support Japan ultimately provided
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2002).97 Still others argue
the Alliance can actually get in the way, such as the Koizumi-Kim summit in August
2002. This event, part of Japan’s efforts at political normalization with North Korea, ran
counter to U.S. policy at that time (Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: Japan
and the Great Powers, 2006).98
The U.S. also provides extended deterrence for Japan by threatening to punish
nuclear attacks upon Japan with U.S. nuclear retaliation. Ken Jimbo argued the credibility
of U.S. extended deterrence to Japan, too, was fragile. In this case, and in light of threats
from North Korea, Japan would rely upon its own BMD and, if necessary, develop its
own conventional military capabilities, options other regional actors do not welcome.
Japan would not, however, likely “go nuclear” in Jimbo’s view (Self & Thompson,
2003).99 Still others argue Japan should go nuclear to contain the North Korean threat.100
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Japan’s Increasing Independence
Cultural, economic, and political factors have been driving Japan toward greater
autonomy and independence since WWII. Culturally, Dower argues Japan experienced a
“forced Americanization” following its own colonial experience and defeat in WWII, a
feature of Japanese culture that added to national disgrace and impacted national identity
(Dower, 1999).101 Japan also finds itself entrapped by its past in some respects, though
there is a growing belief Japan has been forced to abide by standards no other nation has
faced and must somehow escape its postwar “legacy of subordinate independence”
(Dower, 1999).102 Still alive through the Alliance structure, these psychological features
may help explain Japan’s partial willingness to avoid complete dependence on the U.S.
for its security.
In fact, Japan’s security position has changed markedly since its period of
weakness following WWII: its economy is one of the world’s strongest; its technology
base is of global stature; and, its leadership role in the region on political and economic
issues continues to rise (Green & Cronin, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and
Future, 1999).103 Richard Samuels argued Japan’s strategic culture is now marked by
moves to a grand strategy “based on respect.” More than simply autonomous, Japan’s
emergence in the new security environment means its junior status with the U.S. itself
policy and technical self-restraints which should allay fear of a Japanese nuclear breakout: transparency in
international inspection and safeguards; storing of most surplus plutonium overseas; lack of technical
expertise in bomb or warhead design; and, overlapping policy bodies to police each other (Self &
Thompson, 2003); page 176. See also: (Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin, Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate,
Prospects, and U.S. Interests, 2009). It must also be remembered that Japan, like other states in the
international system, has an inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
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may have fundamentally shifted, a partnership he suggests “may be slipping into history”
(Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 2008).104
BMD, while serving political purposes with Japan’s relationship with the U.S., is also an
important part of Japan’s overall interest in recreating an autonomous military industrial
complex following WWII (Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army:" National Security and
the Technological Transformation of Japan, 1994).105
For these reasons Japan today reflects a much more assertive political and military
posture. Kenneth Pyle, for example, identified several ways in which Japan, since the end
of the Cold War, adapted itself to the new security environment. These include: (1)
ending a ban on overseas deployment of its forces allowing, for example, deployment of
noncombat troops to Cambodia in 1992; (2) easing of the long-held narrow constitutional
interpretation of Article 9 banning collective self-defense activities, permitting
deployment of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq; (3) acquisition of power-projection
capabilities such as air refueling Boeing 767 tankers; (4) breaking of the taboo of
discussion of acquisition of nuclear weapons; (5) breaking of the prohibition of sharing
military technology and exporting arms through acquisition of BMD capabilities from the
U.S. but then sharing related advanced technology; (6) growing its defense spending;
though officially about 1% of GDP, Japan has masked its military spending throughout
the budget and it could now be the world’s third or fourth largest; (7) abandoning
104
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prohibition of the military use of space, including decisions to deploy reconnaissance
satellites in 2003; and, (8) make other institutional changes beyond easing Article 9
interpretation, such as enlarging the role of the office of prime minister in defense issues;
the passing of many new laws to afford more nimble crisis management in case of attack
or crises; and, raising the Defense Agency to ministry status, with a new headquarters
complex built upon the original site of Japan’s Imperial War Ministry (Pyle, 2007).106
Japan’s autonomous rise is also reflected in how it carries itself in its relationship
with North Korea, China, and in international organizations. For example, Linus
Hagstrom and Marie Soderberg argue Japan has since the early 1990s pursued an
autonomous strategy toward North Korea, acting in the post-Cold War period out of
concern for its own security interests and in light of regional changes. Japan was
essentially becoming a “normal” military power and this was showing itself with North
Korea. Japan has also threatened to cut funding to the UN unless it is elected a permanent
member of the Security Council (Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: Japan and
the Great Powers, 2006).107 Economically, Japan interacts with key actors, including
potential U.S. adversaries, such as Iran and China, to guard against what Japan sees as
economic threats, suggesting Japan’s willingness to depart from U.S. interests to protect
its own in the future is rising (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2002).108 The U.S., for its part,
has had to work to allay fears in China and ROK that Japan’s emergence will not be a
militarily assertive one (Menon, 2007).109 Japan’s BMD specifically faces strong
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opposition by China, citing fears it undermines its nuclear deterrent capabilities (Cossa,
Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partnership, 1997).110
Rapprochement.
Japan seems to have taken a long-term political approach in its relational
strategies with North Korea, particularly since the end of the Cold War. This reflects the
preferred deterrence approach advocated by George and Smoke. They argued deterrence
can be described in short-term (crisis) problems and long-term influence strategies
between two actors seeking to coexist. The deterrer, they argued, should seek to guide
change between the two actors in a favorable political direction rather than existing in a
perpetual deterrence relationship. Rapprochement and political normalization is a
reflection of this reality for Japan (George & Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign
Policy: Theory and Practice, 1974).111
Near the end of the Cold War it was North Korea that proposed normalization of
relations with Japan in late 1990, presumably after losing political and economic support
from the failing Soviet Union. North Korea expected compensation for Japan’s colonial
past, as it had done with South Korea. The ROK objected, fearing a large infusion of
funds would merely fuel North Korean military capabilities and alter the balance of
power on the peninsula much more in North Korea’s favor (Kawashima, 2005).112 That
deal fell through, as did attempts in subsequent years. The key stumbling block
surrounded money—an instructive lesson for North Korean coercive use of its ballistic
missile activities to exploit Japan and others. Reconciliation stalled due to North Korean
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demands for financial compensation, specifically on four counts: for Japan’s colonial
rule; for Japan’s WWII war reparations; for losses North Korea incurred when Japan
normalized relations with ROK; and, damages North Korea incurred due to Japan’s
complicity during the Korean War (Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: Japan
and the Great Powers, 2006).113 It is difficult to assess what the total amount of all of
these demands would be, but the figure would be many billion dollars.
A deal appeared closer in 2002. An executive-level summit emerged in
Pyongyang on 17 September 2002, producing: the Pyongyang Declaration; Japan
apologizing for colonial suffering; the waiving of all colonial-era claims; KJI personally
apologizing for abductions; and North Korean agreement to extend a missile testing
moratorium (started in 1999). A second summit between KJI and Prime Minister
Koizumi occurred in Pyongyang on 22 May 2004. The moratorium was extended and
North Korea released family members of two abductees; Japan agreed to provide food
and health aid. But this exchange did not play well in Japanese domestic politics
(Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: Japan and the Great Powers, 2006).114 No
significant measures since then have furthered the political process of rapprochement,
though this is clearly Japan’s long-term preference.
Rise of North Korean Threat to Japan.115
The threats from North Korea to Japan stem from its ability to deliver munitions
via ballistic missiles in minutes and how they use that capability to coerce. Being able to
do so, and testing the missiles in provocative ways, can create a range of threatening
effects: instilling fear among its population; coercing Japan to concede an economic or
113

Pages 14 and 22.
Pages 24-6.
115
Again, more information on North Korea’s capabilities will be provided in Chapters Five and Six.
114

53

political benefit; provoke a response favorable to North Korea domestically or in its
relations with China; to punish it for past grievances; or, to exploit its vulnerability to
being drawn into a conflict between North Korea and the U.S. and incurring grave
consequences as a result. North Korea’s ballistic missiles lie at the center of its threat
because it can use these directly to threaten, or as an escalatory tool.
Regarding North Korea’s ballistic missile threat, Victoria Samson argues North
Korea’s main threat to Japan and the U.S. stems from its short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), not its intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) class Taepodong. These include 500 Scud B and C model SRBMs and
320 Nodong MRBMs, the latter of which is WMD-capable (including nuclear-armed)
and can range Japan but cannot be intercepted by the U.S. homeland-defending
interceptors in Alaska and California (nor were the U.S. interceptors designed for these
range missiles). She further suggests North Korean missiles, because they have poor
accuracy, are likely planned more as “shock” weapons than precision weapons. North
Korea continues to be the world’s leader in ballistic missile proliferation (Samson,
2010).116
But even conventionally-armed ballistic missiles are a threat to Japan given North
Korea’s intentions to use them for coercive purposes. Robin Ranger recognized
conventional ballistic missiles were a strategic threat because of their very significant
political effect upon the one attacked (especially if civilian casualties occur) and,
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similarly, the high political gain that could be wrought by the attacker. Such was the
scenario when Iraq used conventionally-armed ballistic missiles in the Gulf War to split
Arab members from others in the coalition and to cause enough civilian and military
casualties in places like Saudi Arabia to retard military operations against Iraq. This
demonstrated that ballistic missiles had become the weapon of choice for “strategic
intimidation” by regional actors against the U.S. and its regional allies (Ranger, 1998).117
These types of factors and historical events likely weighed heavily in Japanese leadership
calculations concerning missile defenses since the Gulf War demonstrated the value
missile defenses can have against such threats. Tokyo, Japan, for example, is particularly
vulnerable to coercion by fear of any type of ballistic missile attack or accident.118 These
fears might stem from, for example: Japan’s imperial domination of the Korean
Peninsula; Japan’s alliance with the U.S. and basing of its military forces in Tokyo; and,
Tokyo is the center of Japanese economic vitality and the source of a preponderance of
Japan’s economic output.
Both North Korea and Japan recognize the significance even of North Korean
ballistic missile tests. These events, and the reverberations that follow, demonstrate their
value to North Korea, but their source of anxiety by Japan. In September 2002, in an
agreement with Japan, North Korea extended a pledge to maintain a moratorium on
ballistic missile flight-tests. However, only a month later North Korea acknowledged
existence of a secret uranium program, significantly raising regional tensions. On 4-5
July 2006, North Korea resumed missile tests including several short and medium-range
and a long-range TD-2 missile. Japan was the initiator of an emergency meeting of the
117
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UNSC as a result. North Korea conducted its first test of a nuclear device on 9 October
2006. Reaction in Japan to the nuclear test was “relatively restrained” though public
discussion of Japan pursuing a nuclear weapons program emerged with more openness
(Burns, 2010).119 More missile tests occurred in 2007 and 2008. On 5 April 2009 another
TD-2 was tested, followed by a second nuclear test 25 May, and then more short-range
missile tests. Between 2-4 July 2009 North Korea launched 11 missiles, including KN01, Scuds, and three Nodongs, all landing in the Sea of Japan and precipitating a strong
Japanese reaction that included a government characterization of North Korean behavior
as a “serious act of provocation against the security of neighboring countries” (Burns,
2010).120
The ultimate threat to Japan is attack with nuclear weapons. North Korea, in the
early 1990s, used its plutonium reactor to begin producing sufficient quantities for a
small number of nuclear bombs, but it had the potential to produce 100 weapons per year
if unchecked. A deal was struck in 1994 to curtail such expansion but not before North
Korea had stored up plutonium for 2-3 weapons. Japan’s part of the deal was to provide
$1 billion worth of funding to help build a no-threat nuclear reactor in North Korea
(Kawashima, 2005). Efforts to curtail North Korea’s nuclear program have had mixed
results at best. While uncertainty remains over exact North Korean nuclear weapons
capabilities, it appears possible it can deliver these weapons with ballistic missiles against
regional actors including Japan.
Japan’s BMD Program.121
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As sketched above, Japan’s response to the threats include development of a
capable BMD program to deter North Korea by denying the North its underlying, if not
blunt, instrument of coercion, and to defend against ballistic missile attack in wartime.122
Japan is faced with the situation in which North Korean shorter range missiles, immune
to U.S. national BMD systems, could threaten or attack Japan independent of any general
attack on the peninsula. As a result, BMD not only defends U.S. forces in wartime
contingencies, but more closely connects to protection of Japanese people and its
interests, particularly in pre-conflict situations.123 Japanese possession of a credible
domestic BMD system of its own would set the U.S. retaliatory option in the background
behind Japan’s independent defensive capability. Defenses, however, if possessed and
deployed are expected by the public for basic national security. This argument, too,
makes sense from a Japanese vantage point where the North Korean threat (given its
behavior and stockpile of ballistic missiles) and Japanese domestic politics (given
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), its national homeland defense subset of BMDS called the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, or former U.S. missile defense names, including
National Missile Defense (NMD) or Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense systems. Only a limited number of
states possess, are developing, or are considering acquisition of BMD capabilities. These include: U.S.;
China; Israel; Japan; ROK; Italy; France; UK; Germany; Spain; Greece; Denmark; Russia; UAE; Netherlands;
India; Taiwan; and, Saudi Arabia. Different sources reflect different lists of states possessing or seeking
BMD capabilities. See, for example, Hildreth & Ek (2011). Interestingly, North Korea has not developed a
BMD capability.
122
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under the heading “Effective deterrence and response” (Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2010); page 10.
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U.S. nuclear weapons, cover all situations in the region (O'Donogue, 2000); pages 1-3. He describes three
broad categories where Japan’s BMD development will be seen: operational initiatives; doctrine; and,
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and behavior. For Japan, the TD-1 missile launch made its public well aware of the need for a means of
self-protection in the face of regional actors. While North Korea was the more immediate danger, Japan
was aware Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan could just as easily target Japan as could emerging Chinese
road-mobile missiles. O’Donogue, pages 6-8, 13, and 15. On the threat posed by North Korean and
Chinese ballistic missiles see Figure 1 (p. 7) and Figure 2 (p. 10) depicting range lines of their respective
ballistic missiles.
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constraints on offensive military capabilities) combine to undergird the value of ballistic
missile defense.124 BMD should, however, be recalled as an instrument in context of the
broader Japan-North Korea relationship in which cooperative engagement also exists.125
Japan engaged in various activities in response to the ballistic missile threats it
perceived including many internal and cooperative studies (other decisions, such as
creation of BMD-related governmental agencies, limited research and production of
missile defense technologies, and decisions on BMD-related acquisition followed).126 By
far the most significant event pushing Japan toward actually fielding a BMD system was
the North Korean test flight of a Taepodong-1 (TD-1) missile on 31 August 1998. The
124
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missile’s trajectory, consistent with that expected of a launch to place a satellite into orbit
(North Korea’s stated intentions for the flight) took the TD-1 directly over Japan. The
TD-1 was a three-stage missile, with the first stage falling into the Sea of Japan, the
second stage falling into the Pacific Ocean near the northeastern coast of Honshu
(Japan’s main island), and the final stage failing partway into powered flight and landing
in the ocean. The launch was a surprise to all, creating feelings of unpreparedness among
Japan’s public, but the test was also a technological surprise even to the U.S. in that it
used a third stage: a capability not attributed to the TD-1 missile nor to North Korean
engineers. The first stage was a Nodong and the second a Scud C, both North Korean
produced missiles (Kiziah, 2000).127
The time had come for studies to transition to action. While other domestic
constituencies existed in Japan, immediately after the launch both houses of Japan’s Diet
condemned the launch and recommended Japan seek the means necessary to provide
protection of its population (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001).128 At that time,
Japan had three broad military options available to address the ballistic missile threat:
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offensive measures; passive defenses; and, active defenses. Only active missile defenses
would have the needed psychological deterrent effects upon North Korean leadership
(Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001).129 The formal, publicly-announced Japanese
government decision to pursue BMD emphasized the defensive nature of the system with
a principle purpose “to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic
missile attacks.” Further, the “system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own
independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own
sensors” (Government of Japan, 2003).130 This clearly stated Japan’s intent to have a
capability that can operate and defend Japan independent of U.S. capabilities or
oversight.
Japan’s BMD development path has taken it in two directions: acquisition of its
own capability to address current North Korean threats; and, joint development of new
capabilities to address future threats with the SM-3 Block IIA missile system years away
from deployment (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military
Transformation, 2012).131 The former is the emphasis of the dissertation as it is
foundational to Japan’s deterrence strategy. Over time, Japan would devote significant
resources and political support to pursue its BMD system through development, outright
purchase and acquisition, and deployment. The Japanese multilayered missile defense
system, using its sea-based Aegis and land-based Patriot PAC-3 BMD assets, provides
129
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Japan with autonomous capabilities against ballistic missile threats. “Layering” of BMD
provides different interceptor missiles to engage attacking missiles at different altitudes,
engaging the missiles with overlapping layers of defensive coverage. Japan’s BMD
system is also “interoperable” with the U.S. BMD system through radar detection
capabilities based in Japan (Missile Defense Agency, 2009).132 In 2007, Japan deployed
its first operational BMD asset and to date has deployed four BMD-equipped Aegis ships
and 16 PAC-3 firing units, along with the necessary command and control assets (Japan
Ministry of Defense, 2010).133 The latest government projection is that Japan will acquire
and deploy six Aegis BMD ships and six PAC-3 firing units (Japanese Ministry of

132
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Defense, 2010).134 This could mean approximately 540 SM-3 missiles on Aegis and 120
PAC-3 missiles, providing Japan a capability to defend against potentially dozens of
attacking ballistic missiles.135
Japan is addressing the missile threat both with organizational and technical
remedies. The flight time of a North Korean offensive ballistic missile to Japan is about
10 minutes, compressing time available for decision-making and defense (Kaneda,
Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007).136 For this reason, Japanese leaders have provided
delegation of authority to launch BMD assets below the political leadership to military
commanders. This is also why early detection capabilities are of significant concern to
Japan. Launch detection in particular is provided only through U.S. Defense Support
Program (DSP) space-based capabilities (Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007)137
raising questions of Japan’s ability to provide for its own security independently. An
indigenous tracking capability provided through its Aegis system provides Japan an
autonomous BMD capability able of independent operations against North Korean
ballistic missiles without tracking capabilities otherwise provided by the United States.
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What was lacking is a capability to detect a North Korean missile at the time of its
launch. Such a capability could be provided by infrared sensors located in space, a
capability currently provided by the U.S. on behalf of Japan, but not possessed by Japan.
Alternatively, surface-based radar, such as the land-based x-band radar deployed in
northern Japan in 2006 can provide the U.S. and Japan detection and warning of missiles
early in flight. This facility, however, and the new facility planned for 2013 in southern
Japan, is operated by the U.S., not Japan.138
On April 5 2009, a longer-range variant of Taepodong was launched, but the
North Koreans opted to comply with a United Nations request for safety of flight and
navigation pre-launch notifications. In the lead up to the launch Japan gave orders to field
its BMD assets, defend Tokyo and other areas, and prepare to shoot the missile down
(Japan Ministry of Defense, 2009).139 The behavior and statements of North Korea for the
2009 event were clearly different from the 1998 surprise launch—did North Korea
change the missile’s flight profile to one that was less threatening to Japan in response to
awareness of Japan’s BMD? If so, Japan achieved a deterrent effect for which its BMD
was designed.
In April and December 2012, North Korea launched Taepodong missiles from its
new Sohae Satellite Launching Station in northwestern North Korea. In both cases Japan
again deployed BMD assets and were prepared to engage the North Korean missiles.
Both missiles flew southerly over open ocean (the April launch failed shortly after
138
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launch; the December launch successfully placed a satellite into orbit for the first time in
North Korean history). The 2009 and April 2012 launches were not handled well by
Japanese authorities due to miscues in information handling and decision errors: in the
2009 launch, the MoD announced the launch a day ahead of the actual launch; in the
April 2012 launch they did not announce the launch until an hour later; these issues
seemed to be remedied by the December 2012 satellite event (Takahashi, Ballistic
Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation, 2012).140 Despite
these shortcomings in Japanese command and control, North Korea again changed its
missile flight behavioral pattern in Japan’s favor by launching missiles to the south away
from Japan’s main population centers. It is possible North Korean missile launches to the
east could no longer fly the distance North Korea desired fearing they would be shot
down by Japan’s BMD, or the North Koreans desired lower conflictual interaction with
Japan at that time.
Consequences
Japan-North Korea relations exist as an independent interactive political process.
However, historical events, security alignments of various parties, threats and military
capabilities interplay in, and occasionally overshadow, these relations. Several factors are
dynamic, reflecting a changing security environment for Japan, including: a relative
decline of U.S. global and regional hegemony particularly given China’s rise; greater
Japanese independence; and changes to North Korea internally. Japan is adapting and
must confront the near-term threat it perceives from North Korea. BMD is a key feature
of this adaptation.
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In the long-term, Japan seeks a political solution with North Korea. Rozman, for
example, believes Japan will do so through economic integration policies. This, he
argues, will only occur after North Korean capitulation on the abduction issue and the
threats presented by its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons (Rozman, Strategic
Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and
the United States, 2011).141 Such a long-term approach is complicated by the North’s
internal stability, however. Many have forecast North Korea’s demise for years and
predict its eventual collapse. Victor Cha, for example, claims North Korean survival to be
merely an “accident of history” (Cha V. , 2012).142 However, its resilience cannot be
understated. Alternatively, North Korean leaders may reflect a shrewdness to navigate
their political hand. A more careful understanding of North Korea and its leaders is,
therefore, an essential component in exploring effects of a deterrence strategy oriented
against it.
Regional Deterrence Situation
Japan’s missile defenses exist to deter North Korean behavior, not only as
defensive systems to protect Japan should deterrence fail. Japan is faced with both the
threat of political coercion and threat of attack by North Korea. Japan’s BMD is intended,
in part, to deter North Korea from such political decisions. Japan might be attacked with
North Korean ballistic missiles as part of a broader conflict involving the United States
since the U.S. defense of Korea involves the use of its forces staged at various locations
in nearby Japan. As such, Japan’s role in the defense of Korea has a high probability of
either making it a target of North Korean coercion to refrain from supporting the U.S.
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combat effort or, if it does, a physical target of armed ballistic missiles. The history since
the end of the Cold War, however, is generally not related to crisis involving armed
confrontation upon the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the principal coercive threat from
North Korea toward Japan is for other regional security goals of the North Korean regime
and for other political needs including financial gain. Threatening and provocative North
Korean statements and behavior therefore, specifically oriented toward Japan, are the
primary focus of Japan’s deterrence strategy. Given North Korea’s history of challenges
to its sovereignty or outright defeat and occupation, it uses the long-range technology and
destructive power offered with ballistic missiles to deter others from armed intervention
in North Korea, but also as a visible instrument for political coercion of others.
Therefore, Japan’s BMD is a logical choice of deterrence, especially as Japan becomes
increasingly independent from the U.S. politically. Further, Sugio Takahashi states
limited North Korean ballistic missile attacks or raids fall below the “threshold for
retaliation” by the U.S. under extended deterrence conditions (Takahashi, Ballistic
Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation, 2012).143 What this
means is that it will take many North Korean ballistic missiles to cross a threshold for
war and U.S. retaliation as part of the U.S. extended deterrence security guarantee,
placing Japan’s BMD at the center of deterring North Korea in scenarios below such
large-scale attacks including political coercion or limited missile attacks.
While Japan has its own security interests to consider, including its deterrence
strategy against North Korea, the U.S. is also active in deterring North Korea. Key
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differences exist, however, and are summarized below to help bring further clarity to
Japan’s situation and the deterrence area of emphasis for the dissertation.
U.S.-North Korea Deterrence Situation
While the U.S. is generally concerned about North Korean provocations, the U.S.
deterrence problem set is principally about deterring war on the peninsula. With North
Korea’s arsenal of ballistic missiles, the U.S. worries about their use in conflict. These
missiles could, for example, target U.S. military force bases in Japan or ROK in order to
drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies (Perry, Davis, Schoff, & Yoshihara,
2004).144 In wartime, such a wedge could be driven with North Korean use of WMD as a
way to blackmail Japan from allowing the U.S. to use its territory, severely weakening
the U.S. warfighting position (Kawashima, 2005).145 Being dragged into conflict driven
principally by the interests of the U.S. is precisely the type of “entrapment” scenario
Japan fears (Sokolski, 2005).146 The strike forces of the U.S. at bases in Japan may also
serve to punish North Korea following a North Korean wartime attack on these bases.
Japan’s BMD could, therefore, provide the U.S. with a “damage limitation” capability for
U.S. retaliatory forces (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and
Military Transformation, 2012).147 Thus, the deterrence challenge for the U.S. is a
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In his chapter, “Japan’s Grand Strategy of the Korean Peninsula: Optimistic Realism.” Page 237.
According to Victor Cha, the U.S. and ROK forces have planned for war on the peninsula through
Operational Plan 5027 since the early 1990s, a plan intended to fight North Korea on its territory and end
its regime. Prepositioning of U.S. forces in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii is part of the defensive scheme. North
Korea could threaten or actually attack Japan with 100 chemically-armed Nodong missiles, the purpose
being delay of U.S. forces to the peninsula (Cha, 2012); pages 212 and 218.
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See pages 23-4. While Japan’s BMD could limit damage to U.S. forces at bases in Japan, it would
require a large North Korean ballistic missile raid to achieve. Further, the U.S. possesses other
strike/retaliatory forces that could be brought to bear. Under wartime conditions, it does not appear the
damage-limitation role of Japan’s BMD for U.S. combat forces would be a decisive one and, therefore,
may not be a significant factor in deterring war itself.
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complex one. BMD may play a small deterrence role in this situation where the
deterrence objective is to deter war—a task that exceeds BMD expectations—whereas
the U.S. and ROK provide extensive conventional forces and the U.S. its nuclear
weapons punitive capacity to deter North Korean aggression.
Japan-North Korea Deterrence Situation
Japan’s deterrence problem is principally against North Korean behavior short of
the wartime scenario sketch above. Japan’s situation is better categorized as a “general
deterrence” (status quo) or possibly an “immediate deterrence” (crisis) situation. Japan’s
missile defenses deter in this situation by having influence over North Korean behavior.
This is the area of the dissertation’s focus.
Japan’s deterrence strategy does not use BMD exclusively, however, and includes
the “carrot” of deterrence through cooperative engagement with North Korea.
Engagement, through use of food, energy, and compensation-based financial
inducements, seeks to attract North Korea to better behavior. Japan seeks to deter North
Korean behavior by disincentivizing it with its combined capacity of national power,
including its BMD that is also used as a safety net. While Japan is unable to threaten
punishment of North Korea with offensive kinetic military power, Japan is uneasy about
any aggressive U.S. posture as it could trigger conflict (scenario above) and North
Korean attacks on Japan (Perry, Davis, Schoff, & Yoshihara, 2004).148
By the time Japan fielded its first operationally deployed BMD assets in 2007,
intellectual work was also underway to further Japan’s deterrence-related strategy vis-àvis BMD. For example, a Japan Institute of International Affairs report reviewed the
development of deterrence, and the role of missile defenses, conceptually in the U.S.,
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arguing Japan’s thinking followed that of the United States. They cited, for example, the
2004 version of the U.S. Defense Department’s deterrence concept document, drafted by
U.S. Strategic Command, in Omaha, Nebraska, in the development of Japan’s thinking
on deterrence—a source of foundational conceptual thinking applied in the dissertation
(Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007).149 The authors feared key U.S.
conventional capabilities, such as carrier battle groups, could redeploy out of Northeast
Asia, as has happened in the past. The JIIA report also reflected on the 2006 North
Korean ballistic missile tests, suggesting diplomacy may have been more effective had
Japan had deterrence-capable BMD deployed, which it did not at that time. The report’s
authors also argued BMD meant Japan will not need to “surrender” to such intimidation,
arguing BMD carries significant emotive meaning to Japan given the strains of
unconditional surrender at the termination of World War II. More robust BMD
capabilities, they argued, would deter more effectively North Korean “reckless behavior”
and forms of political intimidation (Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007).150
Some argue North Korean behavior toward Japan reflects more of coercion rather
than threats to attack and wage general war—to get something from Japan, such as aid,
reparations, or opposition to U.S. basing access, without military attacks. Part of Japan’s
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The dissertation reflects more on the 2006 version, the DO JOC, though the basic conceptual tenets of
deterrence of both documents are the same. As the authors of the JIIA report developed the thinking of
deterrence in Japan, they included the following essential discussion points: technology is critical,
including both the nature of the threat and defenses brought to bear to deter and defend against that
threat; Japan relies on the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee for nuclear threats to Japan, inferring
conventional and non-nuclear WMD threats fall principally to Japan to deter; BMD primarily delivers
deterrence by denial by restraining the political and military advantages sought by the enemy through
actual or threatened ballistic missile attacks; BMD also deters and makes an enemy more cautious by
complicating an enemy’s “strategic calculation” by increasing uncertainties he will achieve his goals or
objectives; BMD restrains an enemy from deploying greater numbers of ballistic missiles and from
proliferating them to other countries; deterrence will be further enhanced by successful BMD tests and
exercises; passive defenses also provide benefit-denial deterrence; and, BMD provides Japan’s leadership
rational decision-making even in crisis. See pages 137-9.
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task, therefore, would be to deter North Korean coercion, particularly through use of its
ballistic missiles.151 As such, Japan is interested in deterring North Korean ballistic
missile tests, or at least those that threaten Japan’s population given sensitivities to aerial
attacks from the past and the surprise overflight in 1998. However, the backdrop of U.S.
nuclear weapons providing extended deterrence of North Korea for Japan has shown its
limits. Just as the U.S. threatening massive nuclear retaliation against small threats
proved to lack credibility in the Cold War, so, too, U.S. nuclear threats do not avail
themselves for deterring provocative North Korean behavior such as missile tests.
According to Victor Cha, the U.S. views North Korean ballistic missile development and
tests as woeful U.S. deterrence failures stating in 2012, “The United States has failed for
over twenty years to deter DPRK development and testing of its ballistic missiles” (Cha
V. , 2012).152 This fact, and the ability of North Korea’s shorter-range ballistic missiles to
strike Japan free from being intercepted by the U.S. national system has shaped Japan’s
thinking of its deterrence situation and the value of its own BMD to devalue North
Korean ballistic missiles and deter their behavior. In Japan, where even test missiles can
fly over and endanger civilians, change of North Korean ballistic missile launch and
testing patterns might be viewed with relief and guarded optimism of deterrence success,
such as the change in flight profile in the North Korean 2009 Taepodong missile test.
Japan’s development and heavy investment in BMD suggests it is a primary instrument in
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North Korea’s ballistic missile tests and overflight of Japan could be considered “coercive diplomacy,”
essentially backing a political demand with the threat of punishment for noncompliance. For example,
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the U.S. attempted to deter Japanese aggression through the
threat of an oil embargo and military intervention. The U.S. decided to maintain the naval fleet in Pearl
Harbor as a signal of U.S. resolve. Later, it chose to move from deterring aggression to coercing Japan to
remove its military forces from China with the same threats, although the U.S. policy became a de facto
embargo by way of internal administrative mishandlings (George & Simons, The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy, 1994); pages 2, 58-71. In this way, a ballistic missile test communicates a threat of punishment
for noncompliance.
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such a deterrence strategy, not only serving to deter ballistic missile attacks in support of
U.S. war plans against North Korea for peninsular-wide scenarios, but more practically
against North Korean flight profiles that instill societal fear, and doing so without
dependence on the U.S. or violation of Japan’s constitution. Deterring ballistic missilerelated behavior denies North Korea its principle tool of coercion and could, therefore,
have a constraining effect on other behavior toward Japan.
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW
Deterrence Theory and Missile Defenses
Deterrence retains a few core concepts but has, especially in the post-Cold War
era, experienced development of thought. Described by some as “waves” of thought,
scholars of modern deterrence thinking have sought to adapt deterrence to meet a variety
of security challenges and new technologies and capabilities including BMD. Considered
an influence-oriented activity, deterrence can occur in peacetime and crisis (referred to as
“general” and “immediate” deterrence, respectively) and in conflict. Political leaders can
devise deterrence strategies using all of the instruments of power at their disposal. Taken
from the context of the Cold War bipolar security context, deterrence has moved for
many theorists from strictly a nuclear threat deterred by other nuclear capabilities to:
conventional, nuclear, and cyber threats, for example; provocation to coerce; and
technical acquisition such as Iran pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
Further, deterrence is no longer isolated to cost-imposition, but can be
accomplished in other ways of influence, including benefit-denial and affecting an
adversary’s perceptions of not acting, or the costs and benefits of restraint (the latter term
is also dubbed the “carrot” of deterrence, as opposed to the “stick” of traditional costimposition). The means of deterrence have not only moved beyond nuclear weapons but
can include other military capabilities such as cyber, BMD, space, and reconnaissance,
and non-military instruments such as diplomacy, financial sanctions on banks, trade
restrictions, and law enforcement. Another departure from Cold War practices is the
move from simple counting rules, comparing numbers of various forces and assuming
parity was stable, or just a little more than the opponent was even better for deterrence. In
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place of numeric comparisons, emphasis shifted to qualitative and psychological
understanding of the adversary. BMD in the Cold War was considered for its deterrent
value, but national systems were questionably effective, costly, and more political
baggage than they were worth. President Reagan’s grandiose vision in the 1980s of
defenses making nuclear weapons obsolete, and regional threats, such as Iraq in the early
1990s, changed many views on deterrence and BMD’s contribution to it.153 While it is
difficult to establish with precision, Japan’s views on deterrence also evolved: echoes of
deterrence were voiced periodically by its leaders and today its official positions reflect
modern adaptations found in U.S. literature. For Japan to view BMD as a central
component of its deterrence strategy is a direct reflection of the knitting together of
modern military capabilities with modern deterrence thought.154
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Not everyone has made the intellectual jump from BMD defending to BMD deterring, however. Aaron
Karp also reflects the idea that deterrence has transformed to a greater emphasis upon defenses and now
the two exist as parallel concepts. Deterrence has declined because nuclear confrontation between
traditional Cold War rivals has declined. Conventional conflict and terrorism have overtaken the
international security landscape, making missile defenses of value for warfighting in regional scenarios
only. National missile defenses in the U.S. defending against nuclear attack by Russia or China does not
make sense (Karp, 2004); pages 72-5 and 81. While Karp’s description of the decades-long transformation
from Cold War deterrence to an increasingly dominant international security framework of defenses helps
place Japan’s missile defense program into a larger international security context (and one emphasizing
threats from regional actors like North Korea), like some others he does not address any conceptual or
practical relevance of missile defenses to deterrence. For example, if missile defenses contribute to
regional warfighting capabilities, does this not have any effect on regional stability or deterring regional
conflict?
154
Navigating terminology within the “deterrence” lexicon is challenging, especially when seeking clarity
on the simple question of whether BMD deters or simply an enabler for the “real” instrument of
deterrence—nuclear weapons—to work. For example, in a timely revisit of his 1966 classic, Arms and
Influence, Thomas Schelling draws distinction between defense and deterrent defense. The difference, he
suggests, is the intent of the action. For example, “pure defense” is in play if the intent of the defender is
to block or resist the adversary such that he cannot succeed in his plan. However, “deterrent defense” is
purposefully inducing the adversary from proceeding at all (Schelling, 2008); pages 78-9. Japan’s BMD,
therefore, can be considered both pure defense, in the sense of simply working to save lives under
ballistic missile attack, and deterrent defense as they are also intentioned to sway North Korean leaders
from making the decision to use ballistic missiles in the first place, or from other aberrant or unwanted
behavior that could escalate somehow.
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As a strategy generally, deterrence is a component of one’s national security. In
execution, deterrence cuts across many lanes and is especially woven into the fabric of
foreign policy. For example, the U.S. seeks to gain foreign basing access at various
locations throughout the world in order to deter specific regional threats. It could take
years of diplomatic negotiation to accomplish, and may entail other U.S. political or
economic commitments. Deterrence could not be accomplished, however, without the
intertwining of national security and foreign policies. Theoretically, deterrence
compliments other international relations streams or activities, crossing events of history
no less than other political science or IR emphases. For example, in the Cold War,
deterrence was closely aligned with non-proliferation and arms control, including the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, ratified by the U.S. and USSR to help
maintain stable deterrence without an offensive arms race. Deterrence is also related to
peace and conflict studies, alliances and interdependence, political psychology, and
constructivism. But if deterrence has conceptually expanded one would expect wide
revision in other international relations theoretical approaches or policy applications.155
In total, the dissertation research has identified over 50 theoretic arguments of
how BMD can support or undermine deterrence. This represents the largest list of such
arguments consolidated that could be found. Some of these are conceptual ideas, others
from an analysis of a specific historical event. As such, it can be difficult to judge which
theoretic view applies to any one deterrence situation. Such a large number of
perspectives can also create theoretic and policy confusion in the expectations of missile
defenses to deter.
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Two recent examples are the theoretic and policy struggle to deter terrorists or deterring in and
through cyberspace.
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As a strategy, deterrence has existed since ancient times. It is essentially about
one party influencing another from doing something the first wants to avoid or finds
harmful. Deterrence operates in the legal domain, such as a community deterring criminal
behavior through use of its law enforcement capabilities and creation of prison sentences
for prosecuted criminals. At the interstate level, deterrence works through various levers
of national power to influence an adversary’s thought processes and calculations of
actions under consideration. Various threats of punishment or means to deny the
adversary perceived benefits of such action are useful deterrence tools. In recent years,
ballistic missiles emerged both as an instrument to threaten by an adversary and to deter
by the threatened. Likewise, defensive capabilities against ballistic missile threats also
grew in prominence, both in consonance with the threat and as needed technological
hurdles were crossed enabling ballistic missile defense to be cost-effective and credible.
Most theorists and practitioners agree missile defenses are an important new military
capability, though disagreement exists as to their efficacy as a tool of deterrence.
In exploring the concept of deterrence and the contributions of missile defenses
historically, much is to be gleaned from the literature as it relates to the U.S. experience.
For example, many of the fundamental ideas of deterrence relied upon today have their
origins in the Cold War period. So, too, were some of the central arguments of the roles
and deterrent effects of missile defenses. No value is lost with respect to the applicability
of these deterrence concepts to Japan and its use of missile defenses as a deterrent tool
against North Korea since Japanese thinking on deterrence tends to be similar to that of
the United States. However, while deterrence thought has developed in many ways from
its early beginning, there remain several gaps germane to the Japan-North Korea case.
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For example, little is written dealing with Japan-North Korea relations generally and
empirical data is lacking with respect to the deterrent role of Japan’s missile defense
capabilities toward North Korea. Further, little is addressed empirically as to the deterrent
role of missile defenses in status quo (non-wartime) conditions or how the development
of a missile defense capability over a long period of time, as Japan has done, contributes
to deterrence. Additionally, the pros and cons of missile defense contributions to
deterrence are widely scattered—no single compilation can be found from which
theoretic or empirical case study analyses can be based. These and other gaps will be
highlighted throughout this chapter. The dissertation will address some of these empirical
gaps.
Deterrence theories have ranged from a simple proposition of having more forces
than one’s opponent, on the one hand, to the great difficulty understanding adversary
psychology or how deterrence works on the other. Questions were raised about why
deterrence had failed in many cases and pointed to the need to better understand one’s
adversary including cultural and psychological factors that inform his national security
decision-making. Analyses, plans, and policy ebbed, too, including how deterrence was
addressed between the U.S. and regional allies. As missile defenses rose in prominence to
address regional threats increasingly armed with greater numbers and more lethal
offensive ballistic missiles, so, too, did debate in the U.S. about how missile defenses
contribute to, or undermine, deterrence of those threats—over 50 arguments, some
contradictory, have been identified in the research of the dissertation and are captured in
Table 1 at the end of this chapter. All of these developments were highly relevant as U.S.
allies, including Japan, considered partnering with the U.S. in such enterprises or
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embarking on missile defense programs of their own. Dependent, in part, upon the U.S.
for its security, Japan has also looked to the U.S. experience to inform its own thinking
on deterrence concepts and the special role of missile defenses for its own security. Such
considerations are exceedingly relevant for a country no longer possessing formidable
offensive military power, but who is nevertheless forced to confront a very near and
present danger from North Korea.
The evolution of the missile defense-deterrence dynamic has provided important
and revised concepts, including lessons learned from past historical deterrence failures or
illuminations of historical events, valuable to Japanese decision-making with respect to
its research, acquisition and deployment of its own ballistic missile defense (BMD)
system. This chapter, therefore, will be divided into three parts: the development of
deterrence theory, including the importance of the Cold War period as well as
understanding deterrence theoretic development through “waves” of thought; modern
features and ideas of deterrence, including the role of regional actors, general vs.
immediate deterrence conditions, deterrence tailoring, improved adversary understanding,
and use of various capabilities to influence; and, missile defenses, including the historical
development of BMD, the technical characteristics of ballistic missiles and BMD, and the
arguments for and against BMD in deterrence. Application of ideas described to the
Japan-North Korea case, as well as theoretic gaps and shortfalls to that case, will be
provided and summarized within the chapter’s three parts.
Deterrence Theoretic Development and Features
Historical Evolution
The Cold War Period.

77

According to a recent U.S. Department of Defense report, “deterrence operations”
are defined as “integrated, systematic efforts to exercise decisive influence over
adversaries’ decision-making calculus in peacetime, crisis, and war to achieve
deterrence” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009).156 Today, the Japanese perspective is
similar. Such a broad definition reflects decades of theoretic evolution and debate, with
Cold War era deterrence serving as the point of departure, at least for most theorists.
In a prominent theoretic study nearly four decades ago, Alexander George and
Richard Smoke provided important background on the development of deterrence
thinking and conceptual ideas for its application. Considered an influence type of activity,
deterrence was present conceptually in early writings such as Thucydides, Machiavelli,
and others in the 18th and 19th centuries, though an important distinction for political
leaders in those days was that deterrers had the capability to threaten harm only after they
defeated their opponent’s military forces. Technology, however, changed this dynamic.
With the advent of strategic bombing in World War II and later, nuclear weapons,
deterrence was able to be conceived as a separate strategy since it was possible to
threaten grave national consequences without defeating the opponent’s armies first. For
the U.S., it was not until the 1950s that any coherent deterrence strategy emerged
(George & Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice,
1974).157 While there is empirical evidence technology advanced deterrence thinking
considerably, it fails to address Japan’s current situation in which it needs to deter North
Korea without offensive military arms. The term “deterrence,” according to Dougherty
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and Pfaltzgraff, “did not appear in the literature of international relations or strategic
theory prior to World War II” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).158
George and Smoke described deterrence as a relational process of influence by
one over another, but confined deterrence to threats of punishment, and in the modern
era, emphasized nuclear weapons in context of nuclear scenarios between nuclear-armed
states (George & Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice,
1974).159 The North Korea-Japan case in the dissertation lies beyond the types of
deterrence cases presented by George and Smoke, reflecting just how much of the
modern era theoretic development, policy, and concomitant literature on deterrence
originated in the post-war period of relations between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and how regional situations like the Japan-North Korea case
were simply ignored.
In his early volume on national security strategy (first published in 1959), Bernard
Brodie provided a classic perspective on deterrence and described components of early
deterrence thinking, many of which remain operative, or are at least debated, today. For
example, given the nuclear circumstances with the USSR, he presented three broad
approaches to U.S. national security, including preventive war, preemptive attack, and
massive retaliation (Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 1965).160 The credibility of
massive retaliation deterrence relied upon an overwhelming, “embarrassing” amount of
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Pages 223-63. The term “massive retaliation” was coined by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in
1954 in which those offensive nuclear forces responsible for retaliating to nuclear attack would form the
backbone of U.S. deterrence in part because there was, at that time, “little alternative.” Pages 248 and
252.
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power with one’s nuclear weapons, though conventional forces could provide a
deterrence “signaling” role (Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 1965).161
By the mid-to-late 1950s, however, the U.S. was faced with other security
choices, impacted in part by military technologies. These options included: deterrence;
war-winning; and defense (Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy,
Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972, 1977).162 While active and passive defenses could
save lives and provide protection of various points of high value, missile defenses could
specifically enhance deterrence by limiting damage to U.S. offensive forces (Yanarella,
The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972,
1977).163 As technology improved and as the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery
systems increased on both sides, the only core change in the deterrence equation, at least
on the U.S. side, was a move from the idea of mutual vulnerability to each other in a firststrike scenario, to mutual invulnerability to a first strike (Adams, 1971).164
As if to acknowledge mutual unease of the destabilizing effects of ballistic missile
defenses upon deterrence, however, the U.S. and USSR agreed to two simultaneous arms
161

Pages 253 and 273. Brodie also suggested, as others did, the decision-makers of governments were
rational people possessing widely varying temperaments though, under extreme circumstances, can make
unreasonable choices and may in fact make most decisions out of intuition without careful weighing of
objective facts. In this regard he argued effective deterrence was based upon a “subjective feeling” in the
adversary’s mind. Pages 277-80 and 397-9.
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Page 50.
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Page 51. The preeminent view in the U.S. remained that deterrence through assured destruction could
and must be accomplished by more and more capable offensive weapon systems. See pages 76-7.
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Pages 169-70. First strike invulnerability was made possible due to the hardening of intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, survivability of at-sea submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on
submarines, and warning and readiness of manned bombers. This meant both sides were actually assured
destruction if either initiated a nuclear war due to the certainty of facing a large nuclear second strike in
retaliation. Beliefs and perceptions coupled with actual estimates of nuclear forces of the opponent were
central to achieving deterrence and so long as the forces of both sides were comparable in overall
balance, a stable psychological or cognitive environment would exist among leaders on both sides, thus
deterrence would remain operative. Also, in the most active period of research, development and
deployment (1959-1969), a review of literature on the policy debate was overwhelmingly against U.S.
BMD. See page 247.
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control agreements in 1972, only a few years after the U.S. deployed the SAFEGUARD
BMD system. This was effectively a “closing off of the defensive realm” to afford
assured destruction to retain centrality in deterring nuclear conflict (Yanarella, The
Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972, 1977).165
Later, it became apparent that U.S. thinkers had engaged in “mirror-imaging” of the
Soviet Union, assuming (falsely) they were attracted to a mutual goal of stability. In
reality, the USSR was pursuing a nuclear war-fighting capability marked by a mix of
offensive and defensive systems, including active ballistic missile defenses (Goure,
Hyland, & Gray, 1979).166 Pursuit of extensive damage-limitation capabilities indicated
MAD was no longer “mutual” (Goure, Hyland, & Gray, 1979).167
The U.S. in the 1980s considered three basic strategy alternatives: retaliation
only; prevailing or warfighting; and a defense-dominant approach (Office of Technology
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These treaties were the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I, limiting offensive nuclear arms) and
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Pages 185-6. Robert McNamara, following his decision to
recommend deployment of a U.S. BMD system in the 1960s, argued missile defenses not only could deter
the minimal Chinese threat but discourage other consequences, such as nuclear proliferation by other
states—his central argument for favoring missile defenses. Ironically, when a robust U.S. BMD system
began deployment, significant diplomatic efforts at both offensive and defensive (BMD) arms control
between the U.S. and Soviet Union emerged, with many claiming U.S. operational deployment of BMD
playing a positive role in the U.S.-Soviet political relationship generally and the stabilizing of the overall
strategic deterrent relationship. This is an important prospect in the dissertation since stable relations in
the Japan-North Korea case generally are, likewise, used as a benchmark for the deterrence relationship
as described above in the U.S.-USSR case.
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Page v. War-fighting capability, argued Gouré, not only included offensive counterforce capabilities,
domination at war’s end, and ability to recover, but active and passive defenses. Further, the reason the
Soviets agreed to the ABM Treaty was not because they accepted the MAD concept for their security but
because they saw, at the time of the treaty’s debate, U.S. superiority in defenses—something the USSR
saw as integral to a successful war-fighting strategy. Having stopped U.S. missile defense deployment and
technological research, the Soviets began their own process of catching up and speeding by the U.S. in
critical deterrence capabilities, including missile defenses. See pages vi and viii-ix. Further, Soviet military
officers described features of their strategy and the rising role of defenses, including missile defense, civil
defense, and protective measures such as offensive force mobility. The Soviets were also pursuing other
BMD technologies, such as lasers and charged-particle beam systems. These capabilities would present
benefits over use of ballistic missiles for defense, including: faster response time against incoming
warheads; radars used in BMD would not be blinded by the effects of nuclear-armed ABM missiles; and,
there would be unlimited capacity to shoot at incoming warheads. Page 24
167
Page 20.
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Assessment, 1986).168 Proponents of a defense-dominant strategy viewed missile
defenses increasingly as providing clear deterrence value by making an adversary’s
objective more difficult by protecting at least some of his intended targets and by making
his planning more uncertain by denying him knowledge of how many, and precisely
which, warheads will get through (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986).169 For the
USSR, defenses were to help them absorb any first blow by the U.S., providing the
Soviets valuable time and decision space before proceeding in conflict (Goure, Hyland, &
Gray, 1979).170 Despite U.S. fears that Soviet BMD and other war-fighting technologies
presented it first-strike capabilities, Hyland argued Soviet military leaders had for years
suggested BMD provided both sides deterrence value (Goure, Hyland, & Gray, 1979).171
As in the U.S.-Soviet case, little empirical study exists on North Korean leader thinking
with respect to deterrence generally or to how a regional actor’s BMD might deter North
Korea.
As relations with the Soviet Union began to stabilize around more pragmatic, less
ideological, factors, reconsideration was given by some in the U.S. of the value of BMD
to enhance deterrence (Starsman, 1981).172 This discussion moved to the fore under
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Page 83.
Pages 86-7.
170
Page 31. This advantage, with active missile defenses at the center, was comparable to Soviet strategy
in World War II in which it traded territory temporarily for time to regroup against German attacks.
171
Pages 31-2. In 1964, for example, Soviet General Talensky published an article claiming active defenses
helped provide “balance” since they added to the options one side could pursue to compensate for any
advantage by the other. Talensky also remarked such defensive systems maximized deterrence by placing
such capabilities into your own hands rather than relying on the goodwill of the other side to restrain.
172
Page 2. For example, Colonel Raymond E. Starsman, in a study at the National Defense University,
suggested BMD could make the new MX (later called Peacekeeper) ICBM more survivable. He argued that
the ABM Treaty forced U.S. planners to focus attention on offensive systems, particularly their
modernization and basing options. This was reflected, in part, in U.S. research and development (R&D)
funding on BMD over 25 years. Starsman showed that BMD funding rose rapidly from the early 1950s,
peaked in the late 1960s, and continued a rapid decline through the ABM signing period and bottomed
out around $.3M per year in the late 1970s through 1980. The central technological feature of offensive
169
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President Ronald Reagan when he revealed his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in
1983, providing a broad vision of redefining deterrence in national security through use
of defenses. The vision of SDI relatively quickly succumbed to technical limitations,
however, and more modest thoughts of the emerging role of missile defenses
(Binnendijk, 1986).173 Nevertheless, U.S. strategic doctrine was in transition from an
offense-oriented to a defense-oriented doctrine.174 The period following SDI’s start
forced many new studies and reevaluations to provide U.S. leadership more options than
massive retaliation or surrender (Binnendijk, 1986).175 It was feared by some in the U.S.
that the transition period from a deterrence strategy based on retaliation to a defensedominant one would be risky (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986).176 Another
significant shift in thinking about BMD, however, occurred at the end of the Cold War,
particularly in the period surrounding the Gulf War in 1991. Deterrence strategy
increasingly focused on regional and operational threats (Payne K. B., Missile Defense in
the 21st Century: Protection against Limited Threats, 1991).177 Despite this new and
profound shift in attention to regional threats, including North Korea, and the rising role
of BMD, no empirical studies examined implications of regional BMD, such as Japan’s
early program, for deterring North Korea.

forces driving current thinking was MIRV capability, providing great offensive prowess and reducing ABM
value except for the most robust and technically superior missile defense systems. Page 4.
173
Page 5. There were, however, benefits of newer SDI technologies, including the fact BMD no longer
required use of a nuclear warhead atop the interceptor and BMD could successfully deal with the problem
of attacking MIRVs. See pages 11-2.
174
Page 17. This transition was also reflected in political-military strategy games and operational
wargames.
175
Pages 78-9. This led to the concept of “escalation control” and emphasis upon a U.S. nuclear reserve
force. Critical to these studies, according to Sloss, was the emergence of the U.S. countervailing strategy
which sought once again to find the proper mix of offenses and defenses to deter and hedge against
deterrence failure.
176
Page 113.
177
Pages 4-7.
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Schools of Thought, “Waves” of Theory, Models Employed.
In addition to the historical approach, another method of exploring the
development of deterrence thought—and its relevance and relationship to BMD—is
through the broad schools of thought, or periods of thinking on the subject. Robert Jervis
and others have described the theoretical development of deterrence over time in terms of
“waves” of ideas expressed by various scholars. The first wave grew following World
War II and spoke of the immense implications of the advent of nuclear weapons upon
international relations and realist thought. Bernard Brodie was a leader among first wave
scholars (Jervis, Deterrence Theory Revisited, 1979).178 More systemization was applied
in the second wave by Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, Roberta Wohlstetter and
others. Like the first wave, the second wave was also framed by the need to address the
nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Use of games was common,
though perhaps in an over-simplistic manner. Another feature, and source of criticism,
was the overestimation of objective, benefit-maximizing, utility oriented rationality in
leader decision-making through development and use of the rational actor model (Jervis,
Deterrence Theory Revisited, 1979).179
The “classic model” of decision theory in international relations, with its roots in
the Enlightenment period, is the rational actor model (RAM) used extensively in first and
second wave literature. The RAM presumes a decision-maker calculates based upon
objective consideration of the utility and probability of alternatives and chooses the
option that maximizes expected utility given a value-based rank-ordering of his
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Pages 291-2.
Pages 291-300.
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preferences (Allison, 1971).180 Many early, predominantly realist, theorists, such as
Morgenthau, Schelling, Kennan, Waltz, Kissinger, and Bueno de Mesquita used the
classical model. Several theoretic problems with the rational actor model have arisen,
however, as others in later waves explore other empirical cases or approaches. For
example, RAM, and other game-theoretic approaches, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or
Chicken, always relies on the element of retaliation in the formal deterrence model
(Langlois, 1989).181 This is a considerable gap for the Japan-North Korea case. Japan, for
example, does not possess an offensive, retaliatory, and especially nuclear-armed
capability and the value of such games for insights in this particular case appear very
limited. Further, while the RAM can provide some insights into “tacit” and diplomatic
bargaining (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001),182 game-theoretic deterrence models,
however, are admittedly not representative of reality in international relations (Franck &
Melese, The Access Deterrence Scenario: A New Approach to Assessing National
Missile Defenses, 2002).183
Another problem is that the rational actor model avoided incorporation of
qualifying features from constructivist or psychological theories. Herbert Simon offered
the idea of “bounded rationality” and “satisficing” decisions that are good enough and
reached without complex matrices of all conceivable decision factors (Dougherty &
180

Pages 10 and 35. In his examination of the key decisions involved in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
Graham Allison introduced the model as the “classical” approach to understanding calculations and
decisions of leaders. This model focused upon the choices made by U.S. and Soviet senior leaders and
assumed they rationally maximize values in their choice. He compared this model to an Organizational
Process Model, which focused on routines and outputs of organizations, and a
Governmental/Bureaucratic Politics Model, which looked at the politics involved, to offer insights to the
crisis. Pages 245-56.
181
Page 67. See also Exploring the Stability of Deterrence, edited by Jacek Kugler and Frank Zagare (Kugler
& Zagare, 1987), though their approach, like many others, emphasized the U.S.-USSR stability problem
and retained common game-theoretic assumptions.
182
Pages 562-70.
183
Pages 234-6.
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Pfaltzgraff, 2001).184 Many theorists since the early 1990s have stressed the need to take
a more eclectic conceptual approach. As Alex Mintz suggested, national security related
decisions were “best explained as the amalgam of a mixture of theories” that capture
personal, environmental, and social or cultural identity factors (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff,
2001).185 This is the dissertation’s approach; as such, application of simple rational actor
modeling to the Japan-North Korea case is of little value.
The third wave stressed theoretic development of deterrence along the lines of
psychological factors and risk-taking in decision-making. Third wave deterrence theorists
explored more fully the decision calculus elements of leaders, including the probability
estimates of perceived consequences of their choices, but Jervis argues more was needed
in this area, too, to understand how leaders actually employed probabilities. For example,
their estimates tend not to be made with the precision suggested by formal theory.
Additionally, third wave deterrence explored the idea of commitment, suggesting leaders
“generally place a greater value on keeping what they have than on making further
gains.” Finally, third wave deterrence began to explore the role of a leader’s political
goals in his decision-making more fully. An adversary’s reason for initiating movement
from status quo to crisis or conflict mattered immensely, but was not addressed with
vigor before third wave deterrence (Jervis, Deterrence Theory Revisited, 1979).186
Constructivist theory’s contribution to decision-making and broader decisionmaking theory played a central role as deterrence thinking expanded in the third wave.
Constructivism, for example, suggests leaders’ perceptions of various components of the
184

Pages 560-2. The authors make the point that the assumption of rational choice continues to be
prevalent in international relations (state-level) theory, but not necessarily decision-making (individuallevel) theory.
185
Page 571-4 and 599.
186
Pages 301-11, 318, and 322.
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external and internal environment around them, such as technology, resources, and social
demography, influence their decision-making, sometimes creating bad decisions due to
informational gaps in the environment or erroneous interpretations of environmental
activity or change. Alexander Wendt, Robert Keohane and others argued that the national
interests of a state were socially constructed from the identity, values, norms, and culture
of the state’s people (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).187 But these ideas did not generate
a significant series of study on North Korea and how these factors inform their
deterrence-related decision-making with respect to Japan, where historical interactions
clearly resonate in North Korean culture. The dissertation, through use of the strategic
profile, will seek to address this gap.
Robert Jervis stressed the need to approach deterrence from a psychological
perspective, or at least to unpack an opponent’s psychological factors as part of an
approach to deterrence. As part of the third wave of thinking, he suggested that
“deductive logic,” the premise of rational choice modeling, ran contrary to reality and
history in many cases since opponents in international relations rarely have a good
understanding of the other (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 1989).188
Perceptions can skew reality (Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International
Politics, 1976).189 In analyzing the decision-making leading to crisis and World War I,
Jack Levy, for example, suggested key psychological factors may have contributed to the
outcome of war (Levy, 1986).190 While the North Korean leadership resides in a closed
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Pages 164-7.
Page 1.
189
Pages 3-4 and 8.
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Pages 212-4. These included a rigid commitment to one’s long-standing military plan or national policy,
stemming perhaps from leader insecurities, uncertainties, or value conflicts under stress. In general, this
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87

society, and fidelity of the psychological factors of its leadership lacking, the dissertation
will seek to address these factors where possible and related to Japan’s BMD.
Jeffrey Knopf describes a “fourth wave” of deterrence theoretic and conceptual
focus that aims to better understand deterrence with respect to regional actors and nonstate actors. Fourth wave deterrence is influence-oriented, includes non-punitive and
communicative measures, and inclusion of empirical research (Knopf, 2010).191
However, he does not provide any analysis of the role or utility of BMD in deterring
regional actors such as North Korea. Knopf also suggested clarity in deterrence tailoring
by adding deterrence objectives to adversary understanding and use of leadership profiles
(Knopf, 2010).192 It is, however, difficult to imagine any tailored deterrence strategy that
does not include both elements.
In general, there is very little quantitative academic literature on North Korean
behavior, especially in its foreign policy over an extended period, and none solely on the
North Korea-Japan relationship. Also, very little deterrence literature involves Asia and
most missile defense-deterrence literature addresses U.S. national missile defense issues
and many of those relative to deterring nuclear war. Of all the academic literature sources
reviewed on missile defense-deterrence, none of the cases were on the deterrence effect
of Japan’s missile defenses toward North Korea. Further, of all the specific arguments
identified on whether missile defenses enhance or undermine deterrence (summarized in
Table 1 at the end of this chapter) none of the arguments were based exclusively upon
research of the Japan-North Korea case.

could lead to discounting new information that conflicts with one’s existing policy, generating
misperceptions and bad or irrational decisions.
191
Pages 2-4.
192
Pages 26-7.
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Significant Features of Modern Deterrence
Emphasizing Regional Actors.
An important factor—particularly since the end of the Cold War period—is the
emergence of regional states as new and significant threats to U.S. and allied security, an
obvious point of interest for the dissertation. Keith Payne argued that the post-Cold War
period would not be dominated by superpower confrontation but by regional powers,
including North Korea, obtaining ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and, with these
capabilities, seeking to deter the U.S. and then coerce others in the region with greater
impunity. Stakes would be high for such regional powers making deterrence more
challenging (Payne K. B., 1996).193 These actors were less constrained from coercion and
use of force, more risk-tolerant, lack effective communication with opponents, and,
shared an asymmetry of stake where only their survival was at risk (Kartchner, 2002).194
Regional actors were not, however, “suicidal” (Butler, 2001).195 Key decisions were
influenced by high motivation stemming from the attacker’s values or the psychology of
its leader; misperceptions of consequences; or, perceived vulnerabilities in an opponent
(Wolf B. , 1991).196 Another characteristic of modern regional actors was the real threat
they posed to civilians (Payne K. B., Missile Defense in the 21st Century: Protection
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Pages 30-5. Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold recognized Western powers were becoming “expeditionary”
in their focus to address regional “rogue” threats (Ranger, 1998). See page 10. For the U.S., however,
domestic tolerances for intervention were reducing over time, and despite a formidable nuclear force,
deterrence of regional actors would be harder (Handberg, 2002). See pages 90-1.
194
Pages 2-4.
195
Page 112.
196
Pages 5 and 17. All three of these, he argued, could be present in the emerging regional states such as
North Korea and why he advocated for BMD. Missile defenses not only limit one’s vulnerabilities, but can
defend and limit damage should deterrence fail. While Wolf’s emphasis was on U.S. defense against such
a regional actor, it is reasonable to consider the three factors of North Korean decision-making to threats
to Japan, not just the U.S., as well as the value of Japan’s BMD, not just that of the U.S., to deter and
defend.
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against Limited Threats, 1991).197 While North Korea began to emerge as a significant
concern for U.S. deterrence, no empirical research explored Japan’s deterrent problem set
vis-à-vis North Korea. Part of the reason is likely the continued focus by theorists upon
deterring with punitive measures; BMD was viewed only in relation to those punitive
measures. Having no military punitive capabilities, Japan was excluded from deterrence
literature, despite its proximity to an immediate threat from North Korea.
Payne introduced the idea of placing emphasis upon what an adversary considers
to be “reasonable” in his decision-making, based upon lessons of the Gulf War and
dealing with Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein. What was not understood, according to
Payne, was that adversary behavior operates more upon what he believes to be
“reasonable” given his own values, expectations, and goals (Payne K. B., Missile
Defense in the 21st Century: Protection against Limited Threats, 1991). Regional actors
were less well understood than the Soviet Union. As a result, deterrence against such
actors may fail, increasing the value of missile defenses.198 This should have driven deep
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Page 49. Payne, for example, argued that the threat to civilians seen by millions on television during
the Gulf War transformed public views of ballistic missiles, even simple Scud missiles, in the hands of
potential enemies. It also raised awareness of missile defenses as Patriot missile batteries engaged Iraqi
Scuds. North Korea was not yet a dominant threat at the time of Payne’s book. In Figure 8, North Korea
does not appear on the list where U.S. BMD capabilities were compared to third party ballistic missile
threats, such as those posed by Iraq and China. In this context, Payne reminded the reader of the ballistic
missile threat in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and how U.S. options were constrained under difficult time
pressures, despite having conventional and nuclear superiority over the USSR. His implication was clear:
possession of BMD could have provided time and options against such a missile threat. Pages 56-60.
198
Pages 122-6. April Glaspie, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, suggested Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was
due to in part to Saddam Hussein being “stupid” (p. 125). Understanding an adversary does not guarantee
deterrence success but it does provide increased confidence in its effectiveness. Japan was not mentioned
among the seven. Payne summarized key lessons of the Gulf War on the missile defense debate as
follows: defenses do not need to be perfect to be useful; the ABM Treaty should not be considered
sacrosanct; deterrence will not suffice against third parties with missiles; limited missile defenses are
affordable; and, key U.S. allies will become increasingly supportive of missile defenses. On the latter point
concerning allies, Payne cites seven states interested in Patriot missile defenses, for example. Pages 1418.
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study of regional actors, including North Korea, two decades ago, but there is little
evidence of interest in doing so or empirical research based upon such study.
General vs. Immediate Deterrence.
In the early 1980s, Patrick Morgan separated deterrence problems conceptually
into general and immediate deterrence categories. General deterrence deals with the
purposeful managing of an existing adversarial relationship between two states, perhaps
over considerable time. No crisis threats implying war was imminent are present and the
situation could be considered stable, status quo, or relatively peaceful. Immediate
deterrence, however, is when one of those states has transitioned from stable conditions
into crisis by contemplating an attack and the other side is considering how to deal with
the potential egregious action, including making threats of retaliation. This concept was
examined later with a wide variety of studies by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett (Dougherty
& Pfaltzgraff, 2001).199 In his recent study, Stephen Quackenbush speaks of general
deterrence as being much broader than transition to crisis-oriented immediate deterrence.
General deterrence is regulatory and deals with “everyday decision making in somewhat
conflictual or adversarial relationships” (Quackenbush, Understanding General
Deterrence: Theory and Application, 2011).200 Quackenbush, however, does not explore
North Korea or the Japan-North Korea case in his study. He also limits his study to a
game-theoretic approach and does not conduct any in-depth qualitative case study
material for any of the adversaries considered. These are significant gaps in
understanding deterrence.
199

Pages 372-3. Freedman further states that general deterrence is operative as the deterred chooses to
respect the vital interests of the deterrer, creating a more stable relationship the longer this lasts. Political
changes can, however, upset these conditions, creating instability between the actors and, if going
unchecked in some way, crisis and immediate deterrence (Freedman, 2004). See page 42.
200
Page 4.
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Military procurement activities, such as Japan’s BMD, can be considered part of a
general deterrence strategy. Patrick Morgan, for example, suggests “procurement of
weapons systems” is one type of deterrence-related action in the strategic engagement
between the deterrer and deterred as the latter assesses the overall strategic environment
(Freedman, General Deterrence and the Balance of Power, 1989).201 Japan’s BMD can
also be seen as a central component of a Japanese general deterrence strategy, while
North Korea assesses Japan’s BMD within the overall security environment. However,
this critical detail has not been addressed in any significant general deterrence empirical
research.
Assessing whether general deterrence is working is analytically challenging
though an essential component of policy. When general deterrence is working, Colin
Gray argued, “it is apt to leave a shortage of convincing evidence for the data mills of
social scientists,” a phenomenon “utterly beyond research” and “well out of sight.” It is,
nevertheless, “at work” in influencing the behavior of foreign political leaders in part
through norms (Gray, Maintaining Effective Deterrence, 2003).202 Gray acknowledges a
critical gap but appears to resign assessment of general deterrence to the realm of
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Page 203. Colin Gray also speaks of capabilities, even intangible ones, such as the determination of a
civilian population, as “strategic currency” used to achieve one’s political and military ends (Gray, War,
Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, 2007). Page 254. Japan’s BMD, for
example, could be viewed as such a “currency” in its relations with North Korea under general deterrence
conditions.
202
Pages 29-30. As the author has suggested in an edited volume, deterrence is a “competition of wills”
between political leaders. Further, this competition need not wait until crisis to be operative. In keeping
with the concept of general deterrence, deterrence operations include activities done in peacetime in a
purposeful, dynamic, ongoing way to influence adversary leaders (Kamp & Yost, 2009). In the dissertation
author’s chapter entitled “Concepts for Deterrence Operations.” Pages 197-9. From a different point of
view, Handberg argued that deterring nuclear conflict in the Cold War was easy to conceptualize.
However, as the level of potential conflict decreases, deterrence becomes more ambiguous and difficult
to operationalize as a concept (Handberg, 2002). One can presume from his argument, therefore,
deterrence of adversary behavior in general deterrence or crisis conditions is even more challenging. See
page 105.
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impossible. However, if this is the case, then adversary behavior that conforms with, or
departs from, such norms can be a useful measure of general deterrence effectiveness.
The dissertation seeks to address this gap through use of the strategic profile and
quantitative analysis to offer insights into the challenges of North Korean behavior under
general deterrence conditions. This offers a unique approach to general deterrence and
the possibility of a “norming” effect of Japan’s BMD in the Japan-North Korea case.
The challenge of assessing general deterrence could also be supplemented with
other approaches to provide analytic insights. For example, using an approach similar to
the dissertation, A. Cooper Drury and Stephen Quackenbush analyzed the impact of U.S.
national missile defenses upon deterrence with three other states. They did this by
examining the levels of dissatisfaction in their relations, assuming satisfaction reflected a
stable deterrence relationship (Drury & Quackenbush, 2007).203 As a result, the
dissertation will also consider the broader stability of Japan-North Korea relations as an
indicator of the deterrence relationship. This is also a unique empirical approach to the
Japan-North Korea case and will be done in the review of cooperative-conflictual
interactions in the quantitative analysis chapter.
Japan’s general deterrence challenge can in some general ways be compared with
the Israeli model, though violent interaction is the norm in Israeli experience. In
describing the Israeli experience and evolution of its concept of deterrence, Thomas Rid
suggested that deterrence was “restrictive,” and not absolute. This means that most
deterrence relations, including the ones to which Israel is enjoined, do not anticipate
203

Pages 9 and 13-4. Further, their approach incorporated data from the IDEA dataset and measures of
dissatisfaction reflecting WEIS indicators, aspects used in the dissertation’s quantitative analysis. Their
findings, though not incorporating very much qualitative analysis, showed missile defenses, in these
cases, had no significant effect on dissatisfaction and, therefore, did not upset otherwise stable
deterrence relationships.
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absolute and permanent adversary restraint in aberrant behavior; rather, the use of force is
considered by Israel to be necessary occasionally for deterrence to succeed. Further,
instead of deterrence by threats of high retribution, deterrence is achieved in a “golden
range” of interactive behavior between two actors in a relationship of norms—norms are
achieved by limited use of force, if needed, with low levels of retribution in play (Rid,
2012).204 The Israeli concept suggests “tacit bargaining” occurs in “violent dialogue”
between two actors. This idea also reflects legal philosophy where violence cannot be
removed from society, and instead is mitigated by law enforcement mechanisms in a riskmanagement strategy. The use of force creates and maintains rules, but disproportionate
use of force is only for redefining or reestablishing the rules of the game that occasionally
are breached by the adversary. The goal, therefore, given the realities of an ongoing
deterrence relationship, is to deter through decisions and actions not too low to be weak,
not too high to be provocative or escalatory, but through actions in the “golden range” of
acceptable cooperative-conflictual interaction—doing just a little more when needed to
encourage the adversary back down when he breaks the rules (Rid, 2012).205
The North Korean deterrence challenge for Japan is, therefore, somewhere
between traditional general deterrence and immediate deterrence—a deterrence literature
gap. Further, it is somewhere between traditional general deterrence and the behavioral
“norms” ascribed by the Israelis in their “golden range” of violence that lies somewhere
just short of immediate deterrence. North Korean behavior is neither completely status
quo under peacetime general deterrence conditions, nor frequently or continually violent
as violence is the accepted norm. North Korea, on the other hand, presents periodic
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Pages 127-8 and 137-40.
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provocations and aberrant behavior, including occasions of violence. In this case, Japan
can use its BMD, and supplement its BMD as needed, to carefully manage North Korean
behavior with the expectation that there will be episodes of cooperation short of
permanent peace and competition short of armed conflict. For Japan, BMD is a staple of
deterrence and through various BMD-related decisions and activities can “bargain” with
North Korea in a “law enforcement” way to maintain North Korean norms of behavior.
This type of approach is not addressed empirically in the deterrence literature.
“Tailoring” Deterrence.
In studying a case of deterrence, Raymond Aron (1969) broke it into five
meaningful parts: (1) the actor doing the deterring; (2) the actor being deterred; (3) what
that actor is being deterred from doing; (4) the circumstances that exist during the
deterring; and, (5) the means being used to deter. This is an early suggestion that
deterrence must be “tailored” in its approach in order to be effective (Dougherty &
Pfaltzgraff, 2001).206 The early 1980s also saw a change in U.S. thinking about the nature
of deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, including the ideas of tailoring deterrence to the
adversary and continually adjusting that strategy. The idea of tailoring required taking
into account, and then purposefully shaping, Soviet perspectives (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1986).207 Ironically, the U.S. approach to deterring the Soviet seemed to
capture third and fourth wave deterrence ideas at the end of the Cold War and not its
beginning.
However, unlike the long period of Cold War superpower confrontation, recent
years have been characterized by dynamic shifts in international politics, the centers and
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strengths of relative power, and sources and types of threats. A “one size fits all”
deterrence approach under these circumstances seemed dubious if not perilous. M. Elaine
Bunn suggested that deterrence “tailoring” could be done in three general ways: to
specific actors and situations; by kinds of capabilities; and, communicating intentionally
(Bunn, 2007).208 Michael Mazarr and James Goodby argue deterrence strategy should be
approached by policymakers as a “highly contingent tool” requiring careful consideration
of the context for which it is being called upon (Shultz, Drell, & Goodby, 2011).209 This
approach is similar to the approach in the DO JOC and represents the relationship
described between Japan and North Korea in the dissertation.
Adversary Understanding.
Regardless of whether one is deterring a formidable nuclear power, such as
Russia or China, a regional actor, such as North Korea or Iran, or a non-state actor,
emphasis is placed on the need for a deeper understanding of that adversary and its
leadership. Not simply a review of its military capabilities, adversary understanding
entails what they perceive in the environment, and how those perceptions interact with
other perceptions of national identity and personal psychological factors. Adversary
understanding, therefore, requires a broader case study including a biographical sketch of
its leader making the decisions one seeks to deter. In this section, in addition to ideas on
adversary decision-making modeling generally, another important feature has been
consideration of the adversary’s decision calculus in deterrence strategy, particularly the
psychological factors involved in adversary leader decisions and ideas for better
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In Chapter 2 entitled, “Redefining the Role of Deterrence.” Pages 51-8.
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understanding them.210 Psychological analysis is no panacea. However, Jerrold Post,
Stephen Walker, and David Winter suggest a leader’s personality can matter a great deal
under certain circumstances, including when the actor occupies a strategic location (Post
J. M., 2003).211 This may apply to North Korean leaders given their position in Northeast
Asia and its security affairs.
Walter Langer’s report on Adolf Hitler was a pioneering biographical sketch and
psychological analysis of an adversary leader conducted for the U.S. Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) early in World War II (Langer, 1972).212 Langer organized his project
around the person of Hitler and considered many of the types of topics still used by others
today in adversary studies or biographical sketches including, among other areas, the
social construct in which he led Germany and his emotive qualities (Langer, 1972).213
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A significant amount of research and theorizing exists on this topic, some of it repetitive, some
conflictual, others unique. Some of the details will be provided in the introduction to Chapter Five:
Strategic Profile – Part I. Robert Joseph and John Reichart refer to this type study as a “strategic
personality of the adversary” (Joseph & Reichart, 1999). See page 29. Robert Butterworth, given the
dynamics of the 21st Century strategic environment, finds the notion of using deterrence as an organizing
strategy troubling. Butterworth argues, “Deterrence, in sum, can be a desirable goal but an impossible
guide. In pursuing it the country is seeking security through a concept that requires unavailable data
about unknown processes, that is not empirically testable, and that cannot be shown to be working.” He
does, however, acknowledge the DO JOC and its analytic approach in his footnote. The weaknesses and
challenges notwithstanding, the dissertation will use the DO JOC, in part, to explore the influential effects
of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean leader perceptions, decisions, and behavior (Returning to
Fundamentals: Deterrence and U.S. National Security in the 21st Century, 2011). See pages 4, 7.
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Pages 1-2.
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Pages 5, 11 and 25.
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Pages 153-233. Interestingly, Langer laid out eight possible future scenarios and addressed each with
psychological factors developed after examining Hitler’s patterns of behavior, concluding that if things
turned against Germany, the most plausible outcome was Hitler committing suicide—the culmination of
successive defeats and loss of self-confidence. See pages 237-41, 254. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff warn,
however, of the difficulty of drawing, for example, a definitive causal linkage between a distant past
emotive event of a foreign leader and his present behavior. The dissertation uses a mixed methods
approach in order to understand, where possible, correlations of North Korean behavior in relation to
Japan’s missile defense program activities. In doing so, the dissertation seeks insights into this relationship
from study of variables and data on both sides while avoiding drawing overly confident causal linkages
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). Page 559.
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One of the earliest authoritative reports on how various psychological factors
correspond to nuclear conflict prevention, including deterrence, was published in 1964 by
a group of psychiatrists formed in 1946. Psychological factors were placed among other
factors in decision-making, including social, economic, and political factors (Committee
on Social Issues, 1964).214 These experts suggested that key psychological factors can be
grouped in six categories: psychological defense mechanisms, such as denial and
emotional isolation; the effects of fear or panic that can lead to impulsive behavior
without regard to long-term consequences; dehumanization of man and society to
depersonalize suffering consequent to conflict involving use of WMD; ethnocentric
perceptual distortions or nationalism, creating stereotypical views of the opponent,
ineffective communication, distrust, and misperceptions of what is reasonable behavior;
mutual distrust fostering bad expectations leading to self-fulfilled bad behavior; and, the
realities of the situation, combined with the psychological factors above, create internal
conflict within political leaders seeking to maintain power and prestige domestically, on
the one hand, while trying to deescalate tensions with the adversary in that situation
(Committee on Social Issues, 1964).215 These types of psychological factors may also be
part of North Korean leadership decision-making and will be addressed where possible in
the strategic profile chapters.
Process-wise, the perceptions of an adversary leader, including images,
environmental stimuli and the behavior of other actors, are shaped through the leader’s
mental processes and form cognitive constructions of the circumstances and situation at
hand. How such a leader perceives the situation will in turn shape his view of the possible

214
215

Page 229.
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range of choices and any decisions that follow by that leader. Perceptions, therefore, are
the essential ingredients of a decision. While conceptually this is a simple explanation of
adversary decision-making, psychologists and theorists alike agree reality is complex,
complicated further by a lack of in-depth empirical information from leaders in the
process of perception formation and decision response (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff,
2001).216 Jervis’s approach addresses “how decision-makers perceive others’ behavior
and form judgments about their intentions” using two parts or steps. The first is the
actor’s perceptions (images held and beliefs) as a cause of his behavior. The second step
is comparison of the perception with previous information or perceptions (Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 1976).217 Cognition, then,
generally deals with a decision-maker’s “process” of information-handling—it is
essentially a mental activity.
Cognition has certain elements and steps of order, including: input source (i.e., the
environment); method of input reception (i.e., written communication; action);
interpretation of the input; and, ascription of meaning to the decision-maker and decision
calculus. Cognition merges objective or rational inputs with psychological factors
throughout the cognitive process. For example: dissonance and heuristics may arise early
in these steps; sentiments of national identification or other social factors may emerge in
the middle; and, personal emotions of the leader may play a factor later in the process.
Perceived consequences in a decision calculus, then, are cognitively constructed but
216

Page 593.
Pages 29-31. He cautioned, however, in placing too much emphasis or reliability on psychology in
international relations and suggested five ways psychologists err: over-emphasis on emotional versus
cognitive factors of misperception; laboratory experiments drive psychological theories, not the real
world; policy biases exist in most analyses; “over-psychologizing” overlooks the existence of an
international system and its components; and, they do not explain how people think since they are based
in large measure on relatively small, unimportant beliefs. See pages 3-4, 8.
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environmentally and socially informed. Further, calculus perceptions can be discounted,
accentuated, dropped, or misinterpreted as psychological elements interact with more
objective cost-benefit calculations. The mixed-method approach in the dissertation relies
on tools like the strategic profile of North Korea, long-term data of broad external
relations, and an analytic evaluative section to infer North Korean perceptions and their
sources and how these may relate to Japan’s missile defenses.
Psychological factors also emerge in adversary actions in deterrence relationships.
Negotiations, for example, involve psychological aspects to be successful, including:
avoidance of weakness; respect for the power position of the other; identification of
shared values, principles, and goals; and appropriate use of candor or concealment of
information (Committee on Social Issues, 1964).218 Some adversary leaders also displace
blame of domestic problems on external factors including historical animosities or
interactions with others (Committee on Social Issues, 1964).219 This type consideration
appears to be another gap in the deterrence literature, particularly the Japan-North Korea
case. This situation could be present in the North Korea-Japan relationship given their
historical and conflictual past.
Other psychological factors involved in deterrence relationships could include:
unmotivated biases—results of inherent cognitive limitations and the need to avoid being
overwhelmed by environmental complexity and ambiguity—which lead to
misperceptions of reality (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 1989);220
problems associated with a leader’s health, including masking illness by a leader’s inner
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Taken from chapter one, “Introduction: Approach and Assumptions.” Pages 4-5.
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circle, drug and alcohol abuse, and, aging and personality (Post & Robins, 1993);221 pride
as a motivation for accepting higher risks in crisis and conflict (Payne K. B., Missile
Defense in the 21st Century: Protection against Limited Threats, 1991);222 cognitive
dissonance, where too much information or stimuli can simply overload a leader and, to
cope, he might distort the information to match his core beliefs to simplify decisionmaking (Smith, 2006);223 uncertainty generally, explains why adversary decision-making
requires calculating (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001);224 interpretation of environmental
factors or the filtering of information through the leader’s inner decision support group
(Raser, 1969);225 one’s willingness to suffer pain, perhaps enduring pain over time
(Lebow, 1996);226 overconfidence in one’s abilities (Jervis, Deterrence and Perception,
1982-1983);227 failing to recognize the value of other policy alternatives (Jervis,
Deterrence and Perception, 1982-1983);228 the tendency to assimilate new information to
fit one’s preexisting beliefs (Jervis, Deterrence and Perception, 1982-1983);229 or, the
notion of “learning” through interactions (Bennett & Bueno de Mescquita, 2003).230
While there are too many factors to explore in the scope of the dissertation, some of these
psychological factors, such as pride or the limiting role of a leader’s inner circle, will be
221

Pages xiii-xv. One case explored was the health of U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt late in his
presidency, and his decision-making and behavior representing the U.S. in negotiations with foreign
leaders at the 1945 Yalta Conference. In this case, Roosevelt’s decision-making was clearly impaired by
various illnesses. The consequences included: very little intervention in discussions; lack of mental vigor;
difficulty formulating and expressing his thoughts; drifting from consciousness; and, diminished reasoning.
See pages 25-30. Illness may have been a factor both in the lives of Kim Il-Sung and his son, Kim Jong-Il,
the two North Korean leaders reigning during the period considered in the dissertation.
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Pages 118-20.
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Pages 553-5.
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Pages 51-2.
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Pages 555-8 and 561.
227
Pages 20-4.
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considered in the strategic profile. Doing so may offer insights into the North Korean
calculus and how Japan’s BMD may influence it.
Ways and Means of Deterrence.
The ways and means of deterrence can best be understood as approaches to
influencing the adversary’s decision calculus. “Ways” include, for example, imposing
costs or denying benefits. “Means” refers to military and non-military instruments of
power that can be applied against the different “ways” with a view toward influencing
adversary decisions and behavior.
Snyder includes at least three parts of a deterrence decision calculus described
later by the DO JOC, including benefits of restraint, costs of action imposed if he acts,
and benefits of action denied if she acts. Snyder characterizes benefit-denial as
influencing the probabilities of an adversary achieving his objectives by, for example,
holding one’s territory, and by limiting damage to one’s forces and nation (Snyder G. H.,
1961).231
Cost of restraint as a deterrence concept was described by Kenneth Watman and
Dean Wilkening in their explanation of prospect theory and deterrence. Prospect theory,
stemming from psychology, economics, and political science together, suggests the
“prospect” of losses can influence leader decision-making in ways contrary to predictions
of expected utility (Watman & Wilkening, 1995).232 This description closely resembles
231

Pages 4, 9-11, and 14-5.
Pages 22-3. In one way, they will take more risk to avoid a loss than obtain a gain—losses simply weigh
more than gains. In a second way, higher losses are risked with acting to avoid smaller, but sure, losses of
not acting. According to the authors, this is referred to as “the strategic costs of inaction,” where such
costs of restraint are simply unacceptable and push the decision-maker to action. In this case, “leaders
facing losses can be expected to choose a course of action that runs the risk of greater losses so long as
this choice contains the possibility of averting the loss.” Probabilities of the risks are important and play
upon the decision. The original article on prospect theory by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky was
described as an alternative risk-based model to expected utility. A key feature was the replacement of
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the “costs of restraint” described in the DO JOC, though the DO JOC concept tends to be
risk-neutral; should an adversary be deemed risk-acceptant, then prospect theory would
suggest the costs of restraint may weigh more than other factors in his decision-making.
These ideas are also expressed in the exceptional 1962 book on U.S. and Japanese
decision-making in and around the attack on Pearl Harbor by Roberta Wohlstetter
(Wohlstetter, 1962).233
According to the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC),
the DoD’s most extensive and recent concept document on deterrence, “Deterrence
operations convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by
means of decisive influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved
by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs while encouraging restraint
by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome” (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2006).234 The idea of influence over adversary decision-making
is central to the dissertation.
The DO JOC also described several assumptions for deterrence strategy. First,
adversary “decisions to act are based on actors’ calculations regarding alternative courses
of action and actors’ perceptions of the values and probabilities of alternative outcomes
associated with those courses of action.” According to the DO JOC, the adversary leader
is informed in his decision calculus from various sources, including: “historical, cultural,

one’s expected utility of final assets with “values” of relative gain or loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). See
page 263.
233
Pages 354 and 356-7. She argued Japan was faced with a decision of going to war with U.S. or face
national collapse and dishonor. The difference, in the Japanese calculation, was that at least in the war
option the Japanese “wishfully” calculated the probability of U.S. acquiescence. The risks of not attacking
were so overpowering, “the Japanese never seriously considered restraint.” The U.S. simply did not think
Japan willing to accept such risks.
234
Page 8.
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religious, ideological, political, military, informational, organizational, bureaucratic,
personal, and other factors” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006).235 Alternative “courses
of action” appear to be either choosing to act or choosing to refrain from taking action.
Alternative “outcomes” are described in terms of various perceived “consequences” of
acting (benefits or costs) or restraining (again, benefits or costs). Perception “values”
suggest a hierarchy of perceived consequences (i.e., some perceived consequences will
matter more than others). Perception “probabilities” suggest the adversary judges some
consequences to be more likely than others. His decision to act or restrain will, therefore,
be based upon some internal calculations that consider more important factors and their
likelihoods. Second, acknowledging the lack of ideal information about adversary
leadership and its decision-making, the DO JOC states the assumption that “some
adversary values and perceptions relevant to their decision-making can be identified,
assessed, and influenced” by others, particularly the deterrer (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2006).236 The dissertation will be based upon partial information of North
Korean leadership, and that in large part provided by outside sources including outside
experts and analysts with modest or no firsthand experience or interaction with the
North’s senior leaders. Third, the DO JOC assumes, at least for deterrence planning
purposes, the adversary leader to be “rational,” meaning he calculates his decision based
on perceived consequences of action and restraint. Irrational leaders, such as those who
make decisions based upon random factors, are rare (U.S. Department of Defense,
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2006).237 This closely compares with the description of rationality provided by Keith
Payne and others and is applied in the dissertation.
Further, the DO JOC describes an ends-ways-means approach to deterrence
operations. The “end” is decisive influence over the adversary’s decision such that he
chooses to restrain from egregious action. The “ways” speak to altering each of the four
broad perceptual components of his calculus (costs and benefits of action; costs and
benefits of restraint). Lastly, the “means” speak to various instruments of national power
that can affect influence over the adversary’s perceptions in some way, including a wide
variety of military and non-military kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities (U.S. Department
of Defense, 2006).238
Deterrence in theory and practice is about decision calculations and influencing
the calculations of your opponent. Such calculations can either be material or
psychological. Forms of influence might broadly include diplomatic, economic, and
military means employed in many types of activities. Military means can include nuclear
and non-nuclear strike forces; conventional combat power; defenses including BMD;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; cyber warfare capabilities;
and space-related capabilities. Non-military instruments of power can include diplomacy;
economic and financial sanctioning capacity; and, law enforcement means. A deterrent
237

Pages 11, 25 and 39.
Pages 19-20. The author, in his 2009 NATO article, expands upon the calculus components by
suggesting, from the adversary’s perspective, perceived benefits of action and costs of restraint
“undermine” deterrence because they both work in favor toward an adversary choosing to act
(deterrence failure). Benefits of action are attractive and “pull,” as it were, the adversary’s choice toward
acting. Costs of restraint are painful motivators that “push” the adversary to acting. On the other hand,
perceived costs of action and benefits of restraint “enhance” deterrence since they favor restraint. In a
similar push/pull fashion, costs of action can be fearful inhibitors that “push” the adversary to restrain,
while benefits of restraint, oftentimes dubbed “carrots” of deterrence, attract or “pull” the adversary’s
choice toward restraint from action. The role of deterrence strategy is, therefore, to use available means
to “moderate” those perceptions that incentivize him to act and “reinforce” those perceptions that
incentivize him to refrain (Kamp & Yost, 2009). See page 204-5.
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activity can include, for example, the movement and positioning of the defender’s
military forces (Huth P. K., 1988).239 This type of behavioral feature compares to Japan’s
activities with its BMD development and deployment over time. Another activity can be
the use of targeted financial sanctions to deter, as was done on North Korea in 2005 in
response to weapons sales, counterfeiting activities, and general concerns over North
Korean nuclear proliferation (Shultz, Drell, & Goodby, 2011).240
As described earlier, nuclear weapons have played an essential role in 20th
Century deterrence, though that role has changed with the end of the Cold War and
emergence of regional threats. Acknowledging the post-Cold War security environment,
Lawrence Kaplan argued “…when the point is to deter a group of states that, between
them, possess fewer than two dozen ICBMs, enshrining defenselessness in official policy
makes no sense” (Dudley, 2003).241 BMD, therefore, makes much more sense in defense
and deterrence, particularly in Japan’s case.
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Page 34.
In Chapter 2 entitled, “Redefining the Role of Deterrence.” Pages 60-5. The U.S. Treasury Department
undertook sanctioning charges against Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a financial institution in Macau handling
funds for illicit North Korean activities. The immediate effect was the freezing of $25 million in assets
belonging to the North Korean regime. That same month the U.S. offered a nonaggression pledge as a
step toward normalization of relations. The financial sanctions could have proven an effective deterrent
tool but in the end had the opposite effect: the North Koreans abandoned the Six Part Talks; they
conducted missile tests; and, they tested a nuclear device. The authors argue a key problem was
managing deterrence expectations. Deterrence in the modern era, with challenges such as North Korea,
requires nuanced approaches to influencing “discontinuity” from the status quo. Failure in this case led to
U.S. self-restraint and North Korea meeting its objectives of regime survival, unambiguous movement to
being a nuclear power, and continuation of illicit behavior. It was as if the U.S. understood the demands of
peacetime, general deterrence, with little engagement and emphasis upon static capabilities, and that of
immediate deterrence, with crisis action and overt saber-rattling. It did not, however, know how to
navigate between the two with a state like North Korea. This is precisely where Japan finds itself today.
241
Pages 70-3. In the case of chemical and biological weapons atop ballistic missiles, as in the threat facing
Japan, Jon Day concluded deterrence and missile defenses to be the critical elements for addressing those
threats (Ranger, 1998). See pages 22-8. Missile defenses are also an instrumental component of policy
and a technological response to specific types of threats, an idea dating back to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz
(Peoples, 2010). Pages 1 and 11-6.
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Anne Sartori argues that deterrence is a form of communication or a “form of
talk.” Deterrence is, therefore, essentially interstate communication and diplomacy the
public face of deterrence. For example, the well-known “diplomatic protest” is both a
verbal or written statement of unhappiness toward another country, but it carries an
intrinsic message of sanction behind it. As such, it is a form of deterrence (Sartori,
2005).242 There are many examples of diplomatic activities, even protests over ballistic
missiles, from Japan toward North Korea that can be categorized, therefore, as deterrence
activities. Related to diplomatic activities are “signaling” and strengthening one’s
reputation in the mind of the adversary.
Signaling, according to Richard Ned Lebow, can communicate one’s limited
objectives to an adversary in crisis or conflict to avoid wider violence, though signaling
has a mixed record in deterrence (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, Psychology and Deterrence,
1989).243 Schelling also emphasized the need for signaling (Lebow, 1996).244 Signaling,
either through communication or physical action, can also be a means of escalation
management to set a norm or to establish one’s reputation (Morgan, Mueller, Medeiros,
Pollpeter, & Cliff, 2008).245 These are important considerations to Japan in its signaling
with BMD to North Korea. However, as Lebow points out, the adversary may not ascribe
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Pages 124-5.
Taken from chapter 9, “Conclusions.” Pages 204-6. Lebow provides examples of how psychological
factors can interrupt deterrence strategies, including “signaling” activities to the opponent. Two common
mistakes occur by otherwise well-intentioned states seeking to signal effectively. First, they assume their
adversary shares common symbols in communication, even though they may speak different languages or
have different cultures. Subtle signals, therefore, have a poor track record of success. Unfortunately, even
“calibrated signals” usually fail for this reason. Complexity in signaling and signaling during high drama
make reception and understanding of the signal challenging for the receiver. Second, they fail to
understand the context of the signal and how that context can ascribe certain meanings to the signal,
including unintended inferences. For example, a signal must depart in some way from the “norm” of
activity such that it draws attention by the adversary.
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meaning, or salience, of the signal sent in the same way as the sender (Lebow, 1996).246
This suggests that North Korean reactions to Japan’s BMD activities may not follow as
Japan intended or as some missile defense-deterrence arguments suggest.
Deterrence assessment, in the end, is an exceedingly difficult challenge given the
literature review provided above. Then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
acknowledged the difficulty in knowing whether deterrence strategies are working, in
contrast to earlier thinking which measured differences in forces. He argued deterrence
success was an intangible, stating, “We can never really measure how much aggression
we have deterred, or how much peace we have preserved (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1986).”247 Snyder, likewise, did not provide any process for the deterrer in
making effectiveness evaluations, since the calculus factors are “highly intangible,
unpredictable, unmeasurable, and incommensurable except in an intuitive way” (Snyder
G. H., 1961).248 Further, Handberg suggested that, because deterrence success is the
appearance of nothing happening, it can be self-deceptive to rely on lack of activity as a
measurement of success. He argues that, in reality, deterrence has only been measured in
failures (Handberg, 2002).249 This notion is one of the greatest and most enduring
deterrence theoretic and analytic gaps in the literature. While the mixed method approach
to the dissertation is a new one in which analytical inferences may be available,
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Pages 566-7. For example, while the U.S. saw crossing the Yalu River from North Korea to China akin to
someone crossing over the Rio Grande into the U.S., the Chinese simply did not see the Yalu nor the
restraint from crossing it the same way. The consequence was they did cross it, marking that incident as a
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inferences from the qualitative strategic profile and North Korean behavioral activity
captured in the quantitative chapter suggest some assessment is possible. Even modest
improvement in general deterrence assessment, however, would help address this
considerable gap and generate new thinking on the “impossible.”
Missile Defenses
Historical Development
Technical development of missile defenses in the United States began near the
close of World War II as the U.S. and allies sought solutions to new long-range rockets
used by Nazi Germany, such as the V-2 rocket. The combined threat of long-range, soon
to be intercontinental-range, ballistic missiles with nuclear and then thermonuclear
weapons drove research of defenses capable of engaging nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
This research raised serious technical and feasibility questions and, as the notion of U.S.
offensive and defensive capability mixes emerged in response to the threats posed by the
Soviet Union and China so, too, did questions of how best to deter such threats (Adams,
1971).250
Key decision points for the United States in its missile defense program
development can provide comparisons for Japan’s program development. For the U.S.,
four periods can be defined; these four periods also compare generally to the key decision
points and periods of Japan’s missile defense program, making review of the U.S. case
even more germane to this dissertation. The first period of consideration was
approximately 1945-1955, and includes: the end of World War II; technical growth
coming from the need to address the German air and rocket threat; the rise of Soviet and
Chinese ballistic missile and nuclear threats; and exploration of some concepts for missile
250
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defenses (Adams, 1971).251 This period provided a baseline of U.S. thinking and activity
prior to the later BMD development period. The second period in the U.S. ballistic
missile system program development, 1955-1958, saw initial study; and, by later
standards, small U.S. military efforts into missile defense feasibility. This activity drew
on experience in air defense technical development in the post-war period and included
research mostly for the U.S. Army, such as Project NIKE, Hercules, and ZEUS (Adams,
1971).252 The third period, 1958-1967, marked a large resource commitment by the U.S.
government for ballistic missile defense research, development, and testing (Adams,
1971).253 Given the resource commitment, technological growth was rapid, leaving ZEUS
behind in favor of an improved NIKE-X, then SENTINEL (a dual-missile defense
system), and eventually the SAFEGUARD system designed less for point defense of U.S.
military bases and more for wide area coverage of U.S. population centers. The fourth
period lasted from 1967-1976 and was a period of U.S. BMD deployment in the face of
Soviet (especially the SS-9 ICBM) and Chinese ballistic missile and nuclear threats
(Adams, 1971).254 The SAFEGUARD system was deactivated in 1976. In his policy
review of the introduction of U.S. ballistic missile defenses, Benson D. Adams argues
that the central decision upon which U.S. policymakers wrestled in the 1950s and 1960s
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Page 111. All U.S. BMD systems were to be armed with large nuclear weapons to destroy incoming
adversary warheads.
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Pages 177-249. The SAFEGUARD system was chosen, first to provide area coverage of U.S. cities against
Chinese attack (the fledgling Chinese ballistic missile and nuclear threat was deemed defensible by U.S.
BMD, but could also provide limited defense against various Soviet attack options). It could have as many
as 12 different sites around the U.S. However, as U.S. domestic resistance grew to the prospects of
nuclear-armed defensive missiles located in or near U.S. population centers (e.g., Seattle and Chicago),
and as arms control discussions occurred with the Soviet Union (including controls on BMD) the U.S.
chose to field SAFEGUARD around U.S. missile sites to protect them from Soviet ICBMs and in limited
numbers as part of the arms control bargain.
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was what kind and how much effect missile defenses would have on deterrence (Adams,
1971).255
A very significant shift in the debate about deterrence and defense occurred
following President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. This shift
fundamentally altered U.S. development of national security strategies and how BMD fit
into those strategies. In particular, the U.S. weighed deterrence, war-fighting, and
defensive focused strategies, recognizing overlap among them and ultimately preferring
the latter as the central approach to national security. These debates shaped the thinking
about missile defenses and deterrence for many years into the future. Deterrence-only
strategies were those where the “sole objective of strategic nuclear forces is to deter” and
deterrence operated through the threat of retaliation (Carter & Schwartz, 1984).256 Warfighting strategies assumed nuclear war could occur and would, therefore, demand
extensive planning for using nuclear weapons, defenses, and terminating conflict with a
favorable outcome (Carter & Schwartz, 1984).257 The defense-centric strategies were
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Pages 37-40. Two primary deterrence strategies emerged, differing only in what was to be targeted,
that helped frame the role and value of missile defenses. First, “minimum deterrence” described a way to
deter by possessing nuclear capabilities that threaten targets most valued by the opponent including his
cities or industrial centers. BMD was thought to be destabilizing in this strategy since it would only lead to
a nuclear offensive arms race. Opposing this was the “countervailing strategy” which targeted adversary
military forces and leadership. BMD had value in this strategy, since it could protect U.S. ICBMs and
command and control nodes it necessary to survive Soviet counterstrike.
257
Pages 41-3. To be effective, these strategies required high technologies for employing nuclear weapons
with minimal collateral damage and for defense of one’s high value military and civil assets. The central
deterrent feature in these strategies was benefit-denial—denying the adversary his desired political or
military objectives. In the 1960s, war-fighting was abandoned as a plausible “damage limitation” strategy
and the U.S. instead focused its war-fighting capabilities on offensive systems and “assured destruction,”
a form of minimum deterrence in that deterrence, in a formulaic way, was assessed to be operative if
sufficient U.S. counterstrike forces were available to destroy 20-30% of Soviet population and 50-75% of
its industrial capacity. After President Reagan unfolded the SDI quest for the feasibility of a
comprehensive defensive shield over the U.S., thinking on war-fighting strategies changed in that they
provided confidence in defense of the nation and, in doing so, enhanced deterrence of adversaries and
assured allied as well. Not only did new war-fighting strategies require a high “damage expectancy”
confidence level with offensive systems, but quality defenses could ensure the U.S. a favorable position
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preferred by the Reagan administration, though were less well-defined. The objective was
to render Cold War deterrence strategies and nuclear offensive forces “obsolete” through
the development and deployment of an expansive and technically superior strategic
defense system, including vast midcourse and boost-phase BMD capabilities, coupled
with offensive force reductions (Carter & Schwartz, 1984).258
Technical Characteristics of Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defenses
Ballistic Missiles.
Offensive ballistic missiles have different properties associated with them
throughout the duration of their flight. These “phases” of flight of the attacking missile
have, therefore, been used to develop BMD capabilities, with some defending in one
phase while others defend in other phases. Having multiple ballistic missile defense
capabilities to defend in multiple phases of attacking missile flight is referred to as a
“layered defense” system. These phases of offensive ballistic missile flight include: boost
phase (from initial launch through layers of atmosphere, lasting 3-5 minutes); post-boost
phase (when the warhead, decoys, and other penetration aids separate from the “bus”
carrying them and fly into the exoatmosphere, lasting up to 6 minutes); midcourse phase
(flight of warheads and other objects through exoatmospheric to high endoatmospheric
altitudes, lasting as long as 20 minutes); and, the terminal phase (the reentry period when
decoys and penetration aids fall behind and the warhead passes through lower altitudes to
after nuclear conflict ended. To do so, strategic defenses needed to protect five categories of priority
assets in the U.S.: offensive forces; command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) facilities;
population centers; industry; and, other critical resources of the nation. BMD, along with other
components of defense, would need to expand greatly in this strategy.
258
Pages 43-6. This strategy, too, featured a benefit-denial concept that would deter by making the
prospects of attack uncertain. Proponents of this strategy argued that pressures within the U.S. and Soviet
Union would push the two sides toward a defensive strategy, given moral and political arguments and
technological improvements. They further argued imperfect defense would still be sufficient to deter.
Opponents argued that it could still be interpreted as a war-fighting strategy and would, therefore, make
the U.S. more willing to wage war since we could act with relative impunity.
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its target, lasting several seconds perhaps as long as one minute) (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1986).259 Offensive ballistic missile range is affected by the missile’s
booster power, makeup of the missile, its shooting angle or trajectory, the target it is
aiming at, and climate conditions (Abmann, 2007).260
Opponents can employ various countermeasures to defeat or disrupt specific
BMD components. These can be categorized as follows: blinding; spoofing and hiding;
hardening; and, evading and fast-burn techniques. Further, an opponent could use a
systems-wide approach to BMD countermeasures, including: saturation with a larger
number of attacking warheads (thought to be far cheaper than the defenses needed to
protect against such saturation); circumvention of part of the BMD system by evading its
area of coverage (e.g., use of depressed-trajectory missile flight profiles); and,
suppression, or directly attacking defensive components (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1986).261 Of the various tactics available to offensive capabilities,
penetration aids carried on ballistic missiles offer the attacker ways to stress missile
defenses and improve the chances of successful attack (Carter & Schwartz, 1984).262
Missile Defenses.
259

Pages 139-44.
Page 141, footnote 256.
261
Pages 170-77.
262
Penetration aids can include: decoy warheads; chaff; aerosols; maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs);
jammers; and, antiradiation homing vehicles. Decoys are intended to fool missile defenses into attacking
harmless objects causing the actual warhead to get through. Decoys are more effective in space
(exoatmospheric altitude) since there is no drag in weightless conditions of space and decoys fly like
actual warheads. Designing a decoy to fly and look like an actual reentry vehicle at lower altitudes of
approach (endoatmospheric) is very difficult. Chaff (fine metallic wires that reflect radar signals) and
aerosols (small beads that reflect light) can be employed at exoatmospheric altitudes to confuse
defending radars and optical sensors, respectively. Chaff and aerosols are not effective in the atmosphere
since they are slowed behind attacking warheads due to the effects of atmospheric drag. Pages 107-8,
including footnote 8. Other approaches to offense cited by Carter & Schwartz include: more ICBMs and
RVs; other weapons such as cruise missiles; attacking defenses; attacking C3 of the defenses; employment
tactics such as lofted trajectories; manipulation of nuclear effects; and shoot-look-shoot strategies. See
pp. 105-09.
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Functionally, missile defenses have changed little from their early development in
the post-war period. These generally include: acquisition and detection warhead or
reentry vehicle (RV) part of the missile through active radar surveillance; tracking of the
RV and, if possible, providing trajectory predictions; discrimination of the RV from other
incoming parts such as the missile booster, dummy or decoy RVs, and radar signal
saturating chaff; guidance and tracking of the defending interceptor missile to the
incoming RV; and interception of the RV by the interceptor or effects of its detonation
(Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 19551972, 1977).263 Likewise, the components of a BMD system have remained essentially
the same since the post-war period. These include: the radar for surveillance of enemy
missiles and RVs; computers for processing the vast amounts of data needed to
effectively engage defending against attacking missiles; the interceptor missiles (early
U.S. BMD systems were nuclear-tipped); and command, control, and communications
networks to knit all components together for display, decision-making, and engagement
(Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 19551972, 1977).264
As missile defenses proved their value during the Gulf War the prospects for
missile defense proliferation increased along with ideas for their role and deployment
patterns. One study conducted by analysts at RAND used a quantitative model of costeffective allocation. This study, which focused on conventional theater ballistic missile
threats, such as that posed by North Korea, stated regional ballistic missile threats,
coupled with WMD, could deter U.S. action or constrain it from achieving desired
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Pages 6-7.
Page 7.
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objectives in regional conflict. The Gulf War caused a shift in U.S. focus on missile
defenses, away from a comprehensive national system associated with the goals of SDI
and toward theater systems to defend against regional threats with limited offensive
missile forces (Larson & Kent, 1994).265 Modeling the outcomes of missile defense
engagements with one, two, and then three layers of defenses, demonstrated the more one
layers defenses to engage attacking missiles passing through each “phase” of flight, the
fewer total interceptors one needs to shoot to achieve a reasonably high probability of
kill. The study suggested optimum defense requires a layered approach utilizing a 4:1
ratio of defending missiles to attacking warheads. It further argued early engagement of
attacking missiles provided the highest payoff in missile defense efficiency (Larson &
Kent, 1994).266
Ballistic missiles can be defended with two types of “kill mechanisms:” kinetic
kill and directed-energy kill. Directed-energy systems (lasers and particle beams) use
three primary means to destroy or disrupt an attacking missile: functional kill (prevents
electronic components of the offensive weapon from performing properly); thermal kill
(heating attacking boosters to the point they weaken, deform, or melt); and, impulse kill
(shock waves collapse the target). Kinetic systems are designed to “hit” the attacking
missile or component and disrupt or destroy it through kinetic energy. Kinetic systems
use two primary means: nonnuclear kill (attacking missile is destroyed by collision); and,
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Page xi.
Pages xii-xiii. By allocating interceptors among layers, the study’s authors argue a theater BMD system
defending with 90% effectiveness against a regional adversary with over 500 potential attacking warheads
would cost about $15 billion, but about $10 billion less than a single-layer system built to defend the
same threat. Pages 56-8.
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nuclear kill (missile is disrupted or destroyed by impact or effects of the defending
missile’s nuclear blast) (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986).267
Reliability of BMD has plagued its development and political support, possibly
raising doubts in adversary minds about its effects in crisis or conflict. Some of these
questions have been addressed with testing over time as well as operational experiences
in conflict (Burns, 2010).268 More recently, the PAC-3 missile was reportedly “100%
effective in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” a claim provided by the missile’s producer
(Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2006).269 Performance of other, newer BMD systems is
vastly improved. For example, from 2002-2008 Aegis-based SM-2 and SM-3 systems
were successful in 18 of 22 tests while THAAD, from 2005-2009, was successful in 6 of
6 tests (Burns, 2010).270
Arguments For/Against Deterrence
Summary.
The Japan-North Korea deterrence problem set is not simply to deter war, or even
armed attack with ballistic missiles. As the various missile defense-deterrence arguments
portray, BMD can influence an adversary’s behavior by playing upon many perceptual
nuances or consequences of his decision under consideration. Adversary choices,
especially in the North Korean case, can involve behavior in many ways other than
267

Pages 155-8. The U.S. no longer retains a nuclear-armed kill mechanism (the Safeguard ABM system
used this type of kill mechanism), but Russia maintains an ABM system using nuclear-armed defensive
missiles.
268
Pages 74-5. For example, Philip E. Coyle, III, head of DoD’s weapons testing programs from 1994-2001,
believed Patriot PAC-3 batteries in the upcoming 2003 invasion of Iraq would suffer from unreliability and
be able to successfully engage less than 50% of Iraqi Scud missiles. After the invasion, the success rate
was estimated much higher, including the U.S. Army reporting 9 of 9 were shot down. This, however,
marks a significant improvement over PAC-2 performance in the Gulf War. According to a Government
Accounting Office (GAO) report, only four possible hits occurred out of 158 Patriot missiles launched at 47
Scuds. See page 110.
269
See “Missile of Choice” section.
270
Pages 124 and 130-1.
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simply choosing to fire, or not fire, ballistic missiles. The North Korean security posture
and power-based approach to diplomatic and economic relations are all undergirded by
its ballistic missiles. BMD, therefore, can influence North Korean choices across the
board. This broad perspective is the approach taken in the dissertation. The question is, as
Japan brought forth BMD to deter North Korean behavior, have any of the various
perceptions or influences of BMD presented in the literature factored into North Korea’s
calculus and possibly affected its choices and behavior? The 50+ arguments presented in
Table 1 below represent all of the pros and cons discovered in the dissertation’s research,
along with one other postulated by the author. For the sake of brevity, narrative
descriptions have been omitted here. The points of view, describing both how BMD can
enhance or help deterrence and how deterrence can be hurt or undermined by BMD, have
been categorized into a handful of broad “domains” of activity (i.e., political) and into
decision calculus categories perceived by the adversary (i.e., costs, benefits). The
arguments are taken from a variety of sources; some originate from a single case, others
from many cases. If the perspective has been repeated in several sources, multiple
sources may be cited; the source citations are not intended to be exhaustive but merely to
capture at least one source from which the idea originated. The author has, on occasion,
broadened the view captured in literature sufficiently to apply to the Japan-North Korea
case where, in the author’s judgment, this is possible. Other views are so narrow, such as
those dealing with implications for U.S.-USSR nuclear arms control, or those with
consequences explicitly in wartime conditions, that they are identified as N/A—not
applicable—to the focus of the dissertation and will not be addressed further.
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It appears, then, there are four broad ways to approach deterrence effectiveness
assessment or analytically to address whether an adversary’s decision-making
perceptions and behavior are changing. The first way is a lack of evidence of deterrence
failure. In other words, if deterrence was failing, or had failed, one would expect to
observe or hear certain types of statements or behavior or activities from the adversary.
The second way is if the adversary changes behavior or course of action altogether, away
from the thing being deterred. The third way one could assess deterrence may be working
is in drawing inferences about the adversary’s decision values and the effect of one’s
deterrence strategy upon those values as suggested above. Fourth, there may be relational
change with the deterrer politically or with respect to national security. Looking at
strategic profile and decision calculus types of qualitative information along with
quantitative data may provide insights or inferences into whether or not Japan’s BMD
program has had any deterrence effects in any of the four areas above. This is a unique
approach to addressing North Korean behavior and the effect of Japan’s BMD in KJI’s
calculus.
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Table 1: Arguments
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN
Introduction271
In the past 20 or more years, scholarly research has emphasized the utility of
missile defenses in warfighting, such as the 1991 Gulf War, or how defenses protect the
U.S. homeland against regional powers developing long-range missiles and nuclear
weapons. Japan, however, chose to develop and deploy its own BMD system for
deterrence of North Korean political coercion undergirded by ballistic missile threats
under general deterrence conditions and to defend itself against possible North Korean
raids with small numbers of non-nuclear ballistic missiles. Understanding whether and
how Japan’s BMD program contributed to, or undermined, deterrence of North Korean
coercion was the main idea of the dissertation and was pursued using multiple research
methods: (1) a review of historical interaction; (2) in-depth theoretic review of
deterrence, missile defenses, and their relationship; (3) in-depth study of North Korea and
its leadership; (4) research and development of a deterrence-oriented strategic profile; (5)
statistical analysis of North Korean behavior and possible changes correlated to Japan’s
BMD and other variables; and, (6) integrated analysis pulling upon information from all
the above. This basic framework is described below in greater detail. A discussion of the
research design begins below with a brief review of the theoretic background of
deterrence and missile defense.
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A note on nomenclature used in the dissertation: rather than using the formal title “Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea,” or DPRK, the terms North Korea and North Korean were used for readability
within the narrative; since the names of North Korea’s leaders are used with various spellings by different
authors and sources, one common style was adopted for use in the dissertation for all three of North
Korea’s leaders including Kim Il-Sung (founder and first leader, also abbreviated KIS), Kim Jong-Il (son of
KIS, second leader, dominant object of research in the dissertation, also abbreviated KJI), and Kim Jong-Un
(son of KJI, third and current leader, also abbreviated KJU); and, in Korean culture family surnames
precede given names and this style is maintained in the dissertation.
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The North Korean strategy with regional opponents has for years been one of
political coercion undergirded by a strong ballistic missile force capable of reaching a
wide variety of targets in the region, including targets in Japan. Though North Korean
coercive behavior is not limited to threats with, or provocative tests of, ballistic missiles,
the underlying threat against regional opponents is that of ballistic missiles—either with
overflight of missiles being tested, or the threat of direct missile raid as punishment for
noncompliance with the wishes of North Korean leaders. Further, the predominant North
Korean ballistic missile threat is regional; that is, North Korea’s missiles are not yet of
the range required to strike the continental United States. Instead, the vast majority of
their missiles is capable of, and likely intended to, reach targets within the Northeast Asia
region, including Japan. North Korean coercion toward Japan is not conceived, however,
as a binary behavioral decision of North Korea’s leaders where they were either highly
coercive toward Japan or highly cooperative. This would not be consistent with North
Korean patterns of behavior. Rather, North Korean behavior was expected to reflect
increases or decreases in cooperative and conflictual toward Japan in smaller gradients of
behavioral intensity over time across a wider range of positive and negative behavior.
This broad perspective is the approach taken in the dissertation.
For these reasons, ballistic missile defense (BMD) may play a special and
significant role for regional actors like Japan seeking to deter North Korea coercion or
attack with ballistic missiles. While BMD could certainly play a decisive role in conflict
involving attack upon Japan with ballistic missiles, it is the counter-coercion, deterrence
aspects of BMD of concern in the dissertation. Many theorize about the defensive value
of missile defenses in conflict or how BMD can help deter war from happening in the
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first place. But few discuss the possible deterrent effects of BMD in general deterrence
situations like that between Japan and North Korea. Nuclear retaliation is not an option
open to Japan, and while such a capability contributes to the prospect of escalation to
conflict, nuclear threats would not likely be very credible in general deterrence conditions
anyway. Japan finds itself needing its own, non-nuclear capabilities to deter North
Korean coercion independent of U.S. capabilities. In this way, Japan’s BMD would serve
to moderate North Korea’s behavior toward Japan and help establish norms of behavior
less provocative than they would be otherwise.
Two recent events involving North Korea’s Taepodong long-range offensive
ballistic missile point to the relationship between North Korea and Japan and the
potential role of missile defense to influence North Korean behavior. The first event was
the launch of Taepodong-1 on August 31, 1998, which overflew Japan. This event helped
solidify Japan’s pursuit of ballistic missile defenses, which were later accelerated after
North Korea, in 2006, first tested a nuclear device. On April 5, 2009, a longer-range
variant of Taepodong was launched, but the North Koreans opted to comply with a
United Nations request for safety of flight and navigation pre-launch notifications. The
behavior and statements of North Korea were clearly different from the 1998 event. But
why did they modify their behavior? Did deployment of Japan’s missile defenses
influence North Korea’s decision to test the missile in a less-threatening manner?
The advantages missile defenses provide the defender can, for example, influence
the attacker’s decision-making by denying the operational benefits sought—at least to the
degree BMD is effective—and denying political benefits sought by the attacker with the
use of his missiles whether or not BMD is highly effective. In this case, use of missile
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defense decreases the adversary leader’s perception of the probability the missile attack
will successfully reap the benefits sought, and illustrates but one way missile defense can
deter an aggressor from carrying out a missile attack in the first place. However, because
ballistic missiles are such an integral part of North Korea’s strategy toward Japan, the
influence of Japan’s missile defenses upon North Korean leadership will likely be
reflected widely across North Korean behavior.
The central question was not simply whether Japan’s BMD affected only North
Korean ballistic missile-related activity—this was too narrow. Rather, the question was
whether Japan’s BMD affected North Korean behavior toward Japan generally and in
areas not specific only to missile activity. This is because North Korean behavior,
whether cooperative or conflictual, was carried out in the shadow of North Korea’s
ballistic missiles which undergirded its overall political coercion strategy. Overall North
Korean behavior, therefore, was a gauge of the strength of the underlying missile-related
strategy. The question, then, was whether Japan’s BMD strengthened or undermined
deterrence of North Korea. But other related questions were also informed by the
research of the dissertation. Did North Korea show more restraint, especially in its
relations with Japan, in the shadow of Japan’s missile defense program? Did Japan’s
missile defenses have the opposite effect? Or, might Japan’s BMD strengthen deterrence
in some circumstances and undermine deterrence in others? In what other ways might
Japan’s BMD influence North Korean behavior? The missile defense-deterrence
literature provides many arguments regarding BMD strengthening or undermining
deterrence in various situations. However, there was not any in-depth research of BMD
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over time in the Japan-North Korea case especially under general deterrence conditions.
That was the subject of this dissertation.
Theoretic Background
Deterrence Theory
The general state of affairs between North Korea and Japan is often framed in
international relations theory in terms of a deterrence relationship where Japan is seeking
to deter North Korean coercion or even aggression. This is understandable given Japan’s
constitutional constraints since WWII, its lack of offensive military arms, and the danger
posed by North Korea the past several decades with its ballistic missiles and threatening
behavior. This creates a unique deterrence situation for Japan since their BMD
capabilities are in a purely defensive posture. Theoretically, Cold War-era deterrence
came to describe how one side’s offensive arms influenced an opponent from taking a
hostile action, particularly nuclear attack. The dissertation, however, explored how the
use of defensive capabilities influenced adversary behavior along a wider spectrum of
behavior under peacetime—but coercive—conditions between two actors with a
conflictual history. Further, one could argue that the U.S. extended deterrence
relationship with Japan is a powerful backdrop for Japan’s position and that researching
the Japan-North Korea case must acknowledge a dominant U.S. position both over Japan
and in North Korea’s behavior over Japan. But this would be valid only to the extent
extended deterrence security was provided Japan by the U.S. to include North Korean
behavior short of war—the focus of the dissertation. While extended deterrence clearly
looks to a scenario of North Korean war against Japan, no evidence was discovered that
extended deterrence by the U.S. included peacetime security guarantees regarding North
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Korean coercive or provocative behavior. In fact, Sugio Takahashi, Deputy Director of
Japan’s Office of Strategic Planning in their Ministry of Defense, stated North Korea
could conduct a “cheap-shot strike” against Japan using a limited number of ballistic
missiles (“one or two”) as blackmail or coercion without triggering U.S. military
retaliation (conventional or nuclear) as part of U.S. extended deterrence security
guarantees; a greater number of North Korean ballistic missiles attacking Japan (a
number was not suggested) would be needed to cross a “threshold” for U.S. retaliation
(Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation,
2012).272 There is room, therefore, to provide analytic separation between Japan and the
U.S. to address the impact of Japan’s BMD capabilities to influence North Korean
behavior short of war.
Such a deterrence-oriented relationship between Japan and North Korea continues
today. More specifically, relations between the two states during this period existed
across a spectrum ranging from general deterrence, at the one end, and an escalated
situation of acute crisis or immediate deterrence at the other end (Huth & Russett,
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models,
1993).273 Theoretically, this helped frame deterrence by Japan, in context of Japan-North
Korean relations, as an activity upon North Korea’s behavior, not simply deterrence of a
North Korean decision to wage war. But the potential range of cooperative and
conflictual interaction between two actors in general deterrence conditions is undefined
in the literature with any precision. As a result, general deterrence in the dissertation is
conceived to include a relatively wide range of Japan-North Korea cooperative and
272

Page 23.
Huth and Russett provide a very good description of general and immediate deterrence concepts.
Pages 61-73.
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conflictual interaction, just as North Korean coercive behavior (mentioned above) can
include a wide range of interaction short of crisis or war. While the dissertation was
grounded in deterrence theory, of necessity it was tailored to the influencing role of
missile defenses.
The Japan-North Korea deterrence problem set is not simply to deter war, or even
armed attack with ballistic missiles. As the various missile defense-deterrence arguments
portray, BMD can influence an adversary’s behavior by playing upon perceptual nuances
or consequences of his decision under consideration. North Korean choices can involve
behavior in many ways other than simply choosing to fire, or not fire, ballistic missiles.
The North Korean security posture and power-based approach to diplomatic and
economic relations are all undergirded by its ballistic missiles. BMD, therefore, can
influence North Korean choices in many ways and, in general deterrence conditions short
of war or even short of war-related crisis.
From the theoretic literature review, 54 arguments regarding how BMD may
strengthen or undermine deterrence were identified, many with small differences of
nuance. Over half of these were identified by the author as having some possible
application to the Japan-North Korea case. Most of the 54 arguments were optimistic,
suggesting BMD strengthened deterrence and did so usually by denying the adversary
some sort of benefit he perceived if he were to use his ballistic missiles in any way,
whether actually shooting them or coercing others with them. A considerable number of
these arguments reflected benefits perceived in the political and/or military domains. See
Table 2 for a summary of the various missile defense-deterrence arguments taken from
Chapter Three: Literature Review. This table helps understand the broad areas where
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BMD may have been a factor in Japan’s efforts to deter North Korean coercion in general
deterrence or provocative—but sub-conflict—conditions.

Literature Gaps
One of the benefits stemming from the dissertation research design is helping to
address gaps in the literature. First, there is very little quantitative academic literature on
North Korean behavior, especially in its foreign policy over an extended period, and none
solely on the Japan-North Korea relationship over time. Neither is there any long-term
quantitative international relations (IR) literature on the impact of Japan’s missile defense
program upon North Korea’s behavior. Further, there is little IR literature on missile
defenses generally (e.g., in Table 1, there were only 10 academic sources in the past 10
years), and there appears to be a specific need for improving deterrence literature
regarding the effects of modern non-nuclear capabilities, including missile defenses, upon
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potential adversary behavior over an extended period of time under general deterrence
conditions. The rigidity of general deterrence theory also seems inadequate for addressing
modern IR security challenges such as dealing with coercive strategies like that of North
Korea. Additionally, there does not appear to be examination of the various arguments of
missile defenses to support or undermine deterrence in a single long-term, time-series
case study, especially one employing a mixed-method approach.
Most deterrence-related literature dealt with traditional military issues of Cold
War Era nuclear warfare and strategic forces, international relations issues such as arms
control, and cases of U.S. strategies historically as part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Very little deterrence literature involved Asia and most missile
defense-deterrence literature addressed U.S. national missile defense issues and most of
those relative to deterring nuclear war. Of the 35 books and numerous articles of
academic literature reviewed on missile defense-deterrence, none were on the deterrence
effect of Japan’s missile defenses toward North Korea over time.274 The closest
discussion was Lars Abmann’s volume (Abmann, 2007), which looked at all regional
BMD efforts, including Japan’s, but predominantly through the lens of Chinese security
interests. Another source was Michael D. Swaine, et al (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami,
2001), which discussed the early period of Japanese contemplation of BMD following the
1998 surprise TD-1 launch over Japan. Both of these volumes, however, were very dated.
Further, of the 54 specific arguments identified on whether missile defenses enhance or
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A small sample: Michael W. Simon, “Rogue State Response to BMD: The Regional Context” (Simon,
2002); Palmore, Julian, and Francoise Melese, “A Game Theory View of Preventive Defense Against
Ballistic Missile Attack,” Defense & Security Analysis 17, no. 2 (Palmore & Melese, A Game Theory View of
Preventive Defense against Ballistic Missile Attack, 2001); Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War
Experience with Patriot” (Postol, 1991-1992).
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undermine deterrence, none of the arguments were based upon exclusive research of the
Japan-North Korea case.
In recent years, deterrence literature began moving beyond basic questions of
Cold War nuclear deterrence to provide additional insight into: the basis for
understanding the deterrent functions upon adversary behavior short of war (general
versus immediate deterrence);275 expansion of deterrence concepts beyond merely fear of
cost-imposition (now more emphasis on benefit-denial and consequences of restraint);276
and increasing recognition of the positive and negative deterrent implications of missile
defenses. The emphasis in the literature, however, was upon U.S. BMD in defending the
U.S. homeland or U.S. use of BMD in conventional conflict in the Middle East over the
past 20 years. However, all three of the areas in deterrence literature above have failed to
address the role of missile defenses upon adversary behavior generally, or the JapanNorth Korea case in-depth over time.
In the early period of the Cold War, the crux of the debate was the meaning of
U.S. anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems not only to defend the nation but the
specifically offensive nuclear forces. However, the Japanese BMD case was essentially
free of the constraints of this argument since Japan had no meaningful offensive
capabilities capable of attacking or retaliating against North Korea in response to an
attack. The advancement, however incremental, in deterrence concepts and theory failed
to explore the case of Japan’s BMD with analytic rigor, though it offered an opportunity
to further theoretical development.
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For general and immediate deterrence concepts, see Huth and Russett (1993); pp. 61-73.
See, for example, the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (U.S. Department of Defense,
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Huth and Russett articulate the great uncertainties present in deterrence generally,
and regarding measuring outcomes specifically (Huth & Russett, Testing Deterrence
Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference, 1990).277 In the statistical analyses in the dissertation
the direction of North Korean behavior was utilized as a measure, though it was
understood such analyses are statistical correlations only. Adding additional analysis
from qualitative research aided in clarifying or strengthening analyses. Generally,
however, uncertainty in deterrence analysis is unavoidable apart from undisputed
declaration of intent and thought from the adversary leader deliberating decision-making
perceptions and ultimately making the choices.
One key limitation in Huth and Russett’s early approach to deterrence assessment
was theorizing about deterrence only at the level of conflict or armed attack (Huth &
Russett, Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference, 1990).278 The approach
of the dissertation was within general deterrence conditions, a theoretical category largely
ignored in their early analysis. Later, when Huth and Russett sought to address the topic
of testing general deterrence, they chose data that involved crises that lead to full-scale
war (Huth & Russett, General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three
Competing Models, 1993).279 But this approach was too limiting in that general
deterrence was assessed successful if armed challenges did not lead to war, and in a
recent analysis by Stephen Quackenbush (Quackenbush, Understanding General
Deterrence: Theory and Application, 2011), general deterrence was studied without
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exploring cooperative or conflictual behavior by the adversary or general deterrence in a
time-series approach. The dissertation’s research explored “gradients” in general
deterrence and approached its statistical measurement through cooperative and
conflictual behavior below the level of armed challenge or war.
Research Design
General Approach
Methodologically, in order to research or understand the impact of Japan’s missile
defenses (independent variable) upon cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior
toward Japan (dependent variables), the overall research design employed a mixed
methods approach using both qualitative case-study analysis and quantitative statistical
analysis. To ensure data quality in the research and writing of the dissertation, the
research design considered the ideas and guidelines for qualitative and quantitative
design and systematic data collection and evaluation found in Designing Social Inquiry
(King, Keohane, & Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative
Research, 1994).280 Many of the research design features of the dissertation were
informed by these guidelines.
Understanding the complexities of general deterrence—marked by the strategies
and actions of some with provocations and coercion—is a challenge theoretically and
practically. For example, it is far easier to recognize an “immediate deterrence” threat
posed by the movement of large military forces to the border of an opponent, or of
outright deterrence failure with an armed attack. Increasingly, threats are made and
carried out at levels short of war—sometimes through the coercive or provocative use of
ballistic missiles and the underlying threat they communicate.
280

See, for example, Section 1.2, “Major Components of Research Design,” pages 12-28.
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If two opponents are to create acceptable norms of behavior with each other, the
first step is better understanding of each other, past behavioral interaction, and how
different instruments of power such as BMD or other tools such as regimes and
institutions contribute to deterrence and norm-setting. The dissertation sought to navigate
these issues, for example, by: 1) exploring briefly the historical interaction between two
actors, in this case Japan and North Korea—this essential background not only helped
characterize the Japan-North Korea relationship in modern times, but helped identify
possible alternative influences or variables to be considered later in the dissertation; 2)
exploring deterrence theoretically and all the ways BMD might strengthen or undermine
deterrence—this identified several possible ways in which Japan’s BMD could influence
North Korean behavior under general deterrence conditions that could be considered in
the qualitative and quantitative analyses; 3) constructing a theoretically-supported profile
of North Korea as the “deterree” to help understand its people and leadership—this
provided potential deterrence-oriented factors of value in North Korean leadership
decision-making regarding security issues and analytic cues to how they might interpret
Japan’s BMD program; 4) and, employing empirical data from a dataset tailored to
Japan-North Korea interaction—analysis of these data permitted insights into changes in
North Korean (as deterree) cooperative and conflictual behavior toward Japan and the
role of Japan’s BMD in that interaction.
Thus, the historical background and literature review informed: how to construct a
strategic profile of North Korea; how BMD might influence an adversary like North
Korea; and, how a statistical framework could be constructed to support empirical
analysis of Japan’s BMD program upon North Korean behavior over time under general
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deterrence conditions. Information from the literature and profile was then drawn upon
again to help explain the statistical findings and how possible North Korean perceptions
regarding its coercion strategy vis-à-vis Japan, as reflected by empirically-based North
Korean behavioral change, were affected by Japan’s BMD. Concluding analysis in the
final chapter revisited appropriate missile defense-deterrence theoretic arguments
(excluding, for example, arguments dealing with U.S. national missile defense
capabilities providing protection for nuclear retaliation in a conflict with a nuclear-armed
opponent) in light of core North Korean decision factors from the strategic profile and
statistical results from the quantitative chapter to offer summary inferences and insights.
Use of Mixed-Methods
In addition to the guidelines in Designing Social Inquiry, overall mixed-method
design features included consideration of guidelines provided with the “Program Effects”
case model application in order to enhance the quality of the data used and inferential
analysis stemming from it (United States General Accounting Office, 1990). In such a
design, a case is studied to assess and understand the effects of a program as well as
reasons for the program’s success or failure. In the case selected for the dissertation,
Japan’s missile defenses were the “program” and the “effects” determined were the
cooperative and conflictual North Korean behaviors. Two distinct “design features”
included combining qualitative and quantitative data and surveying before-and-after
effects. Exploring the deterrent effect of Japan’s missile defenses upon North Korean
behavior in one period before the BMD program began in earnest, and in subsequent
periods of its development, contributed to the body of knowledge on the effect of Japan’s
BMD program upon North Korean behavior using this mixed-method design.
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Design criteria also considered ideas in Designing and Conducting Mixed
Methods Research (Creswell & Clark, 2007).281 For example, the timing of the research
was sequential; in this case qualitative research was conducted first, then quantitative
research. Second, weighting was ascribed to the quantitative data only. Third, research
was mixed through “connecting” the qualitative and quantitative data, both in the
quantitative analysis (Chapter Seven) and the final analysis (Chapter Eight). In this case,
qualitative data was used both to provide contextual understanding of the adversary as
well as explanatory analysis of quantitative data, thus strengthening the accuracy of the
analyses and overall validity of the framework.
In using a mixed-methods approach, the dissertation used the strengths of each
approach to compliment the other. The Strategic Profile provided essential background,
helped with deductive inference and forming hypotheses, and provided information for
comparison with the quantitative analysis. The empirical data in the quantitative chapter
provided a means of statistical analysis based upon the hypotheses informed in part by
the Strategic Profile. This helped to affirm the analysis from the Strategic Profile,
strengthen some judgments or conclusions, and offer ideas for new data requirements or
further empirical research.
Data Timelines
Japan’s BMD was explored in the dissertation across a 22-year period, starting
approximately with the end of the Cold War and ending when Kim Jong-Il (KJI) died.
Japan’s BMD program spanned about the last 13 and one-half years of the 22-year
period. For the purposes of analysis, Japan’s BMD program was divided into four BMDrelated decision points or meaningful periods of Japanese BMD development (described
281
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below). The period was purposely structured to provide a baseline period prior to the four
periods of significant BMD program activity as a means of comparison in keeping with a
mixed-methods design, as well as to capture meaningful (but non-BMD-related) events
and interaction in the baseline period. The BMD periods, combined with the baseline
period preceding Japan’s BMD program initiative, provided missile defense-related
coverage to complement the dyadic Japanese and North Korean behavioral data in the 22year dataset. Thus, all of the variables were expressed and analyzed in a time-series
methodology, both in the qualitative and quantitative sections of the dissertation.
The period of time from January, 1990 to August, 1998 was included in the
design to provide a baseline of Japan-North Korean dyadic behavioral interaction. This
period provided a setting when Japan was not engaged actively in missile defense
capability development despite aggressive North Korean ballistic missile growth and
when missile defenses were proving of value elsewhere, such as in the Persian Gulf War.
The first period of Japan’s BMD examined (September, 1998 to November, 2003)
explored North Korean behavior in the early stages of Japan’s R&D efforts on missile
defense. This activity was taken in response to the 1998 North Korean launch of a TD-1
long-range ballistic missile that flew directly over Japanese territory and surprised, even
scared Japan’s populace. The second period (December, 2003 to February, 2007)
followed Japan’s decision to actually acquire missile defenses of its own as opposed to an
initial commitment limited to helping develop missile defense technologies in
cooperation with the United States. This period included Japanese commitment of
significant fiscal resources toward Japanese BMD acquisition. The third period of Japan’s
BMD program (March, 2007 to December, 2011) explored the period marking Japan’s
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first BMD operational deployment. The fourth period (February, 2009 to December,
2011) evaluated North Korean behavior during and following Japan’s first fielddeployment of BMD within Japan. This deployment included a stated intent of shooting
down a North Korean TD-2 long-range missile in April, 2009 under certain
circumstances. These four periods also served as the principal independent variables
included in the statistical analysis.
Qualitative Methods
The design employed qualitative research in three basic ways in the dissertation.
The first was the research of the Japan-North Korea relationship generally through
exploration of their long-term historical interaction. The second way qualitative research
was employed was in drawing final analytic judgments in combination with missile
defense-deterrence theoretic arguments and statistical analysis (see Chapter Eight:
Conclusions). Third, and requiring the most significant research effort, was an in-depth
study of North Korea and its leadership since the behavior of North Korea as deterree
was what mattered as the principal effect to Japan’s BMD. The general goal in
deterrence, as suggested by the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2006), is to influence an adversary to decide to restrain from
taking undesirable or egregious action against the one deterring or their interests in some
way. In this case, Japan sought to use its BMD to deter North Korean coercive behavior
toward Japan by countering the principal source of North Korean coercive power and
strategy—its ballistic missiles. As stated above, North Korean behavior would not be
expected to be either completely conflictual or cooperative. Instead, it moved in gradients
of intensity over time. To understand the relationship of Japan’s BMD and North Korean

138

behavior, it was important to understand the characteristics of North Korean leadership,
their motivations and other decision-making factors, and how contextual circumstances
and change, including development of Japan’s BMD program over time, might affect
their perceptions and, therefore, their actions (Payne K. B., The Fallacies of Cold War
Deterrence and a New Direction, 2001).282 Because of its length and construct, a more
detailed description of the Strategic Profile is provided below.
North Korea Strategic Profile
A strategic profile provides an overview of a state from a deterrence perspective.
It structures one’s understanding of an adversary, its leadership, and the factors that
matter in its national security-related decisions in keeping with the deterrence-related
literature. Specific to the dissertation, the strategic profile was intended to aid in drawing
some general conclusions about the Japan-North Korea relationship, but more
specifically the effects of Japan’s missile defenses on North Korean leadership decisionmaking and behavior.
A strategic profile provides a qualitative perspective of a deterree, though views
vary over its precise contents.283 Constructed, in part, upon Keith Payne’s empiricallybased approach (Payne K. B., The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New
Direction, 2001),284 and incorporating many of the theoretically-based ideas of others
(i.e., McVicar, Mendelsohn, Post, Huth and Russett), the dissertation’s strategic profile
provided more than just a review of North Korean military capabilities or personal quarks
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of its leader.285 Payne emphasized the need to consider certain adversary characteristics,
such as their rationality, motivations, goals, value and risk structure, regional security
context, and sources of power, among others. Huth and Russett employed an approach
based upon levels of analysis and incorporated various internal and external
environmental factors of an adversary state (Huth & Russett, General Deterrence between
Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models, 1993).286 Post emphasized various
psychological factors that complimented, if not expanded upon, considerations of the
personal aspects of an adversary leader described by Payne and Huth and Russett (Post J.
M., 2003).287 Most of these factors were addressed in the profile, along with other
information and other categories provided by other sources.
Emphasis in the strategic profile was on those areas in which national securityrelated beliefs and perceptions of North Korea’s leader emerged in its state-level
behavior—interaction that might be relevant in context of the North Korean political
strategy of coercion and the emergence of Japan’s BMD program. Substantive sections of
the strategic profile were organized as follows: a review of the identity and cultural
factors of North Korea’s people, providing historical insights to their national values and
how those values might inform the security-related political culture of North Korea’s top
leaders; the cognitive and psychological factors that informed Kim Jong-Il (KJI) as the
primary decision-maker in North Korea in the period explored in the dissertation;288 and,
key internal and external environmental factors of the North Korean state and how KJI
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See: (McVicar, 2011); and, (Mendelsohn, 2003).
See, for example, their framework description (page 64) and brief discussion of psychological models
(pages 67-8). These factors departed in many ways from traditional rational choice theory as did Payne’s
ideas. See also: (Huth & Russett, Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference, 1990).
287
See also: (Post J. M., 2004).
288
KJI was the focus of this section of the strategic profile. KJI died 19 December, 2011.
286

140

may have interpreted those factors in his decision-making. The leader, ultimately, then,
was the focus of understanding for deterrence purposes since: he was the top decisionmaker for national security-related decisions; he was the one whose personal
psychological factors might play upon state decisions; he was the one who reflected the
national identity and culture of the people; and, he was the one who ultimately interpreted
changes in environmental factors, such as changes in Japan’s BMD program over time.289
The North’s relations with Japan were also revisited to address the strategy of North
Korea toward Japan and political rapprochement. KJI’s interface with internal and
external environmental factors was consistent with his personal and national identity and
cultural factors. Because of the length of the material presented the Profile was divided
into two chapters: the first two substantive sections (Identity & Cultural Factors, and Kim
Jong-Il Personal Factors) comprised Chapter Five: Strategic Profile – Part I; the third
substantive section (Environmental Factors) comprised Chapter Six: Strategic Profile –
Part II.
Qualitative Analysis
A strategic profile requires a great deal of information dealing with a potential
adversary. Without access to primary sources in their original language, such as private
conversations between Kim Jong-Il and his advisors in Korean, one might suggest
insufficient information was available to research and analyze North Korea. However,
research found that a great deal of information about North Korea, its capabilities,
intentions, and leadership sentiments was available in a wide array of other sources, such
as: U.S. and allied government reports; legislative research reports; third-party
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governmental reports or diplomatic statements; North Korean official news media; North
Korean communities and related media outlets in Japan; reports from visitors to North
Korea, such as members of international organizations, non-governmental organizations,
foreign dignitaries, and private citizens; reports from government and private research
entities, such as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs);
information provided by scholars and analysts who have studied North Korea over time;
or, accounts from North Korean defectors.
Further, the notion of insufficient public-domain information is not strong when
one considers the role of information technologies in making vast amounts of information
available today, including reports translated into English using automated software tools,
providing significant insights into a potential adversary through information available in
the public domain. The strength of public-domain, or “open-source,” information was
acknowledged by U.S. Intelligence Community leaders. For example, in 2007, Mr. James
Clapper, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in describing his years of
experience in the U.S. Intelligence Community said, “And many times, the most
important insight, the most important and relevant information, is not in the secret
material; it’s open-source” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007).290
More recently, Dan Butler, Assistant Deputy Director for Open Source, at the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, said, “Open source is research. It’s good research.
It’s rigorous and disciplined research. And I could give you a lot of good examples of
how our intelligence community back in the 1940s and 1950s was built on a very solid
foundation of what today we call open source intelligence, or open source exploitation.
Back then we called it research” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
290
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2010).291 Research to support development of the dissertation’s strategic profile was
informed by several inputs from the deterrence theoretic arguments on understanding
adversaries (such as Keith Payne’s framework) and research stemming from
approximately 200 books, a number of academic articles, and other material available in
the public domain described above. As voiced by leaders of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, extensive information of use for national security-related research and
analysis was available in the public domain. Research for the dissertation found extensive
information on North Korea that fit into the areas of the strategic profile.
Quantitative Methods
Acquired Dataset
The dataset acquired for the dissertation was provided by Dr. Doug Bond and
Virtual Research Associates, Inc. (VRA®) at the request of the author. Doing so provided
a single dataset that used the same data sources and tagging methodologies, substantially
increasing data reliability.292 The dataset was titled “Events Data 1990-2011.”293 Data
represented monthly summaries of daily IR-related events and interactions and were
291

Page 5. Remarks made 17 June, 2010, at The National Press Club, Washington, D.C. He added, “The
game changer was the Internet. We are in the Internet age. Today, in 2010, we’re grappling with a
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against us. It can be used against our national security. It can be used against our families. So it’s a typical
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Further background on the reliability of VRA’s methodologies can be found in Doug Bond, et al (Bond,
Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor, 2003), especially pages 739-42; Gary King and Will Lowe (King & Lowe, An
Automated Information Extraction Tool for International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as
Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design, 2003); and, Daniel Hopkins and Gary King (Hopkins &
King, 2010).
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The dataset was derived using VRA® Reader v. 3.11.0., proprietary software used to search large
amounts of digital news reporting. Further information on the company is found at
http://www.vranet.com. Data were provided in Microsoft Excel spreadsheet form in three basic sets of
information: monadic; dyadic; and, BMD terms. The database acquired from VRA for the dissertation
research is here and throughout the dissertation entitled, Events Data 1990-2011 (2012). The parameters
of the data were agreed upon with the dissertation chair prior to final acquisition of the purchased
dataset from VRA.
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gathered through automated software capabilities and derived from either Reuters or AFP
(Agence France-Presse) news sources. VRA used Reuters news articles for data
encompassing the entire dataset period (1990-2011) and AFP was added to supplement
Reuters data from 2002-2011. The dataset provided both monadic and dyadic content.
Monadic data reflected IR events or actions originating from one state and were not
specifically tagged to any other state. Dyadic data were IR events between two states and
tagged as directional in nature, such as Japan made a public statement directed at North
Korea. Monthly data were collected from news reports scanned using VRA software for
the period 1/1/1990 through 12/31/2011 (22 years). Each event or action in the dataset
was derived through automated content analysis of daily newswire reports using a scoring
process called Integrated Data for Event Analysis (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor,
2003).294 IDEA built on the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and its behavioral
scoring methodology originally developed by Charles McClelland (McClelland, 1999).
This methodology relied on a “who did what to whom, when and where” approach to
international interactions. Each event was assigned a weight based on the level of
behavioral cooperation or conflict inherent in the action or statement. IDEA incorporated
nearly all events covered through the original WEIS coding while adding fidelity.
Aggregates for each month (by each state) were compiled for IDEA event form codes 122, inclusive. These codes included both cooperative (cue categories 1 to 10) and
conflictual (cue categories 11 to 22) events (see the section below entitled “Behavioral
Scale” for a description of these categories and the weighting scheme used).295 The
dataset also included data for subcategories, monthly averages, and cumulative scores
294
295
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(totaling 72 different categories). The geographic scope of the data, chosen by the author,
included 10 countries: Australia, China, Iran, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South
Korea, Syria, and the United States (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).296 Six of these states
(Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, and Russia) represented six
regional powers commonly engaged in negotiations with North Korea regarding its
nuclear weapons program (i.e., the Six Party Talks) and which had a history of
interaction, including conflict, in the region. Australia was selected as another important
regional actor that also interacted with all of the other six regional actors, including some
interaction with Japan with regard to BMD issues (The National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2008).297 Three other countries (Iran, Syria, and Libya) are states with which
North Korea had proliferant relations including ballistic missiles and nuclear
technologies.298
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Monadic Data.
Monadic data reflected IR events related to one of the 10 state actors regardless of
whether those events were correlated to another actor irrespective of whether that actor is
one of the 10 principal states. The dataset included 2,640 months of summaries of
monadic event data among the 10 states. The information for these summaries was very
detailed but not directional toward any specific country. There were a total of 6,121,511
events represented by these 2,640 months of event summaries in the monadic data.
Dyadic Data.
The second set of data was dyadic, where the unit of analysis was monthly dyadic
scores for cooperative and conflictual behavior between two states.299 Data were also
collected from 1/1/1990 through 12/31/2011 (22 years) and included the same 10
countries as in the monadic data. Dyadic data reflected directional behavior from one of
the 10 states toward another of the 10 states. Directional data included a numeric count of
events and a cumulative score for each month (on the Goldstein scale); the numeric
counts and cumulative scores provided both cooperative and conflictual directional
behavior. These types of data were recorded for each state against the other nine states.
The weighted sums accentuate high intensity actions (Virtual Research Associates, Inc.
(VRA), 2012).300

and required of only one case (Japan-North Korea) and in a limited timeframe (2005-2011). However, this
would have taken considerable time.
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A sample of dyadic data from the dataset is seen in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis (Figure 3).
Unlike the monadic data, with 72 different categories and subcategories, dyadic data included eight
categories for each entry: the name of the source state (SrcName); the name of the target state, or statelevel object of the source-state’s behavior (TgtName); the year of the entry (Year); the month of entry
(Month); the Goldstein Positive Case numeric count (GPCount); the Goldstein Positive Cumulative
weighted score (GPCum); the Goldstein Negative Case numeric count (GNCount); and, the Goldstein
Negative Cumulative weighted score (GNCum).
300
See the worksheets labeled “Dyad Notes” and “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).” Some months had no
data as there were no reports in those months for this dyad. In these cases, to facilitate regression
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There were 60,789 months of event summaries in the dyadic events data for the
10 state actors. These events included both cooperative, positive directional dyadic data
as well as conflictual, negative dyadic data. There were some months in some dyads that
had no events identified, and there are many months with multiple events. There were a
total of 237,759 dyadic events in the dataset: 167,763 cooperative, positive events within
the monthly summaries; and, 69,996 total conflictual, negative events recorded. In the
dyad of key interest for the dissertation (Japan and North Korean dyadic interaction)
there were a total of 1,932 dyadic events across the 22-year dataset: 1,181 events of
Japanese behavior toward North Korea (713 cooperative, positive events and 468
conflictual, negative events); and, 751 events of North Korean behavior toward Japan
(443 cooperative, positive events and 308 conflictual, negative events).
BMD Events.
A third set of data provided in the VRA dataset was comprised of specific news
reports in the 22-year period that searched out specific terms in the Japan-North Korea
dyadic relationship in order to ensure all reports were accounted for that dealt with
Japan’s BMD. These data also provided summaries of the contents of the news reports
themselves, a valuable feature not available in the monadic and dyadic data. Since the
methodology used by VRA to identify reports of dyadic significance used the scanning of
only the first two sentences of all available reports, it was possible some data containing
largely BMD-specific references were omitted if that term was not used in the first two
sentences of the report. Therefore, a supplemental data search was conducted to avoid
analysis, new worksheets were created by copying the dyadic sheet and manually adding months to the
data. A zero (0) was added to any monthly record created having no original data. Thus, a complete timeseries set of data was available with all months represented across the 22-year dataset period—a
prerequisite for meaningful regression analyses. Figure 3 reflects the original dataset plus some months
with 0s added to complete the year.
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this gap.301 These data strengthened the reliability of the dyadic interaction and were used
to construct a variable (described below) to aid in statistical analysis.
Behavioral Scale
Description.
As a standard for identifying the cooperative and conflictual behavior and
measuring such behavior intensity on a scale of action or restraint conducive to
deterrence, quantitative data in the dissertation used the categories of political events and
interactions identified in the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) framework
(Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor, 2003) which built on the World Event Interaction
Survey (WEIS) (McClelland, 1999). Broad event categories (a total of 22) ranged from
cooperative, positive categories of interaction (i.e., yield, comment, consult, approve,
promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose) to conflictual, negative event
categories that were increasingly negative until they reached pre-war conditions (i.e.,
reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relations,
expel, seize, and force). There were more specific events (100+) under most of these
broad event headings. Each category was assigned a weight according to the Goldstein
scale.
The Goldstein scale was developed to provide placement of international events
that were categorized by Charles McClelland in the World Event/Interaction Survey
(WEIS) onto a negative/conflictual-positive/cooperation scale. This scale has a numeric
value range from -10.0 (conflictual interaction bordering/starting war) to +8.3
(cooperative interaction associated with close partnerships or alliances). While the WEIS
categories provided a meaningful “ladder” of international dyadic interaction, the
301
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Goldstein scale adds intensity weights that capture the direction and levels of interaction
more appropriately and with greater utility in making comparisons (Goldstein, 1992).302
A summary of Goldstein’s application of weights to WEIS events is provided in Table 8
at the end of Chapter Seven.
According to VRA, the weighted sums of the events in the dataset accentuated
high intensity actions while the counts assumed all actions were equal. VRA suggested
using the weighted sums on both positive and negative polarities, which was done for
data used in the regression models. Averaging the positive and negative polarities
together was discouraged as positive and negative actions were not necessarily inversely
related (i.e., a +3 was not necessarily the same level of positive behavioral intensity that a
-3 was of negative behavioral intensity). Some averaging was done in Chapter Seven:
Quantitative Analysis, however, among groups of positive events and, separately, groups
of negative events. This was done to further analyze one particular month’s events of the
same polarity, for example, rather than comparing cumulative weighted scores since
these varied widely in month to month comparison. This method complied with VRA’s
theoretic structure for utilizing the data provided in the dataset.
Variables
Dependent Variables.
Two dependent variables were used: one for positive, cooperative North Korean
behavior toward Japan and one for negative, conflictual North Korean behavior toward
Japan. These dependent variables account for the “effect” of Japan’s BMD “program” as
described above in the mixed-method design description. There were several advantages
to this approach. First, there existed technologies through VRA, for example, that could
302
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search, sort, and assemble structured datasets with both monadic and dyadic features. The
interaction between two states, such as Japan and North Korea, created a relatively large
number of media-reported events identified by VRA. The data were expressed both in a
directional form (i.e., the event was behavior from Japan toward North Korea), but also
typed as either cooperative, positive behavior or conflictual, negative behavior. Further,
VRA’s processes assessed a weight, or level of intensity for each event, using the
Goldstein scale described above, indicating just how cooperative or conflictual the event
was on a scale.
The dependent variables were also chosen in order to provide direction of
behavior (cooperative, positive and conflictual, negative behavior) as a measure of the
deterring effects of Japan’s BMD. In this way, criteria for deterrence effectiveness were
identified as follows: increases in cooperative, positive North Korean behavior toward
Japan during a specific BMD period indicated Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence;
decreases in conflictual, negative North Korean behavior toward Japan indicated Japan’s
BMD strengthened deterrence during that BMD period; decreases in cooperative, positive
North Korean behavior toward Japan during a specific BMD period indicated Japan’s
BMD undermined deterrence; increases in conflictual, negative North Korean behavior
toward Japan indicated Japan’s BMD undermined deterrence during that BMD period;
and, no statistically significant changes in North Korean behavior toward Japan during a
specific BMD period indicated Japan’s BMD had no deterrent effect during that BMD
period. Analysis of these data using these criteria indicated the deterrent effects of
Japan’s BMD program over time; however, the inferences drawn from these analyses
cannot prove decisively that Japan’s BMD caused certain deterrent changes in North
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Korean behavior. However, the methods and results used in this design provided
improvement in better understanding how BMD may have affected North Korean
thinking and behavior, as well as methodological advancement in addressing general
deterrence challenges in a time-series framework.
Independent Variables.
The primary statistical models included those variables specific to Japan and its
BMD program. This set of variables was applied to all but one initial model in the
regression analyses. Applying these variables to the other variables allowed analytic
comparison with other, non-BMD-related independent variables. The first variables
included cooperative and conflictual Japanese behavior toward North Korea. As with the
dependent variable, the Japanese behavioral variables used the Goldstein weighting scale
described above and reflected the cumulative monthly intensity of all interactions that
month. Including both components of Japan’s interaction with North Korea in a single
regression model was an essential step in providing a statistical foundation upon which to
add the BMD-related variables of Japan’s interaction with North Korea. As with the
dependent variable, data for these dyadic behavioral variables come from the VRAprovided database (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).303
A variable was also included in the primary regression models reflecting the
supplemental BMD-related data provided in the VRA dataset (see the section “BMD
Events” above). This dichotomous variable did not reflect positive or negative behavioral
direction, nor the cumulative weighting on the Goldstein scale, as the dyadic cooperativeconflictual behavioral variables did. The months in which these terms appeared in the
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data across the 22-year dataset were tagged to create a variable ensuring all Japanese
BMD activity in the data was captured within the statistical analyses.
Lastly, as mentioned above, there were four dichotomous independent variables
that reflected the emergence of Japan’s BMD program over time. One variable was
created for each of the four periods of Japan’s BMD program. The first BMD variable
represented the time period of September, 1998 through November, 2003—the period
immediately following the 31 August, 1998 TD-1 missile launch that overflew Japan.
The second BMD variable represented the time period of December, 2003 through
February, 2007—beginning with Japan’s choices and commitments relating to acquisition
and deployment of its own BMD system. The third BMD variable represented the time
period of March, 2007 through December, 2011—the first deployment of operational
BMD that occurred in Japan (March, 2007) and extending to the end of the timeframe
considered since Japan’ BMD deployment did not cease. The fourth BMD variable
represented the time period of March, 2009 through December, 2011—the first time
Japan placed operational BMD assets on a ready alert status in preparation to engage
(shoot down) a North Korean ballistic missile; North Korea warned UN civil aviation and
maritime agencies of the impending launch which occurred on 5 April, 2009 (a modified
TD-2 missile).
Control Variables.
In evaluating the effect of Japan’s missile defenses on North Korean behavior, the
research employed various models that controlled for rival explanations in the statistical
analysis. This provided data dealing with Japan-North Korea interaction for statistical
analysis, but isolated from other variables. These control variables included: cooperative
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and conflictual U.S. behavior toward North Korea; cooperative and conflictual South
Korean behavior toward North Korea; cooperative and conflictual Chinese behavior
toward North Korea; two periods of political rapprochement between Japan and North
Korea (in the early 1990s, and again in the early 2000s); and the political parties of Japan,
South Korea, and the United States. The cooperative and conflictual behavioral variables
used the Goldstein weighting scale described above. These variables addressed the
potential impact of other key actors in the region, changes in their political parties that
could result in policy changes toward North Korea, and the dynamic of significant
interaction between Japan and North Korea through political normalization talks. These
variables were controlled statistically in regression models evaluating both dependent
variables as well as the BMD-specific independent variables. As a result, they aided in
isolating the influence of Japan’s BMD over time in effecting North Korean cooperative
and conflictual behavior toward Japan. In all cases, North Korean cooperative and
conflictual behavior toward Japan remained the dependent variables. Qualitative data
were then incorporated to provide further analysis of the statistical results or support
explanations of the quantitative data.304
Data constructed with the Goldstein directional and weighting scale scheme
(Goldstein, 1992) were particularly useful in addressing dyadic relationships under
general deterrence conditions as they provided “gradients” of behavioral change. Further,
these data could be collected and assembled within datasets on a monthly basis to enable
added granularity in behavioral interaction. Detailed, monthly cooperative-conflictual
behavioral interaction in a dyadic relationship, such as the Japan-North Korea
relationship, especially in a time-series study, served as a very good baseline of
304

Analysis used qualitative research techniques taken from Jack Levy’s qualitative approach (Levy, 1986).
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independent and dependent variables from which statistical analysis was supplemented
by other independent variables of high interest—such as Japan’s BMD. Adding BMD
variables—while controlling for other influences (i.e., the control variables)—permitted
the effects of Japan’s BMD program to be measured by changes in the cooperative and
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan. This also provided statistical analysis of
each period of BMD development so that the direction of North Korean cooperative and
conflictual behavior toward Japan was analyzed for deterrence effects. The results of
each period were analyzed further with qualitative data and then compared one with
another.
Quantitative Analysis
The purpose was to evaluate the effect of Japan’s missile defenses on North
Korean behavior. To do this, a 22-year database was compiled and regression analysis
conducted using publically-available statistical software for all months from 1990-2011.
These data were crafted into discrete models reflecting Japanese cooperative and
conflictual behavior toward North Korea and Japan’s BMD variables reflecting the four
periods of BMD development. The control variables were then analyzed in separate
regression models. All data results were displayed in activity tables for comparison.
Analysis provided the following results: which BMD variables were statistically
significant in correlation with North Korean behavior toward Japan in each period;
whether it was cooperative or conflictual North Korean behavior that changed; and, the
direction of behavioral change indicated in the statistical analysis inferred by Japan’s
BMD. Statistical analysis was an important component of the dissertation’s goal of trying
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to understand the effects of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean behavior in general
deterrence conditions.
Analytic Tool.
The regression and other statistical analyses were performed using the gretl
software package, available online (Cottrell & Lucchetti, 2012). This software interfaces
with a variety of data spreadsheets including Microsoft Excel—the format in which the
dissertation’s database was constructed. All regression analyses and related statistical
tests, such as tests for serial correlation, for example, were conducted using gretl
software.
Alternative View.
An alternative perspective on Japan-North Korea relations may be that the JapanNorth Korea relationship could not be analyzed in isolation or as a stand-alone case.
Perhaps KJI focused only on the U.S. and saw Japan and South Korea only as mere U.S.
puppets. In this construct, North Korean behavior would have been driven by U.S.
behavior and KJI’s belief that he needed ballistic missiles solely as a means to make a
credible nuclear deterrent against aggressive U.S. action.
This proposition may have been stronger in the Cold War era. However, things
have changed politically and militarily in the region, including: North Korea’s loss of the
Soviet Union as a dominant political, military, and economic sponsor; the rise of Japan as
a world economic power; the significant rise of ROK conventional capabilities; the
decline of U.S. relative position in the region indicated by removal of its tactical nuclear
forces from the region in the 1990s and the near-term plan to transition operational
control of combined military forces on the peninsula to the ROK government; and,
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Japan’s substantial growth in BMD investment, technology, and deployed capabilities.
Since the 1990s, of necessity the North Korean strategy was no longer a U.S.-only
approach. Instead, it was multi-dimensional, emphasizing political coercion of regional
actors with ballistic missiles, and the U.S. strategy component focused most intensely on
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack and regime change.
Further, U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, since they are neither expressly
nor incidentally intended to deter North Korean behavior in periods short of war
(Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation,
2012),305 are likely perceived in North Korea in the same way—that is, germane in
wartime conditions. As such, North Korea’s coercion strategy was aimed at interaction
with regional actors below the threshold of armed conflict. Lastly, if the U.S.-only thesis
had been the case, then there would either have been no effect of Japan’s BMD on North
Korean behavior, or there would have been a high correlation in the statistical analysis of
U.S. behavior as a control variable for Japan’s BMD. However, the statistical analysis
indicated Japan’s BMD were important variables in effecting both cooperative and
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, while the U.S. behavioral control
variable was not a statistically significant factor in the effects of Japan’s BMD.
Analytic Integration
Statistical findings and qualitative contextual analysis from the strategic profile
case study were considered with various missile defense-deterrence arguments from the
Literature Review. This was done to explore further insights into possible explanations
for North Korean cooperative or conflictual behavior short of war in light of Japan’s
decisions and activities with its missile defense program. This involved comparing
305

Page 23.
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qualitative analyses of North Korean characteristics found in the strategic profile, coupled
with additional qualitative data as necessary on North Korean activity as characterized in
missile defense-deterrence theoretic arguments, with quantitative statistical analysis data
in order to better understand Japan-North Korea dyadic interaction.
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CHAPTER FIVE: STRATEGIC PROFILE
PART I—IDENTITY & CULTURE AND PERSONAL FACTORS
Executive Summary
A strategic profile, unlike a general country study that provides a geographical
overview of a state, seeks to provide a meaningful order to understanding an adversary,
its leadership, and the factors that matter in their national security-related decisions. For
the dissertation, the strategic profile, in keeping with the deterrence-related literature, is
intended to aid in making judgments about the Japan-North Korea political relationship
generally and the effects of Japan’s missile defenses on North Korean leadership
decision-making and related behavior specifically.306
Research of the North Korea leadership strategic profile found a leadership
regime that was pragmatic and rational, but acted through a decision-making lens that
ascribed to a value system consistent with its history, culture, and ideology. This value
system, though very different from that in recent experience in the U.S., permitted North
Korean leaders to treat its people and neighbors in an instrumental and sometimes violent
way. In a return of Korea’s royal legacy, the Kim dynasty of North Korea sought to avoid
reruns of intervention, invasion, and occupation, whatever the cost, including unaided
advancement of the nation, though large amounts of aid is precisely what was needed in
some cases. This view of security placed a premium upon the military instrument for
defense and plans of forced Korean reunification and, more recently, the development of
ballistic missiles and WMD to threaten and coerce its opponents in their own heartlands.
The personal traits of the Kim leaders facilitated this interpretation of domestic and
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These judgments will be provided in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis, culling information provided
elsewhere in the dissertation, but principally the two Strategic Profile chapters.
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external security environments, using cooperative and conflictual behavior, consistent
with the North Korean revolutionary past, to create an image of a nationalistic, even
dangerous, state. This image perpetuated North Korean security goals with regional
actors and helped placate domestic audiences, though it may not be discernible when this
image reflected genuine emotions or was simply being orchestrated. Personal pride,
intermingled with national honor, however, occasionally led North Korea’s leaders to
take actions probably motivated more by desires to save face and avoid inconsistencies
than to achieve strategic political or economic goals. Personally, KJI may have been
malleable to environmental influences—at least in his relations with Japan—including
the deterring effect of Japan’s BMD.
Japanese decisions on BMD came as a result of North Korean patterns of
behavior with its missiles and other instruments of power. However, while North Korean
intentions for developing missiles that could threaten Japan may have been intended, in
part, to strike U.S. forces throughout Japan in context of general war on the peninsula, the
residual problem was that U.S. extended deterrent actions and capabilities did not address
North Korea’s new strategy of political coercion that paralleled its rapid development and
deployment of its longer-range ballistic missiles that could range Japan. This meant
Japan’s BMD, while adding to the defensive suit of capabilities needed in general
regional war, also appear to have been the greatest variable affecting North Korean
political coercion behavior toward Japan in the context of relations short of war. The
elements of the strategic profile reflect various qualitative data that suggests North Korea
could, and perhaps did, modify its perceptions of coercive or conflictual behavior toward
Japan over time.
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More specifically, Japan’s BMD directly undermined North Korea’s ballistic
missile capability—a core value central to North Korea’s post-Cold War deterrent
security strategy and capacity to coerce others. However, KJI did not view Japan’s BMD
in the same fashion as offensive strike forces, such as those possessed by the U.S., that
could preemptively decapitate KJI’s regime, inflict personal harm upon him and his
family, and destabilize if not threaten the survival of the North Korean state as it existed
under KJI. Further, KJI had much to gain from the prospects of normalization of relations
with Japan—rather than the result of coercion—including substantial amounts of direct
monetary infusion and investment. Japan’s BMD did not deny KJI the option of building
and using a new missile test facility in which it could still advance its space and ballistic
missile technologies by flying southerly trajectories. Further, KJI’s perceptions regarding
Japan’s BMD included considerations of China, the U.S., and various other effects of the
development of BMD in Japan over the course of several years. Some of these effects
included: an extension to North Korea’s ballistic missile test moratorium; substantive
normalization talks; fears of a Japanese offensive arms buildup; complications to North
Korean missile-related activities or war plans; use of surprise tactics; Japan’s defenses
were not aggressive or ambiguous; North Korea could simply build or use more ballistic
missiles, go around defenses, or use alternative means of delivery, coercion, or attack;
and, failures to deter North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile tests.
Background and Contents
A strategic profile provides a qualitative perspective of a deterree. There are a
number of views as to its contents, though it is less debated as to whether the deterrer
should research and develop an adversary profile. In an effort to provide a more

160

empirically-based approach and reduce uncertainties in deterrence analysis and strategybuilding, Payne suggested a two stage methodology of (1) developing a detailed
understanding of the adversary; and then (2) orienting the deterrer’s capabilities and
deterrence-oriented actions to influence the factors known about the adversary and his
decision-making. Payne argued for identifying those elements critical to the adversary
leader’s decision-making, including: leaders’ motivations; decision-making processes;
sources of regional friction; contextual lessons of history; how they view others in the
region; and national capabilities (Payne K. B., The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and
a New Direction, 2001).307
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Pages 102-14. According to Payne, other specific elements of adversary characteristics needed as part
of a deterrence strategy include: assessment of a leader’s rationality or predictability (i.e., perhaps based
upon past history, domestic political pressures, or ideological factors; also involves senior leader physical
or mental health, drug addictions, or other psychological factors limiting or distorting perceptions of
reality and rational behavior); leadership (i.e., key decision-makers, their personal will or determination,
motivations, constraints on behavior); familiarity and focus (i.e., are they aware of and do they
understand the deterrer’s goals, actions and policies); communication (i.e., methods for communicating
with North Korean leadership); values and risk structures (i.e., what the North Korean values are and how
the deterrer’s capabilities or strategy squares with those values; regime core values such as regime
survival, regional power relations, commitments from culture, ideology, or religion; tolerance to risks);
options (i.e., the options it believes are available in response to the deterrer’s capabilities, such as
conciliation or conflict); precedent or credibility (i.e., whether North Korea senses a demonstrated
commitment from the deterrer to address the North Korean threat); opportunities for learning (i.e.,
whether North Korea has communicated with the deterrer in the past); priorities and value trade-offs
(i.e., which values are paramount to North Korea regarding pursuing their interests in light of the
deterrer; how that choice might affect other North Korean political or economic goals; whether
provocation is better than conciliation); and, deterrer regrets and policy options (i.e., how North Korea
perceives deterrer options if North Korea is conflictual; how conflictual behavior might affect North
Korea’s freedom of action). Jerrold Post also provided an excellent conceptual framework for profiling
political leaders, with an emphasis upon their personalities. The essential categories included: the leader’s
psychobiographic information, including cultural and historical background; his personality traits,
including such things as cognitive complexity, emotional reactions, and motives of leadership; his
worldview, such as ideology and sense of nationalism; and, his style (Post, The Psychological Assessment
of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, 2003); in his chapter, “Assessing
Leaders at a Distance: The Political Personality Profile,” pages 102-4. Also see another Post book that
expands these ideas further (Post J. M., 2003); pages 102-4. These sources provide details helpful in any
North Korean leader profile. Some information needed in a North Korean strategic profile may not be
available or may be of questionable confidence. As such, it cannot, nor can any other adversary leader
strategic profile, be used to ensure deterrence success. Understanding an adversary is crucial to a
deterrence strategy, but in no way does it, or any assembly of robust military capabilities, guarantee an
adversary will be willing to acquiesce to a deterrer’s efforts. Measures taken to prepare for deterrence

161

In addition to Payne’s outline, others provide valuable insights also needed to
create a more complete picture and profile. For example, deterrence analyst Michael
McVicar provides an excellent synopsis of the rationale and ingredients of modern
deterrence-focused adversary leadership “strategic profile” information. In his qualitative
approach, McVicar provides six broad categories of information essential to adversary
leadership strategic profiles, including: historical, ideological, and cultural influences;
conditions and beliefs; leadership characteristics; decision-making structures and
processes; strategy and doctrine; and, key uncertainties (McVicar, 2011).308 Mendelsohn
brings further specificity to a profile outline by suggesting deterrence also consider the
opponent’s: military and economic power; geostrategic position; type of regime; internal
dynamics such as level of cohesion; cultural-social characteristics; and, how national
identity affects top leader decision-making (Mendelsohn, 2003).309 Further, the
framework used by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett in understanding deterrence
relationships importantly considered an opponent’s environmental levels of analysis that
informed their leadership’s decision-making. These were comprised of traditional balance
of power indicators emphasizing the military component of power, along with internal or

failure, therefore, are prudent despite the development of an empirically-based method of adversary
understanding, such as this type of profile. Page 110.
308
Pages 6-8. McVicar argues profiling is essential to more detailed adversary decision calculus
assessments which, in turn, serve as the focus for a defending state’s “tailored” deterrence planning.
Profiles aim to capture, with the material available, the “key factors” that inform how an adversary might
value or weigh such factors and calculate decisions to act or refrain from doing so. He includes statements
made by the adversary and cultural features to help alleviate “mirror-imaging” assessment of the
adversary by ascribing to him the defender’s values or, on the other hand, concluding he is so different he
cannot be understood at all and deterrence efforts hopeless.
309
Pages 84-8 and 96-7.
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domestic factors, and relationships with other actors externally (Huth & Russett, General
Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models, 1993).310
Emphasis in this chapter is on those areas in which national security-related
beliefs and perceptions of North Korea’s leader emerge in its state-level behavior.
Substantive sections of the chapter will be organized as follows: a review of the identity
and cultural factors of North Korea’s people, providing historical insights to their
national values and how those value might inform the strategic, the security-related
political culture of North Korea’s top leaders; the cognitive and psychological factors that
informed Kim Jong-Il (KJI) as the primary decision-maker in North Korea in the period
explored in the dissertation; and, key internal and external environmental factors of the
North Korean state and how KJI may have interpreted those factors in his decisionmaking. The leader, ultimately, then, is the focus of understanding for deterrence
purposes since he is the top decision-maker for national security-related decisions; he is
the one who’s personal psychological factors might play upon his decisions; he is the one
who reflects the national identity and culture of the people; and, he is the one who will
ultimately interpret changes in environmental factors, such as changes in Japan’s BMD
program over time.311 As Jeffrey Record argued, in his examination of Japan’s WWII
decision to wage war, “there is no substitute for knowledge of a potential adversary’s
310

Pages 61 and 64. These analytic levels, combined with other considerations by Huth and Russett and
others, form a broad conceptual framework used in the dissertation, including: the adversary nation’s
identity; factors that exist in the adversary’s internal and external environment; and, the individual
leader’s personal factors. Identity envisions such things as historical and cultural values. Internal
environmental factors can include such things as the state’s political apparatus, economy, military forces,
and social issues including unrest or violence. External environmental factors can include trade or political
and diplomatic interaction with other states or organizations. Personal factors of the leader can include
his risk-propensities, emotive psychological factors, and cognitive processes at work.
311
For more on the role of the leader as a reflection of national values, an interpreter of the environment,
and focus of psychological factors in deterrence-oriented profile research, see the author’s article, “Can
Tailored Deterrence and Smart Power Succeed against the Long-Term Nuclear Proliferation Challenge?”
(Lowther, 2012).
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history and culture” (Record, 2009).312 This sentiment is shared by Paige and modern
scholars so the dissertation also takes this approach and seeks to understand, albeit in an
abbreviated level of depth, the North Korean actor as Japan’s deterrence-based adversary
(Suh & Lee, 1976).313 These characteristics are useful in the development of a North
Korea strategic profile and support broader theoretic arguments that deterrence is more
likely to be effective with improved understanding of one’s adversary. The outline that
follows in this chapter incorporates the background information provided above.
Identity & Cultural Factors
The North Korean national identity and psyche are heavily influenced by Korea’s
history, including ancient history and more modern occupation by Japan.314 Along with
other cultural factors, this informs North Korean leadership decision-making, and is
summarized below. Motivations from the past led to what could be described as a
distinctive North Korean national identity and the rise and national embrace of Kim Ilsung (KIS) and the Kim family dynasty. This section of the Profile includes: lessons from
history, describing the long Korean history and the conflictual and cooperative interaction
with Japan; the social contract, which connects the past to the modern Kim dynastic rule
and gives Kim a powerful position regarding national security and relations with
outsiders including Japan; and, national cultural values, such as nationalism and
admiration of the military, which strengthen North Korea and help explain its internal and
312

Page 52.
In his chapter entitled, “Toward a Political Leadership Profile for a Changing Society.” Pages 240-1.
There are several ideas from scholars on the approach one could take to a strategic profile and the
contents therein. For example, Glenn Paige identifies 11 different types of political leadership profiles that
reflect the difficulty in supporting or crafting a single, authoritative deterrence-oriented strategic profile.
These 11 include: conceptualizing studies; operational code studies; political biography studies; role
studies; leadership institution studies; elite studies; follower studies; community power studies; value
studies; problem-solving studies; and, area studies (Suh & Lee, 1976).
314
North Koreans claim a history of Korean people dating back 5,000 years, though this is typically
connected with legend or myth. See, for example, David Rees (Rees, 2001); page 1.
313
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external behavior. These identity and cultural factors are the foundational components
through which the other two major sections of the Profile orient themselves: KJI’s
personal factors, in large part a reflection of the national psyche described in the identity
and cultural factors section; and, the internal and external environmental factors,
describing KJI’s interaction, as leader of North Korea, with external actors.
Lessons from History
Korean history is a long one, marked by depth in culture, a relatively high level of
sophistication, and deep traditions including dynastic rule. Geographically situated as a
peninsula, however, meant Korea’s interaction with the world was less inclined toward
global relations, like China’s, for example, and more toward regional contacts,
particularly with China and Japan.315 And for two millennia Korea was content with this
situation, earning it the label “hermit kingdom,” though this characterization is inaccurate
in many ways. However, the Korean people, and their provincial—and later, central—
leaders were exceedingly proud of their culture and independence, and when outside
invasions occurred over the centuries, Korea found this exceptionally offensive, criminal,
wrong, and disrespectful to its position as an advanced culture. These memories are deep
on both sides of the current political divide, and combine in modern North Korea with
other factors, such as personal characteristics of its leaders, Communist influence, and
ideology to orient much of North Korean state behavior.

315

New archaeological discoveries, lending to modern development of the landscape, are offering new
insights into ancient Korean culture and the roles of China and Japan in their cultural development and
history. North Korean perspectives, however, are aimed at interpreting archaeology to support their
notions of centrality and primacy of their position in Korean culture, if not to propagate a myth it was the
source of all human civilization (Byington, 2008); in Hyun Sook Kang’s chapter, “New Perspectives of
Koguryo Archaeological Data,” page 24.
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Earliest Korean historical records were established with the Three Kingdoms
period (57 BC to 668 AD). Koguryo was a kingdom to the North that also stretched into
large parts of Manchuria (it occupied what is now North Korea and more); Silla was to
the southeast; while the Paekche kingdom was to the southwest. Of particular note from
this period was the effort by Koguryo, a “warrior” kingdom that was the land-based
gateway to the rest of the peninsula, to fight off the many attacks including China. A
“Golden Age,” which lasted for 300 years, followed in which Koguryo itself was
conquered by China and the Korean kingdom of Silla in the south. Chinese culture,
including Buddhism, also moved south and eventually to Japan as a result. But the
lengthy Koryo period that followed (935-1392), with a new capital in the peninsula’s
center, was turbulent: the peninsula came under Mongol control by invasion; and,
“Korea” (as it was first called in this period) helped the Mongols attack Japan
(unsuccessfully) and fight Japanese pirates. In 1392, Korean General Yi T’aejo took
control of Korea and moved the capital to the area of what is today the South Korean
capital of Seoul (McCune, 1950).316
The Yi dynasty (also called the Choson dynasty) lasted over 500 years, until the
1910 Japanese annexation of Korea in its imperial period. This period is remarkable for
many reasons. First, the Koreans again were faced with invasions, both by Japan in 1592
and later by the Manchus.317 This period was also known for Korea’s isolationist
approach and the nickname of “hermit kingdom,” though trade and other contact with
Japan remained active from the early 1600s. Internal strife also emerged, with revolts in
1882 and 1884, ultimately climaxing with Japan’s forceful control of the region that it
316

Pages 10-13.
Such was the devastation during the various invasions that little of the reportedly vast and brilliant art
and pottery has survived (Vos, 1997); page 8.
317
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had already begun to control economically (McCune, 1950).318 Combined with other
cultural, environmental, and personal leader factors, these forces are potent decision
variables in scenarios like the recent period of Japan-North Korea relations and its
broader regional context.319 This view of the real possibility of externally-based
existential threats was reinforced during Japan’s imperial occupation and still dominates
the North Korean psyche.
During the Japanese imperial period (which included Japan’s murder of Korean
Queen Min),320 Korea experienced social upheaval and economic plundering at the hand
of the Japanese. Socially, Japanese colonial practices represented exceedingly foreign
(European) ideals contrary to Korean cultural norms (Woodside, 2006).321 Kang spoke of
the rules imposed by Governor-General Minami Jiro, from 1936-42, in his quest to unify
Korea with Japan, including: reciting the Pledge of Imperial Subjects; speaking only
Japanese; worshiping at Shinto shrines; and, changing their Korean names to Japanese
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Pages 12-16. One internal revolt in the later Choson period was the Hong Kyongnae Rebellion in 1812,
an action by elites and peasants in the northwestern Pyongan Province. Starting small, the rebellion
sought to uproot systematically the dynasty. Put down within months, the rebellion showed some
weakness to the dynasty’s central government to address the issues of regional groups (Kim S. J., 2007);
pages 3-10. Tae-jin Yi argues the “hermit kingdom” is an unfair one since Korea was actually trying to
modernize and join international society, despite its military weakness, though this effort was not until
the late 1800s (Yi, 2007); pages 340-50. The common picture of Japan forcibly opening up Korea to the
world and modernization, Yi argues, is a misplaced one. Importantly, McCune summarizes these historical
periods as ingraining three “forces” of modern Korean thought: nationalism; social and political
conservatism; and ties to China. These forces have endured in North Korea especially, despite years of
Japanese occupation, division, conflict, and Communist influence. Pages 12-16. Korea, however, had
become very weak in its late dynastic period as other regional powers grew, leaving it but a “pawn” to the
stronger (Grayson, 2002); page 150. Nationalism, it should be noted, is also a hallmark of South Korean
culture (Breen, 1998); page 18.
319
So deep an impression were these long-ago invasions by the Japanese and others that they
“overturned fundamental assumptions concerning national security” in the minds of Koreans (Haboush &
Deuchler, 1999); page 51.
320
The Japanese murder of Queen Min was not simply an effort to quell dynastic rule in Korea: it was an
effort to quell dissention if not rebellion since the queen was in “the vanguard of the opposition” to
Japanese reforms (Rees, 2001); page 97.
321
Pages 40 and 88.
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names (Kang, 2001).322 Humiliation for Koreans began immediately: it forced all Korean
men to receive haircuts, removing their top-knot, the very symbol of manhood.
According to McKenzie, this single legal act did more to “alienate the affection of every
Korean” (McKenzie, 1908).323 Kim Il Sung, in a speech given to inspire support for
guerilla warfare against the Japanese in 1931, claimed, among other things, that Japan
was arresting, imprisoning, and murdering innocent people everywhere in Korea and
through its laws deprived Koreans of freedoms of speech, press, and assembly (Kim I. S.,
1977).324 Economically, Japan loosely divided Korea into economic production regions,
with the south being developed for its agricultural strengths and the north being
developed in heavy industry, capturing the vast minerals and other resources in that
region (Clark, 2000).325 This industrial development in the north by Japan is what
significantly helped North Korea rise to such industrial heights in the first twenty five
years of the postwar period (Kang M.-G. , 2005).326
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Page 111. Changing names was considered “the ultimate indignity.”
Pages 46-8.
324
Speech delivered at the Meeting of Party and Young Communist League Cadres at Mingyuehkou,
Yenchi County, December 16, 1931. Pages 15-8. Kim Il Sung is often also rendered Kim Il-Sung. In addition
to Japanese occupation and the Korean War, James Grayson argued the presence and growth of
Protestant Christianity to be another significant influence on Korean history since the end of the Choson
Dynasty. This religious factor not only brought ideas of modernization from the west but also ideas of
working to care for needy people. Missionaries from the U.S., Canada and Australia organized the entire
peninsula into sectors for growth, expanding the churches to becoming “thriving institutions.” Later,
Japan suppressed these organizations, which came to symbolize, if not side with, anti-Japanese nationalist
movements. Likewise, in the aftermath of the postwar period when Korea was initially divided, Christian
entities were far stronger in the north but were designated anti-Communist by the Soviet side
consolidating power with Kim Il-Sung in the north. Many fled south, others who remained were executed
or went into hiding (Grayson, 2002); pages 155-63. Some religious elements in the north survived,
however, at least into the 1980s and 1990s. Religion, especially that stemming from outside powers, was
suspicious and its influence, and that of other religion, was to be replaced with Juche ideology.
325
Page 7. He cites, for example, Arab references to gold in the Silla kingdom east of China and, later,
European and American miners working gold veins in Korea’s north in the 1890s.
326
Pages 140-1. Mineral exploitation by Japan during its colonial period in Korea was staggering, with
Japan acquiring outright ownership of 80% of all mines and production. WWII wartime production
increased, particularly in gold mining, where the bulk of the gold mined in Korea was sent to Japan to fund
its war efforts. In addition to gold, Korean mines provided Japan with high production in silver, iron,
323
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The North Korean identity continued to be formed after the close of WWII
including its influence by Communism and the Korean War.327 In the postwar period
prior to the Korean War, the Communist revolts in the South were supported by North
Korea and Kim Il-Sung (Kim, 1977).328 In the period leading up to the Korean War,
North Korea maintained it was “the only lawfully elected people’s government” in
Korea. It clarified Pyongyang (the current capital of North Korea) to be its
“revolutionary” capital only; Seoul remained the true capital of all Korea (Kim, 1977).329
Kim Il-Sung, the father of KJI and the modern North Korean state, served as an antiJapanese guerilla and, upon conclusion of WWII, KIS collaborated with Soviet forces to
become the Korean leader in the North. His role as a popular nationalist (disputed by
some in the West) not only helped propel him to lead the country, but to shape the
country and its ideological companion to nationalism and recreate a type to totalitarian
dynasty for his son, KJI, to inherit. The personal role of KIS and North Korean

tungsten, and graphite, considered “particularly essential to national defense” needs in Japan. Trade in
Japan’s imperial era rose quickly, with Korea being active through its brokers for agricultural products at
first (predominantly rice) but later in industrial production to support the war efforts (McNamara, 1996);
pages 27-35.
327
Influence of Communism did not, however, mean North Korea could be identified simply as a
Communist state. Hyun Ok Park argues that many wrongly interpret North Korea’s anti-colonial struggle
as part of the broader Communist movement in earlier years of the twentieth century. Communist
ideology, Park emphasized, was trumped by ethnic nationalism from the very beginning, with China
purging ethnic Koreans from its party ranks (Park, 2005); pages 22-3. On the idea of North Korea being
more nationalist than Communist, see Robert Oppenheim (2008), page 47 including note 11. In fact, both
North Korea and China would prove more nationalist than Communist as time went on.
328
Pages 78-80. This not only failed to spark the desired surge of Communist sympathy and rebellion, the
South outlawed Communism and strengthened anti-Communist ideology and U.S. involvement. These
revolts, occurring in Cheju Island, Taegu, and Sunchon, among others, were very violent with many
innocent people getting killed. During the five-year UN trustee period of Korea, Communist connections
strengthened in the North. While it is difficult to assess, Lee suggests that, had the UN trusteeship of
Korea succeeded in creating a unified Korea, such a state would have eventually landed within the Soviet
orbit of influence, not the West’s, due to common borders with Communist states (China and the Soviet
Union) and the likelihood of their influence with sympathizers in Korea (Lee, 2006); pages 156-7.
329
Page 77.
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nationalism during and after the Korean War were important factors in shaping the
identity of the people and their state.330
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North Korean nationalism, however, is generally overshadowed in many historical accounts at that
time by the Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Valois writes, for example, how Truman,
after the North Korean invasion into the South in 1950, warned that Soviet expansion, if unchecked,
would continue through Asia, the Near East, and could continue through Europe. Soviet Communism in
Korea was akin to the beginnings of Hitler’s campaign—an intolerable situation to Truman (Valois, 1997);
page 8. According to U.S. war reporter John Dille (and many others at the time), the U.S. intended the
Korean War to provide it (along with Japan) a second anti-Communist base in Asia; for the Soviets, it was
simply a test of U.S. resolve and an effort to wear it down (Nishi, 2003). In John Dille’s article, “Saving
Ourselves for the Big Battle against Communism.” Pages 106-14. According to the footnote, the original
source was John Dille, Substitute for Victory, 1954. Part of the reason many ascribe the Korean War’s
trigger to the greater Communist struggle, was the role of Stalin and the Soviet Union with, if perhaps
over, Kim Il-Sung and North Korea in the early postwar period. Graeme Mount argues Stalin’s interest at
the time was access to obtain ice-free ports on the Pacific coast, an option it simply did not have within its
territory. A deal with Chiang Kai Shek granted Soviet access to the port of Lushun, but with Mao’s success
in China’s civil war, that prospect was gone. The ports in Inchon and Pusan interested Stalin as
alternatives should conflict on the peninsula emerge. He supported KIS and was willing to provide him
military arms (Mount, 2004); page 24. Ironically, use of the 38th parallel to divide Korea, as was done in
the Korean War, was not a new idea to peninsula occupiers in the postwar period. It was Japan which
suggested that dividing line with Russia in 1896 in its negotiations over carving up interests there and in
Manchuria. Disputes between the two led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5, with Japan prevailing
(Kim D. K., 2005); page 119. Unlike North Korea, which incurred devastation and over a million military
and civilian casualties, Japan, as a base for U.S. operations in the Korean War, received nearly $3 billion
from the U.S. to aid in facilitating the U.S. military activities from there, allowing Japan’s economy to
significantly rebound in the postwar period (Kim S. S., 2006); page 172. While the idea of nationalism can
be found in both North and South Korea, key differences to the people of the south lie in political choices
across the divide. Decades of purposeful cultural inculcation in the North, however, may have developed
very different views by the people of the north though this cannot be confirmed either way. For example,
although he acknowledged a great historical “interdependence” between Korea, China, and Japan,
Syngman Rhee (South Korea’s first president) was clearly a voice for independence for Korea in his day—a
necessity for its survival (Rhee, 2001); pages 253-80. According to Rhee, the three peoples were part of a
single Mongolian race; pages 80-1. His six principles for Korean independence included: being open to the
outside world; adopting new methods for security; mastering diplomacy; respecting sovereign rights;
honoring moral obligations; and, respecting the right of freedom. In addition to common ideas of
nationalism, recent studies suggest the people of the south recognize a strong connection with North
Koreans with respect to their common blood line and ancestry (Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea:
Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, 2006); pages 195-8, including tables 10.3 – 10.7. Defector accounts are
mixed in that they reflect a desire, at least by some, to reunite with family, on the one hand, and a
completely different view of their individual and national identity on the other. Perhaps a simple view of
Korean national identity is that it reflects a proud independence built upon early historical consolidation
and rule of Korean groups on the peninsula, but one which was tempered by past recurrences of invasion
and resulting suffering following. Keith Pratt, for example, says “Modern Koreans are inclined to speak of
their special shaping as a people by the psychological and physical suffering their nation has endured”
(Pratt, 2006); page 304. On a personal level, Sunny Che, speaks of growing up and life as a “Cho-sen jin”
(Korean immigrant living in Japan): ostracized, never feeling welcome, and always feeling he was an
outsider (Che, 2000). Che’s mother was a relative of the Queen of the Korean Yi Dynasty. See pages 3-5.
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Given this historical backdrop to the modern North Korean state, one would
expect a general pattern of relations with its neighbors to be marked by opposition,
confrontation, power-politics, self-help, and violent provocation from North Korea’s
leaders. This is the consistent trend. While it is the military forces of ROK and the U.S.
that directly threaten North Korean sovereignty and regime survival, given the history of
Korean interaction with Japan one would expect the North Korean relationship with
Japan to also be confrontational or violent. However, at least since the end of the Cold
War a less violent framework has existed in its relations with Japan, at least when
compared to the North’s interactions with the U.S. or ROK. One may also expect direct
confrontation over Japan’s pursuit of a BMD program since it undermined North Korea’s
means of coercion. However, this has generally not been the case.
Social Contract
The historical and cultural component of Korea’s past, coupled with a shared
popular nationalism after WWII, permitted KIS to embark upon a totalitarian regime,
fostered by Communist ideas of the era, without a great deal of resistance. This became
solidified after the Korean War. Leadership, even national “fatherhood,” was provided
for the North Korean people. The Japanese occupation may have strengthened North
Korean nationalism, but the people of the North came to possess a “fixation” on KIS
exceeding even the passions of nationalism (Shin & Robinson, 1999).331 The people
received certain entitlements from the state in exchange for support of, and submission
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In Carter J. Eckert’s chapter, “Exorcising Hegel’s Ghosts: Toward a Postnationalist Historiography of
Korea.” Page 370. Robert stresses the importance of the adversary leader’s role or position over the
people, regime, or state. The strategic role taken by the leader in his environment regionally and
historically can, in large measure, inform and explain his decisions, perhaps more than personality
(Roberts, 1988); pages 160-4.
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to, its leaders, including education, employment, and health care (Robinson, 2007).332
Such cultural perceptions can be powerful motivations for political behavior toward
Japan. Chang and Lee argue the people of the North are part of a collective, unlike the
people in the democratic South who are characterized by their individuality (Chang &
Lee, 2006).333 It is this collective to which the people belong and which KJI controlled
and provided.
North Korea’s predominant ideology is juche, a framework of self-reliance begun
under KIS. Juche, at its core, reflects the struggles and occupations of the past, marking
the ideology as essentially nationalism walled by a deep distrust of others (Belke,
1999).334 But juche must be conceptualized as more than a notion of independent-minded
nationalism or resistance to outside help. Rather, it is a stubborn duty to do things in the
North Korean way, regardless of whether that way is efficient, effective, or the best
alternative available. Juche is an imperative that motivated KJI toward decision-making
that helped make KJI appear reckless, risky, uninformed, or heartless. Juche, then, was
part of the social contract in which the state, through the regime and its leader, provided
essential needs of the people, particularly national security needs, and they in turn would
cede decision-making rights to national leaders. This approach not only led North Korea
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Page 150. However, Robins and Post speak of the paranoia of North Korea internally in which its
people, either willingly or under compulsion from fear, subordinate themselves slavishly to their leader
(Robins & Post, 1997); page 87.
333
Page 222. However, control of the people began immediately upon the end of the Japanese colonial
rule. Since North Korea emerged, the state, with Soviet help, established a “regime of surveillance” that
included spying on its population, social controls, and mental and physical self-criticism. Ever fearful of
external dangers, such as from South Korea, North Korea’s national security was dependent upon control
and, with this view in mind, pushed its surveillance regime down to the village level, but linked all
information links to its central government (Armstrong, 2003); pages 191-214. Self-criticism involved
disciplining the mind and body so as to be in unison with the state—a process westerners called
brainwashing. According to Armstrong, a highly-efficient program of near-total control took decades.
334
Page 197. Juche, like Confucian thought, describes the value of humans only in terms of their existence
within society, though juche emphasizes the communal aspects of society (Baker, 2008); page 147.
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to embark on a path of military strength and violence to secure regime and national
survival, but one of authoritarian rule. The consequences of employing juche within the
social contract, however, were mixed. For example, military discipline has seen fissures
including the possible naval provocation in June 2002 off the west coast that was not
directed by KJI but conducted by disgruntled military officers (Schneider & Post,
2002).335
Cultural Values
In addition to a powerful sense of independence and recognition of North Korea’s
leader as benefactor, certain qualities, also related to its past, might also be described as
North Korean cultural values of which North Korea’s leader KJI shared. These values
appear to have strengthened North Korea in ways that temper the need for economic
relief, for example, that outsiders have ascribed to periods of North Korean plight. In
such cases, the North Korean strategy of coercion, including interaction with Japan,
should, therefore, not be presumed to reflect a willingness to acquire external funding or
aid at all political or military cost. North Korean cultural values include admiration of the
military, filial community, nationalism, honor, and pride in culture including resiliency
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In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 109 and 116-8. Others included: high levels of military investment despite extreme
economic challenges; a social culture of dependency and population passivity; an attempt at total state
control where no real opportunities for political or religious opposition or independence are possible;
soaring corruption in which illegal economic activities occur even with the aid of government officials.
Intended as a national policy path, juche grew out of a xenophobic view based on past historical invasions
of North Korea, but especially Japan’s more recent colonial occupation period in which KIS earned
veneration as a guerilla fighter against Japan. According to a western diplomat who served in North Korea,
juche simply meant relying upon one’s own resources, and doing so in a non-capitalist but non-dogmatic
way. The North Korean’s viewed it of particular value to developing countries of the world where
emerging states could skip the capitalism step in traditional Marxism-Leninism and go straight to
socialism. It led to pride, in his view, but also overconfidence resulting in lack of value in international
cooperation, and elites living in luxury while the vast numbers of people experienced starvation and
destitution (Cornell, 2002); pages 42-5. Cornell was the Swedish Charge d’Affaires to North Korea from
1975-77. The Embassy of Sweden in Pyongyang was for many years the only western embassy there.
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and technological achievement.336 Dependence upon the military for protection may also
stem from experiences during the Korean War not unlike some peoples and cities during
WWII. Springer makes the case, for example, that the North Korean people endured great
suffering during prolonged aerial bombings of the cities of Pyongyang, Hungnam,
Wonsan, and Kanggye—an experience that shook their psyche (Springer, 2010).337 In
providing defense and “liberation,” the military and its personnel are highly regarded in
North Korea by its people.
Long-held beliefs, stemming in part from Confucian connections, help form the
core of Korean, and North Korean, cultural identity, chiefly the idea of filial deference
and loyalty (Chang & Lee, 2006).338 In a collective state such as North Korea, this helps
binds people with leader and is another feature of ancient Korean history intertwined with
modern experience.
Anti-Japanese sentiment continues in North Korea at the center of its nationalism
and spans from the central government down to ordinary citizens. Bruce Cumings, for
example, describes life in North Korea as if the country is “still fighting the Japanese,”
with government-run press near-daily flogging Japan for wartime atrocities (Cumings,
2005).339 Nationalism in the North is not only important, it is viewed as superior (Chang
& Lee, 2006).340
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There are diverse views on the division between north and south. For now, many voices ascribe to
North Korea a different culture, or at least differing emphases upon cultural aspects. Others, such as Roy
Grinker, argue the differences have become deeper, and the two now more heterogeneous than not
(Grinker, 1998); pages 225-7. He states, “North Koreans will never be replicas of south Koreans,” citing the
difficulties defectors face in integration after making their ways to South Korea.
337
Page 11.
338
Page 224.
339
Pages 406-7. Cumings also says North Korean youth take camping trips to retrace the steps of antiJapanese guerillas during their struggle.
340
Pages 254 and 278-9. Neither the North nor the South dispels the idea of being nationalist. However,
many in the North argue the nationalism of the North is “purer” than that of the South, the latter having

174

Technological development is an important historical phenomenon globally, and
has merit in Korea’s history as well, its people also reflecting ingenuity and
accomplishment. Korean pride today flows, in part, from the period of the Yi dynasty
when, for example, in the late 16th Century they invented and employed iron-clad ships to
defeat the Japanese naval ships during its invasion. Korea also penned its first written
language and invented “movable metal type” for its language perhaps decades before
such an apparatus was invented in the west (McCune, 1950).341
Pride in its self-sufficiency, often reflected in its resiliency, is a psychological
factor that exists at both the societal and individual leader (KJI) levels. Resiliency was
tested particularly in the 1990s where the state had lost a great deal of support from the
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries following the Soviet collapse. It was in this
period when consecutive years of flooding and drought left 18% of North Korean
farmland utterly destroyed (agriculture accounts for 30% of its entire economy); and,
perhaps 10% of its population (two million people) died of starvation or related illness
(Kim S. H., 2003).342 Hwang argues the idea of a strong central government in North

retained a measure of occupation and willing adoption to Western tendencies. On the other hand, the
South portrays itself as better nationalist victors, having beaten both the Japanese and Communists. As
others have described, Korean nationalism was, and is, a very strong factor in its thinking on security. In
addition to the other accounts cited in this chapter, Schmid described the great many violations that
occurred along the border with China in the late 1880s leading to a feeling of “siege” and heightened
Korean sensitivity regarding its territory, contributing to the emergence of an enduring Korean
nationalism (Schmid, 2002); pages 199 and 202.
341
Pages 12-16. When compared with other peoples, however, Seong-Rae Park suggests Korean
contributions were historically modest (Park S.-R., 2005); pages 1-5.
342
Pages 135-6. It was during this challenging time South Korea’s leadership adopted the “sunshine
policy” which sought to pursue humanitarian issues with the North separate from political ones. The rise
and influx of dozens of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) resulted from this policy. Pages 136-7.
These NGOs worked in four functional areas: public service, unification, religion, and vocational support. It
should also be noted that the desire for humanitarian support from the south toward the north may stem
from both the desire to aid fellow ethnic Koreans, but also as a reflection of the strong Christian influence
in the south that spread in the postwar period with anti-Communism. From a different perspective,
Pollack suggests fear of outside economic influence is a consequence of its ideology and culture. North
Korea denounces such influence as “ideological and cultural infiltration,” an age-old strategy used by an
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Korea can be ascribed to the influence of Confucian thought while the “sacrifice” stems
from Buddhist influence upon North Korean society (Hwang, A History of Korea: An
Episodic Narrative, 2010).343 Together, these may help explain the resiliency of the
people in the most trying times, such as famines of the 1990s, but happened in such a
way that the sovereignty of the KJI regime was never stressed through uprising in
response to government failures.344
KJI Personal Factors
Kim Jong-Il, only the second person in the North’s dynastic continuity, was a
reflection of national identity and culture and the nation’s clear dominant leader in its
relations with external actors including Japan. KJI’s personal factors were, therefore, knit
into the fabric of the nation-state, the ruling regime, and interaction with the outside
world. While KJI lived in the shadow of his father KIS, it must be remembered that in the
development of North Korea’s strategic culture of national independence, political
sovereignty, and regime survival, its leader, KJI, was the regime and the regime was the
nation. Independence and sovereignty depended upon the regime to succeed and survive,
but the regime depended upon KJI personally. This is part of the North’s unique cultural
and dynastic legacy, but also a reflection of the practicalities of modern totalitarian rule.
As explained previously, the period of dissertation focus is 1990-2011. This period is
principally one dominated by the leadership of KJI (he began to take over prominent

aggressor before violent attack (Pollack, 2004); in Nicholas Eberstadt’s chapter, “Why Hasn’t the DPRK
Collapsed?” Page 157. This fear may explain the resilience, if not stubbornness, of North Korea to be
unwilling to include outside participation in solving its economic woes, instead of merely exploiting their
resources through coercion.
343
Pages 33-40.
344
North Korean resilience is difficult with which to argue and claims of impending collapse are a regular
occurrence. One interesting claim was by a group of experts at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
who claimed in 1997 the North would collapse within five years (Ford, 2008); page 152.
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positions from his father at the beginning of this period and died at its end). Thus, he is
the focus of this section of the strategic profile.345 This major section of the Profile
includes: KJI’s ascendency to power, including his long-term service in, if not control of,
the activities of government rather than being a casual bystander; KJI’s personality and
approach to decision-making regarding national security issues; and, KJI’s psychological
factors—his rationality and predictability, motivations and goals, cognitive processes,
risk tolerance, health, and emotive factors—affecting national security decision-making
including decisions involving ballistic missiles and relations with Japan. Thus, KJI’s
personal factors reflect, in part, the national identity and culture of North Korea, and can
be seen in his interaction with internal domestic audiences and relations with external
actors including Japan.
Ascendency to Power
KJI was not a disinterested member of royalty, ascending to a throne at an
appointed time to serve as a figure head. Rather, his ascendency was purposeful and
perhaps strenuous, ultimately leading to not only to the ultimate position of national
power but command of government and national security policy, including relations with
Japan. The process of KJI’s succession and takeover of power was gradual through rising
positions in government. For example, in 1974 KJI gained operational control of the
Workers’ Party; by 1980 his measures were seen in the party Congress; and, he was later
named head of the party’s secretariat, essentially making him the second most powerful
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KJI died 19 December, 2011, and upon his death his son, Kim Jong-Un (KJU) assumed power of North
Korea including Supreme Commander of the military December 30th. In April 2012 KJU took over the KWP
as its First Secretary and control of the NDC by becoming its First Chairman (Defense of Japan 2012,
2012); pages 20-1. KJU thus consolidated power, at least officially.
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person and effectively running the government (Jung, 1998).346 KJI was named successor
in 1980 (Grayson, 2002).347 KJI’s public stature and path to succession emerged in 1980
when he was elected to senior Party positions at the October Party Congress. In 1982 he
received the title “Hero of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” and published On
the Juche Idea, the latter making him the “definitive interpreter of his father’s ideology.”
Further, state press began to speak more of KJI and by 1983, according to Adrian Buzo,
he’d been “endowed with the same personal and political genius-leader attributes of his
father.” Outside speculation was KJI would represent a new, younger generation with
new ideas. However, as KJI produced more ideological papers it became clear he was
aiming for all generations of North Korans to continue on the guerilla revolution of his
father—no significant change was coming in the person of KJI (Buzo, 1999).348
While KJI did not officially take over leadership of North Korea until 1994 when
his father died, he had been groomed for succession for many years and his control
effectively began closer to 1990. Handover of power was incremental and, according to
Oh and Hassig, KJI exercised near-total control of the state before his father died (Oh &
Hassig, 2000).349 For example, according to Baird, KJI became the first deputy chairman
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Page 340. When KJI was head secretary of the Party’s Organization Department (essentially running
the government) he managed the various bureaus with meticulous control and efficiency. For example, he
required every bureau department to submit reports weekly and he personally read and responded to
every report. He kept his father informed, later using a tape recorder for him so it would be easier to
grasp what was happening as KJI orchestrated it all. Further, all instructions, no matter how small, coming
from KIS went through KJI before going to any bureau. KIS was a charismatic leader; KJI was in his comfort
zone as a detail-oriented manager (Becker, 2005); pages 124-6 and 129. This process of KJI control and
keeping information from his father may also have led to fighting between father and son over internal
conditions, though this is unconfirmed.
347
Page 151.
348
Pages 105-6. In keeping with Korean tradition of myth surrounding its great leaders, so, too, is the
story of KJI’s birth: born on sacred Mount Paekdu, triggering a new star in the sky, rainbows, and lights in
the sky. Most North Koreans likely understand the story to be the allegory of Kim’s special purpose it was
intended to portray (French, 2007); pages 57-8.
349
Page 91.
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of the powerful National Defense Commission in early 1990 (full chairman in April
1993), the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Supreme Commander in December 1991, and
awarded the military rank of marshal in April 1992. He did not assume leadership of the
Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) until three years after KIS died and never assumed KIS’s
political title of president (Schneider & Post, 2002).350 Thus, after 20 years of such
management processes, KJI was able to maintain his tight government control upon his
father’s death.
KJI took over North Korea in every respect when his father died in 1994.351 KJI’s
succession of his father and founder of the state was not automatic, nor was KJI’s grasp
of power. KJI was well-prepared, adapted as necessary, and took measures to buy loyalty
where necessary. These, and other reasons, explain KJI’s success in garnering and
retaining power (Lynn, 2007).352 While North Korea does not today control its people
quite to the extent it once did, KJI sought to control what he could of what his people did
and thought (Scobell, Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System,
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In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Page 111-2. Further, KJI was the one who met with Soviet officials in 1990 when they informed
the North it would be losing considerable Soviet aid (Cha, 2012).
351
Two significant political activities were already underway that summer: negotiations with the U.S. over
North Korea’s nuclear program and an upcoming, and first-ever, North-South summit (Jung, 1998); page
342. He navigated both, though neither led to North Korean abandonment of its nuclear program nor
political reconciliation with South Korea. To ascribe “generalship” upon himself is not that far removed
from ancient Korean history when, for example, Koryo royal kings partnered with “royal” military leaders
in the same capital city (Shultz E. J., 2000); page 175. This was unlike Japanese shoguns who were more
autonomous and geographically separate. Eugene Park expands on this and argued Korean military
influence expanded through the rise of a distinctively military aristocracy that allowed a better military
cadre through use of an examination system, as well as improved access across the social strata by elites
and non-elites alike (Park E. Y., 2007); pages 179-80.
352
Pages 110-6. According to Lynn, the reasons include: (1) 25 years of preparation, governmental service,
and personal power consolidation; (2) replacement of old generation loyalists; (3) adaptation of juche
ideology to undergird a new “military first policy,” solidifying loyalty of the military behind him; (4)
tightening his grip of control through information management; (5) buying loyalty from elites and party
members through material perks; (6) fostering a siege mentality among the people; and, (7) conducting
limited economic reforms in 2002 to help manage a growing black market. According to Lynn, public
executions continue as a tool of psychological control of the people.
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2006).353 Interestingly, B.R. Myers argues North Korean provocations of recent years are
intended to demonstrate legitimacy to the domestic audiences of North Korea—
legitimacy being a growing problem and a potential source of future crisis in North Korea
(Myers, 2010).354
Personality
Worldview, Style, & Image.
KJI followed in his father’s footsteps in many ways, though KJI departed from his
father in some ways as well as circumstances warranted. His personality also affected
how KJI interacted with Japan through ballistic missile-back coercion, on the one hand,
and political normalization actions on the other, having implications for how he may have
responded to Japan’s BMD program. KJI was heavily influenced by his father, KIS, who
founded North Korea and began the Kim dynasty, now stretching over 60 years and three
generations. Jerrold Post argued KJI’s father cast a long shadow, placing increased
pressure upon KJI to perform and leading to narcissistic behavioral patterns (Post J. M.,
2004).355 The cult of personality pursued by KJI followed that of his father. But it cannot
be presumed that the people, or the elites, ever warmly accepted this strategy, or that KJI
believed they did. Rather, KJI wrapped himself in it and the people complied (Lankov,
2005).356 Neither did KJI depart from the North Korean autonomous idealism espoused
by KIS—a disastrous choice, in Jung’s view (Jung, 1998).357
353

Pages 2-4.
Page 17. As such, they are not attempts to threaten and blackmail external actors, such as Japan, the
U.S. or ROK.
355
Pages 239-41, 254, and 258. Post offered a passage about KIS to consider from an official website of
the North Korean government. A few of the words from this passage, referring to KJI’s father, include:
great man; praised; legendary hero; liberated; defeated; led; patriot; repulsed; dignity; historic; gifted;
invincible; immortal; peerless; and unprecedented.
356
Pages 5, 97-8, 130-1, 146, 150, and 171. According to Andrei Lankov, Kim Il-Sung was challenged
openly by other senior leaders in 1956, for example, on his aggressive campaign of self-adulation and for
354
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The Kim dynasty is viewed in North Korea as “fatherly” leaders, starting with
KIS. According to Martin, this otherwise emotive and culturally filial connection is an
historical one. For example, scores of North Korean children were left fatherless or
orphans as direct consequence of the Korean War which left 25% of North Korea’s 10
million people dead. The state took charge of their welfare after the war and they were
taught that its new leader, Kim Il-Sung, was their new father (Martin, 2004).358 Unlike
the cult of personality forced upon the nation, KJI viewed himself—and presumed the
masses willingly view him in the same way—as a continuation of this “fatherly” filial

mistreatment of the people, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with the regime. It failed, all
conspirators were executed or jailed, purges by KIS followed, and the central lesson learned by all was
that “nobody should dare challenge the Great Leader and hope to get away with it.” Lankov, using newly
available information from former Soviet primary sources, described the challenge as a legal one made
during the party’s August Plenum meeting August 30, 1956. Lankov places the challenge in context of
other Communist challenges, such as the 1956 uprising in Hungary, and a wider Communist “thaw” that
allowed others to be more open about domestic problems. KIS endured none of this. See also pages 2-4,
77, 89, and 121. Of note, so close is the ideology of juche to KIS that it is also referred to as
“Kimilsungism” (Kim D. K., 2005); page 165.
357
Page 343. The personality cult tactic first begun by KIS gave him the opportunity to solidify his rule, set
aside the image of being a Communist puppet, and instill his personal “brand” of leadership style and
ideology without opposition. The personality cult is the same style adopted and followed by KJI. Neither
did KJI seek to reduce or dismiss the deification of his father through a complete “de-Kimification”
campaign similar to what was seen in China regarding Mao or the Soviet Union with Stalin. The people,
including defectors, according to Scobell, continue personal reverence for Kim Il-Sung. All of these things
suggest to Scobell that North Korea is at best an “eroding totalitarian regime,” and has not yet begun
transformation toward authoritarian rule. Under these circumstances, dissent emerges, while other things
wane such as rigid ideology, party control, terror practices upon the people (though the means of
coercion remain), information control, and central economic planning (Scobell, Kim Jong Il and North
Korea: The Leader and the System, 2006); pages 3-4, including Figure 1. Scobell also suggested KJI’s
successor would not likely be able to sustain a totalitarian regime. See page 39. KJI did in 2004 take
measures to soften the personality cult aspect of his leadership style, removing some portraits of himself
and dropping some references as “Dear Leader.” The reasons were unclear, though some speculated it
was an effort to help garner foreign aid or to draw attention from the North Korean people (Mystery as
Kim Title, Posters Go, 2004); originally an Associated Press source.
358
Pages 1-3. Kyung Moon Hwang argues KJI, like his father, merely reflects the revival of the ancient
Korean kingship, a structure with which the people are comfortable given its familial orientation and
succession and its sense of national stability (Hwang, A History of Korea: An Episodic Narrative, 2010).
Page 256. This type of a structure, given its history, “made perfect sense.” Hwang argues it would be
wrong to think the North Korean state and society was illegitimate or the political or cultural aberration;
both simply followed a relatively logical path given their shared past but modern position across the
dividing line (page 260).
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theme. KJI also used Juche like his father, though KJI took it to a different level of
engagement with the masses (Buswell, 2007).359
As absolute ruler, and surrounded by his own cult of personality, KJI had few
restraints in feeding his ego. From a variety of first-hand and secondary accounts, Oh and
Hassig suggest KJI was independent if not arrogant and disrespectful. They also believe
his behavior was beyond decisive toward impulsive or reckless. At times KJI yelled or
displayed a violent temper; allegedly, KJI ordered the killing of his former agriculture
minister and personally executed the assistant to his brother-in-law, Chang Song-taek, as
a warning to Chang for his arrogant behavior. This also appears in keeping with Kim’s
lack of trust for most people, retaining mostly family members, including his sister and
her husband, as his closest associates or advisors. A hard worker, he expected the same of
others in his name (Oh & Hassig, 2000).360 Kim lived in complete luxury as leader, with
an abundance of every personal preference available to him (French, 2007).361 His
independence also took on a more pragmatic side since KJI appeared confident as leader,
one who used crisis as a tool, and whose decisions were informed in most respects to
official information.362
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In Eun Hee Shin’s chapter, “The Sociopolitical Organism: The Religious Dimensions of Juche
Philosophy.” Pages 517-22. Juche, according to Eun Hee Shin, has undergone transformation in its
application in North Korea. Beginning as an anti-imperialist ideology, its founder, Kim Il-Sung, created and
used juche as a nationalist instrument through the Worker’s Party and government organs to help win
sovereignty. It was interpreted later (in the 1970s and 80s) in a humanistic way to apply to social
interactions. Lastly, under KJI, it was transformed into a state religion to be followed by faith with KJI as
the religion’s priest. Shin says “serving the people” was a mantra of KJI. Juche should be thought of as a
philosophy of “sovereign autonomy” among other similar linguistic definitions.
360
Pages 91-5, including note 25.
361
Page 62. These preferences included money, cars, clothes, palaces, alcohol, and women.
362
Roberts identifies elements of decision-making style possibly germane to North Korean leaders. These
include: their cognitive style (who and what informs their decision-making); confidence in decisionmaking; and, whether they are a conflict-seeker or avoider (Roberts, 1988); page 175.
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At the center of KJI’s personality was the need to be in control, not only to dispel
any notions that he did not live up to his father’s persona, but also as a practical method
of managing the state domestically and internationally. KJI was also comfortable being in
control; external arrangements that sought to constrain him were contrary to his personal
style. For example, KJI was willing to breach an agreement to forego developing nuclear
weapons when he felt it was no longer in North Korea’s interests to do so. He also sought
to circumvent sanctions on proliferation, including missile or nuclear related technologies
that turned up later in places such as Syria. Further, he did not agree with the
interpretation of UNSC resolutions banning North Korean ballistic missile launches,
activities North Korea felt were space-related. It is difficult, therefore, to suggest North
Korea to be anything but noncompliant in some key security related agreements.
However, this should be understood to be a reflection of KJI’s personality and need to be
in control. KJI needed control of all events and was a micromanager in his style and
approach as leader (Schneider & Post, 2002).363 This suggests he was personally involved
in all decisions and state behavior regarding interaction with, and responses to, external
actors, including Japan and its BMD.
KJI’s personality was reflected in domestic affairs such as directing, or at least
permitting, harsh treatment of North Koreans even when dire circumstances already
existed (Martin, 2004).364 KJI’s personal qualities were characteristic of most dictators:
363

In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Page 112. He did not, however, like public appearances or giving speeches.
364
Page 679, including notes 62 and 63. Analytic differences exist on this point, though they appear to be
questions of the order of magnitude of KJI’s cruelty. For example, while KJI had been identified as a
“malignant narcissist” without any capacity to empathize with his people by Dr. Jerrold Post, one of the
foremost political psychologists in the U.S., Martin questions this analysis as an exaggeration. Martin
himself, however, cites as evidence of KJI’s empathy words in a 1996 speech and words he shared with
visitors in 1998, both during horrendous domestic suffering; Martin also took issue with Post’s claim KJI
ordered systematic infanticide in political prison camps, though he acknowledged the infanticide as
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he dominated others principally by fear; he did not care if others cared about him; he used
bribes and privilege on the one hand, and humiliation or threat of execution on the other;
he viewed people, decisions, and behavior from a utilitarian view; he welcomed new
ways of getting foreign currency; and, he lived an indulgent lifestyle (Schneider & Post,
2002).365 Lynn claims KJI maintained systematic thought control over the people (Lynn,
2007).366
KJI’s control in foreign relations was complex and included both a personal
charm and command of details when necessary. On the one hand, in seeking to control
foreign relations, KJI resorted to the use of brinkmanship and threats as his primary tools
when relating with foreign leaders, hoping to advance his objectives through bluster
(Schneider & Post, 2002).367 Brinkmanship was also conducted with violence, allegedly
under KJI’s direction (French, 2007).368 Hwang Jang-yop, KJI’s former advisor said Kim
was “strong willed, short-tempered and ruthless.” To diplomats, on the other hand, he
factual—it was merely whether KJI had personally ordered the action. It seems plausible, given KJI’s
attention to details and desire for total control, that he had ordered the infanticide. Further, Martin
admits KJI returned to military matters during the devastation in his country despite his public statements
of empathy.
365
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 113-4.
366
Page 95. Central control by KJI over economic affairs was a weak point in KJI’s pursuit of control.
367
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Page 109. According to Jerrold Post, Stephen Walker, and David Winter, KJI’s personality and
need for control was important in North Korea’s foreign policy (Post, The Psychological Assessment of
Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, 2003); in their chapter entitled,
“Profiling Political Leaders: An Introduction.” Page 2. The personality of a political leader matters more
under certain conditions and under these conditions reflect most in foreign relations with their
opponents. Some of these conditions include: when there are no clear precedents, routines, or
established norms of acceptable behavior; when the leader occupies a strategic position; when the leader
is charismatic; when the external environment is unclear; or, in crisis. While not an exhaustive list of
conditions provided by the authors, many of those cited above appear to apply to KJI, North Korea’s
leader, implying his personality played a prominent role in North Korea’s foreign policy including relations
with Japan and reactions to its BMD.
368
For example, some claim KJI ordered a bombing in 1983 in Rangoon, Burma, that killed 17 South
Korean officials, including cabinet members, presidential advisors and an ambassador. Pages 59 and 194.
KJI did not favor large public appearances or interaction with common people but preferred small groups
since he was lacking in charisma.
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was charming personally, commonsensical, and smart. On one occasion, when Madeleine
Albright met with Kim in Pyongyang in 2000, Kim personally answered most of the 14
missile-related technical questions the U.S. team presented, rather than delegating such
details to others (French, 2007).369 This, and other events, showed KJI to be aware of the
issues, including technical ones, pragmatic, rational, and calculating.
Control also led KJI to seek to manage perceptions of others, including foreign
audiences. Some authors argue that the North Korean threats, even the very images of
North Korea internally, are Confucian deceptive practices to merely give the illusion of a
happy state domestically, but a dangerous one to the world. This approach built upon
KJI’s experience in the North Korean cinema industry and was affirmed by admittedly
weak intelligence capabilities to discern the realities of the North Korean threat (Kracht,
Munz, & Nikol, 2007).370 Events, such as provocations, may also have been measured
events used by KJI simply to “keep people off balance about his next move,” or as Kim
supposedly described that strategy, creating an environmental “fog” to hinder his
enemies. As such, Scobell viewed KJI as wanting to appear dangerous without actually
possessing personality traits of self-destructiveness on the order of Hitler is his final
throws (Scobell, 2006).371
On big issues, however, it appears KJI’s personality was also very pragmatic,
defaulting to the influence of strategic culture—namely, personal, regime, and national
survival needs. For example, in 2002, a crisis over North Korean revelations of expansion
369

Pages 62-3. As the unquestioned leader of a regional state holding a key strategic position, the foreign
policy and behavior of the state reflected KJI’s personality. For example, Hwang Jang Yop, the highest
ranking defector from North Korea and the intellectual architect of the juche idea, argued KJI was the only
person in North Korea with any real power; other faces known to the outside world, such as diplomats,
were merely his instruments of policy but had no power (Oh & Hassig, 2000); page 91.
370
Pages 12-5.
371
Pages 13-4.
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to its nuclear program derailed rapprochement efforts with Japan (Schneider & Post,
2002).372 On the other hand, Baird argued Kim Jong-Il was intrigued by change, much
more so than his father, Kim Il-Sung (Schneider & Post, 2002).373 If so, then KJI may
also have been susceptible to the changing influence of external environmental factors,
including deterrence activities (and Japan’s BMD), and behavior patterns would be
expected, perhaps with the change in missile flight test directions, even originating
launch facility.
Psychological Factors
In addition to KJI’s personality, key psychological factors were also present that
appear to have affected his national security decision-making in some cases, including his
relations with Japan and he may have interpreted Japan’s BMD in relation to the North’s
overall strategy of coercion versus long-term political goals in the region.
Rationality and Predictability.
In the post-Cold War era KJI generally showed consistent patterns of coercive
actions, undergirded by a deterrent posture, with threats of ballistic missile use that could
escalate as high as use of WMD. KJI was also rational and calculating in his decision-
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In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 132 and 134-5. In September 2002 KJI and Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi signed an
agreement setting the stage for establishment of diplomatic relations and political rapprochement. Japan
was poised to send North Korea several billion dollars of aid. However, in October 2002 North Korea
confessed it had been working on a clandestine uranium enrichment program, its second path to making
nuclear weapons. Such a program was a breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Baird argued this type of
calculating underscored the great fear North Korea maintained of outside intervention and the high value
North Korea placed on possession and manipulation of WMD capabilities. The 2002 crisis offered KJI
opportunities and he seemed willing to lose the political progress with Japan, and the very significant
financial dividends flowing from it, in exchange for coercive security achieved through crisis itself and
markers of deterrence success through his WMD. While the dissertation suggests KJI’s decision-making
reflected North Korean strategic culture, Baird suggests that, at least from the view of the U.S., KJI’s
decision-making reflected miscalculation.
373
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Page 109.
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making, though he sought to manipulate the perceptions of foreign audiences to enhance
his deterrent security position. For example, Rex Kiziah points to analysis by Richard
Fisher of the Heritage Foundation that suggests the 31 August 1998 TD-1 launch was a
coercive act to extort $500 million annually from the U.S., a request made to U.S.
congressional staffers earlier in August (Kiziah, 2000).374 In addition to the predictable
pattern of political coercion described above, some suggest North Korea sought to
maximize the probability of coercion’s success by appearing dangerous if not
unpredictable. For example, Derek Smith argued that North Korea manipulated U.S. and
allied fears of North Korea’s “rogue” state irrationality and impacted U.S. behavior
(Smith, 2006).375
Motivations and Goals.
KJI was motivated by both external factors relating to North Korean security and
internal factors pertaining to national pride and regarding his position as leader.
Generally, Glenn Snyder creates a distinction in a leader’s types of motivations, useful in
the dissertation when examining North Korea’s leadership. He describes, for example,
374

Page 6. Kiziah described alternative perspectives concerning decisions and actions of KJI. On the one
hand, behavior surrounding ballistic missiles and WMD were thought to reflect “irrationality” in his
decision-making. On the other hand, Kiziah said some, such as Kim Tae-woo of the ROK Policy Research
Office, considered KJI not only rational but in Kim’s words, “dangerously calculative,” influenced by
regime survival and severe economic conditions.
375
Pages 68 and 71-4. In the late spring of 1994, North Korea used tense rhetoric against allies, creating
an impression in the U.S. that North Korea was unpredictable. The outcome was, Smith argues, a quite
rational outcome, from the North’s strategy perspective, whereby the U.S. was deterred by North Korea
and U.S. credibility diminished not only with North Korea but elsewhere including disarmament policy.
Smith blamed the outcomes on poor U.S. understanding of North Korean leadership. This example
occurred just weeks before the death of KIS; though he was still leader of the North Korean regime, KJI
was certainly involved in the discussions and final decision-making on the North Korean course of action
taken in this crisis. The U.S. took North Korean statements seriously including it would turn Seoul into a
“sea of flames.” Christoph Bluth argues KJI is not suicidal nor irrational, but suggests North Korean leaders
want other countries to believe the North’s leaders “as being capable of anything and afraid of nothing,” a
psychological strategy to deter foreign attack. An otherwise simple and successful strategy, Bluth cautions
it carries risks of someone miscalculating (leading to war) or events simply spiraling out of the North’s
control (Bluth, 2008); page 141.
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“in-order-to” and “because-of” motives (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).376 Perhaps a
better way is to describe such motivations regarding North Korea’s security is
temporally, where because-of motives relate to past experiences or event-sensitive values,
interests, or emotions and in-order-to motives are intentions, goals, and objectives yet to
be realized in the future. KJI, for example, behaved toward Japan in ways motivated by
the emotive past occupation of Korea by Japan in its colonial period preceding World
War II to punish Japan and extort from it as much political and material compensation as
possible. He may also have behaved toward Japan in ways motivated by an intention to
strengthen North Korea’s balance of power position and become the future, undisputed
regional hegemonic power in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, KJI probably believed
political normalization with Japan would have provided North Korea with leverage in
Japanese decisions regarding U.S. forces based inside Japan as well as providing political
and economic victories to boost KJI’s standing at home and in the region. For these
reasons, among KJI’s priorities for preserving his regime and, therefore, national
survival, was positive progress in relations with Japan. However, the issue of North
Korean abductions of Japanese citizens damaged relations and stymied progress (Bechtol,
2007).377
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Page 559.
Pages 139-40. Domestically, KJI also seemed genuinely motivated by his position as leader of the
masses and not simply by the perks that position afforded, though he certainly took advantage of those
perks. The social contract, for example, is a theme he spoke of early to which he came back to frequently
over time. In a paper on socialism in 1991, he spoke of the uniqueness of North Korea’s course, claiming
their socialism “derives its unconquerable might from the masses’ support for it and their confidence in
it.” He went on to say the people “entrust their destiny” to it, the Party, and, of course, the leader—juche
was actually the desire of the masses that (first) Kim Il-Sung captured for them and to which he, too, was
guiding (Kim J. I., 2003); pages 1-2 and 45. This source document states it was a “talk” given by KJI, though
it is hard to imagine he narrated the entire 46 pages of material; perhaps he presented a shorter version
or simply made the paper available to Party members present at the 5 May 1991 meeting.
377
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While KJI was pragmatic, he was also influenced by national and personal pride.
For example, prior to North Korean multiple missile launches in July 2006, international
pressure against North Korea was sufficiently marshaled to appear “unanimous,” an
otherwise positive diplomatic feat against North Korea. However, the problem was that
this left KJI without a “face-saving way to back down” (Pritchard, 2007).378 This, then,
became a challenge to KJI’s personal honor and to North Korean national pride: KJI
chose to launch the missiles and incur UNSC condemnation.
Cognitive Processes.379
While KJI traveled occasionally to Russia and China, and to Eastern European
countries in the 1950s, his cognitive processes concerning interpreting external
environmental factors through firsthand experiences and informational exposure to the
outside world was limited or “bounded” (Scobell, 2006).380 Further, information coming
to KJI was designed by Kim himself reflecting a preference of official information. He
utilized the Three Revolution Team Movement concept in which party workers at the
lowest and most distant districts obtained information of possible use in state operations
378

Pages 146-8.
Understanding of an adversary’s cognitive dimension is critical. In general, environmental factors exist
that are reflected in adversary knowledge of events and changes across his state’s internal landscape as
well as events within the region and across the globe. The cognitive factor is how that leader perceives or
interprets those events or changes to the environment and how he includes those perceptions in his
decision-making, including decisions one might seek to deter. For example, as a leader is considering
taking action one would consider egregious, that leader’s cognitive mechanism might connect
environmental factors to perceived consequences of his decision to act or, alternatively, decision to
restrain from acting at that time. The cognitively constructed, but environmentally informed,
consequences (i.e., perceived costs and benefits of acting, and perceived costs and benefits of restraint)
are what others, especially in recent writings, refer to as elements of an adversary’s decision “calculus.”
Michael Santacroce, in describing the role of the “cognitive dimension” in his guide for U.S. operational
military planning against adversaries, suggests that in this dimension “people think, perceive, visualize,
understand, and decide” (Santacroce, 2011); page 191. Decisions of these leaders may be influenced by
their personal psychological characteristics, motivations, emotion, state of mind, perceptions, or rumors,
among other factors.
380
Page 11. Scobell suggests his perceptions, or misperceptions, of other countries is probably limited to
what he observes in movies, the internet, and satellite TV.
379
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and passed it up through a reporting system directly to Kim’s personal office. Reports
prepared for Kim needed to arrive within three days, regardless of the Party,
governmental, or security service source; urgent matters were to be phoned in
immediately (Oh & Hassig, 2000).381
Opinion differs on how well KJI was informed, however. Baird, for example,
argues that KJI was well-informed, receiving not only official government reports but
also getting information from foreign press, television, and the internet (Schneider &
Post, 2002).382 On the other hand, Oh and Hassig suggest KJI’s subordinates lied to him
regularly at least about domestic conditions, though propaganda appeared to suggest
awareness of economic or social problems (Oh & Hassig, 2000).383 In foreign affairs,
limited information may have meant KJI was vulnerable to misinterpreting the intentions
of his opponents (Schneider & Post, 2002).384 KJI’s need of being, if not appearing to be,
in control, or in cases where information conflicted, may also have led him to shortcuts in
his decision-making, resorting to those things with which he was comfortable and
informed by those ideas with high and historic value.
Risk Tolerance.
KJI was likely willing to accept increased risk if necessary, but did not take risk
blindly. For example, Baird stated KJI was a self-centered man who possessed a ruthless
381

Page 98.
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Page 112. He was reportedly personally adept at monitoring all types of foreign media and using
the Internet (French, 2007); page 62.
383
Pages 95-6. Individual and governmental self-interest was a particular concern in North Korea and
something KJI spoke of in the confidence of private conversations (revealed later). However, as Oh and
Hassig disparage, if KJI thought reform the remedy, that would have become apparent through new
policy; to the contrary, Kim seemed to think greater and more frequent ideological indoctrination was the
answer, apparently believing the ideology useful for the masses though he himself never lived a life of
sacrifice.
384
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Page 109.
382
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personality, willing to escalate in crisis or use WMD, but only if the situation warranted
(Schneider & Post, 2002).385 Opinions vary on this topic. At one extreme, some, such as
Richard Betts, saw KJI’s actions as “reckless provocations” reflecting a high risk
tolerance that could have led him to “to do wild and crazy things” with their nuclear
weapons. Such an assessment was common in the post-Cold War era (Cha & Kang,
2003).386 Less extreme were the views of Cha and Kang who argued that, after years of
unattained hopes, he became increasingly risk-acceptant (Cha & Kang, 2003).387 While
this may explain KJI’s willingness to accept higher risk as needed (as Baird suggested),
prospects of political normalization and stability with Japan, coupled with Japan’s
significant strengthening of its deterrent capability through its BMD program, may have
tempered KJI’s risk-propensity, at least with Japan. More likely, KJI used the illusion of
unpredictability and high risk tolerance to create fear in the U.S. of extreme North
Korean actions. This was a logical strategy for KJI to achieve his objectives given his
values, but was generally misunderstood in the West as irrational and “crazy.”
Most probably, KJI’s risk tolerance changed as North Korea’s general strategy
changed. Baird and others, suggest KJI calculated carefully in cases regarding national
security, reflecting the significant environmental changes with which North Korea
needed to adapt. The new strategy was oriented around political coercion to achieve its
objectives, but always with an implied threat of punishment or escalation (Schneider &
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In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Page 109.
386
Page 42.
387
Pages 25-33. Citing prospect theory, they described KJI as in a “losses” frame of mind, where the riskpropensity of his decision-making was organized around continued prospects of losing what his country
had, more than trying to gain new benefits. These losses might include: the inability of juche to attract
and change either South Korea or Japan as KIS predicted; loss of Communist aid and political
undergirding; economic and military decline; and international isolation.
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Post, 2002).388 This may actually reflect a lower risk tolerance overall since national
survival now relied on deterrence, while coercion was used to affect North Korea’s
relative position and well-being. Likewise, North Korean behavior regarding Japan’s
BMD development reflected a move from more risk tolerance in the period of the North’s
strategy of confrontation to risk aversion in the period of ballistic missile-dominated
coercion, the latter of which paralleled the maturing of Japan’s BMD deployed in 2007
and postured against North Korea’s missile test in 2009. Despite the challenging nature of
Japan’s BMD program, or perhaps because of it, KJI’s risk tolerance toward Japan in his
overall coercive strategy was lower than that toward ROK since a more violent course of
action was taken against ROK. KJI chose less overt responses to Japan’s challenge to the
North’s ballistic missiles with its BMD program. He did not, however, abandon his
ballistic missile program and, in fact, expanded ballistic missile deployment.
388

In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 129-30. According to Baird, dramatic changes of “strategic decline,” most evident since
the end of the Cold War period, reflected two broad and different North Korean perspectives on securityrelated risk. Regardless of period, however, Baird argued North Korean leaders always engaged in careful
risk assessment and decision calculation (the end of the Cold War era is comparable to the beginning of
the dissertation research period). The key factors shaping North Korea’s new calculus of its national
security included: it was now diplomatically weak; its economy was in perpetual decline; its population
was shrinking; its military manpower was declining; its conventional weaponry was old and inferior; and,
it continued to lose control over the people. The earlier risk “calculus” was closely associated with a
decision to reunify the peninsula through war as described above, even should China and the Soviet Union
be unwilling to fight alongside North Korea. When the Cold War ended, along with substantive support
from a broader community of like-minded Communist states, North Korea’s risk calculus changed to one
oriented around decisions to take coercive action. Examples of North Korea’s shift to a new security
calculus can be seen in the 1990s. In April 1993 North Korea announced its intent to withdraw from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and deny international inspectors access to its nuclear program. North
Korea was unsure what actions the West might take, but given its new security calculus it sought to make
as many gains as possible without giving up much. In October 1994 North Korea signed the Agreed
Framework regarding controls on future nuclear-related activities in exchange for light water power
reactors and oil. Japan contributed to the financing of the reactors. North Korea maintained control of the
plutonium it had already reprocessed, however, providing it the means of deterrence through nuclear
weapons. Such threatening capabilities enabled North Korea to create a climate of instability in exchange
for international aid, essentially keeping the country, and the regime and its leadership, afloat. Pages 1301 and 139. For example, the August 1998 missile test that overflew Japan was a “nuanced” method of
pressure or coercion, implying the threat of worse action in the future if regional actors did not provide
North Korea needed concessions.

192

Health.
Health is a legitimate factor that could affect a decision-maker’s cognitive
processes and, therefore, his perceptions and decisions (Roberts, 1988).389 KJI was not
immune to health struggles. For example, despite rumors to the contrary in the 1990s, KJI
appeared healthy to those foreigners who actually engaged with him (Oh & Hassig,
2000).390 However, he suffered a stroke in August 2008, appearing later as frail and
raising questions of leadership succession. But the effects the stroke had on KJI’s
decision-making capacities was not known for certain (Seth, 2010).391 The patterns of
North Korean decisions and behavior, however, did not seem to change in any substantial
way owing to KJI’s health struggles near the end of his life.
Emotive Factors.
Though a careful decision-maker, KJI may have also been influenced by
emotional stimuli affecting his decisions, though none of these appear to be extreme or
without any consideration of consequence. For example, KJI allegedly ordered the
bombing of a ROK airliner in 1987 out of “frustration” that North Korea had been unable
to stop the Olympics from occurring in Seoul the following year (Eberstadt & Ellings,
2001).392
KJI was also influenced by respect toward him, or lack of it, coming from foreign
leaders. For example, in the Bush administration, U.S. leaders used disparaging terms for
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Pages 181-3. Roberts suggested physical and mental health can also be significant factors in the
decision-making of leaders in crisis.
390
Pages 91-5, including note 25.
391
Page 218.
392
In Chuck Downs chapter, “Discerning North Korea’s Intentions.” Pages 99-100. According to the one
surviving perpetrator (the other committed suicide in custody), it was KJI who ordered and directed the
placement of a bomb onto Korean Airlines flight 858 on November 29 1987, killing all 115 onboard when
the bomb detonated inflight en route to Seoul.
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KJI, leading to North Korean anger and difficulties in diplomacy. The North told South
Korean diplomats in 2005 that arms control discussions might move forward if the North
“gets appropriate respect from the United States” (Herman, 2005).393 That same year,
North Korean media praised President Bush when he called KJI “Mister” in a news
conference (Kelley, 2005).394 Another KJI favorable response to Bush came in 2007 after
Bush sent a private letter to KJI regarding the North’s nuclear program and addressed the
letter “Dear Chairman” (N. Korea's Kim Responds Favorably to Bush Overture, 2007).395
KJI possessed a high confidence as leader and was greatly influenced by personal
and national honor and pride. However, such confidence in extremis can skew rationality
and discount caution with respect to risk. For example, Keith Payne provided three
historical cases in which otherwise sane and rational adversary leaders demonstrated
“blinding chutzpah,” or supreme self-confidence if not gall, in the name of honor or
mission resulting in deterrence failure. Payne argues from these cases that deterrence can
and will fail with regional actors like North Korea, not because a leader is “irrational” –
in fact, he argues “rogue leaders may well be fully rational.” Rather, deterrence can fail
because those seeking to deter them may not understand how they calculated, including
their emotive and other factors (Payne, The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record
Straight, 2005).396 Chutzpah may have been part of the psychological makeup in KJI’s
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Original source is the Associated Press.
Vice President Cheney, for example, referred to KJI as “irresponsible” and “oppressive.” Original source
is the Associated Press.
395
The Bush letter was dated 1 December 2007.
396
Pages 139-40. These cases included Japan’s war minister in 1945 arguing in the name of honor to
continue fighting after the U.S. dropped the first atomic weapon; Cuban leaders in 1962 advocating
nuclear war to aid socialism’s triumph; and, Argentine’s military leader in 1982 choosing to occupy the
Falkland Islands under the presumption the geographically distant United Kingdom would not respond
militarily.
394
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decision-making and behavior—an assessment comparable to others provided above in
terms of his confidence and sense of honor as North Korea’s leader.
Given North Korea’s history of invasion, intervention, or occupation, KJI was
sensitive to perceptions of foreign encroachment. In a study done for the DoD, it was
argued the psychological effects of military maneuver, including encirclement or
equipment loss, were significant, accounting for 60 percent of the reason the opponent
altered course (Hasslinger, et al., 2002).397 This process of influence is the deterrence
process of how Japan’s BMD could affect North Korean leaders psychologically. In this
case, Japan’s BMD would not “encircle” North Korea but would shape KJI’s views of
losses he’d incur with his ballistic missile force if he tried to attack Japan with a ballistic
missile raid—a higher number owing to Japan’s BMD.
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Pages 21-2. The study argued the way to alter an opponent’s will to act or behave in a certain way is to
affect his underlying beliefs that inform his decision-making. The goal is to play upon his reason and
cognitive processes to alter his perceptions of various consequences of his decisions, such as losses and
hopelessness.
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CHAPTER SIX: STRATEGIC PROFILE
PART II—ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
General
As leader of North Korea, KJI’s national security strategic culture reflected the
nation’s identity and culture described in the Profile’s Part I, and emphasized
independence, sovereignty, and survival. Shaped by this identity, he was also informed in
his national-security related strategy and decision-making by important internal and
external environmental factors in existence during his reign as leader. Internal factors
included: formal and informal political organizations and processes, reflecting KJI’s
position, power, and control over affairs; North Korea’s military power, a relatively vast
set of capabilities considering North Korea’s size, population, and GDP; the nation’s
economy as an instrument of supporting military needs; and, issues of internal social
well-being and unrest that may inform, or detract from, KJI’s national security strategy.
Such internal factors not only informed KJI’s decision-making but were also included
among his tools of policy as he acted, behaved, and related with other actors in the region
and international system. External environmental factors include: diplomacy and
communication, consistent with North Korea’s state-level strategy of coercion, if not
extortion; and North Korea’s relations and interactions with others, including the U.S.,
ROK, Russia, China, and Japan. The North’s relations with Japan are revisited to address
the historical context and strategy of North Korea toward Japan and political
rapprochement and related issues. KJI’s interface with internal and external
environmental factors was consistent with his personal and national identity and cultural
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factors. Part II of the Profile begins with a description of the internal environmental
factors.
Internal Environmental Factors
Political
The political processes and organizations through which KJI led were significant
factors in his national-security related decision-making. These political features also
demonstrate his sole position as leader of the state and executive of its security and
foreign policies, including the North’s conflictual and cooperative interaction with
regional actors such as Japan. KJI organized the political processes and advisors to suit
his personal style and notion of effectiveness. These included military and party channels
and a limited number of trusted interlocutors to ensure control of strategy and message.
Choy and Kim argued KJI used a conflict-oriented decision-making process that can have
its political arm dealing cooperatively while its military arm can be engaged in
conflictual activities, as was the case in 1999 when KJI and the Korean Workers Party
(KWP) engaged in reconciliation with South Korea while North Korean military attacked
ROK naval assets (Choy & Kim, 2011).398 While he was not informed of every analytic
detail of policy issues, KJI’s decision-making was characterized by close control of the
people who interacted with him personally and those who carried out his decisions. He
orchestrated all promotions to power and individuals or organizations permitted open
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Pages 12-4. They describe alternative decision-making styles that could exist in North Korea, such as
the monolithic system whereby KJI was in total control of every detail of policy, from analysis to decision,
execution and monitoring, for example. They also considered a highly competitive style in which more
lively debate and discussion occurred at multiple levels. They set aside both of these as too extreme and
unlikely. This type of decision-making process is also more closely related to KJI’s brinkmanship style and
use of provocations. Lastly, they argued KJI was in fact sensitive to the condition of the people, perhaps
less so from an emotive response, but at least from the view that it could endanger his regime’s survival if
he did not pay attention.
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opinion. KJI’s decision-making was facilitated by two groups of advisors. The first
group, a smaller inner circle, was comprised of close relatives, such as his sister and
brother-in-law, and long-time family allies. These individuals held senior posts in key
institutions of power and formed a kleptocracy to acquire and manage large amounts of
foreign currency for KJI and his interactions with others. A second group, or outer circle,
furthered KJI’s control of power and was dominated by KPA officials (Schneider & Post,
2002).399
Military-related decisions flowed from KJI through two chains of command, both
of which were directly under his personal control. The first was a combination of Korean
Worker’s Party (KWP) and Korean People’s Army (KPA), where the KWP’s Central
Military Committee provided party leadership over the military and the KPA’s General
Political Bureau. The second chain was the National Defense Commission (NDC),
comprised of senior military, security, and military industry leaders. Unlike the U.S.
National Security Council, the NDC did not have representatives from the economy nor
foreign affairs (Schneider & Post, 2002).400 North Korea boasts of its military
capabilities, including its ballistic missile program, to all domestic groups. For example,
in 1998 it tested its Taepodong missile just days prior to a key legislative session,
presumably to satisfy domestic needs for protection and, more practically, continued
governmental support and funding for North Korea’s military first policy and missile
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In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 114-5.
400
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 115-6. Such was the control of KJI that in 2000 he reportedly engaged U.S. Secretary of
State Albright with technical details regarding ballistic missiles without the aid of any advisors or time to
study the matter.
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forces (Pollack, 2004).401 Domestic support notwithstanding, changes to North Korea’s
ballistic missile testing program include flying test missile profiles in new, more
compliant ways and flight testing from a new facility further away from Japan. Such
changes may be sufficient to placate domestic audiences while responding to deterrent
pressures from Japan.
Military Power
One of the core instruments of power and source of KJI decision-making
regarding national security, including his ballistic missile-backed coercive strategy with
regional actors like Japan, was his access to the nation’s military capabilities. Though a
small nation in terms of population and economic strength, North Korea’s military has for
decades earned respect as a potent force among domestic and foreign audiences. KJI
oversaw the decline in combat effectiveness since the end of the Cold War and, at the
same time, emergence of a nuclear weapons program and increasingly capable ballistic
missile force. These capabilities were sources of domestic pride but instrumental in North
Korea’s strategy of confrontation and, in a shift during the past two decades, one of
coercion. North Korea’s military power is discussed below beginning with KJI’s
oversight and a summary of the policy, doctrine, and strategy.
Political Oversight.
Organization and Spending
The entirety of North Korea’s armed forces was directed by KJI as North Korea’s
Supreme Commander of the Army and in his capacity as Chairman of the National
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One month prior to the August 1998 Taepo Dong missile test, North Korea elected its new parliament.
Its first parliamentary meeting was held just five days after the TD-1 launch. Such activities are used to
solicit calls for support for its “military first” policy. In Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s
Military-Diplomatic Campaign Strategies: Continuity versus Change.” Page 70.
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Defense Commission (French, 2007).402 As North Korea’s missile forces grew in
numbers and range, KJI reorganized them more along the lines of those found in Russia
and China. According to official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and South
Korean media sources, North Korea renamed its missile forces the “Strategic Rocket
Force Command” (Pollack J. , 2012).403 Doing so not only provided KJI perhaps an
improved organizational and command structure, but may have been intended to portray
a more formidable coercive and strike capacity on par with larger states like Russia,
China, or the United States, adding to the strategy of fear and intimidation of others while
strengthening personal and national pride. North Korea’s nuclear program is operated by
its Atomic Energy Industry, though all policy decisions originated from KJI through his
leadership in the NDC (Medalia, 2009).404 North Korea invests a considerable amount of
its total energy and budget upon military power. Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD)
cites North Korean government sources officially stating its defense spending was 15.8%
of GDP, though the Japanese MOD believes it to be higher (Defense of Japan 2012,
2012).405 According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, it spends upwards of
40% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on its military, with most funding devoted to
strategic systems including WMD and ballistic missile capabilities (Hildreth, 2009).406
Policy, Doctrine, & Strategy
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Page 222. Upon KJI’s death in December 2011, his son, Kim Jong-Un, took over leadership of North
Korea, including title of Supreme Commander, presumably giving him command and control of North
Korea’s nuclear weapons (Gopalakrishnan, 2011); citing Daniel Pinkston.
403
See also TheJournal.ie report (North Korea says its rockets can hit the US, analysts say it’s bluster,
2012).
404
See the Summary page (unnumbered) and page 6. However, upon KJI’s stroke in August 2008, nuclearrelated policy decisions were made in the NDC through a more collective group under the leadership of
KJI’s brother-in-law, Chang song-taek.
405
Page 15.
406
Page 3.
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North Korean military doctrine and strategy reflects a blend of Chinese, Soviet,
and North Korean thought and experiences that morphed into the North’s strategy to face
its unique position in the modern era. Early on, KIS was heavily influenced by
experiences fighting the Japanese and close interaction with Chinese and Soviet
Communist leaders; early North Korea strategy was largely a reflection of Soviet
thinking with large armies in conventional warfare postures. However, the Korean War
provided North Korea with other experiences that, combined with the decision by KIS to
secure North Korea in a more politically independent position from the Soviet Union, led
to significant shifts doctrinally. Operationally, the North adopted mobility of its forces
including “lightning” strikes, the ability to provide firepower at all ranges and levels of
conflict to include “deep strikes,” and strong command and control from the top (Savada,
1994).407 Until the late 1980s much of the North Korean planning for war centered on
conditions suitable for violent reunification, taking advantage of ROK political and
military vulnerabilities and devastating attacks on Seoul, just across the DMZ (Schneider
& Post, 2002).408
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Pages 246-9. One shift was in 1962 when KIS sought to “fortify the entire country.” In practice, this
embraced more of a Maoist strategy of being prepared for protracted war, and greater encroachment of
military and technological needs upon the nation’s economic capacity. These ideas were also adopted into
the constitution in 1992. The warrior attitude in Korea’s northern kingdom notwithstanding, Hwang
argued the military in Korean history was consistently subordinate to civil elites, both to organize and to
rule (Hwang, 2004); pages 323-8. The modern prominence of military elites, then, is likely more a function
of ancient Korean history, Japanese imperialism and the exigencies of the Korean and Cold Wars.
According to Pinkston, North Korea’s leaders, starting with KIS, were very sensitive to the vulnerabilities
of Korea in the past—a position that could have prevented foreign attacks and imperial conquests
through a strong military (Pinkston, 2008); page 3. KIS also developed four primary guidelines regarding
the military, effectively militarizing the country even before KJI took power: equipping all the people with
arms; transforming the whole country into an impregnable fortress; converting the whole army into an
army of cadres; and, modernizing the military establishment (Pollack J. D., Korea: The East Asian Pivot,
2004); in Seung Joo Baek’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military Buildup and Strategic Outlook,” page 201.
408
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 125-8 and 130. North Korea also required an assessment the U.S. military would not likely
wage war on behalf of ROK, a condition also dependent upon U.S. basing access of its forces in Japan.
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KJI transformed the center of ruling power in the late 1990s and early 2000s
around his “military first” policy (“songun chongchi”), formalized as policy in 1998. A
military related policy, Kim placed its centrality, along with economic and other key
responsibilities, within the NDC and relegated ideology to the now weaker Party. In
2003, the policy and all essential power brokers, including younger confidants of KJI,
were appointed to the NDC by the Eleventh Supreme People’s Assembly (Kihl & Kim,
2006).409 The military first policy was also promoted with the reminder to people that
even KIS created the army before the party.
North Korea also embraces deception, “cunning,” surprise, and provocation and
deterrence in the use of its military capabilities.410 It used surprise frequently including
the 1998 Taepo Dong missile test. North Korean leaders calculate surprise into their
decision-making, seeking to catch their opponents off balance and perhaps more willing
to cede to North Korean political goals (Pollack, 2004).411 More generally, given the
changes in regional military and economic balance of power over the past 25 years, North
Korea chose to press provocative behavior to get what it needs to stop the bleeding in the
imbalance, and chose to do so through a deterrent foundation. According to Taik-young

Quick victory would yield substantial material gains from the South, offsetting potentially high losses in
the North.
409
Pages 64-5. This move helped consolidate KJI’s power by effectively sidelining some of the older
leaders of his father’s generation, people who may not have been as loyal to KJI. The intention was to
protect the nation from yet another invasion, since without such a policy North Korea would be
“swallowed by outside forces” (French, 2007); pages 218-9. North Korea’s military has remained
conservative as a community. For example, its elite have maintained a traditional, hardline stance in its
opposition to external threats (Jung, 1998); page 343.
410
Minnich suggests North Korean ideas of warfare center on deception, a Sun Tzu idea, and involve
various types of military action reflecting an overall “cunning” principle of war, including: demonstrations;
feints; raids; and inciting fratricide or attrition (Minnich, 2005); page 76.
411
In Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaign Strategies: Continuity
versus Change.” Page 64.
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Hamm, the primary means of this psychological strategy were its asymmetric WMD
capabilities (Yun & Shin, 2006).412
Capabilities.
North Korea possesses a wide variety of military capabilities that undergirded
KJI’s political strategy and informed his decision-making. The section below addresses
the overall posture and readiness of these forces and then specifics of the capabilities
emphasizing those most threatening to Japan.
Posture/Readiness
For years a regional conventional military power, since the end of the Cold War
(and on KJI’s watch) North Korean conventional forces have trended downward while its
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities have trended upwards in numbers and, in some
ways, technology such as increasingly longer-range missiles. Cucullu suggests most
functional areas now lag sufficiently behind that North Korea could not prevail against
South Korea, even if the U.S. provided no conventional military support. Lagging areas
include: artillery, armor, air, infantry weapons, communications, logistical,
transportation, and support capabilities (Cucullu, 2004).413 Military exercises are down
50% due to costs and availability of fuel (French, 2007).414 Decline in military readiness
can be seen in reductions in training, maintenance, and fuel availability—all essential
warfighting capabilities (Bluth, 2008).415 In terms of personnel, while maintaining an
army of one million soldiers, successive reports since the mid-1990s reflect
malnourishment, disaffection among troops, stunted growth, hunger, and changes to
412

In his chapter, “North Korea: Economic Foundations of Military Capability and the Inter-Korean
Balance.” Page 184.
413
Page 268.
414
Pages 221-2.
415
Page 145.
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minimum height requirements for Korean People’s Army (KPA) recruits down to 4 feet,
11 inches (the lowest in the world) (French, 2007).416
An overall defensive posture now exists and likely reflects realities in balance of
power estimates as North Korean leaders survey the military landscape in the region,
though this posture pertains principally to notions of military conquest of the Korean
Peninsula. No longer the strongest conventional power on the peninsula, North Korea
emphasizes deterring external attack principally through its nuclear weapons. Reliance on
nuclear weapons has permitted North Korea to displace its reliance on its aging
conventional armies and compensate for its inability to compete technologically on a
modern battlefield (though it has increased its technological endeavors in nuclear and
ballistic missile technology). Further, the North uses its nuclear weapons program and
ballistic missile capabilities to extort foreign aid, gain recognition, and strengthen its
diplomatic position (French, 2007).417 The North’s strategy of political coercion of its
neighbors stems, therefore, from a stronger, not weaker, position as it senses less
likelihood of external attack to topple its regime and greater freedom of action, such as
provocations and missile launches, in conditions short of war.
Conventional
Militarily, North Korea is the world’s most militarized state, with the highest
proportion of population either on active duty or in reserve status. Most of its formidable
ground forces were located in proximity of the ROK border, close to the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ), and deployed for peninsular combat if needed. North Korea also possessed
substantial naval and air assets, though most of these general purpose forces are of older

416
417

Pages 221-2.
Pages 223-4 and 228.
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Soviet design (Schneider & Post, 2002).418 As mentioned above, the conventional forces
of the North have experienced a considerable qualitative decline, though some suggest
this in part reflects leadership choices to rely increasingly upon ballistic missiles and
WMD and a strategy more of political coercion over confrontation between large
standing armies across the divide.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
The North Korean WMD threat is of significant concern to Japan, ROK, the U.S.,
and others. North Korea had an infrastructure since the 1960s to produce biological
weapons and maintained large stockpiles of chemical warfare agents. Despite internal
hardships, according to both Japanese and U.S. officials, North Korea presented a
significant threat: ballistic missiles armed with conventional high-explosive, biological,
or chemical warheads. Several factories in North Korea were reportedly producing “toxic
gas and germs,” according to the Japanese Defense Agency (Kiziah, 2000).419 Biological
agents, including anthrax, smallpox, and cholera, could be used to disrupt U.S. forces in
conflict on the peninsula or as strategic terror weapons via missile against Japan (Scobell
& Sanford, North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons
of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 2007).420
North Korea possesses a variety of WMD means of delivery, including special
operations military forces, aircraft, artillery and rockets, and anti-ship cruise missiles.
However, the most dangerous means of delivery is North Korea’s large stockpile of
ballistic missiles (discussed in more detail below). While it has had technical assistance
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In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 122-3.
419
Pages 4-5.
420
Pages 107-10.
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for years from Russia, for example, North Korea is self-sufficient in ballistic missile
development and production and, as the world’s greatest ballistic missile proliferator,
used ballistic missile sales to finance its missile program (Schneider & Post, 2002).421
Nuclear Weapons
The North Korean nuclear weapons program reportedly began in the mid-1960s.
North Korean motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons are debated among analysts and
scholars. Generally, Scott Sagan suggests modern nuclear proliferant states are motivated
by three basic patterns: basic national security (or, self-help); to please domestic
audiences; or for changing their national identities before the international community.
North Korea, he argued, likely fit into the basic security model (Sagan, 1996-1997).422
All three elements probably resonated as motivations for North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear
weapons, though self-help was likely the most significant factor. More specifically, Bruce
Cumings points to U.S. decisions regarding threatening regime change of regional actors
following the 1991 Gulf War as instilling deep North Korean fears and contributing to
their decision to acquire nuclear weapons (Cumings, North Korea: Another Country,
2004).423 This also explains the highly survivable manner in which they have built their
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In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 123-4.
422
Page 85.
423
Pages 53-8. Cumings refers to the U.S. stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, from the
late 1950s through early 1990s, designed to be used within an hour of North Korean attacks southward to
contaminate the battlefield and halt their movements. To North Korea, this amounted to nuclear
blackmail. The effectiveness of Gulf War conventional combat technologies changed U.S. perspectives
and, on 27 September 1991, President Bush directed the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons,
including about 60 still at Kunsan airbase in South Korea to be used by F-16 aircraft in wartime. The U.S.
“Operational Plan 5027” was then revised so that the wartime effort would rely on ground forces pushing
all the way to Pyongyang and conducting regime change without resort to use of nuclear weapons. These
raised great fears in North Korea and the primary responses from North Korean leadership, especially
when their economy and energy sources also began to dwindle in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was to
pursue nuclear energy that would provide both electricity and a nuclear weapons capability of its own.
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, beginning in January 1958, were deliverable in a variety of
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overall program with sites being widely dispersed and hidden among a complex web of
locations making its destruction from aerial bombardment all but impossible (French,
2007).424 The security motivation, coupled with its ballistic missile force, could also be
divided further into deterring and coercing others, and guaranteeing one’s survival
(Wilkening & Watman, 1995).425
North Korea possesses two paths for acquisition of fissile material for nuclear
weapons: a plutonium path, recovered from spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon reactor
facility in the capital of Pyongyang; and a uranium enrichment program started later. The
plutonium route produced a small number of nuclear weapons; however, it is not known
if uranium enrichment has produced enough material to produce any nuclear weapons
(Schneider & Post, 2002).426 North Korea’s nuclear weapons inventory is difficult to
assess, though analysts currently judge it to possess perhaps six plutonium-based
means, including at least the following: 280 mm cannons; Honest John missiles; Matador cruise missiles;
F-4 fighter aircraft; atomic demolition mines (ADMs) carried in Jeeps, man-portable backpacks, and
helicopters; and F-16s. Most were deployed very close to the DMZ with the concept of routine use in the
event of war, especially under fear that if they did not use them early they could fall into North Korean
military hands. While emphasis is placed on the North’s development of nuclear weapons, it cannot be
forgotten that ROK also began a secret nuclear weapons development program in the 1970s with the aid
of France. The goal was to create a capable nuclear weapons and missile program to demonstrate selfsufficiency for its security, lacking confidence in the U.S. commitment to its defense. The U.S. opposition
eventually swayed ROK to abandon the effort (Oberdorfer, 2001); pages 68-73.
424
Pages 278-9. The program is comprised of various parts including research and development, fuel and
its processing and storage, weapons technology, production, means of delivery, and command and
control. One estimate from a senior U.S. intelligence official put the aerial sortie total as high as 240,000
strikes over 60 days.
425
Page 32. According to Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, regional adversaries including North
Korea acquire nuclear weapons for three primary purposes: to deter the U.S. from intervening in conflict
in their region; to intimidate or coerce U.S. allies in that region; and, to provide a guarantee of the
adversary’s survival.
426
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 123-4. According to Jonathan Pollack, just as North Korea’s link between the Yongbyon
nuclear reactor and a stated goal of producing electricity rather than nuclear weapons is suspect (its 25year output yielded the equivalent of only 23 days’ worth of electricity from a modern light water
reactor), so, too, is North Korea’s claim that a newer uranium enrichment capability will feed a light water
reactor now under construction suspect. Both are likely for nuclear weapons production and North Korea
will not likely walk away from its nuclear weapons capability (Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear
Weapons and International Security, 2011); pages 184-6.
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weapons (Gopalakrishnan, 2011).427 Others put the number between 6-12 weapons
(Samore, 2004).428 Analysts at the Arms Control Association think the number is closer
to 10 weapons (Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, 2012).429
Today, with a limited number of weapons, North Korea’s goals are thought to be
intrinsically political through possession of these weapons: (1) obtain guarantees of North
Korean state survival (i.e., promises particularly from the U.S. to never attack); (2)
normalization of relations; and, (3) aid in economic stability (Bluth, 2008).430 More
specific nuclear employment or targeting doctrine is not known. As a result, some
suggest North Korea simply maintains a policy of nuclear “ambiguity,” similar to that
found in the early years of Chinese nuclear deployment, or that of Israel. As to targeting,
in part due to limited accuracy of the missile delivery systems, North Korea’s nuclear
weapons may only be more “terror” weapons used against cities. Another possibility was
that KJI guarded the secret, perhaps leaving it unwritten or unspoken at all (Scobell &
Sanford, North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of
Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 2007).431 North Korean nuclear and ballistic
missile capabilities also combine to potentially give it the capability to produce
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects by launching a missile high into the atmosphere and
exploding the weapon (National Security and Electromagnetic Pulse, 2006).432 This could
be employed in an effort to disrupt Japan’s BMD capabilities.
427

The article does not specify a source for the number of weapons.
Page 48.
429
See “States of Immediate Proliferation Concern.”
430
Pages 148 and 155.
431
Pages 87-93.
432
Pages H6352-H6354. Not only has the North restrained from discussing this, making such an
assessment is complicated by the fact that the exact nature of its ability to deliver nuclear weapons and
how many weapons it may have are also not known with certainty. The effects could be widespread
disruption of communications and electrical circuits and infrastructure. Militarily, this could aid the North
428
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Ballistic Missiles
North Korea’s current and emerging ballistic missile programs started with joint
projects with China in the mid-1970s that included delivery of a Scud B for “reverse
engineering” purposes in 1981. This led to North Korean development of its own missile
(tested in 1984), the Scud C version (tested in 1990), development of the Nodong missile
in 1989 (tested in 1991 and 1993), and the Taepodong missile family (first observed in
1994 and tested in 1998) (Ranger, 1998).433 North Korea has also conducted preliminary
research of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Of the various North Korean
ballistic missiles, those that can potentially range Japan are of the most interest here and
include: the Nodong MRBM; Musudan IRBM; Taepodong IRBM; and the SLBM. Both
the Nodong and Musudan are operationally deployed and direct threats to all of Japan
proper. Each of these is addressed below, followed by North Korea’s ballistic missile
targeting and missile production factors.
A newer North Korean missile of interest to Japan is the Nodong (also called
Rodong) missile, tested in May 1993 from the Musudan-ri test site and landing to the east
into the Sea of Japan. With a range of 1300 kilometers and an accuracy of perhaps 2
kilometers, the Nodong can reach all of Japan’s territory and strike soft military targets
(such as airfields) or be used as a political weapon against cities such as Tokyo. Bluth

in battle on the peninsula. Reportedly, North Korea has received scientific assistance from Russia, China,
and Pakistan possibly to include help in developing an EMP weapon for North Korea.
433
Pages 37-42. Lennox described the threat perceptions of North Korea as political perceptions, believing
North Korea’s pursuit of asymmetric capabilities (ballistic missiles and WMD) would dissuade Western
powers from intervening so easily in the region. This logic placed considerable pressure upon Japan to act,
which is precisely what it chose to do with joint missile defense development with the United States and
deployment of its own BMD system. In this same volume, Dr. William Schneider claimed the Nodong
began series production in 1993, following only one test (not two), and subsequently underwent
operational deployment. See page 110.
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argues the Nodong’s strategic purpose is just that: Japan (Bluth, 2008).434 Nodong
deployment began in 1995 and by 1997 at least 10 Nodong missiles were operationally
deployed (Pinkston, 2008).435 The number of deployed Nodong varies, perhaps reflecting
increased production and deployment over time. According to Japan’s Ministry of
Defense, North Korea had about 200 Nodong missiles deployed (Hildreth, 2009).436
Others suggest 240 (Samore, 2004),437 still others argue North Korea could have as many
as 320 Nodongs deployed (Samson, 2010).438 The Nodong missiles are road-mobile
systems, making them very difficult if not impossible to find and destroy before they
were launched. This provides Nodong a high level of survivability and could allow North
Korea to use them in surprise attacks on Japan (Pinkston, 2008).439
Another missile, the Musudan (also called Nodong B), is an entirely new roadmobile IRBM under development, though it has not been flight tested and possibly not
deployed (Pinkston, 2008).440 However, others believe Musudan missiles have been
deployed in limited numbers—perhaps fewer than 50 (North Korea: Missile, 2012).441
According to Joseph Bermudez, however, the number of deployed Musudan is higher,
between 75 and 150 missiles (Bermudez, 2011). The Musudan has longer range than
Nodong, extending it a capability as far as perhaps Guam (Ballistic Missile Defense
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Pages 161-2. Three more Nodongs were tested in July 2006 (Scobell & Sanford, North Korea's Military
Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 2007);
page 116.
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Page 20.
436
Page 4. Bluth also suggests 200 Nodong are operationally deployed (Bluth, 2008); pages 161-2.
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Pages 67, 71-4, and 105.
438
Page 11. Larry Niksch of the Congressional Research Service and other analysts also suggest 320
Nodong (Gopalakrishnan, 2011); they also suggest North Korea could, within two years, have the
capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead on the Nodong.
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Page 47.
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Pages vii and 23.
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Introductory paragraph.
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Review Report, 2010).442 The Musudan and Nodong missiles could, therefore, combine
to threaten Japan with nearly as many as 470 offensive ballistic missiles. The size of the
North Korean ballistic missile threat capable of striking, even aimed at, Japan has
continued to increase, possibly as a response to Japan’s BMD.443
Deployment levels of Nodong are somewhat difficult to assess since Nodong is
also used as the first stage of the larger Taepodong-1 IRBM missile (which overflew
Japan in a 1998 flight test). It is unknown if, or how many, Taepodong may actually be
operationally deployed since some assess TD-1 may only be for technological
development (Pinkston, 2008).444 Bermudez, however, does not assess Taepodong to be
deployed at all (Bermudez, 2011). The ICBM-class Taepodong-2/3 are also not assessed
to be deployed as a weapon; however, if or when they deploy, their range inherently
makes them more of a threat to the U.S. not Japan.
North Korea is also developing a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
The SLBM, though an unlikely technological accomplishment anytime soon, is based on
Russian technology and North Korea continues to receive Russian technical assistance on
its development. Should North Korea be able to deploy an SLBM it would potentially be
able to threaten the U.S. and regional actors in new ways, also complicating the BMD
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Page 5 including the map of North Korea.
Increasing the size of potential missile “raids” is one of three broad types of responses a regional
adversary could employ to friendly BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 2010); see page 8. The
other two responses include use of solid fuels and deploying technical countermeasures on the ballistic
missiles. According to Martin Sieff, solid fuel technology allows the missile to be set up and launched
much more quickly and reliably than liquid fuel missiles, possibly denying warning time to those with
BMD. North Korea has developed a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile that demonstrates the North has
the technological expertise to develop responses to BMD including use of solid-fuel missiles (Ballistic
Missile Defense Review Report, 2010); page 5. As mentioned in chapter two of this dissertation, Japan
could potentially defend against 165 (of North Korea’s 470 that can range Japan) incoming ballistic
missiles, leaving North Korea with potentially over 300 missiles with which to strike an undefended Japan.
444
Page 23 and Table 2 on pages 50-1.
443
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postures of Japan and the U.S. (Hildreth, 2009).445 But the claim alone of working on an
SLBM is clearly a source of North Korean pride regardless of the missile’s status.
Depth of potential North Korean targeting capacity with its ballistic missiles
includes those that can strike targets in four rings: in South Korea (including the Scudbased Hwasong-5 and -6 and Scud-D); in Japan (Nodong and Musudan); U.S. targets
throughout the Pacific, such as Hawaii and Alaska (Taepodong 1); and, targets in the
continental U.S. (Taepodong 2) (Scobell & Sanford, North Korea's Military Threat:
Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles,
2007).446 North Korean targeting is also affected by the potential employment tactic used
and countermeasures to BMD. One such tactic is a “raid” using multiple ballistic
missiles, a threat demonstrated by North Korea with multiple ballistic missile launches in
several tests (The Threat, 2012).447 Another way North Korea could enhance the targeting
capability of its offensive ballistic missile force is through development and deployment
of various countermeasures on the missile to defeat an opponent’s BMD system. While
doing so involves costs, such countermeasures may pale in cost to deploying a much
larger number of BMD interceptors, new or enhanced radar systems, or developing new
interceptors altogether. Some analysts, including senior U.S. intelligence officials,
suggest North Korea has in fact developed some countermeasures (Ghoshroy & Neuneck,
2010).448
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Pages 3-6.
Pages 115 and 124, including Figure 9.
447
See paragraphs five and six.
448
In Philip E. Coyle’s chapter, “Challenges toward Building an Effective Operational BMD System,” pages
47-8. The authors cite, for example, a 1999 report for congressional testimony by Robert Walpole, U.S.
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, who stated North Korea, by the time it
flight-tested its ballistic missiles, could already have developed various countermeasures, “including
separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster
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While North Korea possesses hundreds of ballistic missiles, only a portion of
them (perhaps as many as 470) can reach Japan. It is not known how many of these
would be used against Japan in wartime scenarios. Pinkston, for example, provides a list
of 24 total potential missile deployment sites in North Korea, 15 of which have the
capability to deliver munitions onto “probable targets” inside Japan proper but also
including its distant island of Okinawa to the south (Pinkston, 2008).449 The International
Institute for Strategic Studies assessed the Nodong was intended to be a military and
political strategic weapon able to reach Japan, but also to do so with chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons, in addition to a conventional blast munition. Operational
deployment occurred in North Korea at two locations in the north and east, ideally suited
for striking targets in Japan. Deployment is on mobile launchers that use underground
tunnel networks to aid in surviving preemptive attack. Of note, the Nodong’s lack of
precision makes it ill-suited for attacking U.S. military forces in Japan with any degree of
confidence, effectiveness, or credibility; therefore, assessment is that Nodong is intended
as a political weapon against Japan, not as a military instrument against the U.S. or its
forces in Japan (Samore, 2004).450 Others assess North Korea uses Nodong against Japan
simply as a “terror” weapon threatening an indiscriminate pattern of destruction and
death against Japan’s major cities (Samore, 2004).451 Further, North Korea reportedly has
ballistic missiles specifically aimed at Tokyo, including nuclear power plants located
fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys—to develop penetration aids and
countermeasures.”
449
Pages 50-1, Table 2.
450
Pages 67, 71-4, and 105. The missile is simply a larger, single stage, liquid-fueled Scud, designed and
produced indigenously by North Korea, though some Russian technical advising possibly occurred. Despite
limited flight testing, North Korea also produced and exported perhaps hundreds of Nodongs to Pakistan
and Iran which also successfully tested the missile and likely shared testing data with North Korea.
451
See page 73 for the idea of Nodong as a “terror weapon.” The Nodong would do so by potentially
holding Japan’s major cities hostage with missiles that can deliver conventional, chemical, biological, and
perhaps nuclear weapons with an inaccurate missile making destruction indiscriminate.
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there, as part of a campaign to terrorize Japan’s citizens.452 If so, this would directly
threaten Japan’s domestic population, not only in wartime scenarios involving general
war on the Korean Peninsula and U.S. forces in Japan used in such a war, but also in
limited contingencies or small-raid attacks on Japan completely separate from peninsular
war scenarios. This threat, stated or otherwise, is a tactic of political intimidation in dayto-day, crisis, and prewar conditions not lost on Japan in its pursuit of BMD.
North Korean strategy may include use of its Special Operations Forces (SOF) in
general war with Japan, but also as part of a missile “raid” scenario below the threshold
of general war and direct U.S. involvement. Under these circumstances, SOF forces
would secretly enter Japan to attack Japan’s BMD assets, command and control,
intelligence units, or U.S. assets at Japanese bases (Scobell & Sanford, North Korea's
Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and
Ballistic Missiles, 2007).453
North Korean ballistic missile production and domestic deployment levels is an
important feature of the North’s strategic threat, but may also offer insights into the
impact of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean value in its ballistic missiles. Disparity of
analysis exists, however, over production and deployment levels. At the very least,
missile exports have trended downward for several years (Pollack J. , Ballistic Trajectory:

452

For example, Narushige Michishita argued North Korea, possibly fearing a U.S. preemptive strike
following U.S. doctrinal change in 2002 reflecting preemption, had the capacity to respond with the use of
large numbers of Nodong ballistic missiles to take Tokyo hostage. In his chapter, “North Korea’s MilitaryDiplomatic Campaign Strategies: Continuity versus Change.” Page 69. According to Kim Myung Chol, KJI’s
wartime scenario would include the launching of “long-range missiles loaded with highly effective
warheads to Japanese and American strategic targets, such as nuclear power plants” (Pollack, 2004); in
Seung Joo Baek’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military Buildup and Strategic Outlook,” page 212.
453
Pages 45-6 and 58. Getting SOF to Japan may be more difficult than before as North Korean air force
capabilities have been allowed to decline in part because of its growing ballistic missile threat capability.
North Korean naval assets could still likely accomplish this mission, however.
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The Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market, 2011).454 North Korean value
in ballistic missiles is likely still very high and sufficient missiles for operational,
coercive and wartime purposes already exist in North Korea’s inventory to preclude
further production and deployment. Further, missile production has not ceased and, for
some missiles like Nodong, production has apparently continued in recent years in order
to expand the numbers deployed.455
North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities are well-suited to serve the North’s
political coercion strategy against ROK, the U.S., and Japan. To be sure, North Korea
possesses a large inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking targets in Japan, and
the North could do so in wartime. However, only one or a small number would be needed
for coercion purposes in day-to-day conditions or pre-war scenarios. Short of direct
missile attack, flight tests overflying Japan would also be expected as they serve the
North’s coercion strategy. This is what occurred in 1998 with the TD-1 flight over Japan.
However, that ballistic missile flight appeared to be the seminal missile event that altered
the equation in Japan-North Korea relations and how the North approached Japan,
especially with the use of ballistic missiles. While North Korean missile tests occurred on
later occasions, there has not been, to date, another surprise missile flight over Japan in
the same manner as the 1998 test: later tests either flew with full advance announcements
through the UN for safety purposes; North Korea tested shorter-range missiles; or, the
North flew missiles in southerly trajectories using its new test launch facility. The key
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Pollack provides a variety of reasons to explain this, including international pressures, lower demand,
and presence of regional BMD.
455
While missile production is imprecise at best, Pinkston argues missile production has not been immune
to general industrial capacity decline stemming from severe economic conditions the past two decades
(Pinkston, 2008); pages 44-5.
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difference from 1998 to date has been the assertive pursuit of BMD by Japan to address
North Korean ballistic missiles.
Space
North Korea used its Taepodong missiles to support its efforts to place a satellite
in space and become a space-faring nation, joining an elite international club and
demonstrating technological advancement with which it can garner national honor and
pride.456 After five past failures beginning in the 1990s, North Korea successfully placed
a satellite into orbit on 12 September 2012 using a Taepodong (also called “Unha”)
rocket, though the mission of the satellite is unknown. According to press accounts, the
West condemned the launch as “provocative.” The North maintained it had the right to a
civilian space program and said the new satellite would provide scientific data. North
Korean people celebrated the launch (Associated Press in Pyongyang, 2012).457 North
Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-Un, son of KJI, in an address to the people, spoke of the
December 2012 satellite launch as having “conquered space” but also how such an
accomplishment should inspire the people toward hard work in improving the economy
(New Year Address Made by Kim Jong Un, 2013).458
The December 2012 space launch came from the Sohae Satellite Launching
Station in northwest North Korea. North Korea began construction of the Sohae facility
in 2001 and first used it in April 2012 to launch a Taepodong (also “Unha”) missile, also
456

North Korea reminds the South regularly that this is a technological area in which the ROK has failed.
Koreans were filled with “pride over the scientific advancement” and rushed into snowy Pyongyang
streets and toasted the event at local pubs upon its announcement. North Korea may face yet another
round of international sanctions as a result of the use of dual-use technology. Further, Iran, receiving its
ballistic missile technology and assistance principally from North Korea, used the Nodong it received from
North Korea to develop the longer-range Shahab-3 missile, and from this missile, a space launch vehicle
(SLV) (Burns, 2010); pages 108-9. If Iran can do this with North Korean assistance, the prospects for
continued North Korean ballistic missile and SLV technological improvement seem reasonably good.
458
The reference to the space achievement was mentioned multiple times in the leader’s speech.
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216

an attempt to place a satellite into orbit; it failed. One significant change, and key
advantage, is the ability to launch southward from Sohae and avoid overflying Japan and
ROK. This is unlike North Korea’s other site, the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground
near Musudan-ri, used to launch a Taepodong eastward over Japan in 1998 (Sohae
Satellite Launching Station, 2012).459 Both the April and December 2012 launches from
Sohae flew south.
The missile technology to conduct the North’s space ventures are to be sure dualuse and can be used for the testing and development of long-range offensive ballistic
missiles intended to carry warheads of comparable weight to a satellite. The threatening
aspect of these launches has been the political position of Western nations where protests
to the North’s actions were carried out in the UN producing, for example, UNSC
resolutions 1718 and 1874. More practical measures included strengthening the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) around North Korea intended to deny it meaningful
trade in weapons with the outside world. PSI was an international partnership of
information-sharing on North Korean missile and WMD proliferation activities and more
robust activities including a greater naval presence in Northeast Asia and the actual
boarding of ships by force (Cha V. , 2012).460 While some changes in pattern exist, North
Korea continued Taepodong/Unha flights for what it called its space program.
Cyber
The use of computer networks to gather information, disrupt, or attack one’s
opponent has emerged in recent years, providing would-be users a capability to inflict
pain in a variety of ways in distant territory and at high speed. According to General
459

Another advantage with the Sohae facility is the hindering of observation by foreign air and sea
reconnaissance platforms.
460
Page 273. ROK joined the PSI in 2009.
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James Thurman, North Korea’s cyber warfare capability is a “significant” one and
complements the 60,000 special operations troops, WMD, and ballistic missiles
comprising North Korea’s asymmetric warfare capabilities. He stated, “North Korea
employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber infiltration and cyber
attacks.” He also stated, “Such attacks are ideal for North Korea” because they can be
done anonymously, and they “have been increasingly employed against a variety of
targets including military, governmental, educational and commercial institutions”
(Capaccio, 2012).461 Further, according to U.S. Congressional testimony, North Korea
was the likely source of a 2009 cyber attack on the U.S. and ROK involving “the
malicious use of more than 100,000 computers” (SECURING THE MODERN
ELECTRIC GRID FROM PHYSICAL AND CYBER ATTACKS, 2009).462 More
recently, North Korea allegedly used its cyber capabilities to attack a South Korean
financial institution in April 2011 (Breen, Kim Jong-il: North Korea's Dear Leader,
2012).463 Still an emerging technology for North Korea, it provides its leadership another,
though far less overt, means of political coercion.
Patterns of Behavior.
Three broad patterns are addressed below: technological advances; political
provocation, often involving the military; and, proliferation of military technologies,
particularly ballistic missiles. In terms of technology, as mentioned above, certain key
aspects of the North’s military have fallen into deep decline at the expense of
advancements in nuclear and ballistic missiles. Generally, Korean pride in scientific
accomplishment is strong. For example, it boasts it invented the world’s first ironclad
461

General Thurman was commander of U.S. forces in South Korea at the time.
Page 114.
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Pages xi-xii.
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battleship in 1441 (Korean Overseas Information Service, 2003).464 Japan and the West
have been surprised on occasion by North Korean technological advances, such as the
Taepodong missile flight over Japan in 1998 that used multiple stages. New ballistic
missile technologies that can threaten Japan and the West also include use of mobile
missile launchers and a committed advancement toward an indigenous capability to place
satellites into space. In addition to their military and political utility, ballistic missiles are
particularly valuable to North Korea for their domestic value as a “symbol of scientific
advancement” (Pinkston, 2008).465 Pinkston also points out that, from 1987-92, North
Korea rapidly developed the Scud-C, Nodong, the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and the
Taepodong-2 missiles. Though not without technical problems, Pinkston characterizes
this technological pace as “remarkable and historically unprecedented for a small
developing country” (Pinkston, 2008).466
North Korea has a long record of provocations that most agree were conducted at
the direction or approval of either KIS or KJI. Earlier, political intimidation actions were
part of the North’s strategy of confrontation and conducted to wreak havoc in South
Korea and facilitate the needed conditions assumed for forcible reunification. These
actions included: the unsuccessful 1968 commando raid on the South Korean Blue House
to kill the ROK president; the 1983 commando attack in Rangoon which killed 17 ROK
cabinet members and other officials but not the main target, the president; and, the 1987
bombing of KAL Flight 858 which killed 115. Both KJI and KIS were likely directly
involved in the latter two attacks, but it was not known what role KJI played in the 1968
attack. North Korea has not reportedly conducted any state-sponsored terrorism since
464

Page 5.
Page 12.
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Pages 16-7.
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these events and was eventually removed from the U.S. official list of state sponsors of
terrorism. Additionally, North Korea in this period seized the USS Pueblo in 1968, shot
down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in 1969, and murdered U.S. servicemen at
Panmunjom in 1976 (Schneider & Post, 2002).467
North Korean violence toward ROK is markedly higher than toward others,
reflecting a cultural hostility toward the political leadership of ROK for being “lackeys”
of the U.S. and misleading the South Korean masses. North Korea views itself as the
legitimate center of Korean culture and leadership of the Korean people. North Korean
actions in recent years toward the South have been noticeably more provocative.
According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND), these actions
included: a naval engagement near Daecheong Island in November, 2009; the North’s
torpedo attack on the ROK Cheonon on 26 March, 2010, killing all 46 ROK sailors; and,
the North’s shelling with 170 artillery shells on 23 November, 2010, of a ROK Marine
detachment on Yeonpyeong Island, killing four (including two nearby civilians) and
wounding dozens of Marines and civilians (2010 Defense White Paper, 2010).468
North Korea selectively employs transparency of military capabilities or
intentions (e.g., publically-announced and internationally-observed missile launches). For
example, the 2009 and 2012 Taepodong missile launches were announced publicly and
included providing specific information as to launch time windows and missile booster
splashdown areas to the United Nations in advance. But these actions are rare. On the
other hand, it denied sinking the Cheonon and other past aberrant behavior.
467

In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 125-8 and 130. North Korea deems deployment of military assets close to its border as
provocative and has acted very aggressively against such assets. KJI supposedly oversaw the terrorist
attacks in 1983 and 1987.
468
Page 25. The ROK responded to the artillery attack by launching several rockets back into North Korea.
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In terms of external proliferation, North Korea has been a leader in exporting
ballistic missiles, though this has tapered off in recent years. For example, U.S. and
Spanish naval forces jointly intercepted a North Korean ship delivering Scud missiles and
conventional warheads to Yemen in December 2003. The ship and cargo continued on,
however, since the U.S. saw no immediate threat to it of the missiles and did not believe
it had legal authority to take the cargo (Kerr, 2003).469 But the point was made to North
Korean leadership: others are tracking your missile activities and can and will disrupt
them.
Economic
The development, organization, and condition of North Korea’s economy reflect
the choices of its leaders including KJI. These choices of KJI were informed by the need
to support the military as a top priority, use the military to coerce effectively, show
himself and North Korea as formidable domestically (as part of the social contract) and
abroad, and, to foster his personal image. The net effects have been severe stress upon the
small economy, and North Korea’s people, to fuel one of the world’s largest military. But
the importance of the North’s economy is the broader national security and regional
political context cannot be understated.470
Economically, North Korea in modern times has been a disaster. The
ideologically and culturally driven need for military spending to shore up survival fears,
yet compete with, if not dominate, regional peers like ROK and Japan, has led to
469

The U.S. was also reportedly working with Yemen at the time to win its agreement to cease purchasing
North Korean missiles.
470
As early as the late 1990s, for example, a report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations on the
prospects for peaceful political solutions in Northeast Asia concluded, “The Most important fact is the
continuing deterioration of the North Korean economy” (Abramowitz & Laney, 1998); pages 9 and 11. The
situation was reportedly including, at that time, discontent among elites and purging of economic
officials.
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underdevelopment of other sectors of the North Korean economy such as energy and
industrial infrastructure and agricultural modernization. To be sure, years of flooding and
drought, gross mismanagement, and loss of Soviet and Chinese economic support in the
early 1990s, were all genuine complicating factors to choices made by North Korean
leaders.471 The results in North Korea were years of negative growth, unemployment, and
crop failures. For example, North Korea imported nearly twice what it exported. Mass
starvation occurred as well, killing as many as 2.5 million people, or 10% of North
Korea’s population. KJI departed somewhat from the old Stalinist model, authorizing for
example a special economic zone (SEZ) near the Tumen River to try to garner foreign
investment. On the whole, however, KJI continued his strategy of seeking high payoffs
with minimal risk or costs (Schneider & Post, 2002).472
The economy of North Korea is divided into three main sectors: agriculture,
mining, and industry; defense; and, an independent sector dubbed the “court economy.”
471

It is possible North Korea exaggerated the scale of its agricultural disasters in order to get more aid
(Wolf & Akramov, 2005); page 11. This is based on a reference KJI made about exaggerations of African
nations of their plights. The authors merely infer that if KJI overtly recognized they did it, he, too, may
have done the same thing.
472
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 118-20. North Korea was not always an economic basket case. For example, in 1970 its
per capita exports were comparable to ROK’s. By 1990, however, North Korea was in the lower quarter of
the world’s countries in exports, and by 2000 it was ranked near the bottom. This reflects an exceedingly
sharp reversal and decline (Pollack, 2004); in Nicholas Eberstadt’s chapter, “Why Hasn’t the DPRK
Collapsed?” Pages 155-6. The North Korean sense of comfort with its autarkical economic approach,
according to Bruce Cumings, stems not only from its ancient past of invasions but also economic abuses
from Japan during its colonial period. Cumings calls its self-reliant policy a “response to a prolonged
twentieth-century crisis in their country,” intended to maintain its historical insulation from connection to
the outside world and the travails that come with it. North Korea, he argues, recognizes the need to
change, highlighting comments made by a KIS relative that the North’s economy should follow
Singapore’s model of free enterprise with strong central control (Cumings, 2005); pages 407, 430, and
436-7. Emphasis upon heavy industry was a Communist emphasis as well but really had its roots with
Japanese industrial development in the prewar period. The period of the early 1990s in North Korea was
catastrophic. According to Eberstadt, the severe food shortage stemming from years of flooding and
drought was “the first and only mass famine ever to befall a literate and urbanized society during
peacetime” (Eberstadt, Policy and Economic Performance in Divided Korea during the Cold War Era: 194591, 2010); page 2. According to one estimate, the entire food shortage in North Korea could be remedied
by new policy reflecting a 5% reduction in its $2 billion defense budget (French, 2007); pages 229-30.
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The court economy is an exclusive chain of goods and services for members of the
nation’s political, military, and technical elite class, with access to state resources but
without transparent accounting. As many as three million people have access to the
transparent court economy, a process used primarily to buy control of the entire state in
exchange for loyalty from its recipients (Wolf & Akramov, 2005).473 On the other hand,
with the state-run markets remaining entrenched, it is clear a black market has emerged in
North Korea in response to inefficiencies in the socialist system to meet basic survival
needs of its people (Connor, 2009).474
To support its industry, economy, and population, North Korea has stressed
avoidance of dependence on petroleum and development of its electrical energy capacity.
This has involved the use of some hydroelectric plants and those powered by coal; the
former were expensive to build, and more attention was given to coal-based plants, owing
also to the abundance of coal in North Korea and accommodating its juche self-reliant
ideology. Nevertheless, coal mining technology has been limited in North Korea, driving
it to nuclear power as a source of electricity and the building of facilities at Yongbyon
and Taechon. Reactors, however, were capable of both high electricity output but also
production of plutonium for the construction of nuclear weapons. The 1994 Agreed
Framework with the U.S. and others was intended to replace the existing North Korean
reactors with non-threatening light-water reactors; the political process broke down
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Pages 12-3 and 18. At least some, perhaps $1 billion annually, of this court economy is fueled by legally
forbidden international dealings in drugs, counterfeiting, and missile and WMD technologies with
Pakistan, Iran, and others. The attraction by China in modern days of North Korean minerals is not a new
phenomenon, however. During the Japanese colonial period significant extraction occurred for use by
Japan. In 1944, for example, by far the greater mineral extraction and production took place in the North,
whereas non-mineral production was much higher in the South during the same period (McCune, 1950);
see Tables 4 and 5, pages 57-8. Over 25 specific minerals are listed.
474
Page 191. As a result, Connor argues it is not likely a middle class will emerge as others suggest.
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before much progress was ever made (Connor, 2009).475 So, while development and
possession of nuclear weapons clearly suited North Korean security needs as part of its
post-Cold War strategy, North Korea was also driven to nuclear power (the industrial
foundation for nuclear weapons) owing to its domestic energy needs and technical
limitations with coal, for example.
One of the casualties of North Korea’s overemphasis upon a culture of continuous
revolution, centralized state planning, and juche ideology of self-reliance is the
“stagnation of knowledge” and its consequences on the economy including, for example,
technology and agriculture (Kim S. C., 2006).476 By the late 1990s, KJI was searching for
technology to become the “key link” for the nation’s economy, the same notion his father
had 25 years earlier. By the 2000s, the Zainichi community (Koreans living in Japan) had
indeed grown to become a major source of technology, and North Korea had increased its
skills in computer software engineering and development, including fingerprint and voice
recognition technologies. But years of neglect, compounded by international (including
Japanese) sanctions on technologies with potential military applications, have left North
Korea behind.
Despite having a large military, the economy of the North is very small. North
Korean Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been anemic since 1990 and the end of the
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Pages 134-6.
Pages 180-90. Kim argues the development of North Korea’s intellectual class began erosion in the
1970s and, in parallel with the expansion of juche by KJI, the North also experienced a decline in academic
skill, research, theoretic inquiry, professorship, and technological improvement. Kim Il-Sung complained
about the lack of a burgeoning scientific base for socialism, including basic skills in agriculture and
fertilizers (a plaguing problem), and in the 1980s looked to the Zainichi community to expand its role in
providing the rapid foreign technology back to the “fatherland,” especially in the areas of precision
machinery and electronics. At home, increasing numbers of intellectuals instead were directed to
activities supporting ideological education—the decay continued.
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Cold War period, essentially experiencing no real growth (Wolf & Akramov, 2005).477
By the year 2000, its GDP was a mere $22 billion, compared to $765 billion in ROK
(Schneider & Post, 2002).478 This disparity has continued, with others estimating the
(GDP) of South Korea to be 40-50 times higher than North Korea’s (comparable to the
2000 estimate), though this is difficult to estimate. Most agree, however, the military
sector of North Korea’s economy accounts for much of the total North Korean
investment, possibly 25-30% of GDP or more (Wolf & Akramov, 2005).479
North Korea’s KJI faced a stagnant GDP since the late 1980s, complicated by
trade deficits, loss of Communist support, floods and drought, and then sanctioning
penalties for aberrant behavior. These pressures, atop a “military first policy” of
continued defense spending, drove the North to new sources of revenue, illegal activity,
and reluctant reception of foreign aid. Arms sales, including decades of North Korean
leadership as the world’s top seller of missiles, accounted for much of the external
funding. Missile sales alone accounted for $500 million annually, with ballistic missiles
being sold to Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, Vietnam, Egypt, Iraq, and Ukraine
(Wallace, 2007).480 North Korea maintained in the mid-1990s that sales of ballistic
missiles and their components and related technologies provided it with significant
revenue and balked, even under threat of economic sanctions, at U.S. requests to curtail
such transactions. Smacking of political extortion, in July 2000 North Korea demanded
477

Page 12.
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 118-20.
479
Pages 10 and 13. Despite an anemic start in the postwar period, the ROK economy has grown rapidly in
recent years towering in comparison to the North’s. South Korean General Paik, following the Korean
War, explained how the ROK economy began to surge in the 1960s in large part due to the role former
military personnel, full of leadership and management experience from the war, played in the economic
sector (Paik, 2000); page 253.
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Pages 22-31. While foreign sales have fallen off in past years, the North can still produce, for example,
4-8 Scud missiles per month.
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$1 billion in annual compensation for ending foreign missile sales and also stated the
need for others to launch its satellites if it were to cease developing long-range missiles
(Burns, 2010).481
The strong need for revenue and economic aid to sustain the North Korean regime
was a powerful motivation for the use of ballistic missile tests or similar forms of
coercion. The alternative might have been radical internal economic reform efforts, but
these were problematic for KJI’s calculus. On the one hand, reforms could undermine his
control over the people. On the other hand, adverse effects of reform could trigger violent
challenges to the regime. The top priority was the security of KJI and his regime—but
economic reforms seemed risky, at least compared to missile-based coercion. This is
would be the expected strategy for North Korea given their internal conditions and view
of others, including Japan. Alternatively, political engagement with Japan, for example,
and the economic benefits involved with that course of action, may involve an opening
up that could lead to external exploitation—an historical path that, especially given its
history with Japan, also appeared difficult for North Korea (Pollack, 2004).482 North
Korean interaction with Japan did include coercion; however, periods of interaction
discussing political rapprochement also occurred. Despite great economic disparities,
North Korea did not escalate to patterns of violence with Japan even when
rapprochement negotiations failed.
Journalist and consultant Michael Breen claims the private arm of KJI’s regime
funding was through an enterprise of the Korean Workers’ Party called Division 39.
Formed as early as the mid-1970s, this organization had two functional arms: legitimate
481
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In Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaign Strategies: Continuity
versus Change.” Pages 74-5.
482

226

business through the Daesong Group and its Daesong Bank and Golden Star Bank in
Vienna; and, arms dealing and illegal activities. Legitimate efforts and trade were done
by North Korean officials who trained and studied abroad and included such things as
exportation of ginseng, seafood, and minerals including gold, silver, and magnesium.
Illegal work included counterfeiting and drug dealing including sale of heroin and
methamphetamines to Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, and Taiwan (Breen, Kim JongIl: North Korea's Dear Leader, 2004).483 Buying loyalty in this way is arguably akin to
pursuing regime survival from within (Wallace, 2007).484
The ROK government could also be a source of significant financial resources for
North Korea. According to Marcus Noland, some in South Korea considered
“reconciliation transfers” to North Korea as a means of creating peninsular stability. Such
transfers would have amounted to 1% of the ROK’s GDP, or billions of dollars per year
as “survival rations” for KJI and his regime (Pollack, 2004).485 However, the economic
arrangements in North Korea are so divergent from the South’s, in terms of markets,
military expenditures, and industry, that the potential costs for reunification could exceed
$600 billion (Wolf & Akramov, 2005).486
Social Well-Being and Unrest
Other than the suffering experienced during the 1990s and consequences of
domestic economic policy reflected by people leaving or defecting, the exact status of the
483

Pages 166-8. Breen cites as examples the Australian military seizure of 125 kilograms of heroin aboard
the Pong Su at sea in April 2003 and the 1994 arrest of Daesong officials in Macao with $250,000 in
counterfeit money. He also suggests the $450 million from Hyundai in 2000 ahead of the summit between
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well-being of the people or their sentiments toward their leaders is difficult to know with
precision or confidence. However, from the analyses of others, it appears there is no
means of non-violent political redress; political prisoner camps exist and executions and
repatriation occur; people take risks to leave the country or acquire ROK or Western
goods; there is a general lack of fertilizer and electricity; and, there have been famines,
disease, drought, and starvation. Despite, or perhaps because of, this situation there has
not existed any significant civil strife, organized resistance, or insurrection against the
KJI regime. There was, however, a short period of small public protests over currency
reform in November and December, 2009 (BBC, 2013).487
After the Korean War, KIS reordered society into a new hierarchy that echoed
Confucian and ancient Choson dynasty ideas. He identified three classes that not only
reflected his view of socialism but, more importantly, his remedy for the recent past.
These classes included: the core class; the wavering class; and, the hostile class.
Everyone was investigated thoroughly and placed into a class based upon loyalty to the
Kim regime as well as family connections. The core class includes regime and elite
family members, KWP members, and high-ranking officials. It also includes family
members of soldiers killed in the Korean War and those who were anti-Japanese before
the end of WWII. The wavering class includes families with connections in South Korea
or whose families were merchants and farmers before the end of WWII. Members of this
class might be won over through political education, but are far removed from the
opportunities of the core class. The hostile class includes families of those who have been
critical of the Kim regime or whose families were wealthy or religious before the end of
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WWII. Members of the hostile class live in rural North Korea as outcasts and doomed to
poverty or a concentration camp (Connor, 2009).488
The overall picture of civil liberties inside North Korea is neither good nor
surprising. According to Freedom House, North Korea receives the worst rating for
freedom (7.0), based upon a wide variety of factors, including: lack of open elections;
endemic government corruption; state control of the media; no real freedom of religion,
movement, or assembly; lack of an independent judiciary; social discrimination based
upon designated classes; human trafficking; and forced abortions and infanticide
(Freedom in the World 2012: North Korea, 2012).489 According to Walter Sharp, North
Korea was ranked in the bottom eight countries by Freedom House for internal protection
of political rights and civil liberties, as well as one of the most repressive regimes in the
world (Sharp, 2008).490 This situation, while theoretically part of a social contract, clearly
reflects the goal of maintaining the Kim family regime in power through totalitarian
control. The masses generally seem to reluctantly accept the social order, though there is
no evidence of mass happiness for it.
Years of control, however, have left North Korea’s leaders in a predicament.
Generally, Scobell argues North Korea probably subscribes to some blend of the
following strategic intentions: (1) merely survive as a regime; (2) become a strong and
vibrant state; and, (3) reunify the peninsula on its terms. Its leaders are likely more
488
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confident in their position than fatalistically thinking the regime is doomed or that
survival is all it can expect to achieve. However, one of the greatest challenges facing
North Korea is its internal “dilemma” that impacts other strategic goals: the fear among
its leaders that domestic reforms will undermine their positions of control, but without it,
regime failure also appears on the horizon. The fear of the regime not surviving due to
reforms is higher, according to Scobell, leading its leaders to gamble on modest changes
to the status quo (Scobell, North Korea's Strategic Intentions, 2005).491
KJI reportedly stated recently, “I will do everything to let our people live a
content life by improving their lives in the shortest period possible” (Pollack, No Exit:
North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, 2011).492 However, some
suggest KJI had no remorse for the suffering of North Korean people in the 1990s at the
height of their suffering, at times depriving them of internal and international aid. He
demonstrated willingness for brutality, such as during famines in 1997 and 1999 the
ordering of hundreds of thousands of people into camps where few could survive and the
killing of the babies of political prisoners (Schneider & Post, 2002).493 Others have
described the plight of the North Korean people as more than a policy failure and nothing
less than a neglect of their government, or perhaps as an instrumental abuse. The choice
of KJI was to continue a “military first” program at the expense of his people, 80% of
whom lived beyond the reach of the Party or military distribution networks. The result
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was chronic undernourishment of the people and increased reliance upon the international
community for food (Buzo, The Making of Modern Korea, 2007).494
External Environmental Factors
This section reviews the key external relationships of North Korea and the
diplomatic style employed by KJI in these relationships. This not only provides insights
into KJI’s priorities but helps better understand the political context in which Japan
interacted with North Korea and how its BMD program fits within that context. The U.S.
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) report in 2010 provided broad linkages for
missile defenses to national security and deterrence. According to the report, the top
priority is near-term regional threats, including North Korea, which seek to exploit
ballistic missiles and WMD capabilities not only for operational purposes in conflict but
to “undergird efforts to coerce” others, including those near to them, in times of relative
peace (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 2010).495 Political coercion is the
strategy pursued by North Korea in it relations and diplomacy and the “peacetime”
scenario is the setting in which the dissertation explores.
Diplomacy and Communication
Snyder suggests those who have had high-level interactions with North Koreans
claim a “crisis diplomacy” style, given the position of North Korea in the post-Cold War
era. This crisis orientation came across regularly, such as in discussions on the nuclear
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issue (Snyder, 1999).496 An alternative description—and one with wide currency—is a
style of coercion or extortion. According to Narushige Michishita, North Korean broad
political objectives had not changed much in recent years and, therefore, its military and
diplomatic patterns of behavior, as it sought to relate to Japan, ROK, and the U.S., would
remain essentially consistent. Since the 1990s, North Korean objectives have been
dominated by diplomatic coercion activities more than military confrontation. This
change from military confrontation to missile-backed diplomatic coercion was supported
by a larger share of resources going into ballistic missile development and WMD
(Pollack, 2004).497
Becker argues, despite all the domestic strife and external environmental changes,
there has been “no change of heart” for the North Korean regime. It continues to engage
in various activities, such as interaction with NGOs, cultural events, or searching for
Korean War era missing-in-action (MIA) remains. However, all these engagements were
purchased with some sort of payoff. The only change for North Korea, according to
Becker, is the lethality of military weapons the North acquires to facilitate its extortion of
others (Becker, 2005).498 As seen with the 1998 Taepodong launch, even a test flight can
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have profound effects upon the domestic psyche and significant security-related
consequences in states like Japan and the United States.
Relations and Interactions with Others
General.
Kiyosaki portrays North Korea in the 1970s as politically frustrated with the
entire notion of reunification or breaking out entirely as an independent, if not
predominant, player in Northeast Asian geopolitical affairs. This frustration was due to
four impediments: (1) a period of superpower détente; (2) disunity between China and the
Soviet Union; (3) the presence of U.S. forces and, more importantly, U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons, in South Korea; and, (4) a more unified ROK army and society (Kiyosaki,
1976).499 Kim Il-Sung feared being sidelined. By the early 1990s, with the end of Soviet
Communism, international fear increased over North Korea as circumstances were
considered “volatile” (Hall & Kemp, 1994).500 Some described the problem as North
Korea’s “daunting” challenge to cope with others (Kim S. S., North Korean Foreign
Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 1998).501 However, as time would reveal, external
actors, too, struggled with a way to deal with North Korea in the post-Cold War world.
The very real challenges North Korea faced internally and externally also lend
themselves to theoretic international relations approaches (described by Samuel Kim in
the next paragraph). For example, according to Stephen Walt and Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff, realism attempts to explain the problems in the world through acceptance of
state-level propensities toward conflict. This view suggests leaders are, therefore, worried
over survival, security, and self-help measures, driving them to acquire more and new
499
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measures of power. Though a common view, realism offers little aid in predicting
international change. Liberalism emphasizes remedies or mitigation to conflict through
democracy, interdependence, and cooperative institutions. It perhaps underestimates the
importance of power to state leaders and also does not predict significant changes well,
such as the end of the Cold War. Finally, modern constructivism explores social factors
such as a nation’s identity and culture in order to understand and explain state behavior.
Walt suggests these theories actually complement one another, while Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff describe modern theory as more of a synthesis of multiple theories (Dougherty
& Pfaltzgraff, 2001).502
By the early 2000s, it seemed to outsiders that North Korea was simply coping to
survive, having endured the death and devastation of floods and drought in the late 1990s.
It could not even provide electricity for lighting at night, except in Pyongyang. Survival,
however, could last no further than 2015 according to intelligence estimates. To Samuel
Kim, realists simply framed North Korea’s situation in broader balance of power
realities: U.S. hegemonic retreat; Russian decline; Japanese stagnation; and the rise of
China as clear regional hegemon. Liberals relied on regional institutions—such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO), and Tumen River Area Development Programme
(TRADP)—for solutions, which usually disappointed. Constructivism offered aid in
understanding, through study of the disparate cultures and identities of the various actors
with a stake in the Northeast Asia region. But this, too, he argued, while showing distrust
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of each for understandable historical reasons, did not offer security-related solutions for
the region in general or North Korea specifically (Kim & Lee, North Korea and Northeast
Asia, 2002).503
Despite the presence of great powers, North Korea likely embraces more of a
regional perspective in its security and foreign policies. This is due to the centuries of
security-related interaction with close regional actors like Japan, China and, more
recently, South Korea.504 Further, in conjunction with its change in strategy from
confrontation to coercion at the end of the Cold War, North Korea may also see the role
or impact of the U.S. in Korean affairs as much reduced. For example, according to
Michael Mazarr and James Goodby, one of the key characteristics of the new
international security environment is a “United States politically exhausted and fiscally
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and militarily broke” (Shultz, Drell, & Goodby, 2011).505 If so, North Korea and Japan
may both sense less U.S. credibility to deter or manage North Korean aberrant behavior.
As a result, North Korea has been more provocative, and Japan proactive in its own
national defense including acquisition of a BMD program. North Korea may also be more
willing to pursue or accept political bargains with regional actors such as Japan.
Generally, North Korean leadership has not related well politically with its
opponents. It has difficulty, for example, interpreting their intentions, due in part to
greater (though not “total”) reliance upon conflictual over cooperative means. It is also
highly sensitive to perceptions of external interference in its domestic affairs (Schneider
& Post, 2002).506 One example could be the way Russia chose to abandon North Korea
when the Cold War ended in which Russia sided economically and politically instead
with ROK. Another example would be the sense of suspicion of Japan given the Japanese
occupation of Korea, perhaps inhibiting more positive political relations when those seem
to have been possible.
North Korea’s coercion strategy to seek economic accommodation or political and
security objectives relies in large part upon use of ballistic missiles. Doing so seems to
have cost North Korea little, or little in terms of what matters to North Korea. Sanctions
were not of significant effect on its ballistic missile programs, at least in the sense North
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Korea did not conduct extensive ballistic missile testing to achieve operational training
and technical data needed as part of most Western quality assurance programs for
deployed systems. Missile production capabilities are also sustainable in North Korea.
However, economic losses incurred if North Korea needed modifications to its missiles to
counter defenses would be detrimental to sustained use of ballistic missiles to coerce. On
the other hand, North Korea has also employed cooperative tools on occasion, such as
KJI agreeing in 2000 to a moratorium on missile testing, reflecting a more cooperative
element in his approach (Schneider & Post, 2002).507
Relations with Regional Actors.
United States
The North Korean psyche of defending the land from invader certainly precedes
Japan’s imperialist conquest or North Korean complaints of U.S. occupation of South
Korea. There is, however, an interesting twist on the connection to the U.S. in the family
lineage of North Korea’s modern leaders that dates back to 1866. In that year, Korea sank
the USS General Sherman in the Taedong River near Pyongyang in a dramatic response
to U.S. attempts to pressure Korea into trade relations (i.e., “gunboat diplomacy”). The
leader of the Korean troops who defeated the invaders was reportedly Kim Il-Sung’s
great-grandfather (Snyder, 1999).508
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Beyond resilient, Samuel Kim suggests North Korea’s sovereignty today is more
secure than ever through use of its nuclear weapons capability. These capabilities
undergird a North Korean nuclear brinkmanship style of relations with regional actors,
playing its “collapse card” as needed to get attention. The U.S. response has generally
been a hardline one, with Japan supporting the U.S. more than China, Russia, or South
Korea (Kim S. S., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War World, 2007).509
With uncertain aid from China and Russia, and improved ties between China and South
Korea, Kim also argues the North has found itself needing to work with the U.S.;
however, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has principally chosen coercive, not
positive instruments of interaction to resolve problems, making the vision of U.S.-North
Korea normalization a distant one (Kim S. S., North Korean Foreign Relations in the
Post-Cold War World, 2007).510
Republic of Korea
While the Korean War is technically still unsettled and in a state of ceasefire,
North Korea, through its constitution, continues to call for the overthrow of South Korea
and the unification of the Korean peninsula. However, large-scale land invasion as part of
North Korea’s former strategy of armed confrontation seems unlikely, having moved
more toward a strategy of political coercion, including pressures to provide various forms
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of aid and assistance. Violence and hostility toward the South have risen in the past few
years, in part due to a resumption of tough-line policies in the South, but giving terrible
reminders of past North Korean behavior toward the South: a ROK frigate was sunk,
allegedly by North Korea, in 2010, killing 46 sailors; in 2010, North Korea shelled a
ROK island with artillery, killing four people; and, a computer-based cyber attack,
blamed on North Korea, caused a South Korean financial institution to crash in April
2011 (Breen, Kim Jong-il: North Korea's Dear Leader, 2012).511
In the past several years, South Korean policy has alternated between a tougher
line and accommodation, generally in line with whatever political party is in power. For
example, Key-young Son suggests ROK’s Sunshine Policy, during a 10-year period of
accommodation, was aimed at alleviating the North’s internal security dilemmas with
aid—internal issues which ROK believed drove KJI to provocative behavior outside the
bounds of international norms (Son, 2006).512 A common criticism was such aid was
diverted to North Korea’s military, creating a tradeoff of more moderate North Korean
behavior at the expense of helping their military.
Russia
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To KIS, the Soviet role in WWII on the Korean Peninsula was another “invasion”
that, while it liberated North Koreans, was nevertheless a breach of Korean sovereignty
(Szalontai, 2005).513 This was part of what led KIS to mistrust the Soviet Union from the
beginning. With the end of the Korean War, and the death of Joseph Stalin,
disagreements between the two began to rise. Soviet de-Stalinization and other structural
reform led North Korea’s leaders to greater autonomy from the Soviet Union and the
North Korean branding of its own ideology, different from Soviet, Chinese, or European
Communism—a style that would actually lead it the other direction, toward a stronger,
not weaker, personality cult in North Korea (Szalontai, 2005).514
Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the two states has
reflected periods of cooperation, but the severe drop in assistance from the Soviet Union
at the end of the Cold War has kept the relationship less than ideal for North Korea. KJI,
for example, traveled to Russia as part of this relationship, but never achieved Russia’s
forgiveness of the multi-billion dollar North Korean debt. There has also been interaction
regarding military capabilities, such as Russian scientific and technical assistance in
North Korea with its ballistic missile program and, perhaps, development of EMP
capabilities with its missiles. Other important activities have included reinvigorating
economic ties with Russia. For example, North Korea signed a Defense Industry
Cooperation Agreement with Russia in April 2001 to build a rail line through North
Korea, linking Russia to ROK, potentially bringing much needed revenue to North Korea
as a result (Schneider & Post, 2002).515

513

Page 13.
Pages 35, 39, and 45. North Korean autonomy also included purges of threats to its new thinking.
515
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Pages 121-2.
514

240

China
North Korea’s relationship with China changed when the Cold War ended along
with Soviet aid. The problem was that China (and Russia) both acted quickly to establish
relations with South Korea, frustrating North Korean regional policy. For China, the
relationship with both Koreas gave it a unique opportunity to help shape the situation to
its favor; however, since the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, China’s primary goal has
been to foster stability in Northeast Asia through avoiding North Korean collapse and
border consequences that could follow (Snyder, China's Rise and the Two Koreas:
Politics, Economics, Security, 2009).516 According to Snyder, China is North Korea’s
major source of exchange, providing approximately 40% of all North Korean trade
including grain, petroleum, and coal. However, whether through aid in the post-flooding
situation in the 1990s or the Six-Party talks to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue,
China’s response was begrudging and modest (Snyder, China's Rise and the Two Koreas:
Politics, Economics, Security, 2009).517 Only China retained consistent and “meaningful”
ties with North Korea, though China’s influence over KJI was likely limited (Pollack, No
Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, 2011).518 China did,
however, pursue recurring high-level ties with North Korea including direct contact with
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KJI since 2003 (Snyder, China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security,
2009).519
Relations with Japan Revisited.
Many of the essential factors involving the relationship between North Korea and
Japan have already been addressed or mentioned elsewhere in the dissertation. This
section adds additional detail in the interaction between these two actors including
broader historical context, North Korea’s overall strategy, and various issues affecting
political rapprochement such as North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles, the abduction
issue, and Japan’s BMD. It is interesting to note that, while North Korea transitioned to a
coercive strategy with its neighbors, including Japan, the development of BMD
capabilities in Japan that challenged North Korea’s means of political coercion (i.e., its
ballistic missile program) and the rise of Japan generally in terms of economic and
military autonomy, have not resulted in more confrontation and violence from North
Korea. In fact, the opposite response was displayed, at least in terms of the North’s
coercive strategy with Japan in conditions short of war.
Historical Context & Strategy
During the 500-year period of the Choson Dynasty in Korea until the Japanese
Meiji Restoration (1392-1868), with one conflictual exception in the Imjin War (159298), Korea maintained a relationship toward Japan regulated by the “Kyorin order,”
where Korea chose to deal with Japan as a “neighbor” (unlike Korea’s servitude
relationship toward China during this period). However, Japan changed its domestic
position, including use of strong new titles, which was reflected in diplomatic exchanges
with Korea at the outset of the Meiji government. These changes, which Japan considered
519
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in keeping with Western or international law and standards, included: consolidation of
Japanese representation to Korea now coming from the “emperor” in Tokyo, a title used
only of China’s leader, intentionally placing Korea in an inferior if not servitude
relationship with Japan; and, declaring only Japan to be the sole protector of Korea and
preventing invasion from Russia or others. Korea was appalled (Kim Y. , 2006).520 This
relationship preceded Japan’s harsh imperial period and was followed by conflict in
WWII and the Korean War—two wars which spanned a very brief time in the overall
relationship between Japan and Korea. This is why it is difficult for North Korea—and
Koreans generally—to consider recent political interaction in isolation of their very
lengthy past interaction. Koreans tend to remember the historical issues openly; Japan is
criticized for wanting to set them aside.521
An effect of superpower détente was that it permitted an increase in political and
economic contact and exchanges between North Korea and Japan through the 1970s with
periodic hints of normalization.522 Into the 1980s, North Korean relations with Japan
appeared to offer promise as North Korea sought joint ventures to stimulate economic
520

Pages 3-4, 23-6, and 30. All economic and cultural interaction between Korea and Japan was governed
in this way, though the regional powers in modern Tokyo clearly received deference from Korea’s central
government.
521
According to Samuel Kim, “The relationships between the two Korean states and Japan carry some of
the heaviest historical baggage in contemporary international relations” (Kim S. S., 2006); page 166. For
example, McCormack suggested Japan tends to have a short memory of history and its role in it, while
“Korean memories are long,” including the 400-year old Japanese invasion of Korea for which Japan has
not yet apologized (McCormack, 2004); pages 124-5. The invasion was bad enough, but it was the
plundering that stokes Korean anger: Japan took countless potters along with “doctors, printers, artisans
in wood and metal, paper makers, scroll makers, painters, dyers, weavers and spinners, garden designers
and experts, scholars, large numbers of young women, many cultural treasures, and printing presses—the
‘high-tech’ items of their time—while also selling many Koreans as slaves or exchanging them for guns or
silk.” Japanese history in Korea made headlines even as ROK’s president-elect begins her relationship with
Japan, claiming Japan needed to “squarely face” its imperial past in Korea (Alpert, 2013).
522
In 1970, for example, North Korea was open to the idea of independent political relations with Japan,
without sense of obligation to Communist powers China or the Soviet Union. This was evidenced by the
quick return of a Japan Airlines aircraft after it had been hijacked to Pyongyang in April (Kiyosaki, 1976);
page 90.
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development; the North-South dialogue seemed to be easing; and, both China and the
Soviet Union were more cooperative with Japan and the U.S. (Park, Koh, & Kwak,
1987).523 However, this opportunity was balanced as North Korea, as part of its broad
strategy, showed a proclivity toward politically fracturing if not splitting regional actors,
such as Japan, from their partnerships and alliances with the United States. It did so
through various political and military activities under past general deterrence conditions,
and could do so explicitly as part of its wartime strategy against multiple parties in a
broader peninsular war. North Korea uses this strategy of reducing a regional actor’s
commitment in order to isolate it and improve the prospects North Korea will achieve its
aims or advance its position.524
Rapprochement & Related Issues
The prospects for rapprochement broke down significantly in the mid-1990s when
Japan raised the abduction issue and North Korea placed heavy financial demands on
Japan. The abduction issue again impeded progress in talks in 1997-98, just prior to the
North Korean Taepodong missile test that flew directly over Japan (Hoare & Pares,
2005).525 Inference can be drawn from this as coercion by North Korea for financial
compensation without having to give on abductions. By the time of the Koizumi summit
with KJI in Pyongyang in September 2002, KJI caved in on abductions and admitted to
wrongdoing by elements of his government. However, this did not play out well
523

In Jung Hyun Shin’s chapter, “North Korea’s Policy toward Japan: Perceptions, Goals, Trends.” Pages
275-7.
524
While there are clearly economic considerations for Japan’s foreign policy generally, national security is
the primary factor in its relations with North Korea. The good news for Japan is that, contrary to popular
belief, North Korea behaves in a logical and understandable way, consistent with its strategic culture of
national survival (Hagstrom & Soderberg, 2006); pages 6-8.
525
Pages 134-5. From the Japanese perspective, North Korea did not develop into villain status until after
the Cold War and several informal and formal meetings between the two. Hoare and Pares suggest the
people of Japan actually held North Korea in higher regard than the South for most of the postwar period.
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politically among Japan’s population. Pritchard suggests Japan perhaps overplayed the
abduction issue to the detriment of positive diplomatic relations (Pritchard, 2007).526 The
abduction issue not only made progress difficult, but resulted in reduced, not increased,
Japanese economic interaction with North Korea (Bechtol, 2007).527 Regardless,
sentiments of the ethnic Korean Zainichi population in Japan are still raw on both sides
(Ryang & Lie, 2009).528
North Korea has much to be gained in its influence over Japan by remaining a
nuclear power while Japan’s position is to be conventionally-armed only. North Korea is
currently in a dominant position over Japan, which has maintained a generally defensiveoriented posture. According to Jeffrey Kawada, North Korean opposition to Japan is not
much more than branding Japan as a threat and Japan’s BMD part of a regional arms
buildup or a “plan of future aggression” (Kawada, 2004).529 But North Korea may
actually fear Japan’s militarization as part of its overall rise in autonomy (Takesada,

526

Pages 86-9. For example, Japan sought to have North Korea retained on the U.S. terrorism list because
of its abductions of Japanese. The U.S. not only did not want to do that because it was not the cause for
North Korea’s placement on the U.S. list, but Japanese steady prioritization of the abduction issue was
jeopardizing multilateral progress on North Korea’s nuclear program through the Six Party Talks.
527
Pages 139-40. Japan, for example, along with others provided North Korea with substantial aid in the
1990s, though North Korea felt this was simply part of what Japan “owed” it as part of Japan’s colonial
abuses. In 2001, when revelations of North Korean abductions gained traction in Japan, humanitarian aid
to North Korea was stopped and by 2005 formal trade was at a 25-year low: $190 million in 2005, most of
which were North Korean exports to Japan.
528
In Sonia Ryang’s chapter, “Visible and Vulnerable: The Predicament of Koreans in Japan;” pages 62-3.
For example, following media announcements 17 September 2002 that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il
admitted his agents abducted 13 Japanese citizens, Zainichi Koreans received death threats and Korean
children were spat on and harassed in public. She contrasts Japanese public sentiment toward North
Korea (including North Korean sympathizers in the Zainichi community) with that of South Korea, where
“Japan has seen a boom in South Korean cultural products in recent years.” According to Lie, the once
two-million strong Korean diaspora, or Zainichi population, living in Japan after WWII as a consequence of
Japan’s imperial period, remains a reminder of the past and of unsettled business between the two states.
Zainichi, even older ethnic Japanese citizens, Lie argues, respected Kim Il-Sung though KJI was not well
thought of in Japan (Lie, 2008); pages 30-1. Such Koreans still abide by an “ideology of return.”
529
Pages 25-6.
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2001).530 North Korea would likely feel very threatened by Japan should it build
offensive strike capabilities, or a nuclear weapons program—capabilities that might push
North Korea to consider preemptive military action against Japan under some scenarios
for which Japan’s current defensive posture does not provide adequate autonomous
protection or retaliatory capacity.531 The North Korean decision to resume work on
nuclear weapons, and their admission to such in diplomatic meetings in late 2002, was a
setback to North Korea-Japan relations and possible rapprochement (Schneider & Post,
2002).532 The second Koizumi summit with KJI occurred in early 2004. It did not yield
any breakthroughs and essentially ended the robust period of rapprochement dialogue.
Ballistic missiles, either directly or indirectly, serve a valuable coercive purpose
for North Korea against Japan. Coercing Japan likely brought several political, tangible,

530

See the section entitled, “CHINA’S AND NORTH KOREA’S OPPOSITION.” According to Takesada, China’s
interaction with North Korea’s leadership caused North Korean criticism to stiffen. Part of Japan’s rise in
autonomy has involved an increase in its freedom of action. This is characterized militarily by increased
capabilities, longer and further deployments, and more assertive operations including engagement with
North Korean ships. But it is also shown in greater flexing politically, such as pursuit of a UNSC permanent
seat. Japan also has a missile program to support its space program—a capability that could be used to
sharpen Japan’s overall technological capacity or edge. This edge in technology could also aid in
continuing its advancement of credible, effective BMD components and help it acquire the needed skills
for converting its missiles into offensive ballistic missiles should it deem it necessary to do so.
531
Interestingly, George Quester suggests Japan (along with Sweden, Argentina, Australia, and Brazil) at
one time possessed scientists and political or military leaders who welcomed the prospect of developing
and acquiring nuclear weapons of their own for personal, if not national, power and glory (Manwaring,
2001); page 41.
532
In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic
Culture.” Page 109-10. Samuel Kim argues Japan sees value in normalizing relations with North Korea (Kim
S. S., 2006); pages 185-6. Normalization is valued by Japan for three reasons: (1) to finally clear its WWII
political slate; (2) to position itself for more effective economic competition, recognizing Russia and China,
for example, have formal relations with both North and South Korea; and, (3) North Korea collapse
scenarios are all problematic for Japan. However, without an immediate crisis at hand driving Japan and
North Korea to diplomatic engagement, there may be little incentive for Japan to overreach its positive
engagement and appear “soft,” perhaps inciting North Korean threats (Yun & Shin, 2006). In Robert
Carlin’s chapter, “Talk to Me, Later.” Page 20. While Japan has no embassy in North Korea, the General
Association of Korean Residents in Japan (also commonly called either “Chongryun” or “Chosen Soren”),
formed in Japan in 1955 as an organization aligned with the interests of North Korea, has served in some
cases as a “de facto embassy for Pyongyang” (Kim S. S., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold
War World, 2007); page 34.
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and psychologically emotive benefits to KJI, though he did not act independent of the
influence of other factors. However, given Japan’s deterrence strategy, one dilemma in
North Korean decision-making was that to deny Japan success in deterring North Korea
was to stoke the fires inside Japan that it might need offensive conventional strike, and
possibly nuclear, capabilities to sufficiently deter North Korea—an unwelcome prospect
inside North Korea.533

533

Detailed analysis of possible effects of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean perceptions, decisions, and
behavior, stemming from this chapter will be provided in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Introduction
Overview
The analyses in this chapter attempt to capture the effect of BMD on Japan’s
overall relationship with North Korea, controlling for other environmental factors in the
Northeast Asia regional security situation. The central question is whether Japan’s BMD
program in any period of its development had a deterrent effect toward North Korea. To
unpack the role of Japan’s missile defenses on North Korean behavior, the chapter
explores quantitative data presented in dyadic form between the two countries in the
exclusive period 1990-2011. This period is bookended approximately by the fall of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War at one end and the death of North Korea’s
second leader at the other. The first bookend is important since it created a rapid and
significant withdrawal of Soviet power, including marked reduction in political, military,
and financial aid to North Korea. The second bookend is important because Kim Jong-Il,
North Korea’s second leader, ruled North Korea de facto or de jure for essentially the
entire period until his death, making deductive analysis about North Korea’s decisionmaking and behavior in this period centrally focused and more reliable.
Certain other actors and factors may impact the influence of Japan’s BMD on
North Korean behavior toward Japan: the U.S., as a dominant actor and historical
antagonist; the PRC, as a key North Korean ally; ROK, as a cultural and military
opponent on peninsula; possible periods of intense political interaction between Japan
and North Korea, such as rapprochement discussions; and, the politics of North Korea’s
regional opponents whose policies ebb and flow with opposing parties in power. These
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factors may affect the potential influence of Japan’s BMD as a deterring instrument in
general deterrence conditions.
Key Findings
The analyses below lend support to the idea that Japan’s BMD provides deterrent
effects, but these can be both reinforcing and undermining effects that occur at different
times of the BMD program’s cycle of emergence before, during, and after its deployment.
This was seen in three ways in the time-series analysis of the Japan-North Korea case: 1)
Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence by increasing cooperative North Korean behavior
toward Japan early in the BMD R&D phase, prior to any deployment commitments; 2)
Japan’s BMD undermined deterrence by increasing conflictual North Korean behavior
toward Japan when BMD was first deployed; and, 3) Japan’s BMD strengthened
deterrence by decreasing conflictual North Korean behavior much later in BMD
employment under provocative conditions.
Organization of the Chapter
Following the present introduction, the chapter is organized into four subsequent
parts: a theoretical considerations section, which briefly revisits key deterrence issues and
the basic hypotheses considered in this chapter; a design and data section, describing the
general design of the statistical analysis approach, the dataset used for the various
regression models, and a description of the dependent and independent variables; an
empirical analysis section, which assesses the models, variables and hypotheses; and
conclusions.
Theoretical Considerations534
534

The significant body of theoretic arguments on deterrence and the role of missile defenses to support
or undermine deterrence is taken up in Chapter Three: Literature Review.
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General vs. Immediate Deterrence
As described in more detail in Chapter Three: Literature Review, scholars have
for decades recognized a conceptual separation of deterrence activities distinguished by
time and circumstance most often described as “general” and “immediate” deterrence.
General deterrence refers to the purposeful security-oriented management of a
relationship with a potential adversary under the relatively stable, peacetime conditions of
day-to-day circumstances. General deterrence is that period of interaction short of
conflict, though relational disturbances or provocations between opponents are certainly
within the boundaries of general deterrence. Immediate deterrence implies a significant
transition into crisis that could lead to war (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).535
Quackenbush describes general deterrence in broad terms, recognizing the complexities
associated with relations short of war—when most interaction occurs (Quackenbush,
Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and Application, 2011).536
What is recognized generally is that the perceptions of political leaders change
over time as circumstances change, thus altering their cooperative and conflictual
behavior. But these behavioral dynamics are not limited to simply moving from
peacetime to crisis and from crisis to conflict—there exist many gradients in between.
Japan’s BMD program has emerged within and across these gradients under general
deterrence conditions and is recognized by Japan as an integral component of its overall
deterrence strategy. One key question is whether its BMD has had any deterrent effect or,
more precisely, whether there have been deterrent effects across the spectrum of the
Japanese BMD program’s development over time.

535
536

Pages 372-3.
Page 4.

250

One way to explore such possibilities is to break up Japan’s BMD program into
meaningful parts for more refined statistical analysis. Analyzing North Korea’s
cooperative and conflictual behavior toward Japan provides one way to measure their
overall satisfaction with their relationship with Japan, including possible effects of
Japan’s BMD upon the North’s behavior. This approach is similar to that taken by A.
Cooper Drury and Stephen Quackenbush in their analysis of U.S. national missile
defenses in other deterrence relationships (Drury & Quackenbush, 2007).537 Such
gradients of interaction also suggest that deterrence should not be conceptualized as
strictly an act-restraint, zero-sum dynamic. Rather, deterrence success can exist in general
deterrence conditions in terms of acceptable “direction” where success can be seen in the
following ways: 1) increased cooperative adversary behavior toward the deterrer; and, 2)
decreased conflictual adversary behavior toward the deterrer. This is to say that under
general deterrence conditions, deterrence success does not demand absolute cooperative
behavior from the adversary and absolute omission of conflictual behavior; this is
unrealistic. Improvements in the direction of behaviors, however, could be considered
acceptable measures of deterrence success. When considering gradients of interaction,
one can also explore deterrence value and outcomes created through the mitigation of
conditions such that they do not get worse: 3) no decreased cooperative adversary
behavior toward the deterrer; and, 4) no increased conflictual adversary behavior toward
the deterrer. The first two conditions indicate measurable change in adversary behavior
and in a certain direction; that is, one direction can strengthen deterrence and the other
undermine it. They provide two measurable ways to quantity deterrence success. The

537

Pages 9 and 13-4.
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latter two conditions do not measure deterrence success, but may provide indications that
it is not failing.
BMD in General Deterrence.
No single theory of the role or effect of missile defenses in general deterrence
exists within the literature. Further, much of the BMD-related research focuses upon the
U.S. national missile defense system and potential attacks on the U.S. Homeland, or how
BMD might protect or deter in the midst of a regional conflict usually involving U.S.
conventional forces in combat. There are, however, some arguments concerning its
possible deterrent efficacy under general deterrence conditions, some of which could
apply to the Japan-North Korea relationship.538
Theoretically, BMD could, under some circumstances, support or undermine
deterrence. BMD could also operate in both directions at the same time, influencing one
perceptual part of an adversary’s calculus in one way, and another part of calculus in the
other. In the adversary’s thinking, BMD might deny benefits, impose costs, provide
benefits of restraint, or mitigate costs of restraint. For example, BMD could enhance
deterrence if perceived by North Korea as imposing costs by demonstrating Japan’s
commitment to defend its population, and signaling North Korea its stake in their security
relationship such that Japan would not only commit significant resources to address a
perceived North Korean threat but would accept increased risk in fielding the capabilities
resulting from that financial commitment. A demonstrated Japanese willingness to

538

Further analysis of these arguments in context of both the qualitative analysis from the dissertation’s
Strategic Profile and empirical analysis from this current chapter will be evaluated in Chapter Eight:
Conclusions. Some of the missile defense-deterrence arguments are, however, summarized here to help
better understand the statistical analyses later in this chapter. A table of the various missile defensedeterrence arguments identified in the dissertation’s research is found in Table 1 at the conclusion of
Chapter Three: Literature Review.
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employ its BMD to engage a North Korean missile under general deterrence conditions
would likely signal similar resolve during times of dire crisis or conflict, raising the costs
to North Korea and thus strengthening the deterrence of such crises from ever occurring.
North Koreas costs of continuing with its coercive strategy against Japan could also
include needing to build more ballistic missiles or developing BMD countermeasures.
Such Japanese demonstrations with its BMD under general deterrence conditions could
also deny North Korean benefits by reducing the political coercive power of North
Korea’s ballistic missiles over Japanese policy more broadly. Further, Japan’s BMD
program could help North Korea’s leadership recognize attractive benefits of restraint by
influencing them to seek a long-term political bargain with Japan earlier rather than later
when North Korea’s militarily position was stronger. Another perceived benefit of
restraint could be dealing with Japan disincentivized to pursue its own nuclear weapons
program—a prospect that could change without North Korean restraint in its ballistic
missile-backed coercion strategy. Japan’s BMD could also mitigate North Korea’s
perceived costs of restraint in proceeding with an active coercive strategy against Japan
by demonstrating to North Korea the defensive nature of Japan’s BMD and Japan’s
resistance to committing new defense spending on offensive capabilities instead. On the
other hand, Japan’s BMD deployment might push North Korea to become more
provocative, coercive, or conflictual generally by, for example, developing or actually
employing some other means of coercion for which Japan is not yet prepared to defend
itself. Each of these types of activities can emerge in general deterrence conditions and in
different periods of Japan’s BMD program development.

253

Japan, in many ways, followed the same basic pattern of BMD development over
time as did the United States, progressing from minimal research and studies, to
extensive research and development (R&D), to decisions to acquire or produce, then
deployment and operational employment (Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy:
Technology in Search of a Mission (Revised and Updated Edition), 2002).539 These
factors in many ways mirror those of Japan’s leaders regarding development and
acquisition of BMD. Burns also offers several important dates across Japan’s BMD
program (Burns, 2010).540 In this chapter, Japan’s BMD program has been divided for
analytic purposes into the following timeframes: BMD-related R&D and investment
following the North Korean TD-1 missile test; actually deciding to acquire BMD;
deploying BMD; and, readiness to employ BMD against a North Korean TD-1 missile.541
539

Page 3. For example, in his revised volume, Yanarella offers an historical reflection of key early
decisions relating to ABM in the United States. These decisions included: in 1958, McElroy granting the
U.S. Army exclusive rights to developing ABM capabilities; in 1961, McNamara deferring production and
deployment of Nike-Zeus; in 1963, McNamara initiating R&D of Nike-X over Nike-Zeus; in 1967, Johnson
deploying Sentinel; and, in 1969, Nixon deploying Safeguard over Sentinel. These decisions, he suggests,
were shaped by strategic, technological, political, organizational, and economic factors.
540
Pages 101-2. Burns summarizes key periods and Japanese decision points as follows: 1980s, increased
awareness of a growing North Korean threat and decision to “study” the threat and role of missile
defenses; 1993, Nodong-1 test; late 1998 decision to reinvigorate missile defense research following the
TD-1 test; late 2003 decision point to expand missile defense capabilities independent of a U.S. national or
global system; May 2004, decision to purchase SM-3 interceptors for 2007 deployment on a Japanese
Aegis destroyer; March 2008, replacement of six PAC-2 missile batteries with deployment of PAC-3
missiles; September 2008, successful test of two Japanese PAC-3 interceptors, using JASDF personnel, at
White Sands Missile Range in the U.S.; and, 17 December 2008, Japan conducted its first actual intercept
of a ballistic missile target using Japan’s JS Kongo destroyer hitting a target launched from Hawaii.
O’Donogue also recaps Japan’s interest and decision points regarding development of a missile defense
program (O'Donogue, 2000); pages 5-6.
541
Historically, three Japanese governmental agencies stood up to support Japan’s growing BMD
activities. The first agency was the TMD Working Group (TMD WG), a joint U.S.-Japan organization
subordinate to the Security Subcommittee, Security Consultative Committee (SSC-SCC). This agency stood
up in December 1993 after North Korea launched a Nodong missile into the Sea of Japan in May 1993 and
has addressed primarily technical issues. Participants in the TMD WG represent DoD’s Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), BMDO, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and its JDA. The second
agency was the JDA’s Office of Ballistic Missile Defense Research (BMDR), created in April 1995 to assess,
in partnership with the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and DoD’s Pacific Command in
Hawaii, the threat from North Korea’s Nodong-1 missile. The third organization was the Study Group on
the Defense Technology Base, established in August 2000 by the JDA and Japan’s Ministry of Economy,
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Japan’s BMD will result in increased conflictual North Korean
behavior toward Japan. Generally, one would expect Japan’s BMD to create both
cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, consistent with the
wide range of arguments presented in the missile defense-deterrence literature. BMD
does not provide Japan a “solution” to all negative, conflictual North Korean behavior.
More specifically, however, one would expect a higher level of negative, conflictual
interaction between North Korea and Japan given their history of conflict, Japanese
domination during the imperial period, and Japan’s support for U.S. forces in the region
especially during the bloody Korean War. Further, as North Korea developed ballistic
missiles and used these as primary instruments of their strategy of coercion, one would
expect Japan’s decision to research, development, and then acquire and deploy BMD to
significantly degrade the North Korea-Japan relationship, undermining deterrence. Given
these expectations, it is hypothesized that the North Korea-Japan relationship would
reflect a steady decline in cooperative relations and behavior. It is further hypothesized
that Japan’s BMD would amplify the otherwise conflictual North Korea-Japan
relationship, making interaction worse over time, especially when BMD became
operationally deployed.
Hypothesis 2: The dominance of the U.S. over Japan will significantly affect
North Korean behavior toward Japan. One might also expect a strong, even
overpowering effect of U.S. interaction with North Korea, since the U.S. retained an
essentially dominant position in its relationship with its ally, Japan, during the period of
Trade and Industry (METI). This agency, while not designed to address BMD issues, evaluated costs of
BMD system components such as electronics and communications capabilities (Swaine, Swanger, &
Kawakami, 2001); pages 32-3.
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the dissertation’s research. As Japan’s principal ally, and enemy of North Korea, one
would expect the U.S. to try to protect Japan through positive reciprocity with North
Korea or reducing conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan through pressure. As
such, it is expected that across the stages of Japan’s BMD program conflictual U.S.
behavior toward North Korea would increase North Korean conflictual behavior toward
Japan, undermining deterrence; and cooperative U.S. behavior to increase the cooperative
North Korean behavior toward Japan, strengthening deterrence.
Hypothesis 3: The dominance of China over North Korea will significantly affect
North Korean behavior toward Japan. As North Korea’s principal ally, one would expect
China to protect North Korea in some ways, though not at the expense of China’s own
security interests including those interests vis-à-vis Japan where China may view itself
disadvantaged by a stronger, more militant Japan. Therefore, it is expected that China
would employ more cooperative behavior toward North Korea as its ally and, as a strong
ally, would increase North Korean cooperative behavior toward Japan, strengthening or
not undermining deterrence.
Design and Data
The regression and other statistical analyses were performed using the gretl
software package, available online (Cottrell & Lucchetti, 2012). This software interfaces
with a variety of data spreadsheets including Microsoft Excel—the format in which the
dissertation’s database was constructed. All regression analyses and related statistical
tests, such as tests for serial correlation, for example, were conducted using gretl
software.
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Two dependent variables are used: one for positive, cooperative North Korean
behavior toward Japan and one for negative, conflictual North Korean behavior toward
Japan. The models used for cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior include
the same independent variables and are organized the same way.
Dataset Description
The dataset was provided by Dr. Doug Bond and Virtual Research Associates,
Inc. (VRA®). The dataset was titled “Events Data 1990-2011.”542 Data were gathered
through automated software capabilities and derived from either Reuters or AFP (Agence
France-Presse) news sources. Data were provided in Microsoft Excel spreadsheet form in
three basic sets of information: monadic; dyadic; and, BMD terms. The first set of data
was monadic and addressed a wide variety of information pertaining to a set list of states,
one state at a time. The state-month, therefore, was the unit of analysis. Monthly data
were collected from news reports scanned using VRA software for the period 1/1/1990
through 12/31/2011 (22 years). Aggregates for each month (by each state) were compiled
for IDEA event form codes 1-22, inclusive. These codes include both cooperative (cue
categories 1 to 10) and conflictual (cue categories 11 to 22) events. The dataset also
included data for subcategories, monthly averages, and cumulative scores (totaling 72
different categories). The geographic scope of the monadic data included 10 countries:
Australia, China, Iran, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Syria, and the

542

The dataset was derived using VRA® Reader v. 3.11.0., a proprietary software capability used to search
large amounts of digital news reporting. Further information on the company is found at
http://www.vranet.com. Further information on the dataset and its description can be found in Chapter
Four: Research Design.
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United States. A total of 2,640 monthly records were provided across the 72 different
categories in the monadic data (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).543

The second set of data was dyadic, where the unit of analysis was monthly dyadic
scores for cooperative and conflictual behavior between two states. A sample of dyadic
data from the dataset is seen in Figure 3. Data were also collected from 1/1/1990 through
12/31/2011 (22 years) and included the same 10 countries as monadic data. Dyadic data
reflect directional behavior from one of the 10 states toward another of the 10 states.
Directional data include a numeric count of events and a cumulative score for each month
(on the Goldstein scale); the numeric counts and cumulative scores provide both
cooperative and conflictual directional behavior. These types of data are recorded for
each state against the other nine states. Unlike the monadic data, with 72 different
categories and subcategories, dyadic data included eight categories for each entry: the
name of the source state (SrcName); the name of the target state, or state-level object of
the source-state’s behavior (TgtName); the year of the entry (Year); the month of entry
543

See the worksheets labeled “Monad Notes” and “Monadic Monthlies.”
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(Month); the Goldstein Positive Case numeric count (GPCount); the Goldstein Positive
Cumulative weighted score (GPCum); the Goldstein Negative Case numeric count
(GNCount); and, the Goldstein Negative Cumulative weighted score (GNCum). The
weighted sums accentuate high intensity actions (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).544 The
Goldstein scale was developed to provide placement of international events that were
categorized by Charles McClelland in the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) onto a
negative/conflictual-positive/cooperation scale. This scale has a numeric value range
from -10.0 (conflictual interaction bordering/starting war) to +8.3 (cooperative
interaction associated with close partnerships or alliances). While the WEIS categories
provided a meaningful “ladder” of international dyadic interaction, the Goldstein scale
adds intensity weights that capture the direction and levels of interaction more
appropriately and with greater utility in making comparisons (Goldstein, 1992).545 A
summary of Goldstein’s application of weights to WEIS events is provided in Table 8
below.
The third set of data provided in the VRA dataset was accumulations of specific
news reports that searched out specific terms in the Japan-North Korea dyadic
relationship in order to ensure all reports dealing with Japan’s BMD were accounted for
and to provide a summary of the contents of the news reports themselves.546 Since the
methodology used by VRA to identify reports of dyadic significance used the scanning of
544

See the worksheets labeled “Dyad Notes” and “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).” Some months had no
data as there were no reports in those months for this dyad. In these cases, to facilitate regression
analysis, new worksheets were created by copying the dyadic sheet and manually adding months to the
data. A zero (0) was added to any monthly record created having no original data. Thus, a complete timeseries set of data was available with all months represented across the 22-year dataset period—a
prerequisite for meaningful regression analyses. Figure 3 reflects the original dataset plus some months
with 0s added to complete the year.
545
See pages 376-7. See McClelland (1999) for the original 1978 article describing WEIS.
546
The full contents of the news reports are proprietary; only summaries of key articles could be provided.
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only the first two sentences of all available reports, it was possible some data containing
largely BMD-specific references were omitted if that term was not used in the first two
sentences of the report. Therefore, a supplemental data search was conducted to avoid
this gap. These data were then used to create the “BMD Terms” independent variable
(described below) and aid in the analysis of the regression modeling results. Reports
identified an identity tag for the news report, the date of the report, and a summary of the
news item. One worksheet (“JPN>PRK”) captured the dates and summaries of BMDrelated articles in context of the overall Japan-toward-North Korea dyadic relationship
using key terms related to Japan’s BMD program provided by the author.547 These data
yielded 479 total records across the 22-year scope of the dataset. The second worksheet
(“PRK>JPN”) captured dates and summaries of ballistic missile-related articles within
the North Korea-toward-Japan dyadic relationship using key terms related to North
Korea’s ballistic missile program provided by the author. These data yielded 244 total
records across the 22-year dataset.548
Variable Descriptions

547

The list of terms requested by the author for use in the VRA supplemental data search included: IMD,
TMD, GPALS, Global Protection System, Patriot, PAC-2, PAC-3, ERINT, THAAD, Standard Missile, SM I, SM
II, SM1, SM2, SM3, SM-1, SM-2, SM-3, MEADS, Navy Theater Wide, Navy Area Defense, Interceptor, Aegis,
and AWS. This list was reduced since some terms did not reveal results in the specific Japan-toward-North
Korea dyadic reporting, or terms were generating considerable false reports. The following terms used in
the search by VRA for BMD articles in the Japan>North Korea dyad generated accurate reporting results:
using the term missile “or” rocket “and” one of the following—GPALS, Patriot, PAC, ERINT, THAAD, SM,
MEADS, Aegis, LEAP, BADGE, Hawk, and AWS. This type of search would have accounted for various forms
of PAC missiles (i.e., PAC-2, PAC-3, SM-2) and removed false reports of “PAC” or “SM” that had nothing to
do with BMD.
548
The list of terms requested by the author for use in the VRA supplemental data search included: Scud,
Nodong, Paektusan, Hwasong, Musudan, Missile, Rocket, Weapons of mass destruction, WMD, Deterrent,
Deterrence, KN-02, TD-1, TPD 1, TD-2, TPD 2, Taepodong, Taepo-dong, Taepo Dong, SS-N-6, Hawsong, No
Dong, Ro Dong, and Rodong. This list was modified to remove terms reflecting broader common usage
(i.e., “deterrence”) and terms without dyadic results. The North Korea>Japan ballistic missile-related
dataset was not used in statistical analysis as the focus of the research was upon correlation of Japan’s
BMD to all North Korean behavior.
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Dependent Variables: North Korean Cooperative and Conflictual Behavior toward Japan.
There are two dependent variables in the models: one for positive, cooperative
North Korean behavior toward Japan, and one for negative, conflictual North Korean
behavior toward Japan. This recognizes that a capability or an action associated with
deterrence, such as Japan’s BMD, can be correlated with more than a military or
aggressive North Korean response. Rather, North Korea can respond in a variety of
military, political, and economic ways and across a spectrum of positive and negative
behavior. For this reason, the dataset provided by VRA was chosen: it provides data
separation between cooperative and conflictual dyadic behavior toward Japan, and can
give some measure of ordinal strength to the behavior by using a weighting system. Thus,
North Korean behavior toward Japan is broken out in the regression models based upon
positive, cooperative behavior or negative, conflictual behavior toward Japan.
While there is interaction between North Korea and Japan reported in most
months of the 22-year dataset, some months have many more reports than others. In
September, 2002, for example, there were 22 positive data records of North Korean
interaction toward Japan though, on average, there were only about two such cooperative
reports per month. Across the 22-year dataset, there were 443 news reports indicating
cooperative North Korean behavior toward Japan and 308 negative reports.549 More
important than the number of monthly reports, however, are the strength or intensity of
any single report and the cumulative strength of reports each month. Using the
September, 2002 example, these reports reflect a cumulative weighted positive score of
91.3; the average positive cumulative score was 5.1 per month. For comparative
examples, a +5.1 on the Goldstein scale represents providing another actor policy or
549

See the worksheet “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).”
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material support; a smaller level, such as a +2.0, indicates an apology; whereas a higher
level, such as +7.4, reflects extending another actor economic aid (see Table 8). Such
ordinal weighting allows relative comparisons among data and results, and offers some
insight into the energy behind the positive interaction. The average positive value of each
monthly datum in September, 2002, for example, is 4.15 on the Goldstein scale,
indicating very positive interaction since zero (0) equals neutral interaction and 8.3
represents the maximum possible positive interaction. In the end, a deterrence strategy is
an intentional activity to influence an opponent’s security calculus, decisions and,
ultimately, his reciprocal behavior—Japan’s BMD is no exception. Therefore, North
Korea’s behavior toward Japan is the best choice for dependent variable. Data for these
behavioral variables come from the VRA-provided database (Events Data 1990-2011,
2012).550
Independent Variables.
Positive & Negative Japanese Behavior toward North Korea
The positive and negative Japanese behavior variables reflect the in-depth dyadic
behavioral interaction from Japan toward North Korea. Japanese behavior reflects both a
“positive” and “negative” variable, representing Japan’s cooperative and conflictual
behavior toward North Korea. For example, the variable of Japanese cooperative
behavior toward North Korea is labeled “Positive J>NK” while conflictual behavior is
labeled “Negative J>NK.” As with the dependent variable, the Japanese behavioral
variables reflect the cumulative monthly intensity of all interactions that month. For
comparison with North Korean behavior toward Japan, across the 22-year dataset there
were 713 news reports indicating cooperative Japanese behavior toward North Korea and
550

See the worksheet “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).”
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468 negative reports.551 Including both components of Japan’s interaction with North
Korea in a single regression model accounts for the fact that one component (positive or
negative) of an actor’s behavior toward another state does not occur, nor is it interpreted
by an opponent, in isolation of the other component. Since the dependent

variable is a reflection of North Korea’s cooperative and conflictual behavior toward
Japan, models addressing aspects of Japanese influence with North Korea (i.e., Japan’s
BMD program) ideally include Japan’s cooperative and conflictual behavior toward
North Korea in order to capture the best balanced dyadic interaction across the models.
Including these variables is an essential step in providing a statistical foundation upon
which to add the BMD-related variables of Japan’s interaction with North Korea. As with

551

See the worksheet “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).”
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the dependent variable, data for these behavioral variables come from the VRA-provided
database (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).552
BMD Terms
This variable stems from the dissertation’s dataset, which includes a supplemental
data search of Japanese behavior toward North Korea during the 22-year period, but with
an exclusive set of BMD-related terms found within the research for other chapters of the
dissertation, including the strategic profile, historical development, and missile defensedeterrence literature review. The months in which these terms appeared in the data across
the 22-year dataset were tagged to create a dichotomous independent variable to
complement the two Japanese behavioral variables that reflected cooperative or
conflictual behavior toward North Korea. The purpose of the supplemental data search
was to ensure that all Japanese BMD activity in the data was captured within the
statistical analyses.553
The “BMD Terms” variable does not reflect positive or negative behavioral
direction nor the cumulative weighting on the Goldstein scale, as the dyadic cooperativeconflictual behavioral variables do. However, like the “Positive J>NK” and “Negative
J>NK” variables, the “BMD Terms” variable does reflect behavior from Japan toward
North Korea, only that behavior that makes specific reference to Japan’s BMD program,
components, or use. For this reason, it is added into the model with the two Japanese
behavioral dyadic variables that are specified as Japan-toward-North Korea directional
behavioral variables.
Taepodong-1

552
553

See the worksheet “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).”
See the description of the dataset above for more details.
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There are four dichotomous independent variables that reflect the emergence of
Japan’s BMD program over time.554 This set of variables is applied to all but Model 1 in
each of the positive (Table 3) and negative (Table 4) regression analyses and, with the +/Japanese behavioral variables, encompasses the entire period of the 22-year dataset.
Applying these variables to the other variables allows analytic comparison with other,
non-BMD-related independent variables. The “TD-1” variable represents the time period
of September, 1998 through November, 2003, and is coded one (1) for all months within
this period and zero (0) otherwise This period represents the period immediately
following the 31 August, 1998 TD-1 missile launch that overflew Japan, surprising Japan
and the U.S. in many ways and threatening Japan physically with debris or impact of a
missile failure. It also was a clear political threat to Japan as it responded September 21st
with reinvigorated discussions on BMD (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).555 Research
projects following the 1998 Taepodong-1 missile test included both internal and the
initiation of substantial cooperative projects with the United States. Internally, Japan
decided in October 1998 it needed to produce and deploy its own optical reconnaissance
satellites in response to public criticism that the Japanese slow response after the launch
was due, in part, to slow information-sharing from the United States. Indigenous satellites
would enable Japan to reduce dependence upon the U.S. for threat and missile tracking
data. Japan also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. in August
1999 for joint research and production of BMD components specifically relating to the
554

These variables are represented in the models by placing a 1 in those months represented by that
variable’s time period and a 0 in all other months. No variable was created for the baseline period as an
important feature of the modeling framework to avoid multicollinearity. See Lewis-Beck (1980), pages 678. During the “baseline” period (January, 1990 through August, 1998), Japan began regular “consultations
with the U.S. on BMD” in December, 1993, and in December, 1995 “commenced BMD study” including
“possible BMD architecture, cost estimation, other issues” (Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 2010). Page 6.
555
See the year group “1998.”
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Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block II interceptor missile (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami,
2001).556 The TD-1 period ends with Japan’s choices relating to acquisition and
deployment of its own BMD system.
Japan Decides
According to Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Japan’s leadership on 19
December, 2003 “…decided ‘On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and
Other Measures’ at the Security Council and the Cabinet Council today.” These decisions
included the near-term introduction in Japan of Aegis and PAC-3 BMD capabilities
(Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, 2003).557 This variable - “J Decides” is coded
as a one (1) from December, 2003 through February 2007, and zero (0) for remaining
months. Significant research, development, budgetary demands, improved command and
control architectures, and military planning occurred during the December 2003-February
2007 period. The July, 2006 multiple launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea
prompted Japan to “front-load” and expedite deployment of Aegis and/or PAC-3 systems
(Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007), the next variable intended to capture the
Japanese BMD process.558
Japan Deploys

556

Pages 34-5. This MOU obligated Japan only to prototype production of: the SM-3 nose cone; the
propulsion system of the SM-3’s second stage; the infrared seeker; and, the new kinetic warhead. Japan
decided in November 1998 to develop its first-ever satellite reconnaissance capability (two radar, two
electro-optical satellites) at a cost of around $2 billion, providing a technological basis for developing
space-based early warning systems if Japan chose to do so (see pages 36-9). Japan’s space-based
reconnaissance satellites, having no infrared sensors, cannot detect enemy ballistic missile launches. They
are also multi-purpose systems under civilian, not military control, and are not formally linked to BMD
cooperation with the United States. In December, 1998 the Japan-US Cooperative Research Project was
approved by Japan’s Security Council and Cabinet (Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 2010); page 6.
557
See paragraph numbers 1 and 2.
558
Page 7.
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The first deployment of operational BMD occurred in Japan in March, 2007
(Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 2010).559 This marks the beginning of the “J Deploys”
variable (coded as a one [1]). By the time of the 2009 TD-2 missile test, Japan had a
portion of its BMD architecture operationally deployed, including PAC-3 land-based
interceptors and the Aegis naval vessels carrying SM-3 interceptors. As it is understood
that Japan’s BMD was a permanent deployment, this variable is coded as 1 through the
end of the dataset in December, 2011, and zero (0) for months prior to March 2007.
Taepodong-2
The final period of BMD dichotomous variables is the “TD-2” which represents
the first time Japan placed operational BMD assets on a ready alert status in preparation
to engage (shoot down) a North Korean ballistic missile. The modified TD-2 missile (also
referred to as an Unha-2) launched on 5 April, 2009, though North Korea had warned UN
civil aviation and maritime agencies of the impending launch and associated risks from
debris on 11 March. Japan indicated on 18 March it was preparing its BMD for the event
(Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).560 On March 27th, Japan’s Ministry of Defense, in
according with the Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy
Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects, issued the order to “destroy” the TD-2 if needed
(Order for Operation of the Self-Defense Forces Concerning Measures to Destroy
Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects, 2009). Aegis BMD assets with SM-3 missiles and
PAC-3 batteries were field-deployed and comprised a “BMD Joint Task Force.” While
BMD assets were deployed as early as March, 2007, this was the first overt
demonstration by Japan to use their BMD to shoot down another state’s ballistic missile,
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560

The PAC-3 deployed at Iruma Air Base, representing “Japan’s first interceptor in history.” See page 6.
See the year group “2009.”
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and represented a political and military departure, both in terms of political resolve and
military capability, from simply having BMD “available.” For these reasons, the
timeframe for Japan’s BMD from this event to the end of the dataset (December, 2011) is
isolated to capture this departure, and is coded as one (1); other months are coded as zero
(0).
Positive & Negative United States (U.S.), Chinese (PRC), and South Korean
(ROK) Behavior toward North Korea
The next three groups of variables represent detailed dyadic behavioral interaction
from three dominant actors with North Korea in Northeast Asia: the U.S.; South Korea;
and, China. Each actor has both a “positive” and “negative” variable, representing that
actor’s cooperative and conflictual behavior toward North Korea. For the U.S., for
example, the variable of cooperative behavior toward North Korea is labeled “Positive
US>NK” while conflictual behavior is labeled “Negative US>NK.” An identical
approach is taken for ROK and PRC variables. As with the dependent variable, the
behavioral variables of these three countries reflect the cumulative monthly intensity of
all interactions that month. For comparison with Japanese behavior toward North Korea
mentioned above, across the 22-year dataset there were: 2,097 news reports indicating
cooperative U.S. behavior toward North Korea and 1,376 conflictual reports; 661 positive
PRC toward North Korea and 246 negative; and, 1,404 positive ROK toward North
Korea and 930 negative.561 Including both components of an actor’s interaction with
North Korea in a single regression model is needed to account for the realities of dyadic
interaction. The idea with these variables is that each actor’s interaction with North Korea
may affect North Korea’s behavior toward Japan. These variables acknowledge those
561

See the worksheet “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).”
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dynamics and are intended as statistical controls to help isolate the effect of Japan’s
BMD. Data for these behavioral variables come from the VRA-provided database
(Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).562
The variable addressing the role or impact of U.S. cooperative and conflictual
behavior toward North Korea upon North Korea’s behavior toward Japan sought to
address whether the dominant position of the U.S. over Japan was correlated to how
North Korea interacted with Japan in light of the presence of its BMD. The U.S. variables
were included since the U.S. is Japan’s principal ally in the region and has been since
World War II. A dominant player in the region and leader of the Cold War strategy to
contain Communism by armed defense and conflict on the peninsula during the Korean
War, the U.S. remains a central actor in North Korean relations, including its behavior
toward U.S. allies in the region. China also influences North Korea as its closest ally.
Views differ on the strength of China’s influence over North Korean national security
decision-making, though most agree it exists. China also shares Japan as a common
historical enemy with North Korea. However, China’s emergence as a global power
creates periodic friction with North Korea as their regional—and at least on the part of
China—global, interests diverge. China would be expected to have the greatest
mollifying effect upon North Korea’s provocative activities. Finally, the ROK variables
acknowledge the cultural, political, and military proximity of the two Koreas on the
peninsula. ROK policies, such as the Sunshine policy of the late 1990s and early 2000s,
affect North Korean behavior, if but for a time. South Korea’s interaction with the North
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See the worksheet “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).”
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might affect North Korea’s behavior toward Japan given Japan’s security position as a
common ally of the United States.563
Political Rapprochement
Japan and North Korea conducted perhaps two meaningful periods of political
interaction that could be characterized as serious discussions that could have led to
normalization of relations. The first was in the early period of the dataset beginning with
the ending of the Cold War and North Korea’s loss of patronage from the defunct Soviet
Union. Though not as promising possibly as the second timeframe, this early timeframe
included a summit in Pyongyang with a legislative delegation from Japan’s LDP party, as
well as follow up discussions ending approximately November, 1992 when prospects for
overcoming differences and gaining national buy-in for normalization across Japan did
not materialize.
The second rapprochement period began in December, 1999 when diplomatic
talks began in earnest, including discussions in Japan on 9 December, 1999 of lifting all
sanctions against North Korea (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).564 Other meetings and
discussions occurred, but the highlight was clearly the historic summit between Prime
Minister Koizumi and KJI in Pyongyang on 17 September, 2002. But rapprochement
quickly faced the reality of old differences, and the prospects for normalization dipped:
on September 18th, Japanese press questioned North Korea’s sincerity; on September
22nd, Japan was contemplating demands upon North Korea for monetary compensation
for the abductees taken to the North in previous years; and, by 14 October, Japan’s prime
minister called North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens “unpardonable” (Events
563

For more information on the backgrounds of the dynamics and history of each of these actors in the
region, see Chapter Two: History and Chapters Five and Six (Strategic Profile Parts I and II).
564
See the year group “1999.”
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Data 1990-2011, 2012).565 There were both cooperative and conflictual activities that
occurred in the next one to two years, reaching another peak in May, 2004 with the
second Koizumi summit meeting. In July, 2004 it was reported talks may resume, but
talks broke down after that, effectively ending the prospects for any serious
rapprochement, at least for the time being. While there were other meetings and
discussions that followed, including meetings in 2006 and 2008, the abduction issue
proved a stubborn issue in Japanese politics, and North Korea’s coercive strategy had not
been abandoned, making 2004 possibly the last period when normalization was actually
within sight for the two parties.566
Political Parties
The role of political parties can also affect national security policies, activities,
budgets, and other behavior, including interaction with North Korea or U.S. allies. The
cluster of party-related variables includes: Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (“J LDP”);
the ROK Grand National Party (“ROK GNP”); and, the U.S. Grand Old Party (“US
GOP”). All three parties were generally described as conservative and often shared
common, sometimes hardline, security values and policies. For example, U.S. President
Bush and Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi expressed a common, hardline position on
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See the year group “2002.”
The number one (1) was placed in those months identified as part of the rapprochement period; all
other months were identified by a zero (0). While the first Koizumi summit with KJI was an historic event,
the second summit was essentially an effort to see if any way forward was possible in the near term.
While Figure 4 depicts a very high cumulative score for the month of Koizumi’s second summit with KJI
(May, 2004), the number of reports in that month is exceptionally high, helping to generate such a high
overall score. While a high cumulative score usually, and accurately, indicates high intensity, in this
particular case, the sheer volume of positive reports that month (64) portrayed perhaps more intensity
than what was really there: the average intensity of the reports that month is +2.54 on the Goldstein
scale, somewhat higher intensity then the average positive score for the 22-year dataset (+1.74), but not a
remarkably high average. Further, the North Korean volume and intensity was a third that of Japan’s,
indicating more modest North Korean expectations for the 2004 summit.
566
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North Korea at a summit on June 29, 2006 (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).567 Because
North Korea reacted differently to policy (e.g., favorably toward the ROK’s Sunshine
Policy of President Kim Dae-jung’s Democratic Party, which included an historic summit
meeting in Pyongyang), the role of political parties presenting a relatively common
security policy toward North Korea was appropriate.568
Analysis
General
Interpretation of the statistically significant coefficient estimates can be illustrated
by describing the interpretation of one of the independent variables. For example, in
Table 4, the variable “TD-2” reflects a coefficient estimate in Model 2 of -4.31 and an
indicator of “**” following the value. This value (-4.31**) denotes the direction of the
effect of the TD-2 variable on North Korean behavior, in this case (Table 4) negative
behavior. For this variable in Model 2, since the sign is a negative (-), and the coefficient
estimate in the regression equation is a multiplier for the independent variable, the
negative effect indicated (-4.31) upon conflictual North Korean behavior denotes a
positive direction. That is, “TD-2” lessens conflictual North Korean behavior toward
Japan. The “**” indicates statistical significance at the <.05 level.
Two tables summarize the results of the regression analyses and are arranged to
allow one to gauge the sensitivity of the coefficient estimates to different model
specifications. Table 3 provides results for positive, cooperative North Korean behavior
toward Japan; Table 4 lists the results for negative, conflictual North Korean behavior
toward Japan. The models are arranged in identical fashion in the two tables. Model 1
567

See the worksheet entitled “JPN>PRK.”
The number 1 was placed in those months identified as part of the period when each party was in
power; all other months were identified by a zero (0).
568
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includes the cooperative and conflictual Japanese behavior toward North Korea taken
from dyadic interaction provided in the 22-year database along with the "BMD Terms"
variable as it was closely associated with these two Japanese-to-North Korea variables.569
For Model 2, the variables dealing with various time periods of Japan’s development of
its BMD program were added. This provides the baseline from which to view the results
of other independent variables (Models 3, 4, and 5 capture the behavioral variables using
the dyadic data provided in the dissertation’s 22-year database; Model 6 considers the
periods of Japan-North Korea rapprochement interaction; and, Model 7 considers
political parties).570
Analysis of Independent Variables
Positive & Negative Japanese Behavior toward North Korea.
There exists a relatively strong correlation between Japanese cooperative behavior
toward North Korea and cooperative North Korean behavior in return (see Table 3). The
“Positive J>NK” variable was statistically significant in all of the positive models, with
nearly identical (though modest) positive coefficient estimates ranging from 0.48*** to
0.50*** across models. The stability of the coefficient values across models provides
569

This model was used as a starting point to illustrate the basic interaction between Japan and North
Korea and to provide comparison with the time-series BMD related variables in the subsequent model.
570
See Lewis-Beck’s description of dichotomous, ordinal, and nominal variables. Pages 66-7. The
“Rapprochement” variables are nominal dummy variables. As opposed to ordinal variables, such as
attitudes measured in some order of amount, these nominal variables have no particular order or ranking
within their data. In the case of rapprochement, these variables merely acknowledge time periods of
purposeful or intense political interaction between Japan and North Korea expressly aimed at furthering
the dialogue for political normalization of relations between the two states. The political party variables
(“J LDP,” “ROK GNP,” and “US GOP”) are also nominal dummy variables. As opposed to ordinal variables,
these nominal variables have no particular order or ranking within their data. In the case of political
parties, these variables capture the time periods when Japan’s LDP, South Korea’s GNP, and the U.S. GOP
parties were in power. These actors tend to incur more frequent and/or higher levels of conflictual North
Korean behavior toward them when these parties are in power, perhaps owing to their portrayals of
North Korea as a threat more than their political opponents do, or perhaps because of the easing of
economic interaction consistent with their political opponents (e.g., ROK’s “Sunshine Policy” during the
2000s while the GNP was not in power).

273

some additional confidence in the robustness of the estimates; that is, the other variables,
including specific BMD-related variables added to the core set of models, considered
across the models did not alter the coefficients of the Japanese behavioral variables.
Conflictual Japanese behavior did not statistically correlate to any increase in cooperative
North Korean behavior toward Japan, but this was expected.
On the other hand, both of the Japanese behavioral variables (reflecting Japan's
cooperative and conflictual behavior) toward North Korea were correlated with negative
North Korean behavior toward Japan (see Table 4). For example, Japan’s conflictual
behavior toward North Korea (“Negative J>NK”) was statistically significant in all
models and with slightly more effect than the Japanese behavior in the positive models
(Table 3). Coefficient estimates for conflictual Japanese behavior ranged from +0.33***
to +0.40*** across models. The positive sign indicates an increase in negative,
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, which is to be expected. Cooperative
Japanese behavior toward North Korea (“Positive J>NK”) was statistically significant in
all models. Coefficient estimates ranged from -0.12*** to -0.14*** across models. The
negative sign indicates a decrease in negative, conflictual North Korean behavior toward
Japan, which is also to be expected. The low coefficient values indicate conflictual
Japanese behavior may have resonated more with North Korea’s leadership than
cooperative behavior. Coefficient estimates were nearly identical for both variables in all
models. As with the Japanese behavioral variables in the positive models, the stability of
the coefficient values across these negative models provides some strength to their
estimates; that is, the other variables considered across the models, including specific
BMD-related variables added to the core set of models, did not alter the coefficients of
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the Japanese behavioral variables. The coefficient estimates for Japanese dyadic

behavioral variables, however, are both relatively low compared to two of the BMD
variables (discussed below). The “J Deploys” and “TD-2” variables were both
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statistically significant in all but one model with coefficients from 4.1 to 7.0 in absolute
values.
BMD Terms.
The BMD Terms variable was not statistically significant in any of the models in
either table reflecting cooperative or conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan.
The purpose of this variable was to supplement the cooperative and conflictual Japanese
behavioral variables above in the dyadic relationship with North Korea by highlighting
those months in the dyadic variables that specified BMD in the interaction from Japan
toward North Korea. For this reason, it was not expected to result in statistically
significant results in the regression analyses. Further, the relative stability of the
coefficient values across models (ranging from -1.40 to -2.20*) suggests the other
variables considered did not alter the coefficients of this variable.
Taepodong-1.
The TD-1 variable was statistically significant with cooperative North Korea
behavior toward Japan in several of the models where it was present (+2.49** in Model
2; +2.52** in Model 3; and, +2.39** in Model 5).571 Japan’s BMD activity in this period
followed the surprising 1998 TD-1 missile launch over Japan, creating alarm across
Japan, and possibly generating a reaction within Japan (including heavy BMD
commitments) that North Korea’s leadership did not anticipate. The positive effect of the
TD-1 variable in the regression models also corresponds to a period of intense
cooperative interaction between Japan and North Korea (see Figure 4) as, starting in
December, 1999 they met regularly and discussed normalization, culminating in a
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However, after further testing, Model 6 also indicated statistical significance. See “Multicollinearity”
below.
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summit meeting in Pyongyang in September, 2002, and a second summit in May, 2004
(Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).572 It is possible that Japan felt it was in a stronger
political position having made significant strides in BMD R&D and gained considerable
public and legislative backing. North Korea may have calculated that Japan’s BMD
undercut North Korea’s ballistic missile-backed strategy of coercion and that a period of
political “warming” may stifle support among Japan’s public and legislature for large
investments in BMD, ultimately helping North Korea achieve better outcomes from
Japan.573 Interestingly, the Sohae Satellite Launching Station began construction in 2001
(Sohae Satellite Launching Station, 2012),574 during the TD-1 period, as North Korea
was clearly looking for a way to test missiles in other direction; this facility was used to
launch long-range missiles in 2012 that flew in a southerly trajectory and did not fly over
Japan’s main island of Honshu which includes Tokyo. The positive effect of the TD-1
variable seems to support this period of high-level cooperative Japan-North Korea
political interaction and may have contributed to North Korea’s decision to seek an
alternative missile test facility. The effect of Japan’s BMD in the TD-1 period seems to
indicate that Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against North Korea.
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See the worksheet entitled “JPN>PRK.”
For example, North Korea provided advance notice to Japan of its anti-ship missile tests into the Sea of
Japan 24 February, 2003 (Nanto, 2003); page 25. Also, the early 2004 summit meeting may have been
North Korea’s last serious attempt to positively affect Japan’s decisions regarding BMD, though in the
months preceding the second summit Japan had already indicated decisions in going forward with BMD.
574
See paragraph one.
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However, other independent variables appear to affect the TD-1 variable in some
models. This does not appear in any of the negative models for the TD-1 variable (Table
4). In these models, the relative stability of the coefficient values across models (ranging
from -1.32 to -1.77) suggests the other variables considered across the models did not
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alter the coefficients of this variable. On the other hand, in the positive models (Table 3),
the statistical significance of the TD-1 variable was reduced: in two models (Models 4
and 7), the coefficients dropped below the <.05** p-value standard (though they
indicated p-values at the <.10* level); the third (Model 6) lost all statistical significance
(this was reversed in further testing).575 In Model 4, the additional independent variable
was cooperative and conflictual PRC behavior toward North Korea, with the “Positive
PRC>NK” variable statistically significant (+0.09**). This suggests the positive
influence of China upon North Korea contributed to the cooperative North Korean
behavior toward Japan. This effect is a very modest one, however, considering: the very
low (.09) coefficient for the PRC variable; and, the fact that the p-value for the TD-1
variable was .06—very close to making the statistically significant threshold. In Model 6,
the Rapprochement variables had a more noticeable effect upon the TD-1 variable
estimates, moving, for example, from 2.39** in Model 5 to 0.86 in Model 6. This could
be explained, in part, by the positive effect of the normalization talks in the early 2000s,
for example, but if this were the case one would expect the “Rapprochement 2000”
variable to have yielded a statistically significant coefficient. But this was not the case.
As already indicated, further testing suggests TD-1 is statistically significant in Model 6.
The rapprochement variables did not have any significant effect upon other variables.
The political parties variables (Model 7) also effected the TD-1 variable estimates (pvalue moved to .09) with the “US GOP” variable indicating a statistically significant
+2.03** coefficient. In this case, however, the Constant moved to a negative sign, the
only model having such a direction, possibly indicating greater U.S. interaction with
North Korea, though positive in direction, decreased the North’s cooperative behavior
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toward Japan. Since Model 7 contains the highest number of variables (11) it is possible
the number of variables also created some unreliable values among some coefficients.
Japan Decides.
On 19 December, 2003 Japan announced it was partnering with the U.S. in codevelopment of new, more capable BMD missile technologies (Events Data 1990-2011,
2012).576 Later it would decide to acquire and field its own BMD capabilities rather than
rely on the U.S. or others for defense of Japan against ballistic missiles. This was
especially important given the coercive, pressuring nature of the North Korean ballistic
missile activity in the past. Japan was not only worried about wartime contingencies with
North Korean ballistic missiles possibly armed with WMD; it needed to field a direct
counter to the North’s strategy of coercion against Japan in general deterrence, subconflict scenarios. The coefficient values across models were not significantly affected
(i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) suggests the other variables
considered across the models did not alter the coefficients of this variable.
While the “J Decides” variable did not produce statistically significant coefficient
estimates in any model, during this period positive talks between Japan and North Korea
occurred again with Prime Minister Koizumi’s summit with KJI in Pyongyang on 5 May,
2004 (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).577 This meeting achieved by far the highest
cumulative score of cooperative interaction by Japan toward North Korea in any single
month in the 22-year dataset, occurring just five months after Japan made formal
commitments to go beyond BMD R&D efforts. In fact, this was the highest scored month
on either the positive or negative scale in the entire dataset (see Figure 4). Positive talks
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continued in February, 2006 (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).578 As Japan began to
assemble BMD components late in this period, North Korean behavior turned conflictual:
on July 4 and 5, 2006, it test launched seven ballistic missiles, including a Nodong,
several Scuds, and a TD-2 which failed one minute into powered flight; and, on October
9, 2006 North Korea carried out its first test of a nuclear device (Events Data 1990-2011,
2012).579 The North Korean ballistic missile launches occurred prior to Japan fielding any
operational BMD systems capable of shooting down North Korean ballistic missiles.
North Korea may have calculated it was better positioned to conduct such missile tests
prior to Japan’s BMD deployment. Either way, it seems that the relative proximate
timing of the North Korean multiple-salvo ballistic missile tests with the nuclear test was
intended to be understood as parts of a single whole: North Korea could threaten its
neighbors with WMD-armed ballistic missiles.
Japan Deploys.
Japan fielded its first operational BMD capability in March, 2007. Perhaps not
coincidentally, that same month the political dialogue between Japan and North Korea
once again stalled over the abduction issue and failure to resolve core issues between the
two parties (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).580 Further, and not surprisingly, the “J
Deploys” variable did not prove statistically significant with North Korea’s cooperative
behavior toward Japan (see Table 3); that is, it did not yield any measurable improvement
in the Japan-North Korea relationship. This variable did, however, prove statistically
significant in all of the models addressing negative North Korean behavior toward Japan
(ranging from +4.19** in Model 4 to +5.29** in Model 7). The positive coefficient sign
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suggests the new deployment of Japan’s BMD systems was correlated with increased
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan—Japan’s BMD undermined deterrence
against North Korea. If North Korea’s coercion strategy is in fact undergirded by its
ballistic missile force, it appears its leaders were frustrated if not angry by the actual
operational deployment of a reliable countermeasure. Their behavior toward Japan
reflected such sentiments. Further, the coefficient values across models were relatively
stable (ranging from 1.62 to 2.45 in Table 3 and 4.19** to 5.29** in Table 4) suggesting
the other variables considered across the models did not alter the coefficients of this
variable.
Taepodong-2.
As mentioned above, Japan expedited BMD deployment, a decision that may
have contributed to a negative correlation. With the Sohae facility in western North
Korea not yet complete (Kimball & Davenport, 2013),581 and part of Japan’s BMD
capability operationally deployed, it is possible North Korea’s frustration with its new
position vis-à-vis Japan coupled with an enduring need to demonstrate its resolve, led KJI
to modify his decision calculus in several ways concerning the next two North Korean
ballistic missile tests. First, rather than launch a long-range ballistic missile over Japan as
it had done in 1998, North Korea opted to launch shorter-range missiles again in April
and May, 2008 (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).582 Perhaps surprisingly, these events
hardly registered for either state in the dyadic Japanese or North Korean conflictual
behavioral interaction captured in the database (see Figure 4). Prepared to defend itself
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with BMD if necessary, Japan did not appear to be flustered by ballistic missile launches,
especially short-range missiles. The lack of Japanese reaction is noteworthy.
More interestingly, however, the second way KJI may have changed his decision
calculus regarding ballistic missile use under general deterrence conditions occurred
during the next and last period of Japanese BMD development (“TD-2”). This BMD
variable was not statistically significant in the positive models (Table 3) but was in all of
the models analyzing conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan except Model 4.
Coefficients ranged from -4.19** in Model 6 to -7.06** in Model 7; the coefficient was 3.70* for Model 4. The coefficient values across positive models were not significantly
affected (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) which suggests the other
variables considered across those models did not alter the coefficients of this variable in
the positive models. The coefficient values across negative models were not significantly
affected (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) with the exception of Model
4, suggesting the other variables considered across the models did not alter the
coefficients of this variable except in Model 4. In this case, variables reflecting Chinese
behavior toward North Korea affected the TD-2 variable (p-value changed to 0.08),
losing its statistical significance at the <.05** level. Neither of the PRC behavioral
variables, however, was statistically significant and did not significantly affect any other
variables. Unlike the positive (+) sign indicated in the “J Deploys” variable in the same
models discussed above, the negative (-) signs indicate a reduction in conflictual North
Korean behavior toward Japan. This suggests that, at least in this last period, Japan’s
BMD capabilities had a restraining, deterring, effect upon North Korean decision-making
and behavior.
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The change in North Korean behavior centers on the April, 2009 flight test of its
long-range TD-2 missile. It was clear North Korean behavior associated with this test was
markedly different as this test was carried out with different observable patterns. First,
the missile possibly flew a less threatening flight path, such as a higher altitude over
Japan and/or a more northerly trajectory over the northern most tip of Japan’s Honshu
Island away from densely-populated areas (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2009).583 Second,
North Korea announced the anticipated launch weeks in advance and with prenotifications to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), agencies of the United Nations (Kimball & Davenport,
2013).584 This was the first time North Korea had ever placed itself in compliance with
providing this type of information to UN agencies (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI),
2010).585 These changes not only complied with rules for air and naval safety purposes
(MacBurnie, 2006)586 but also quelled notions of North Korea surprise or ill-intent to
Japan and others. But on 18 March, 2009, nearly three weeks prior to the 5 April launch,
Japan gave orders to deploy its BMD and shoot down the TD-2 under certain
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circumstances. By 27 March, 2009 Japan’s BMD was ready to shoot (Events Data 19902011, 2012).587
While North Korea may not have known the exact conditions under which
Japan’s BMD would have engaged the TD-2, it was public knowledge of the BMD’s
preparedness and readiness. Thus, the ballistic missile activity of North Korean behavior
in this period was, in fact, more restrained than in previous actions, demonstrating a
consistent pattern of North Korean calculation and action with the correlation of “TD-2”
indicated in the regression models. The significant North Korean ballistic missile activity
in 2012 (past the cutoff for the dissertation’s dataset) was also consistent with this
analysis, if not more pronounced: multi-stage long-range missiles were launched on 13
April and 12 December, 2012 from the new Sohae facility, flying southerly trajectories
and avoiding Japan’s main island of Honshu (Sohae Satellite Launching Station,
2012).588 The December event was North Korea’s first successful attempt to place a
satellite into orbit. This could suggest North Korea was intent on avoiding engagement of
its missiles by Japan’s BMD simply by flying the missiles away from Japan and its BMD.
Unfortunately, North Korea also conducted its second nuclear test in the TD-2 period
(Events Data 1990-2011, 2012),589 though it did not reflect the level of negative
cumulative Japanese or North Korean behavior as did the TD-2 event (see Figure 4).
Positive & Negative United States (U.S.) Behavior toward North Korea.
Surprisingly, neither the cooperative nor the conflictual U.S. behavior toward
North Korea proved statistically significant in the positive or negative models of North
Korean behavior toward Japan. Though there is a significant volume of U.S. interaction
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with North Korea across the 22-year dataset (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012),590
coefficient estimates for U.S. behavior were negligible (for example, -0.003 for “Positive
US>NK” in Table 3). Neither was there any indication that these variables had much
effect (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) in altering the strength either
way of any of the BMD variables in the cooperative or conflictual models. If the U.S. and
Japan were always aligned in terms of policy and behavior, this would be even more
surprising; however, they often are not. For example, when President Bush characterized
North Korea as part of an “axis of evil,” Japan strongly differed (Events Data 1990-2011,
2012).591 Further, Japan held secret meetings with North Korea in the period leading up
to the 2002 summit meeting between KJI and Koizumi in Pyongyang.592 The U.S. was
purposely kept in the dark about these secret negotiations (Haruki, 2012).593
Positive & Negative Chinese (PRC) Behavior toward North Korea.
The role of China emerged in the model analyzing cooperative North Korean
behavior toward Japan (see Model 4, Table 3). The coefficient estimate was statistically
significant (+0.09**) for cooperative Chinese interaction toward North Korea (the
“Positive PRC>NK” variable). This positive coefficient for cooperative Chinese behavior
suggests that, in this model, China’s positive role tends to increase North Korea’s
cooperative interaction toward Japan. Perhaps China sought to alleviate pressure on
North Korea to antagonize their mutual historical rival Japan so that Japan did not
become more militaristic. This is to be expected in some regards since China is opposed
to Japan’s BMD generally, and because it could provide added protection from Chinese
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ballistic missile attack against Taiwan (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001).594 There
also exists economic competition between China and Japan, as well as territorial disputes
that include significant energy reserves. So, there seems to be ample support to explain
the statistically significant positive PRC behavior toward North Korea. However, the
coefficient estimate is very modest, suggesting a small effect on North Korean behavior
toward Japan. As described above, PRC behavior affected the statistical significance of
the TD-1 BMD variable in the positive model; all other BMD variables remained
unchanged (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) in the remaining models.
Positive & Negative South Korean (ROK) Behavior toward North Korea.
It was difficult to predict the effect of the ROK variables upon North Korean
behavior toward Japan since ROK and Japan have not had a close relationship despite
sharing a common ally (U.S.). But neither the cultural connections between South and
North, nor cooperative policies toward the North, such as the Sunshine policy had any
statistical significant effects upon North Korean behavior toward Japan in either model
(Table 3 or 4). It appears the dyadic interaction between the two Koreas may not
contribute to any North Korean behavior to Japan. ROK behavior did not have any
significant effect on any of the BMD variables (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical
significance) in any of the positive or negative models.
Political Rapprochement.
Despite the heightened cooperative interaction in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
the rapprochement variable that overlapped specific BMD-related periods
(“Rapprochement 2000”) did not have a statistically significant effect on cooperative
North Korean behavior. It did, however, work to decrease conflictual North Korean
594
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behavior toward Japan (-4.43**), as seen in Table 4 (Model 6). As described in the
discussion above (TD-1 variable), rapprochement appeared to affect the statistical
significance of the TD-1 BMD variable in the cooperative model (further tests indicate
TD-1 was statistically significant);595 all other BMD variables remained unchanged (i.e.,
neither lost nor gained statistical significance) in the remaining models. So, while it was
expected that the rapprochement dynamic would have an effect on North Korean
behavior, it was not known the direction (+/- sign) the behavior would take or its
intensity. In this case, the interesting result of the analyses is not the lack of additional
cooperative behavior (statistically) but the reduction of North Korean conflictual
behavior, suggesting it did more to mollify the North from its coercive strategy, at least to
some extent and for a period of time. The political rapprochement opportunities were
seriously set back, however, when Japanese domestic and governmental reactions to
North Korea’s admission to a wider array of Japanese abductions were negative (Events
Data 1990-2011, 2012).596 As with the 1998 TD-1 launch, this admission may have
represented another miscalculation by North Korea’s leadership in underestimating the
domestic sensitivities of these issues within Japan.
Further, between the two summits, North Korea in rapid succession displayed
significant conflictual behavior toward Japan and others: on 10 January, 2003 it
announced the state’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (commonly referred to as the NPT); in February, and again in March, 2003 it
conducted short-range ballistic missile tests, with the missiles impacting into the Sea of
Japan; and, on 19 March, 2003, North Korea’s leadership indicated the state may no
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longer adhere to a long-range ballistic missile test moratorium (Events Data 1990-2011,
2012).597 These were very troubling indicators for Japan, especially having experienced
over two years of cooperative interaction with North Korea. This period included a
positive note with the first round of the Six-Party Talks in late August, 2003 (Events Data
1990-2011, 2012),598 a political process in which Japan formally participated in order to
address the North Korean threat (especially its emerging nuclear weapons capability,
though the abduction issue was never far from Japan’s interests).
Political Parties.
The role of political party did not tend to make much of a difference. In fact, the
periods of rapprochement between Japan and North Korea occurred while Japan’s more
conservative party, the LDP, was in power. Though in power for many years, the LDP
was considered to be very cautious in terms of Japan’s national security interests. It is
possible that part of the drive for interaction with North Korea had more to do with Prime
Minister Koizumi’s personal approach, perhaps seeking a solution with North Korea at a
time when Japan’s ability to absorb the financial compensatory costs would be less
painful, or possibly even for reasons of personal image or legacy. The “US GOP”
variable’s coefficient estimate as statistically significant (+2.03**) is more difficult to
explain. It would appear to be anomalous to the other two political parties (which did not
prove statistically significant) as well as the cooperative U.S. dyadic behavior toward
North Korea (“Positive US>NK”) which one would expect to share results if either was
statistically significant. But these were not the case. It is possible that because the GOP
period overlapped Japan’s rapprochement activities in the 2000s some partnering
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between the U.S. and Japan in relations with North Korea help explain the statistical
significance. However, in comparing the U.S. and Japanese cooperative and conflictual
behavior toward North Korea during this period, it appears their interests occasionally
diverged. Also, as described in the discussion above (TD-1 variable), the political parties
affected the statistical significance of the TD-1 BMD variable in the cooperative model;
all other BMD variables remained unchanged (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical
significance) in the remaining models.
Tests and Diagnostics
All of the variables in both Table 3 and Table 4 assessed to be significant with
their respective coefficient estimates were supported with significance testing both
through proving statistically significant at the .05, two-tailed level and having t-ratios
above 2.0 in value.599 Further tests for autocorrelation and multicollinearity were also
conducted.
Autocorrelation.
Of the 14 regression models, all had Durban-Watson statistical values
approximately 2.0, the value used for identifying potential serial correlation
(autocorrelation). Autocorrelation problems within the dependent variable of the
regression models can arise, especially models using time-series data like the dissertation
database. The dependent variable may produce a lagging effect captured in other data
related to the dependent variable later in the data. Time-series models, therefore, can be
more susceptible to autocorrelation and distort analysis. Since about half of the models
had Durban-Watson values slightly less than 2.0 (ranging from 1.89 to 1.95), further
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testing was conducted to analyze serial correlation of the dependent variable in the
models. All but one of the models with Durban-Watson values less than 2.0 were within
the models analyzing positive North Korean behavior toward Japan—models which also
had higher R2 values than the models which analyzed conflictual North Korean behavior
toward Japan. The possibility existed that part of the explanation for higher R2 results for
the cooperative models was a serially correlated dependent variable emerging in the
regression analyses.

To test for autocorrelation one can either use Durban-Watson and “critical values”
comparative testing, or conduct separate, lagging-variable regression. For the
dissertation’s models used, the test for autocorrelation was done by using “critical
values” provided for Durban-Watson testing. Critical values are two figures which
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provide statistical indications whether serial correlation of the dependent variable may
exist. These testing values are derived using the sample size for time-series analysis and
the number of regressor variables used in each model. The sample size for this testing
was determined to be 264, which corresponded to the number of months (12 months X 22
years) in which data were provided in the database. The critical values used for the
Durbin-Watson statistical tests were obtained from within the gretl software, and also
cross-checked using formal critical values tables provided by Stanford University among
their statistical analysis online resources (Stanford University). One critical value is a
lower “dL” figure; the other is an upper “dU” figure. The regression model’s DurbanWatson statistical score is compared to the critical values: if the Durban-Watson score is
higher than the dU value, then no serial correlation is present; if it is below the dL figure,
then there exists a good possibility that serial correlation is present, warranting further
testing, such as inclusion of a lagged dependent variable; if the Durban-Watson score is
between the two critical values, then the results are not conclusive. The results are seen in
Table 5, reflecting no serial correlation of the dependent variable in any of the models.
Multicollinearity.
Tests were also conducted for multicollinearity for some models, where a high
correlation among independent variables was possible. In such cases, the overall models
are likely accurate, though the validity of the predictive power of statistically significant
independent variables may be reduced. The most common error that could create
conditions of multicollinearity is the improper use of dichotomous independent variables
for coverage of particular time periods in time-series analyses. In this case, dichotomous
variables are created that cover the entirety of the periods in the database sample size

292

(i.e., 264 months in the case of the dissertation’s database), thus creating a condition in
which no period is excluded for statistical comparison. Models 2 through 7 used in both
cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan (Tables 3 and 4) used
time-based dichotomous variables pertaining to key Japanese decision points or behavior
periods relating to their BMD program; however, all models excluded the period January,
1990, through August, 1998, of the database sample (a period of minimal Japanese BMD
related activity). This exclusion was purposely designed to avoid risks of
multicollinearity in the various regression model analyses. However, statistically
significant coefficient estimates resulted in model analyses for three dichotomous
independent variables, so further testing was done to address possible multicollinearity in
the models, especially those variables with significant coefficient estimates.
This further testing was done where models analyzing cooperative North Korean
behavior (Table 3) reflected consistently higher R2 values (though independent variable
coefficients were generally not significant), and models analyzing conflictual North
Korean behavior (Table 4) reflected significant independent variable coefficients that
were significant but in opposite directions (one positive, one negative). Both of these
conditions indicate possible multicollinearity among independent variables.
For example, multicollinearity could have been present in negative models where
the dichotomous variable dealing with the start of operational deployment of Japan’s
BMD system (“J Deploys”) consistently has a positive (+) and statistically significant
coefficient estimate while the variable indicating the period when for the first time Japan
actually fielded BMD prior, and in response, to North Korean preparations in early 2009
to launch a Taepodong missile (“TD-2”) consistently has a negative (-) and statistically
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significant coefficient estimate. As mentioned above, the variables did not wrongly
include time variables for the entire data sample, so further tests were conducted in gretl
for the statistically significant variables. In this case, gretl uses a Variance Inflation
Factors (VIF) test where dichotomous independent variable values >10.0 indicate a
collinearity problem. However, both the “J Deploys” and “TD-2” variables were well
below 10.0 (both scored 2.187), indicating no problem existed with these variables.
Secondly, this same test was conducted in gretl against the statistically significant
variables in the cooperative models. This test included the dyadic interaction variable
capturing cooperative Japanese behavior toward North Korea (“Positive J>NK”) and the
dichotomous variable representing Japan’s significant decisions regarding BMD research
and investment in late 1998 following North Korea’s Taepodong missile test that
surprisingly flew directly over Japan (“TD-1”). These two variables indicated very low
VIF scores of 1.015, indicating no problems of variable collinearity. Overall
multicollinearity testing was conducted also since the positive models achieved higher R2
values than the negative models (see Table 6). When testing was done with a much larger
model (adding five more variables including two more dichotomous variables),
individual VIF scores likewise remained low (ranging from 1.188 to 2.512) and well
below the 10.0 VIF values. Further, the two variables with statistically significant
coefficient estimates in this model scored very low (“Positive J>NK” scored 1.188, “TD1” scored 1.541). However, the cumulative VIF score for all variables combined in the
model was 11.916, exceeding the 10.0 VIF value. This, however, includes eight variables
(including Constant) and it is possible the large number of variables explains the higher
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overall VIF at the “model” level. As indicated in Tables 3 and 4, analysis was conducted
using a reduced set of independent variables to avoid the problem of VIF inflation.
A second test for multicollinearity was conducted in gretl through construction of
a correlation matrix of all 18 independent variables. This test included 153 variable
combinations; only three variable pairs indicated potential for multicollinearity. The three
combinations included: “TD-2” and “J Deploys;” “Rapprochement 2000” and “TD-1”
and, “LDP” and “TD-2.”600 The “TD-1” variable was the only one that had a significant
loss of statistical significance (Table 3, Model 6) among the three pairs identified in the
correlation matrix with potential multicollinearity (the “Deploy” and “TD-2” variables
showed consistent coefficient estimates across models in both Tables; no further analyses
were conducted).601 Further regression analysis was conducted to assess the effect upon
“TD-1” when the “Rapprochement 2000” variable was removed. In this case, “TD-1”
reflected a statistically significant coefficient estimate comparable to that of Models 2, 3,
and 5 in Table 3 (2.70** coefficient estimate; 2.27 t-ratio).
Table 6 provides an overview of R2 values for all models used for regression
analyses. The R2, or coefficient of determination, represents the proportion of variance in
the data explained by, or correlated with, a model. It provides an approximation of how
well a model fits the data and possibly predicts variance of the dependent variable using a
given model.
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Conclusions
The analyses above seem to indicate that Japan’s BMD created both cooperative
and conflictual North Korean behaviors toward Japan, consistent with the missile
defense-deterrence literature. For example, Japan’s BMD program during the TD-1
period had a positive effect upon North Korean cooperative behavior toward Japan,
suggesting Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against North Korea. Japan’s BMD,
when employed operationally during the TD-2 period reduced North Korean conflictual
behavior toward Japan, also suggesting Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against
North Korea. However, Japan’s BMD during the initial Japan Deploys period increased
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, indicating the initial deployment of
Japan’s BMD undermined deterrence against North Korea. Results, therefore, indicated
varied BMD deterrence effectiveness.
The hypothesis of increasingly conflictual interaction between North Korea and
Japan given their historical interaction, however, was not reflected in the analyses.
Significant cooperative interaction is revealed in the data and analysis and the patterns of
interaction do not appear to yield large swings of either reductions to cooperative North
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Korean behavior toward Japan or increases to conflictual North Korean behavior toward
Japan. BMD does not appear to be a contributor to any worsening of the Japan-North
Korea relationship generally. Japan’s BMD did, however, appear to be correlated with
favorable shifts in provocative and coercive North Korean behavior toward Japan with
ballistic missiles in the later (TD-2) period.
The hypothesis that a dominant U.S. would ultimately affect North Korean
behavior toward Japan did not appear to be supported by the analyses addressing the
cooperative and conflictual U.S. behavior toward North Korea. None of the models with
U.S. behavioral variables reflected statistical significance in affecting either cooperative
or conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, nor did they change any of Japan’s
BMD-related variables in any significant way.
Lastly, the hypothesis that China’s influence with North Korea would affect the
North’s behavior toward Japan seems to be supported with the analyses. This was
reflected most clearly with cooperative PRC behavior toward North Korea indicating an
increase in North Korea’s cooperative behavior toward Japan. Cooperative Chinese
action toward North Korea, possibly including inducements, predictably strengthened
North Korea’s cooperative interaction with Japan. Such an outcome would generally
support China’s strategic interests. China’s positive influence also appears to have
reduced the effect of Japan’s BMD in the TD-1 period.
Japan’s BMD
The period immediately following the historic 1998 Taepodong missile launch
over Japan was statistically significant, and in a positive direction. But while Japan's
BMD, other than the TD-1 variable, did not correlate in significant positive ways
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statistically, neither did BMD reflect a reduction in cooperative behavior (i.e., make the
positive relationship between the two worse). It is an important feature of any aspect of a
BMD program to correlate to an increase in cooperative behavior from an adversary. The
implication of Japan’s efforts with BMD in the TD-1 period is that Japan’s BMD
strengthened deterrence against North Korea. Further, given the expectations of
significant reductions in political relations, and the fact that one would expect bad
relations anyway due to their history, it could be noteworthy that the positive relations
did not deteriorate with the unfolding of Japan's BMD program over time.
The dyadic-interactive correlation with negative North Korean behavior toward
Japan (Table 4) also seemed to carry over into Japan's BMD in two ways: the "Deploys"
variable and the late-timeframe "TD-2" variable. The coefficients for these variables have
opposing directional signs (+/-). The TD-2 variable addresses the period when Japan not
only deployed BMD to intercept North Korean missiles in 2009, but also reflects changes
to North Korean missile testing patterns that were less provocative toward Japan. Since
"Deploy" occurred prior to the "TD-2" variable, it is possible "Deploy" did correlate to
early North Korean reactions to Japan's new BMD deployments and North Korea was
constrained from ballistic missile coercion against Japan by the time of the 2009 missile
flight test—Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against North Korea. This is
consistent with the "-" sign for the TD-2 coefficient, meaning Japan's BMD reduced
North Korea's conflictual behavior somewhat toward Japan.
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Within the “TD-1” variable’s timeframe, much of the political interaction
between Japan and North Korea regarding rapprochement took place (Figure 4), which
might have helped explain the cooperative interaction between the two states and the high
R2 for positive models generally. If this were true, then one would also expect the “J
Decides” variable to reflect positive correlation in the cooperative models, since positive
political events also occurred during this period, including the second summit in early
2004. However, the “J Decides” variable did not reflect statistical significance in any
models. Further, the number of BMD-related reports in the Japan-toward-North Korea
data (Table 7) was very high during the “TD-1” period, suggesting BMD was highly
operative even while separate rapprochement talks occurred.
It is also be possible that the statistically significant correlation of “J Deploys” to
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan (Table 4) across the models was
partially the result of other economic and political interaction. These include: the stalling
of Japan-North Korea bilateral talks in March, 2007; Japanese anger on 15 October, 2008
over U.S. removal of North Korea from its list of state-sponsors of terrorism; and,
Japan’s internal public debates in April, 2009 over adding new sanctions against North
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Korea (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).602 On the other hand, cooperative interactions also
occurred: resumption of talks between Japan and North Korea on 6 June, 2008; and,
several reports of Japan’s decision to lift some sanctions against North Korea in June,
2008. As a result, it appears unlikely these interactions explain the statistical correlation
of the “J Deploys” variable with conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan.
Additionally, while the number of reports with BMD terms in this period is lower than
the previous two BMD-related time periods (see Table 7), it should also be noted that the
overall number of cooperative and conflictual behavioral dyadic data from Japan toward
North Korea in their period also dropped by nearly 70% from the previous period (“J
Decides”).
Lastly, the “TD-2” variable, which was statistically significant in reducing
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan in five of six models, could also be
explained should there be other significant reductions in negative activity or significant
cooperative interactions during this period. However, there is no evidence of either types
of interaction in the data in this period. The TD-2 launch occurred on 5 April and North
Korea conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May, 2009. While Japan reacted publicly to
the TD-2 launch in a negative way, the number and intensity for the TD-2 and nuclear
tests were noticeably lower than previous events—about 80% lower than the 2006
multiple ballistic missile launches and first nuclear test. At the same time, however, the
number of BMD-related reports increased from the previous period (see Table 7).
Further, none of the other independent variables analyzed in the negative models, which
could offer some alternative explanation, had statistically significant coefficient estimates
(Table 4).
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Surprisingly, the role of the U.S. was not significant statistically in any of the
models. This was not expected due to the historically dominant role of the U.S. in
Northeast Asia regional affairs. However, it is also possible that greater autonomy on the
part of both North Korea and Japan played a role in weakening the potential impact of
U.S. behavior. For North Korea, autonomy describes its loss of tether from the Soviet
Union when the Cold War ended; its need to act independently—often against the
intentions of the international community; sometimes against the wishes of its closest
ally, China—in part explains its hardened positions, whether ideologically or militarily.
The North’s pursuit of an extensive ballistic missile capability, strengthened by a WMD
capability, has diminished somewhat the influence of the U.S. and others. Japan, too, has
become increasingly autonomous from the U.S., possibly explaining the gap in
statistically significant U.S. effect, at least in these BMD-related models.
In summary, some of the BMD variables were affected in some of the models by
the other independent variables: the TD-1 variable lost statistical significance in two603 of
six positive models (no statistical change in negative models); the Japan Decides variable
saw no statistical change in any of the models; likewise, the Japan Deploys variable saw
no statistical change in any of the models; and, the TD-2 variable lost statistical
significance in one conflictual model (no statistical change in cooperative models). So,
for the 48 total BMD-related models, 94% were not statistically affected (i.e., neither lost
nor gained statistical significance) by any of the other independent variables considered
in the cooperative and conflictual models. This suggests relative strength of the BMDrelated variables in the models considered.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS
In conducting the research concerning whether Japan’s BMD deterred North
Korean behavior, analytic results and insights were gleaned not only pertaining to the
primary question under consideration, but also pertaining to (1) the implications of the
Japan-North Korea deterrence relationship for the future; and (2) insights into deterrencerelated theoretic issues. Details of the BMD-specific findings, using the mixed-methods
approach, can be found in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis. However, considerable
qualitative data was also incorporated to understand those findings. Having provided
those analytic details in Chapter Seven, the emphasis in this chapter will be upon
potential challenges in Japan’s future security environment and revisiting a few of the
theoretic issues. Appendix 2 is also provided to further the theoretic discussion. It applies
the findings of the dissertation’s central question to the various missile defensedeterrence theoretic arguments identified in Chapter Three.604
Japan’s BMD: Effects & Motivations
The qualitative and quantitative analyses suggested Japan’s BMD influenced
North Korean cooperative and conflictual behavior toward Japan in some periods. None
of these analyses demonstrate decisively that Japan’s BMD caused change in North
Korean behavior, but suggest it is possible Japan’s BMD had deterrent effects in some
cases. Further, the level, or amount, or intensity of deterrent behavioral effects under
general deterrence conditions were most likely modest effects. However, even modest
effects could help in widening the difference between general deterrence and crisis in the
Japan-North Korea relationship. Deterrence effectiveness analysis, especially within
general deterrence conditions, can only meet modest expectations; it cannot prove an
604
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adversary was influenced by certain variables with certainty. This is problematic,
however, even in operationalizing failures to deter war unless the adversary leader
explains his calculus openly after the act; few do.605 Instead, deterrence analysis permits
inferences using, for example, the mixed-methods approach described in the dissertation.
These methods did, however, offer ways to approach deterrence analysis under general
deterrence conditions, in context of the Japan-North Korea regional relationship that is
often forgotten, and regarding a capability (BMD) that has deterrence effects that require
better understanding.
Throughout the BMD program’s development over time, the commitment, or
stake of Japan’s leadership progressed from an emphasis on the technical aspects of
effective BMD in the early TD-1 phase, to the commitment to be one of the world’s few
nations with a national BMD system in the Decide period, to the organization and
equipping of its military arm with operational BMD interceptors in the Deploy period
and, finally, to its political willingness to use its operational BMD system if needed
during the TD-2 event period. Each step along the way, each decision point, involved
political risk for Japan’s leaders, both domestically and in the region. However, if there
was any sort of a “peace dividend” in which Japan could share following the end of the
Cold War, that began to fade during the 1990s as North Korea showed itself to be a
continuing threat and it completely evaporated with the 1998 TD-1 launch over Japan. In
addition, Japan’s stake in providing for its own defense was shaped by other factors that
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solidified Japan’s strategic choices for a good, formidable BMD program as it considered
the totality of its security position.606
First, Japan has steadily grown more autonomous from the U.S. since the end of
the Cold War.607 The alliance with the U.S. remains, but Japan has become more
politically independent with regard to North Korea, in part due to Japan’s stronger
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Using various modeling techniques of various North Korean ballistic missile attack scenarios, Douglas
Diehl created a prioritized defended asset list (DAL). The criteria he used (including criticality,
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U.S. and allied targets based on “their obvious political or military significance.” He then applied various
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locations. Diehl’s most pressing insight was the value of secrecy in the deployment locations of BMD –
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1/10th of a missile “leaking” through the defensive network), or roughly a six-fold improvement over
similar attacks with missile defense locations transparent to the attacker (Diehl, 2004). See pages 20-4
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following the end of the Cold War, David Fouse argues friction between Japan and the U.S. in the postCold War era was a contributor to Japanese autonomy in its relations with North Korea. This friction
began as early as 1990 with the surprise “Three-Party Declaration” signed in Pyongyang on 28 September,
1990 among Japanese and North Korean legislative groups. The meetings were not a surprise, but calling
for diplomatic relations to be established, a Japanese apology to be issues, and plans for financial
compensation for 81 years of Japanese-caused sufferings upon the North Korean people were far more
than the Japanese executive had expected. This also surprised the U.S. and South Korean governments
who were particularly concerned over the level and timing of potential Japanese reparations—estimated
in the billions of dollars. More serious, Fouse argued, was the 1994 nuclear stand-off with North Korea
which included U.S. requests for basing access for military action being planned against North Korea, as
well as U.S. requests for Japanese armed participation in a proposed naval blockade. Japan was simply
unprepared for such a short-notice request upon its rather rigid postwar constitutional system and,
ultimately, could not support the U.S. contingency planning. Further, “diverging perceptions” regarding
the threat from North Korea, coupled with the 1998 TD-1 launch over Japan which strengthened public
support for greater Japanese regional activism, helped push Japan into greater autonomy (Fouse, 2004);
see pages 3-4 and 12. Greater Japanese autonomy does not infer independence from U.S. policy; it does,
however, suggest acceptance of increased responsibilities for its own defense and, perhaps, a measure of
Japanese pride. In addition, these disparities in Japan-U.S. policy and the resulting Japanese autonomy
relate the assumption in the dissertation that Japan’s relationship with North Korea, though certainly not
insulated from interaction with other regional actors, can and should be analyzed on its own bilateral
political merits, including the role of BMD as part of the security dimension of that overall political
relationship.
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position economically, as well as its improved military capabilities and willingness to use
them. Japanese apologies for decades-old imperial sins have increasingly been
complimented with incremental changes to Japan’s postwar pacifist constitution,
including changes with regard to its BMD program. Second, the overall threat from North
Korea and its ballistic missiles, potentially armed with WMD, has risen. This was
punctuated by the 1998 TD-1 flight over Japan, but other events, too. Third, Japan’s
confidence in the U.S. as its security sponsor and wartime guarantor has eroded. This was
most likely the result of repeated U.S. failures to deter North Korean development of
nuclear weapons, but also U.S. nuclear force reductions over the past two decades,
including tactical nuclear weapon removal from South Korean territory and deep cuts in
strategic nuclear weapons. Fourth, North Korean coercive strategies aimed at regional
actors, including Japan, are based upon North Korea’s ballistic missiles and exist below
the threshold of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees, creating a significant void for
Japanese security under general deterrence or sub-conflict conditions. Lastly, while the
“clear and present danger” in Japanese threat perceptions stem from North Korea, longerterm challenges are seen on the horizon with China. A clash is possible, sparked perhaps
by economic competition and disputes over energy-rich islands. Japan is well aware that
China’s ballistic missile capability is steadily growing in number, advanced technology,
and range. This security concern and others are addressed in the next section.
Outlook for the Future
North Korea
The near-term security concern for Japan continues to the threats from North
Korea and how those threats might evolve under a new leadership. North Korean strategy

306

changed since the end of the Cold War from one of confrontation over final victory of the
Korean War to one of deterrence and coercion to support long-term political goals. This
change was reflected in policy choices to place the massive conventional arm in a more
defensive posture, to decline and allow its benefit-denial deterrent effect, though still
formidable, also to diminish. As the conventional arm of the strategy of confrontation
declined the nuclear and ballistic missile arm grew in numbers with modest technological
growth as well. Still reflecting an overall deterrence posture, the role of ballistic missiles
in particular also served to replace confrontation with a coercive strategy to pressure
external actors, including Japan, to cooperate with North Korean wishes and, at the very
least, to respect its independence and sovereignty. It remains to be seen, however,
whether the North will remain on this path to buy time and hedge against political
uncertainties or pursue a divergent one.
On the peninsula, the conventional military balance of power is changing. The
ROK military is now the seventh largest in the world (the North’s is ranked sixth largest)
and is equipped with modern armaments, high technologies, and highly-trained and
educated personnel (Lee & Hamre, 2011).608 Further, South Korea announced the
creation of a missile defense command to address the North Korean ballistic missile
threat (Agence France-Presse, 2006).609 One conclusion might be that the North Korean
threats particularly to ROK through violent provocations in the past 2-3 years are due to
North Korean perceptions of declining value of their missiles to coerce and threaten ROK
in light of ROK’s decisions to pursue advanced BMD systems capable of engaging
shorter-range missiles. Such BMD, including Iron Dome-like systems employed by the
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Israelis, might be pushing North Korea to push with increasingly violent actions to
achieve political and military objectives before ROK can more effectively defend itself
against North Korean short and medium-range missiles. While the ballistic missile threat
to South Korea, given its proximity to the North—especially the South Korean capital of
Seoul—is different from Japan’s there may be lessons from the Japan-North Korea BMD
case applicable to South Korea, though this is perhaps a topic for future study.
Regime collapse in North Korea could occur with little warning, as has happened
in other states in modern history. To date, however, North Korea has defied the
projections of most who venture into future predictions. Victor Cha, for example, argued
10 years ago that North Korea was preoccupied with avoiding collapse, inferring even the
North Korean leaders knew collapse was at hand. Others, such as Andrew Scobell,
thought the North was more self-confident than that (Scobell, North Korea's Strategic
Intentions, 2005).610 Time appears to prove Scobell correct, which underscores the
resiliency of the North Korean leadership, the regime, and the state. Scobell built upon
his earlier position and, in his book on alternative futures of North Korea and prospects
for collapse, suggested that, while there have been significant external and internal
changes reflecting negative trends, others, more broadly, could be interpreted in a
positive way (from the North Korean perspective). These positive factors (from the
North’s perspectives), suggesting immediate collapse would not happen as some predict
(if not wish), included: priority upon diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with
various parties; economic reform efforts in 2002; military strengthening at the strategic
level, including ballistic missile and nuclear device tests; and positive demographic
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trends, including a rise in national life expectancy and population growth since 2003
(Scobell, Projecting Pyongyang: The Future of North Korea's Kim Jong Il Regime,
2008).611 These may have been interpreted by KJI as factors that tempered the other,
more “desperate” indicators (i.e., famine, military decline, and economic stagnation)
many analysts cite to infer KJI had all but lost control and the collapse of his regime in
North Korea imminent. KJI may simply not have viewed his circumstances that way.
Kim Jong-Un does not appear to be in fear of imminent regime collapse either and,
having presided over missile and nuclear tests already, the prospects seem unchanged
regarding North Korea and its overall strategy of coercion.
North Korean aberrant behavior and coercive use of ballistic missiles likely has
had many audiences: internally, there were the elites of society, the military, the
governmental organizations, and the people; externally, missile development and tests
were aimed at all regional actors and to a lesser extent the UN. This approach satisfied
many of the identity and cultural, internal and external environmental and personal
psychological factors of value to North Korean leader decision-making. However,
Japan’s sudden and significant press for BMD arguably affected KJI’s calculus, reflected
in political cooperative engagement with Japan, such as summits on rapprochement and,
later, changes in testing patterns, such as less threatening flight paths and construction of
an entirely new missile test launch facility to fire missiles away from Japan proper. To be
sure, North Korea could still satisfy many of his important decision-making factors
through the use of this alternative test facility—the U.S. and ROK are still endangered by
missile shots that skirt the western periphery of South Korean territory and U.S. forces
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located therein. Japan, however, is one important voice that is arguably in a different
position and receiving fundamentally different North Korean activities of ballistic
missile-supported coercion. It remains to be seen whether this North Korean strategy to
cooperate with or acquiesce to Japan will continue to be both politically stable and less
conflictual or violent, unlike more recent patterns of violence with South Korea.
Regardless, it is possible Japan, through its BMD program, has succeeded in its
deterrence strategy vis-à-vis North Korea in both a practical, operational way and in
terms of permitting it to addressing longer-term considerations: political settlement with
North Korea and adapting to the larger regional threat it faces with China.
Implications for Japan
General.
Japan’s security position is shaped by many factors and forces, such as domestic
politics and the strength of its economy. These are not uncommon considerations for
democracies. Externally, however, Japan’s position appears to be delicate, not only in
terms of its relationship with North Korea, but China as well. Certainly Japan’s
relationship with the U.S. will remain important for Japan and how it views national
security in the near-term and into the future. Japan’s cooperative activities in BMD have
strengthened its alliance with the U.S., for example. However, Hagstrom and Soderberg
argue U.S. power has shown weakness since the 1990s—namely in its activities with
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—undermining the assumption of U.S. dominance in
Northeast Asia to the point independent analysis of the Japan-North Korea relationship
was not possible (Hagstrom & Soderberg, 2006).612 Unless U.S. policy toward North
Korea moves significantly then the U.S. will matter much less in the North Korean
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calculus toward Japan. Victor Cha characterized it this way: "Strategic patience, strategic
coma, whatever it is called, has allowed North Korea to patiently develop nuclear and
missile programs” (Yonhap News Agency, 2013).613 More generally, Michael Mazarr
warns the recent and ongoing U.S. “pivot to Asia” could be “an unsustainable U.S.
regional position.” Instead, given the ongoing “post-primacy” position of the U.S.
globally, he advocates the U.S. readjust its regional priorities and commitments in order
to avoid triggering an inevitable “decline in perceived credibility of threats and promises”
(Mazarr, 2012).614 This illustrates the problem of expecting much, perhaps too much,
from the U.S. under general deterrence conditions. To partially compensate, Japan
appears to be strengthening its bilateral relations with key regional partners, including
Australia, India, and South Korea.615
The historical legacy of Japan’s imperial occupation of Korea, and sustained
distrust of Japan, persist and has political and significant security implications.
Politically, this was seen recently in South Korean sentiments, and politics; not just those
in North Korea. For example, an intelligence-sharing agreement, to be signed by leaders
of the two countries, was cancelled only minutes prior being signed due to South Korean
public outcry stemming from anti-Japanese sentiments over wartime treatment of
Koreans (Herman, 2012). But fear and distrust run both ways. Japanese fears look ahead
to the prospects of Korean unification. As Kaplan and Denmark maintain, Japan is well
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Korea, a prospect he suggests “inevitable” (Cossa, U.S.-Japan Relations: Building Toward a "Virtual
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aware of the deep historical sentiments across the region owing to its imperial legacy.
They submit, “Indeed, Japan could be a big loser if Korea were to reunify. It is the
prospect of a united Korean peninsula, as much as the growing might of China, which
could lead to a strengthened and normalized Japanese military” (Kaplan & Denmark,
2011).
Japan-North Korea Relations.
With its BMD, Japan experienced some success in deterring North Korea’s
coercive strategy against Japan that North Korea pursued through its underlying ballistic
missile capability. This was the case not only theoretically but in practical North Korean
behavior as well. What this essentially meant was that North Korean coercion toward
Japan—to gain some sort of benefit from Japan or pressure Japan toward some new
course of action—would need to rely upon some other instrument of coercion to be
effective. But under general deterrence conditions or periods of provocation, what
instrument could North Korea employ? Geographical distance favored use of ballistic
missiles; however, some alternative is required for Japan to bend. North Korea’s
conventional forces do not appear suited for this, although aggressive naval engagements
could provide a means to influence Japan. But this, too, may no longer be effective as
Japan’s anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare technologies and capabilities have
improved. Cyber warfare could also be effective in an asymmetric way to pressure
Japan.616
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What are the prospects for future Japan-North Korea relations? One conclusion
could be drawn simply by pointing to their long and divisive history. On the other hand,
the post-Cold War period has not proven as bad as it could have been for Japan.
Rapprochement still appears possible if conditions are right on both sides. But Japan’s
decision to acquire its own BMD in 2003 happened in the midst of a high level of
rapprochement activity—and between the only two executive summits between Koizumi
and KJI. If the climate for rapprochement worsened at the time of Japan’s decision to
acquire BMD, it rebounded in time for the second summit meeting in 2004. If the period
of the 2009 TD-2 launch and following offers insights for the future it could be a greater
North Korean willingness to refrain more from coercive activities against Japan and
negotiate with Japan as it did in the early 2000s. If Japan’s domestic political climate—
and KJU, as the new leader in North Korea—are equally amenable to normalization then
a period of cooperative interaction could follow. This would seem possible given the
events of late 2012 and 2013: Unha-3 SLV satellite launch and third nuclear test (North
Korea may feel it has demonstrated its strength with external audiences to increase the
prospects of getting a deal. For the Japan-North Korea relationship, this would mean
possibly a large monetary settlement with North Korea to compensate for Japan’s
imperial past. But should Japan seek mutual security guarantees of some sort, North
Korea’s willingness may require a broader settlement including formal conclusion of the
Korean War and inclusion of other wartime participants such as the U.S., ROK, China,
and Russia. Whether Japan can foster these conditions is questionable, increasing the
possibility North Korea could up the coercive pressure on Japan for at least the war
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reparations settlement. BMD will, under these conditions, most likely prove invaluable to
Japan to strengthen its position, strengthen deterrence, or defend itself if necessary.
One could ask what the implications for deterrence would be should North Korea
test launch another ballistic missile directly over Japan and its heavily populated areas
including Tokyo. Would this be considered a failure of deterrence and undercut the value
of Japan’s BMD? Yes, it would, at least partially, but it needs qualification and will
depend upon Japan’s response, including how it employs its BMD in that situation. A
North Korean launch in this manner is certainly more provocative than one flown south
from Sohae. Such a launch may occur in an attempt to coerce Japan in some way, so part
of the qualification is whether Japan chooses to use its BMD to shoot down the North
Korean missile and whether Japan capitulates in some measurable way to the North
Koreans. Engaging the missile would carry certain risks, including operational and
domestic political fallout in Japan should the BMD system fail to do its job. Should this
happen, North Korean resolve for future acts of coercion would be strengthened, not
weakened. Successful engagement, but even trying to engage the North’s missile, can
have positive implications, too, such as a Japanese match of resolve and increasing
confidence in future diplomatic negotiations or military activities beyond Japan’s shores.
It can also stem North Korean tendencies toward more or more dangerous future
provocations over the long term and reinstate a preferable norm of bilateral stability.
Conceptually, this alludes to the notion that how one defines deterrence, including what
constitutes success or failure, is highly dependent upon the situation and the perspectives
of the deterrer and the deterred. Existing narrow definitions, or clinging to those of the
past, are ultimately less helpful to deterrence policy and planning than acknowledging the
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realities of situation and perceptual nuance. This is particularly true of general deterrence
conditions as the Japan-North Korea case demonstrates. This does not mean, however,
that deterrence is unhelpful or unachievable, but only that one must manage expectations
of it. The tendency toward overly simplistic deterrence-centric policy leads to seemingly
obvious solutions which, in the case of deterrence, have a mixed track record and
unintended consequences.
Japan-China Relations.
While North Korea remains the near-term security concern for Japan, China is
emerging as not just an economic competitor but a military threat to Japan. According to
J. Michael Cole, Japan’s 2013 defense budget was predicated on five potential crisis or
wartime scenarios. More importantly, “three of five scenarios explored by the defense
ministry recently involve the Self-Defense Forces squaring off against the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA)” (Cole, 2013).617 The scenarios with China included the
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea and Chinese conflict with
Taiwan. Further, it is interesting to note that in China’s 2010 official defense paper more
references were made to Japan than the United States and Taiwan combined (Full text:
China's National Defense in 2010, 2011).618 These security issues not only have
implications for Japan’s BMD but how Japan’s thinking may be shaped regarding future
military capabilities.
Even as Japan began its BMD research and development in earnest in the late
1990s, China, O’Donogue argued, perceived Japanese missile defenses to be highly
destabilizing with respect to Taiwan. To China, the greatest threat is a legal or de facto
617

According to the report, J. Michael Cole is a Taipei-based journalist who focuses on military issues in
Northeast Asia and in the Taiwan Strait.
618
Japan was referenced 13 times, United States 6 times, and Taiwan 5 times.

315

“freeze” of the territorial status quo of Taiwan, a political situation that could deny China
its objective of reclaiming Taiwan. Since China’s primary instrument of coercion, like
that of North Korea, is its large numbers of offensive ballistic missiles, Japanese
partnership with Taiwan through the sale or transfer of BMD capabilities to Taiwan
would be viewed as destabilizing if not threatening to China as such a significant change
in the status quo could embolden Taiwan officials toward independence. Conflict
between China and Taiwan could, therefore, pull in Japan and possibly the United States.
Further, confidence in Taiwan could potentially trigger cascading effects in Tibet and
Xinjiang toward autonomy and threatening the Chinese Communist Party itself
(O'Donogue, 2000).619 Finally, China continues to develop a wide variety of BMD
countermeasures (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2013).620
The ballistic missile threat to Japan from China was not imminent just 6-7 years
ago (Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007).621 However, that has changed with
implications for the future. China retains a vast ballistic missile arsenal (over 1,000) used
for coercing Taiwan, but also possesses intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching
Japan (Twomey, 2011).622 With regard to the hundreds of Chinese ballistic missiles
facing Taiwan, “Military analysts fear that the Second Artillery could retarget the
missiles, putting Japan at risk, as well as America's Asian bases” (The Economist, 2010).
According to Japan’s 2012 annual defense report, China’s DF-21, DF-3, and DF-4 all
have sufficient range to threaten all or part of Japanese territory (Defense of Japan 2012,
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2012).623 According to the George C. Marshall Center, China has approximately 14-18
CSS-2 (DF-3) intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and 19-23 CSS-5 (DF-21)
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in its inventory “capable of striking Japan,”
though it was suggested these missiles were more likely “targeted principally against
Russian cities and military targets, to deter Russian interference in whatever China might
want to do in the Pacific Rim” (The Chinese Scenario, 2012).624 In addition to the
wartime threat from China, the general deterrence coercion threat from China, through
use of its ballistic missiles, is also present. The future security environment does not look
easier for Japan.
In 2012, the U.S. National Intelligence Council predicted that by 2030 a great
diffusion of power will have occurred, and a multipolar world will dominate. However, a
potential “game-changer” in their prediction was whether rapid shifts in global power
would spark more conflict (National Intelligence Council, 2012).625 The document
predicts China (and India) will rise high and rapidly, and both Japan and the U.S. will
decline in relative strength. Could Japan’s future be one of regional conflict, allied
perhaps with India and other Asian democracies against China? If so, Japan’s BMD, its
political and military posture in the next several years, and its relationship with the U.S.
and others will become increasingly pronounced elements in its national security.
Further, pressures to acquire offensive strike forces, including nuclear weapons and
means of delivery, may rise to address these challenges.
Potential Japanese Military Choices.
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Japan’s BMD provides it a capability to defend and deter North Korean ballistic
missile threats and related political coercion. This capability is particularly important in
day-to-day and crisis scenarios, including missile tests and small-scale missile attack
raids, short of general war and below the threshold of U.S. extended deterrence punitive
options. Japan’s BMD will also improve in the future with deployment of the new SM-3
missile around 2018 giving it advanced engagement capabilities including the potential to
engage enemy ballistic missiles early in the missiles powered flight “boost phase.” One
key advantage to boost-phase intercept is overcoming any countermeasures, such as
warhead decoys deployed on the enemy ballistic missile, since boost-phase intercept
destroys the missile before such countermeasures have a chance to deploy (later in flight),
thus making the prospects of successful intercept higher (Wilkening, Keeping National
Missile Defense in Perspective, 2001).626 This type of capability may also decrease the
challenge of defending against mobile ballistic missiles in North Korea. Japanese air and
naval forces, likewise, provide it defense and deterrence capacity against limited North
Korean attacks. For example, as part of Japan’s military upgrade, and with an eye on both
North Korea and China, it selected a purchase of 42 F-35 stealth fighters from the U.S., a
capability described by the Pentagon as a strategic conventional deterrent in the region
(Takenaka, 2011).
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Dean Wilkening is a leading U.S. physicist on BMD. See the section entitled, “Boost-phase alternatives.”
While being able to engage adversary ballistic missiles, including North Korean missiles, early in their
boost phase of flight has been the preferred, but lacking, option with BMD capabilities, the National
Research Council (NRC) suggests this could change with the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA, under codevelopment by the U.S. and Japan. In a response letter to questions from Congressmen Turner and
Sanchez, members of the NRC claimed boost-phase defense would be feasible in a scenario where a North
Korean ICBM was attacking Hawaii using “an SM-3 Block IIA equipped Aegis ship in the East Sea, provided
weapons release authority had been delegated” (Montague & Slocombe, 2012); page 5. According to the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the SM-3 Block IIA is scheduled for deployment in the year 2018 (Missile
Defense Agency, 2013); see the section, “International Efforts.”
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The one basic military capability Japan lacks, though its strategists and scholars
had discussed it, is the ability to provide indigenous punitive offensive forces that could
reach North Korea (and beyond), using either longer-range aircraft, naval assets, or
ballistic missiles. For example, one of the consequences from the 1998 TD-1 launch over
Japan was a formal call for science and technology research into developing an offensive
ballistic missile, with a range of several hundred kilometers, capable of attacking targets
including enemy ballistic missile sites ('Peace constitution?' Japan plans precision missile
program, 2004). In 2006, after the July North Korean ballistic missile tests, Japan’s Prime
Minister Abe suggested “there was need for debate on whether Japan should develop a
preemptive strike capability” (Hiyama, 2006). After North Korea’s 2009 TD-2 missile
test, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) defence policy committee said Japan should
develop the capability to launch a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if needed to
prevent a missile attack (Japan's LDP backs pre-emptive strike capability against North
Korea, 2009).627 While Japan does not possess an offensive ballistic missile capability,
some argue it is already significantly advanced toward that possibility. For example, the
Nuclear Threat Initiative reports Japan’s “space program includes a number of
technologies that could potentially be adapted to serve as long-range missiles” (Nuclear
Threat Initiative (NTI), 2013).628 Japan also gains ballistic missile technology from its
BMD expertise.
The prospects of Japan “going nuclear” do not seem to be high at the present. On
the one hand, according to Lars Abmann, a former Japanese Liberal Party leader told a
senior Chinese military official over 10 years ago that Japan could build upwards of
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This debate includes overcoming some hurdles for Japan’s pacifist constitution.
See the section entitled, “Missile.”
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4,000 nuclear warheads within months if a political decision was made to do so
(Abmann, 2007).629 But on the other hand, going nuclear would require a large nuclear
force to deter potential adversaries (North Korea, China, or Russia) and would also need
to be effectively hidden from enemy strike. Japan’s net security would, arguably, be
lower with nuclear weapons (Abmann, 2007).630 Some things could, however, change
Japan’s calculus. One way to consider how Japanese perceptions could change is to
consider the dynamics in play in the perceptions of Taiwanese and South Korean
calculations when they “rolled back” their fledgling nuclear weapons programs. This is
the analysis conducted by Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters. Their analysis indicated
the key decision-making perceptions revolved around three factors: their strategic
relationship with the U.S., internal domestic factors, and their perceptions of the security
environment and implications of security-related changes (Hersman & Peters, 2006).631
For Japan, such factors could work in reverse over time. For years, Japan has recognized
increasing threats, and its threat perceptions have diverged occasionally from those of the
United States. Further, U.S. credibility has declined in Japan’s perspective and U.S.
relative power polarity is also expected to decline. On the other hand, Japanese domestic
dynamics may support acceptance of greater political and military responsibilities for its
own security. These circumstances could combine to create the conditions under which
Japan becomes a nuclear weapons power. Possession of a robust BMD capability would
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complement offensive capabilities, but raise concerns in China and a greater Korea of
Japanese preemption.632
BMD, offensive ballistic missiles, capable strike aircraft, and the potential nuclear
capability Japan could foster, together provide Japan a hedging strategy to become a
more formidable offensive military power in the region to counter emerging dangers
stemming principally from China. Even without a nuclear weapons capability, an
indigenous capacity to deliver punitive, even possibly preemptive, conventional strikes
would give Japan significant options to deal with future scenarios.633 Development or
acquisition of such capabilities would be costly, however, and without question add
additional risk to Japan in crisis or conflict. For example, developing offensive strike
capabilities can create a spiral of negative reciprocity in which North Korea may respond
to Japan’s offensive capability option decision with more serious provocations, expanded
offensive and defensive capabilities against Japan, or both. It could even create
conditions in which North Korea could, with a large number of ballistic missiles, preempt
Japan’s actions, though such conditions are difficult to imagine. The security challenges
regarding China or Russia are also complex and the risks great. But, for Japan, the risks
of not developing offensive military power at some point may be greater.
Deterrence Theory
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Such fears are not new. Lawrence Gershwin, a senior official with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
argued the Soviet Union was heavily invested in strategic defenses with a view of enhancing war-fighting
capabilities through their defense and survival, ultimately improving chances not only of surviving a
nuclear war but prevailing. Their perception of military advantage, he believed, could “embolden” them
not only to take greater risk in crisis but to be more assertive or coercive with respect to foreign policy
objectives (Binnendijk, 1986). Pages 57-8.
633
Separately, Mitsuru Kurosawa argues conventional weapons precision and power are “strong enough”
to deter attacks and provide a more realistic response to attacks on U.S. allies, suggesting extended
deterrence is no longer viable (Ghoshroy & Neuneck, 2010); pages 316-21. What he does not discuss,
however, is whether Japan, under such circumstances, should develop its own conventionally-armed
offensive capabilities to combine with its BMD to produce an indigenous deterrence capacity he
advocates for the United States.
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According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “deterrence operations” are
defined as “integrated, systematic efforts to exercise decisive influence over adversaries’
decision-making calculus in peacetime, crisis, and war to achieve deterrence”
(Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, 2009).634 This is a statement that, on
first appearances, provides a concise, adversary-focused, influence-oriented, and
purposeful deterrence function. But this definition of deterrence is too narrow and fails to
delineate general deterrence differences. The conceptual idea of establishing causal
linkages from deterrent actions intended to be “decisive” in nature (Deterrence
Operations Joint Operating Concept, 2006) is also inappropriate—this is simply an
analytic bridge too far. Further, DoD’s efforts at elaborating the deterrence role of BMD,
particularly in general deterrence conditions, are lacking.635 An illustration of the
continuing challenge to understand the role of missile defenses in deterrence is the report
by senior Northrop Grumman analysts in a paper entitled “Deterrence and Defense in
‘The Second Nuclear Age.’” In the report’s executive summary alone, nine times
deterrence and defense were joined together but in all cases described as separate
concepts. Deterrence is later defined to mean nuclear deterrence exclusively, though the
authors recognized the nature of the threats, and how they might be deterred, were
different than during the Cold War. Defenses were relegated to simply helping protect
when deterrence fails, but were not recognized it seems for having deterrent value in
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Page 5.
For example, in the historical review of missile defenses in the United States done by DoD’s Missile
Defense Agency, the term “deterrence” appears only twice in the most recent 2008 report. The first is a
reference to the Safeguard system deployed under President Nixon to protect part of the nation’s landbased nuclear forces, though a very short time later relegated to “bargaining chip” and subsequent
deactivation as part of the ABM Treaty. The second reference was to the importance of missile defenses
in a strategic policy shift under President Reagan away from an offense-oriented MAD framework to one
that emphasized defenses (Kaplan, 2008); pages 11 and 13.
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themselves (Haffa, Hichkad, Johnson, & Pratt, 2009).636 Like many other reports, Cold
War era thinking was still present.637 From the broad ideas on deterrence, especially
traditional ideas on general and immediate deterrence, it can be concluded deterrencerelated activity of some sort and level is present to make deterrence operative—there
cannot be deterrence effects without activities conducted by one and interpreted by the
other. Further, deterrence activities need to be conceived and executed on a scale to be
perceived but not to inadvertently escalate or trigger the behavior being deterred. But the
traditional view of general deterrence falls short of this concept.
General Deterrence
The traditional views on general and immediate deterrence, such as that presented
by Huth and Russett, appear to be far too rigid if one is seeking to analyze and understand
dyadic behavioral interaction over time below the threshold of conflict (Huth & Russett,
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models, 1993).
In the traditional view, both actors are either in a general deterrence status or one actor
(i.e., the adversary) chooses to act belligerently and create a crisis that has the potential of
escalating to armed conflict. Because the two states have a history of conflict of some
sort, their adversarial relationship is presumed to rarely reflect significant or recurring
cooperative interaction. This traditional view is seen in the top half of Figure 4. Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita and others also focus attention in general deterrence writing in
adversary choices about going to war and kinetic cost-imposition activities (Bueno de
Mesquita, Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony, 1990). Further, the analysis
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See also: William Van Cleave, in Robert Pfaltzgraff’s edited volume (Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, 1996), page
100; renowned thinkers and practitioners placed BMD into the mix of military capabilities with deterrent
attributes (The Changing Nature of Ballistic Missile Defense, 2009); page 2.
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by Quackenbush did not explore behavioral interaction over time or the role of BMD
(Quackenbush, Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and Application, 2011). On
the other hand, Joshua Goldstein’s scaling of the various WEIS categories, captured in
the more modern IDEA framework utilized in the dissertation’s dataset, provided an
ordinal characterization of both cooperative and conflictual dyadic interaction across a
wider range of behavior that more accurately reflects the realities of dyads under general
deterrence conditions. This is seen in the bottom half of Figure 4. Using cooperative and
conflictual empirical data drawing upon this type of scale also reflects the range and
nuances of potential behavioral interaction suggested in the missile defense-deterrence
literature. This also permits general deterrence to be better understood with greater
fidelity of the gradients of behavior, including positive changes in adversary cooperative
behavior, using a more complete set of criteria for deterrence effectiveness assessment
under general deterrence conditions. The dissertation research of North Korean behavior
toward Japan as a general deterrence effect of Japan’s BMD program suggests general
deterrence could be expanded conceptually to incorporate this level of interaction,
particularly with a view toward aiding a deterrer establish, or reestablish as necessary,
norms of acceptable behavior in the dyadic relationship with deterree.

324

Tensions between General & Extended Deterrence
While strategies and actions taken in general deterrence conditions can influence
how an adversary may calculate under immediate deterrence conditions or conflict,
including scenarios involving a security guarantor like the U.S. providing extended
deterrence, the presumption that strategies and actions taken for the purposes of wartime
extended deterrence requirements influence general deterrence coercion and provocative
behavior is dispelled in the Japan-North Korea case. In context of this relationship, North
Korea might purposely increase conflictual behavior toward Japan without any intent on
escalating to conflict and with the capacity to draw back from brinkmanship as necessary.
This, in part, is why Japan’s BMD, for example, may have had as much effect upon
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North Korean behavior—Japan was not taking these actions simply to prepare for war;
rather, they were conducted first to address North Korean coercion under general
deterrence conditions. This might also explain why activities labeled overtly as
strengthening extended deterrence only receive strong reaction from the North: they
undermine North Korean stakes that are much higher than its coercion strategy—they
bring the U.S., possibly the only actor with the capacity (and history) of conducting
violent regime change—into the North Korean calculus.
The limits of the effectiveness of U.S. threats of nuclear retaliation against North
Korea can be seen in the North’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program—a program that
included fuel processing, testing of nuclear devices, and presumably the building of
warheads. In 2005, for example, when fears existing North Korea would soon conduct its
first nuclear test, the White House spokesman “warned” North Korea the U.S. had “a
robust deterrent capability” to deter their nuclear ambitions (Faiola & Sakamaki,
2005).638 The North carried out the test in 2006. This suggests that warfighting
capabilities, especially nuclear weapons for nuclear conflict, lack the credibility to be an
effective instrument of general deterrence or even deterring provocative or crisis behavior
such as pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. That is, this was likely less a case of the
failure of U.S. nuclear weapons to deter North Korea than it was a failure to recognize the
limits of nuclear weapons or to “tailor deterrence” with appropriate instruments of power.
Extended Deterrence
The practicalities of extended deterrence have also proven more difficult than
years ago, suggesting BMD and other non-nuclear capabilities can confuse allies while
providing improved conventional capacity. For example, in his comments following
638

See the report’s section, “Sense of insecurity.”

326

meetings with South Korean military leaders, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
officially and publically defined BMD as a component of the extended deterrence
security guarantees provided by the U.S. to South Korea. Extended deterrence also
included U.S. nuclear and conventional strike capabilities (Defense, 2010).639 These three
components also comprise U.S. extended deterrence for Japan. But if extended deterrence
is a wartime security function, what is the role of missile defenses in general deterrence
conditions? The policy did not explain. Confusion in Japan could also stem from U.S.
explanations for how U.S. missile defenses solve the problem. For example, U.S. Air
Force General Kevin Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, argued that a
“North Korean dictator” could deter the U.S. from supporting a regional ally by
threatening a future U.S. president “by saying, ‘You want to trade Seattle for Seoul?’ He
can’t do that because of our missile-defense system” (Gertz, 2011). North Korea may not
be able to deter the U.S. from retaliation in this case but, unfortunately, U.S. missile
defenses do nothing for the protection of Seoul. Being able to defend the U.S. homeland
from North Korean nuclear-armed ballistic missiles protects the “Seattle” portion of that
mix, but the defense of the “Seoul” portion—and just as plausibly, Tokyo—cannot be
accomplished by the U.S. homeland defenses since they are out of range. This means
both North and South Korea may pay a great price, but not the United States. As a result,
the defense of Seattle may be comforting to the U.S., but likely carries little soothing or
assuring power if one is living in Seoul or Tokyo. Instead, for this equation to hold
completely together regional allies need their own BMD capabilities.640 Perhaps this is
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why Japan has been “underwhelmed with recent developments” regarding U.S. extended
deterrence and how new capabilities, including U.S. missile defenses, fit into that policy
(Murdock, et al., 2009).641 According to the “Healey Theorem”—a formulation by Denis
Healey, the British Minister of Defense in the late 1960s, “it takes only five per cent
credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent
credibility to reassure the Europeans” (Murdock, et al., 2009).642 The question is how far
below ninety-five percent Japan considers itself.
More recently—and offering some clarity—Sugio Takahashi pointed out U.S.
extended deterrence commitments with Japan were being updated to be formed by a core
of “nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities,” as opposed to just
nuclear capabilities and, in doing so, Japan was now partnering with the U.S. in extended
deterrence (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military
Transformation, 2012).643 But as Takahashi pointedly clarified, the only way Japan’s
BMD can do this is by causing North Korea to launch so many missiles it would trigger
U.S. retaliation—small numbers of North Korean missile raids (1-2 missiles or more), do
not cross such a threshold, he argued. So, this type of “cheap-shot strike” by North Korea
falls inside the range of activities within North Korea’s coercive strategy toward Japan,
albeit at the higher end of that scale, but below the threshold of extended deterrence. The
message from this seemed to be that Japan—and only Japan—was responsible for its
nor have they explicitly claimed a desire to attack. Instead, she argues, from a poststructural perspective,
that U.S. identity is the key driver in U.S. decisions on a NMD system (Bormann, 2008). Pages 2-7 and 1434.
641
Page 15. Quote from James L. Schoff, Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of
Extended Deterrence.
642
Page 11. Quote from David Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” International
Affairs.
643
Page 22. Updates were to a May, 2007 joint statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative
Committee (SCC).
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defense for coercion, provocations, or even small sub-conflict North Korean missile
raids.
Working together in general deterrence conditions is preferred, however. Only in
January, 2013 did it appear that the U.S. and Japan sat down to talk through how they
could collaborate together on general deterrence types of issues stemming from North
Korea and China (Talks start with U.S. on new defense plan: Greater SDF role sought as
China grows more assertive, 2013). The talks, sparked by North Korean missile and
nuclear tests and aggressive Chinese behavior over the disputed Senkaku Islands,
stimulated agreement at “strengthening cooperation in intelligence-gathering,
surveillance and reconnaissance activities under normal circumstances, and to enhance
deterrence.” The reference to “normal circumstances” was clearly an indication that dayto-day, status quo general deterrence interaction between the two is not where either party
prefers and supports analysis in the dissertation that Japan’s security under these
circumstances has been largely Japan’s to address. However, with the stakes rising, and
U.S. credibility returning to the fore given its “pivot” to Asia, U.S. and Japanese
policymakers may be searching for ways to align strategies and capabilities.
Norms
In a deterrence or coercive relationship like that of Japan and North Korea, some
cooperative and conflictual behavior will always be present and, as a result, general
deterrence in such a case should have a goal of norm-setting and bringing down the level
of coercion to a lower, manageable, acceptable level. The dissertation’s criteria for
deterrence effectiveness were helpful in assessing the presence and direction of
deterrence effectiveness in the Japan-North Korea case and could be applied to aiding in
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norm-setting, since norms are learned behaviors, as an activity of a deterrence strategy. In
their discussion of perceptions and deterrence, D. Scott Bennett and Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita observe countries “learn” about each other in their interactions. In doing so, the
probabilities of decision consequences become sharper and more refined, reducing
uncertainty in decision-making perceptions. One result can be the strengthening of the
deterrer’s credibility (Bennett & Bueno de Mescquita, 2003).644
This idea of learning can possibly work with norms of behavior and show, over
time, a change in North Korean behavior as it “learned” in its interaction with Japan. For
example, Japan’s unfaltering commitment to a BMD program in each successive phase
over time appears to have affected KJI’s perceptions resulting in behavioral shifts
favorable to deterrence. These behaviors included cooperative engagement with Japan on
political rapprochement as well as ballistic missile related changes in behavior such as
less threatening flight paths and construction and use of a new facility for conducting
missile tests launching south, away from Japan proper.
A “dialogue” of action and reaction, described by Thomas Rid in his description
of the Israeli deterrence perspective (Rid, 2012), is also conceptually similar to that
presented here. Further, the idea that deterrence is an iterative activity and should not be
considered a “binary” function where it either succeeds or it does not (as many define it),
is a central idea of this dissertation. Further, these conceptual ideas provide a different
perspective of general and immediate deterrence conditions and can help provide
conceptual ideas useful in understanding the North Korea-Japan case and others. For
example, rather than general deterrence being a stable relationship between two otherwise
hostile actors characterized by relative inactivity, and immediate deterrence being an
644
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acute crisis possibly preceding war, a single framework of norms, norm-breaking, and
norm resetting, could describe the relationship between Japan and North Korea, and
deterrence effectiveness connected to patterns of behavior relative to one’s expectations
of behavioral norms. This could also be useful in trying to understand general deterrence
challenges with regard to cyber warfare between opponents or enemies.645
Missile Defense-Deterrence Arguments
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Appendix 2 provides another brief
review of missile defense related theory in light of what has been learned from
researching the central question in the Japan-North Korea case. In addition to providing
theoretic background essential in understanding how BMD might strengthen or
undermine deterrence generally, the function of the missile defense-deterrence arguments
identified in Chapter Three can themselves be reviewed using the results from the JapanNorth Korea case. The emphasis here is not on further analyzing Japan’s BMD in their
four periods but, instead, revisits the arguments and their theoretic utility. This
supplemental review provides one way in which empirically-based findings from one
case can be used to illumine the many theoretic arguments and represents an area of
possible future analysis from a strictly theoretic perspective. See Appendix 2.646
Possible Contributions of the Dissertation Research
First, access to large amounts of data through use of digitized media files as a
common practice—coupled with new technologies in automated data storage, access,
translation, scanning, reading, interpreting, and reporting—permits use of such data for
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“For instance, there is still no wide consensus on the norms covering conduct of states and
international cooperation in cyberspace” (Defense of Japan 2012, 2012); page 93. See Chapter 2, Section
2 entitled, “Trends Concerning Cyberspace.”
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various forms of statistical analysis of state, organization, and individual behavior where
none existed only a few years ago. Research can progress in many new directions related
to general deterrence that were simply impractical in the 1990s and early 2000s. One
possible strength of the dissertation deals with the notion of a repeatable process of
exploring general deterrence effectiveness and trends using the design presented in the
dissertation. The components of deterrence and capability theory, dyadic history,
deterrence-oriented profiling of the adversary, use of empirical data for statistical
analysis, and establishment of criteria for assessing deterrence effectiveness all appear to
be necessary elements in drawing inferences regarding deterrence strategies under
general deterrence or periods of sub-conflict provocative events. Use of datasets, such as
that provided by VRA for the dissertation, could be a standard approach for research of
various international relations challenges, providing methodological intersections through
common data and data measurements. These challenges could include deterrence, allied
assurance, proliferation, crises, and conflict, within dyadic relations or among several
actors.
A second possible strength is the deterrence expectations of a BMD program as it
evolves over time. The dissertation’s approach may be unique in this regard. For those
states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar or United Arab Emirates, contemplating initial
deployment of their own BMD capabilities, the dissertation suggests defensivelypostured BMD need not be expected to increase only negative, conflictual adversary
behavior or only result in the undermining of deterrence. The deterrence results varied
but may, especially with positive political interaction, include periods of increased
adversary restraint across the years and BMD periods.
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Third, as suggested by scholars in recent years, understanding the adversary, to
the degree this can be accomplished, proved necessary in understanding the security
needs and cultural values of the adversary—not simply the threats posed by his military
forces—and the potential role, value, and expectations of a BMD program to deter that
adversary.647 James Blackwell adds, “The reality of the growing complexity of deterrence
means that we have much to gain from deeper understanding of how to apply the
behavioral approach to deterrence operations” (Blackwell, 2011).648 This is especially
relevant under general deterrence conditions where changes in behavior are smaller or
harder to identify. Further, statistical measures of behavior may tell us of behavioral
changes regarding deterrence but it is also important to delve deep into the research of the
deterree to help explain such analyses. Payne argued, for example, “there is no substitute
for understanding opponents to the extent possible” for deterrence strategy development
(Payne K. B., Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence,
2011).649 The insights from the historical research, literature review including BMD, and
the strategic profile were all invaluable in working with the quantitative analysis in the
mixed-method approach to better understand the relationship between Japan’s BMD and
North Korean behavior. And, lastly, general deterrence may be best understood—and
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Information gathering on adversaries has always been difficult. And it is recognized that states like
North Korea are more daunting than others in trying to glean information needed for analysis. This broad
idea was acknowledged in the wake of faulty U.S. intelligence about Iraq’s WMD in 2003. In a summary of
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measured—as differences in cooperative and conflictual adversary behavior. This should
be explored further.
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APPENDIX 1:
METHODOLOGY HISTORICAL BACKGROUND650
According to VRA, the IDEA (Integrated Data for Events Analysis) Event
Framework evolved from the 1960s McClelland’s WEIS (World Event / Interaction
Survey) framework which had 22 Cue categories and 63 three-digit subcategories
creating 81 nominal WEIS event forms.651 Goldstein’s weights were added to the 1990s
WEIS framework providing a uni-dimensional scale (conflict-cooperation) applied to
nominal event forms with 61 nominal WEIS events made amenable to ordinal analysis
(see Table 8).652 Also in the 1990s PANDA was created (Protocol for the Assessment of
Nonviolent Direct Action) to provide a nominal framework congruent with WEIS and
using Goldstein weights for ordinal analysis, but modified to: 1) highlight coercive and
contentious but nonviolent event forms; 2) de-link events from actors to accommodate
non-state actors and intra-state events; 3) specify civil society-government derived
sectors; and, 4) specify the level of actor organization independent of the events, from
nominal entities, to named individuals to ephemeral entities (e.g. crowds), to groups (e.g.
ethnic), to organizations (e.g. corporate entities, civil society organizations and States) to
compound organizations (e.g. intergovernmental organizations). In the 2000s, IDEA
superseded PANDA while staying congruent with WEIS, expanding its event forms
beyond the original 22 WEIS “two-digit Cue” categories to 249 events across three
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The background information in this section stems from Bond’s worksheet entitled, “Dyad Notes”
(Virtual Research Associates, Inc. (VRA), 2012).
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In the original 1992 Goldstein study, 61 level-2 plus two level-one events were scored. Therefore, not
all IDEA events had a one-to-one match with the original WEIS set. For events that were not scored in the
original WEIS study, VRA took the average score for the events within that cue (Events Data 1990-2011,
2012).
652
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levels.653 In doing so, IDEA: 1) extended the Goldstein weights (mainly through
interpolation) to 86 nominal IDEA events amenable to ordinal analysis; and, 2) crossmapped all IDEA forms to CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations), MIDs
(Militarized Interstate Disputes), and WH (World Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators). In 2011, IDEA events were refined and the weights extended based on a
multi-dimensional survey (locus, affect, mechanism, injury and damage) with weights
applied to approximately 250 nominal IDEA events, of which about 150 were within the
WEIS 22 Cue Categories.654
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These are 2-, 3- and 4-digit forms of increasing detail; typically these low level event forms stem from
specific research agendas.
654
Also, event form tags were added for economic, political and military domains, intended as an interim
step towards open standard domain tags to support multiple multi-level event and weight frameworks
across different domains and accommodating event reports data from various sources and languages. The
dataset acquired from VRA for the dissertation, however, did not have these latter features in the dyadic
data used for regression analyses.
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APPENDIX 2:
INTEGRATION OF MISSILE DEFENSE-DETERRENCE THEORETIC
ARGUMENTS
General
Table 9 provides an overview of how the mixed-methods analysis of the JapanNorth Korea case in preceding chapters might apply to the various missile defensedeterrence theoretic arguments identified in the Literature Review. This analytic
integration is not provided to reevaluate the qualitative or statistical analyses from earlier
chapters but, rather, to revisit the many missile defense-deterrence theoretic arguments in
light of analytic inferences from the case of Japan’s BMD deterring North Korea. This
uses the qualitative and qualitative analyses of the unique Japan-North Korea case to
review the arguments in order to get a sense of which arguments may be related to the
Japan-North Korea case. As seen in Table 9, there was some connection to all of the
arguments. Using this integrated approach suggests some possible ideas, using the
various theoretic arguments, into how Japan’s BMD may have strengthened or
undermined deterrence of North Korea. This is not a comprehensive analysis of all
possible factors relevant to how the theoretic arguments correlated to Japan’s four BMD
program periods. For example, argument #2 (“Demonstrate stake/commitment to assure
allies or coalition partners”), under the TD-1 column, includes four qualitative data
relating to “Environment” factors (“Goal of splitting alliance,” “1998 domestic BMD
commitment,” “1999 MOU w/U.S.,” and, “No increased NK conflictual behavior toward
Japan due to U.S. influence”). All four of these data strengthen deterrence and support
the theoretic argument and the statistical findings in TD-1 that Japan’s BMD
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strengthened deterrence in that period. However, other theoretic arguments may have
some qualitative data that goes both ways. For example, in argument #16 (“Deny or
confound military or political benefits sought by adversary”), factors relating to Japan’s
technology may strengthen deterrence in the TD-2 period, but North Korea may also
perceive gains in the TD-2 period, even though the analysis indicates Japan’s BMD
strengthened deterrence overall in the TD-2 period. A summary of this table is provided
below.
The table reflects the 34 missile defense-deterrence arguments identified in the
Literature Review that could relate somehow to the Japan-North Korea case. The thick
black line separates arguments that BMD strengthens deterrence (#1 through #27) from
those arguments claiming BMD undermines deterrence (#28 through #34). These are
numbered in the far left column. The four periods of Japan’s BMD program are identified
in the middle four columns, with the results of the statistical analyses in the heading (i.e.,
Japan’s BMD in the TD-1 period suggested Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence in that
period). The column to the far right includes the three broad categories of qualitative data
contained in the Strategic Profile. Qualitative data from the Profile or elsewhere in the
dissertation are contained in the various boxes under the four BMD period columns. Data
entries preceded by a checkmark () reflect data that strengthen deterrence; entries
preceded by lines () reflect qualitative data that undermine deterrence.
Profile Factors
The qualitative data dealing with KJI’s personal factors are related in many ways
to his risk-propensity, his expectations, his general approach with external actors, and his
personal style, such as his interaction with Japan in the rapprochement talks and summit
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meetings in 2002 and 2004. While not yet deployed, Japan’s BMD program development
was present in the background of the normalization activities, with Japan’s decision for
acquire its own BMD coming in 2003. Japan’s BMD did not, however, deny KJI his
personal needs to portray a strong image at home and abroad including during the
normalization talks with Japan. Domestically, he presented himself as a strong leader
when it came to dealing with Japan, having armed the nation with ballistic missiles and
strengthening his position. In reality, he was personally more even-handed or reasonable
in his dealings with Japan and interactions with Japan’s leadership. While North Korea
changed behavioral patterns in its 2009 TD-2 missile test, if Japan would have opted to
shoot down the missile, it may have changed KJI’s image at home and abroad sufficiently
to lead him to violent provocation with Japan. Japan’s choice to employ BMD, but
withhold from shooting the TD-2 down allowed KJI to “save face.” He demonstrated
strength to the world with the missile test, though he clearly compromised in how he
carried out that test. Having the missile shot down may have been the worst outcome for
KJI: being outdone technically (and militarily) by Japan; tarnishing his domestic image
with all audiences; and, a direct external challenge to his source of sovereign strength,
demanding a response and possible escalation he most likely did not want. By 2009,
Japan’s BMD had been operational for two years and North Korea was aware of this fact.
Early pronouncements of the intended TD-2 flight, and compliance with UN air and
surface vessel safety agencies, signaled restraint and, quite possibly, deference to Japan’s
BMD.
Regarding factors pertaining to North Korea’s national identity and culture, some
of the qualitative data reflect the domestic, national emotive and psychological
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dimensions of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. This includes high technology generally,
as this is culturally significant to the Korean people from a historical perspective, but also
missile testing and what these types of capabilities and activities may mean to the people
collectively. For example, there is a sense of national pride connected to such activities,
consistent with the identity and cultural values of North Korea and Korea generally,
suggesting a belief in North Korea’s prestige among nations, and not just regional actors.
Japan’s BMD did not deny the North Korean people their sense of national satisfaction,
including emotive hostility toward “imperial” Japan. These identity factors are also
intertwined with support for the nation’s leader, Kim Jong-Il, the cultural father of the
nation and orchestrator of national sovereignty and security.
In terms of environmental factors, North Korea also gained valued knowledge of
Japan’s BMD program, command and control, internal politics and risk-tolerance
regarding BMD, rules of engagement (as publicly announced), and general reactions
useful for North Korea’s own military planning, including BMD countermeasures and
alternative missile deployment schema. This is mentioned here to illustrate the
complexities in deterrence analysis generally or in the Japan-North Korea case
specifically. While Japan’s BMD program during the TD-2 period indicated a reduction
of conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, suggesting a comparable
strengthening of deterrence in this period owing to Japan’s BMD, North Korea likely
achieved some gains in this period as well. Deterrence, therefore, cannot be conceived
solely as a binary outcome with only one winner and one loser. Note that the North
Korean gains mentioned above (i.e., gaining knowledge of Japan’s BMD program) are
essentially passive benefits from launching the TD-2. As a result, North Korean gains and
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Japanese deterrence success can be achieved at the same time. Another example, and a
more significant one for the threat to Japan, is the qualitative data regarding North
Korean ballistic missile exports and domestic deployment trends. While Japan’s BMD
may have strengthened deterrence in the TD-1 period, and had not statistically significant
effect in the Decide period, BMD may have had a role in North Korean choices in
ballistic missile production, sales, and domestic deployment. It appears North Korean
missile exports declined, according to Joshua Pollack (Pollack J. , Ballistic Trajectory:
The Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market, 2011), in part due to the impact
of BMD in other regional markets, lowering the potential value of ballistic missiles
available from North Korea. At the same time, however, North Korea maintained missile
production to deploy more missiles at home, meaning North Korea incurred greater cost
to its own missile force by keeping more of its missiles produced. One logical
explanation is the need to have many more missiles available to overcome Japan’s BMD.
So, while BMD adds costs (#26) and helps in general deterrence conditions against
“cheap-shot” raids, in the Japan-North Korea case the tradeoff is that BMD may also
have meant an increase in North Korea’s ballistic missile deployment (#18, #23 and #33)
useful to North Korea to overcome Japan’s BMD in wartime conditions. This is discussed
further below.
BMD Periods
Under the TD-1 BMD period, most qualitative data entries reflect direct or
indirect support for deterrence being strengthened by Japan’s BMD. For example, while
part of the North Korean long-term strategy has been to try to divide U.S. alliances with
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Japan and ROK (argument #2),655 Japan’s BMD actually helped strengthen the alliance in
some ways. Others have also made the case North Korea is aware of Japan’s BMD
program (#3).656 Likewise, Japan could have committed significant defense spending on
offensive forces, but instead opted for defensive BMD capabilities, clearly reflecting a
defensive posture in Japan’s case (#4).657 Japan’s BMD also helps Japan shore up
potential technological lags to North Korean ballistic missile capabilities (#9), as
evidenced through its missile and, more recently, space-related activities. A recurring
theme for North Korea is celebrating its technological successes, especially those that
also guard national sovereignty and security (#11).658 BMD not only addresses the North

655

North Korea has shown a proclivity toward fracturing if not splitting regional actors from their
partnerships and alliances with the United States. It has done so through various political and military
activities under past general deterrence conditions, and could do so explicitly as part of its wartime
strategy against multiple parties in a broader peninsular war. North Korea uses this strategy of reducing a
regional actor’s commitment in order to isolate it and improve the prospects North Korea will achieve its
aims or advance its position. Further, use of ballistic missiles for coercive purposes, cost North Korea little:
it can afford operational training and technical data that is needed as part of most periodic quality
assurance programs for deployed systems. And missile production capabilities are sustainable in North
Korea. So, launching the missile is already a useful activity with little associated costs. However, actions by
others that could raise the costs of missile launches in peacetime, or diminish their effectual use in
wartime, would be most unwelcome by North Korea. Economic or financial losses, either through
sanctioning practices, or through North Korean modifications to its missiles needed to counter defenses
would be detrimental to sustained use of ballistic missiles to coerce. See also: Umemoto Tetsuya (Tetsuya,
2000); page 135.
656
Some capabilities, intentions, or actions can remain ambiguous, both to North Korea and Japan, among
others. North Korea may, for example, be unsure of ROK or U.S. war aims in a broader conflict on the
Korean Peninsula. Japan, however, has been relatively unambiguous with respect to the capabilities and
intentions of its BMD, and North Korea is likely aware of this. Political scientist Bob Switky suggests it is
reasonable to assume adversaries pay attention to reports about BMD effectiveness. It follows, then,
according to Boyd and Scouras, that the perceptions of the same adversary can be influenced the other
direction, toward BMD credibility (Boyd & Scouras, 2009). See page 194 for both Switky’s suggestion and
comments by Boyd and Scouras. The assumption that North Korea and Japan are generally aware of the
behavior and capabilities of the other is a necessary one in order for Japan’s missile defenses to have
influence over North Korean decision-making and, is therefore, an important consideration in the
dissertation.
657
James Lebovic argues BMD will cause an adversary to take preemptive action and use his ballistic
missiles early before BMD can be forward deployed in crisis (Lebovic, 2002). Pages 460, 463, 469, 474, and
481.
658
Avi Schnurr, Executive Director of the Israeli Missile Defense Agency, argued that missile defenses also
deny an adversary domestic and political psychological gains sought by using ballistic missiles or
conducting a missile test. Under some circumstances, an adversary may seek a limited “victory” by testing
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Korean threat directly with defense-related technologies, but also works to counter
potential new threats emerging from North Korea (#20).659 It also gives Japan the
capacity to more quickly develop offensive ballistic missiles should it deem that
necessary (#27).660 On a positive side, Japan’s initiatives with BMD also contributed to
furthering opportunities for political normalization of relations with North Korea, owing
to the fact BMD would eventually undercut the North’s coercive edge over Japan. As
seen in the TD-1 column, Japan’s BMD program development was no remedy for
mitigating all North Korean perceptions or behavior, nor was this expected. More than
just armament on parade from time to time in Pyongyang’s celebrations, North Korea’s
ballistic missile program is a powerful instrument for retaining sovereignty—a fact that
resonates with national pride and prestige and strengthens KJI’s image (#11). Japan’s
BMD is also limited in denying North Korea domestic political support for its ballistic

a ballistic missile that goes unchallenged with missile defenses, gaining domestic support while
intimidating neighbors at the same time. Without missile defenses, he argued, the adversary would have
free reign with his ballistic missiles, thus undermining all aspects of one’s deterrence (Schnurr, 2010).
These ideas are part of his formal presentation as the panel’s third speaker.
659
North Korea has a tendency for willingness to depart from agreements it feels are unfair or simply do
not suit its liking or security. For example, it was willing to breach an agreement to forego developing
nuclear weapons when it felt it was no longer in its interests to do so. It also sought to circumvent
sanctions on proliferation, including missile or nuclear related technologies that turned up later in places
such as Syria. KJI is also comfortable being in control; external arrangements that seek to constrain him
are contrary to his personal style. Further, it did not agree with the interpretation of UNSC resolutions
banning North Korean ballistic missile launches, activities North Korea felt were space-related. It is
difficult, therefore, to suggest North Korea to be anything but noncompliant in some key security related
agreements. In light of the changes made to North Korean ballistic missile testing patterns, it could be
argued that Japan is in a position to be less susceptible to North Korean coercion. Further, it was with the
Japanese that North Korea discussed extension of a ballistic missile test moratorium, a sign that it was
Japan that held sway, at least temporarily, on North Korean missile tests. While North Korean missile tests
resumed later, in light of Japan’s BMD deployments in 2007, it should be noted that the tests changed in
pattern.
660
Japan, for its part, has a missile program to support its space program—a capability that could be used
to sharpen Japan’s overall technological capacity or edge. This edge in technology could also aid in
continuing its advancement of credible, effective BMD components and help it acquire the needed skills
for converting its missiles into offensive ballistic missiles should it deem it necessary to do so.
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missile programs (#32).661 BMD also has negative consequences for China (#34),662 not
simply as a political supporter of North Korea, but because it challenges China’s ballistic
missile capability as it does the North’s.
There were many positive qualitative data in the Decide BMD period column,
despite the fact that Japan’s BMD was not a significant factor in the statistical analysis
for this period. For example, BMD may have been part of Japan’s signaling, supporting
other interactions with North Korea (#3).663 Japan’s decision to acquire a BMD system in
2003 occurred between the two summit meetings between KJI and Prime Minister
Koizumi. While no final political breakthroughs were reached, Japan’s defensive BMD
program (#4) did not disrupt the talks and may have contributed to their continuation in
2004. During the talks, and this period generally, BMD may have contributed to Japan’s

661

According to Robert Jervis, cognitive psychology suggests images that shape perceptions change
slowly. He also states that the one deterring must use instruments of deterrence that matter to the
adversary’s values and must also realize when the adversary has little choice but to behave egregiously.
Further, Jervis cautions one’s domestic politics can distort the realities of others (Jervis, 1982-1983). Pages
9, 13, and 29. For Japan, then, missile defenses might only have the desired effect on North Korean
behavior over a longer period of time, perhaps years. It further suggests ballistic missile defenses must
somehow resonate with North Korean values, but without denying them opportunities to maneuver
politically in ways acceptable to both parties. It can also suggest North Koreans might see Japan in certain
ways, such as domineering brutes, in order to satisfy domestic audiences.
662
North Korea used missile launches, including the 1998 test, possibly as a bargaining tool in its militarydiplomatic campaigns. If so, the North Korean calculus of using missile launches seemed to have changed,
however, as they prompted Japanese and U.S. BMD deployments resulting in negative perceptions in
China. Such developments indicated North Korea would likely change its behavior with ballistic missile
tests in the future (Pollack, 2004). In Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic
Campaign Strategies: Continuity versus Change.” Page 71.
663
Uzi Rubin argues defenses and offenses should combine in strategy to maximize the deterrent effect
upon an adversary’s calculus before he acts. While he argues from the perspective of missile defenses
strengthening Israel’s retaliatory response capability against an attacking Iran, importantly he suggests it
is missile defenses that provide the most “visible” measure of communication or signaling in influencing
the adversary’s decision calculus (Rubin, 2008). Pages 66-7. Visible communication from a defender to an
opponent with missile defenses plays a central role in the Japan-North Korea case, particularly as
Japanese leaders made strategic decisions over the years in increasing the program and especially since
Japan operationally deployed its missile defenses.
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stronger position (#16 and #25)664 and KJI’s sense of reasonableness though there were
limits to how far he would go (#11). It should also be noted that during this period North
Korean ballistic missile production appears to have continued unabated, despite a
reduction in exports, resulting in the steady fielding of ballistic missiles (#18).665 This
would be in keeping with the admission of U.S. deterrence failures against North Korea
(#21).666 Deploying a large share of missiles produced (rather than selling them) also
raised costs for North Korea (#26).667 This, however, seemed to work contrary to the
longstanding theory that BMD stymies ballistic missile proliferation (#23).668 North

664

David Yost suggests fewer policy analysts in Europe buy into the notion of deterrence by denial where
an adversary is deterred by perceiving his operational objectives are not achievable (Yost, 2004). Pages
727-8.
665
One key unknown is the impact of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean value in its ballistic missiles, at
least as measured by North Korean ballistic missile production and domestic deployment levels. Disparity
of analysts exists over production and deployment levels. At the very least, missile exports have trended
downward for several years, though this may be explained by a variety of reasons. Value in ballistic
missiles is likely still very high and sufficient missiles for operational, coercive and wartime purposes
already exist in North Korea’s inventory to preclude further production and deployment. A downward
trend in production and deployment would suggest a partial loss of value.
666
Burns argues BMD in the U.S. was focused on defending against North Korean and Iranian missile
threats and, therefore, dissuading them from ballistic missile proliferation. However, this strategy failed
with North Korea as it continued to pursue a nuclear weapons capability and missile technology did not
abate, possibly fearing regime change. North Korean nuclear and missile tests ensued, leading to Japanese
choices on BMD (Burns, 2010). Pages 95-6. To avoid the same outcome as North Korea, U.S. missile
defense strategy in Europe, therefore, would need to present the U.S., through NATO, as a “bigger”
defensive influence over Iran’s emerging nuclear and ballistic missile threats. In other words, Japan was
not afraid of U.S. extended deterrence failure, per se, but of aggressive U.S. actions toward North Korea in
its new post-Cold War power projection role that could lead to more aggressive North Korea choices and
embroil Japan as a potential target of North Korean ballistic missiles.
667
Missile defenses would contribute to deterrence by helping deny the benefits an adversary would have
in ballistic missile attack and raising the costs to an adversary by increasing his level of effort for any
attack to be effective (Kartchner, 2002). Pages 2-4. Ashton Carter states it is important to understand the
role of BMD when evaluating its utility in strategy. One goal is to raise the price of attack, or the price of
preparing for attack, meaning the attacker’s costs to launch the attack go up in numbers of ballistic
missiles to types of accompanying technologies needed (Carter & Schwartz, 1984). Pages 102-3.
668
President Bush’s security framework envisioned missile defenses specifically to “strengthen deterrence
by reducing the incentive for proliferation” (Dudley, 2003). Page 11. See also: (Gompert & Arnhold, 2001);
page 9. If North Korean ballistic missile production levels have trended downward in recent years, it could
reflect the idea that it was not worth the costs associated with operational needs of attempting to
overcome Japan’s BMD system. This could also be suggested should North Korean ballistic missile sales
decrease substantially. In this case, according to Joshua Pollack, they have, indicating, at least in part, that
ballistic missiles are less appealing to prospective buyers without significant numbers that can overcome
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Korea’s ballistic missiles were also used in this period, though without overflying Japan,
to strengthen KJI’s foreign and domestic image (#32). China was also very concerned
over Japan’s choice to deploy BMD (#34)669 and, because of its alliance with North
Korea, potentially weakening the deterrent efficacy of Japan’s BMD in KJI’s perceptions.
By the time of Japan’s operational deployment of its BMD system (Deploy
column), the prospects for normalization with North Korea had diminished significantly
and KJI’s position on relenting further on the abductee issue firmed (#6 and #11).670
Having defenses reduced fears of a surprise missile attack (#5)671 and provided a calming
effect on Japan’s populace, however, eroding North Korea’s doctrinal advantages of
surprise and terrorizing an opponent (#10 and #11).672 For the first time Japan’s BMD
provided a credible capability to defend itself, though BMD testing was not perfect (#12
regional BMD systems faced by those buyers. Pollack, in fact, makes such an argument for the impact of
BMD explicitly to reduce buying incentives (Pollack J. , 2011). Page 416.
669
Japan’s BMD system has drawn sharp criticism from China, not only because it thinks its limited
ballistic missile arsenal is no longer as credible, but because China retains images of Japanese imperialism
and brutality. Japan’s BMD may be early protection for a later Japanese offensive posture that could
threaten China directly or at least undermine China’s goals of resolving regional issues, such as island
disputes, with minimal resistance or conflict.
670
Robert Powell argues BMD, since it can significantly lower possible costs to the defender against
ballistic missile attacks, makes the defender more resolute and willing to tolerate risk and escalate if
necessary. However, this can work in two opposing ways. On the one hand, this could lead to nuclear
confrontation or preemptive nuclear attack from large states like Russia. On the other hand, increased
resolve of a BMD-possessing state could lead smaller regional actors to back down (Powell, 2003). Pages
88, 106-7. While Japan is hardly so risk-tolerant to accept nuclear risks in conflict with North Korea, BMD
might, however, create sufficient perception of reduced costs of pushing harder with North Korea in
general deterrence, sub-conflict conditions.
671
Any potential North Korean doctrinal position of using surprise, or a history of surprise action,
complicates Japanese planning, particularly in scenarios involving North Korean use of ballistic missiles
that can strike in mere minutes. This provides North Korea a great advantage in coercing Japan through
unspoken threats of sudden terror from the sky, a scenario with which Japan is all-too familiar. Roberts
defines “crisis” in terms of threats under time stress. In this way, “short decision time distinguishes a crisis
from a non-crisis, and increasing stress further heightens the salience of time” (Roberts, 1988). Page 60.
Japan’s BMD, as defensive capabilities, also reduce stress and increase time in the decision-making of
both actors, thus reducing crisis potential or its duration.
672
Like others, Handberg states the August 1998 North Korean TD-1 missile flight showed Japan’s
vulnerability, a situation magnified by a lack of offensive retaliatory capabilities. He argues, however, that
an attack with WMD would be a game-changer to Japanese society as it would be slow or unable to
deliver retribution upon North Korea while it struggled domestically. BMD helps sooth those fears
(Handberg, 2002). Pages 133-4.
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and #13).673 Technologically, Japan’s expertise with BMD helped to undermine the
advantages North Korea seemed to be gaining with its long-range missile capabilities
(#16).674 On the down side, North Korea apparently worked to develop BMD technical
countermeasures and field many more ballistic missiles (#15); these could be factors both
in general deterrence and wartime conditions. Japan affirmed its reliance on U.S.
detection capabilities and also demonstrated weakness in its BMD command and control
during this time (#28)675 possibly emboldening North Korea to be increasingly conflictual
during this period.

673

Stephen Quackenbush argued missile defenses that become “increasingly effective” deny the
adversary capacity to exert influence over the defender (Quackenbush, 2006). Pages 533, 535, and 53840. Japan’s missile defenses have become increasingly effective throughout the course of their
development and deployment. Both examples can be considerations in which Japan’s missile defenses
contribute to deterrence and stability against North Korea. Many have claimed the unreliability of BMD
over the years. Critics of Japan’s BMD system, or specific missiles or components of the system, take issue
with missile failures or intercept misses. As reliability has increased, the credibility of Japan’s BMD system
in North Korea’s assessment may also have increased. North Korea has, in the past, disclaimed
involvement in certain actions, such as covert naval operations. So, it is possible it may not acknowledge
involvement in ballistic missiles that strike or land in Japan, or at least not acknowledge culpability or
hostile intention. This could occur by accident where a missile flies off-course (as has happened with
other Taepodong missiles) or, less likely, flies to a pre-loaded target in Japan, launched “accidentally” or
without KJI authorization. This could be done to test Japan’s BMD under surprise conditions or the
political resolve of Japan’s leaders. It could also be done to stimulate Japanese compliance in some way
toward a North Korean aim. BMD can provide benefits including protection against accidents (Krepon,
2003). Pages 191 and 195-6. Gordon Mitchell, in his examination of the BMD debate from a rhetorical
perspective, argues the U.S. hides and lies about U.S. military capabilities and foreign threats in order to
protect and aid the “military industrial complex.” This is done by masking the lies in Cold War jargon of
jeopardizing deterrence. The debate, and support for, BMD in the U.S. is but the latest, but biggest,
example of this deceptive strategy (Mitchell, 2000). Pages 2-3. He cites three main missile defense “cases”
of deception from public statements to support his argument, including: experimentations with the X-ray
laser; accuracy of the Patriot missile during the Persian Gulf War; and, whether the U.S. Theater High
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system violates tenants of the 1972 ABM Treaty (Mitchell, 2000). Page 24.
Each of these cases receives a full chapter of material used to illuminate Mitchell’s view of deception.
674
While North Korea possesses hundreds of ballistic missiles, only a portion of them can reach Japan. It is
not known how many of these would be used against Japan in wartime scenarios, but North Korean
planning against Japan, even in limited raid-type crisis scenarios, could be complicated or undermined or
at risk of falling short of North Korean operational objectives. Political objectives, however, would be
much harder to deny as simply launching against Japan may be sufficient in the North Korean calculus to
create the needed coercive climate.
675
To be effective, Japanese BMD requires credible sensors, weapons, command and control, and
doctrine (O'Donogue, 2000). Page 15. Attaining these would raise Japan’s position in regional and global
arms control and nonproliferation activities.
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Perhaps the period with the widest qualitative support for the theoretic arguments
was the TD-2 BMD period. This also supports the statistical analysis indicating Japan’s
BMD strengthened deterrence during this period. In the most pronounced event
timeframe—the 2009 North Korean TD-2 missile launch—Japan, at the direction of its
national leadership, employed its BMD for the first time (the term employment meaning
the interceptors were manned and ready to fire). This had many effects and is related to
several of the theoretic arguments in the TD-2 BMD period: Japan’s populace was
assured (#1),676 an important military and psychological advantage given North Korea’s
strategy and wartime targeting of Tokyo and other urban areas; it demonstrated a
defensive posture that, coupled with North Korean early announcements and compliance
with UN requirements, stymied any real prospect for U.S. preemptive strikes on the
North Korean missile preparations (#3, #4, and #8);677 it raised North Korean
uncertainties678 and reinforced North Korea’s plan to conduct future missile tests from the

676

According to Japanese governmental sources, Japan’s land-based PAC-3 missile groups defend Japan’s
major cities and all major Japanese islands (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2013). See the section entitled,
“Land-Based Missile Defense.” This supports the idea that Japan’s BMD is not meant simply to protect
U.S. forces and bases in a U.S-North Korea deterrence relationship, but they are there for the protection
of Japan’s interests including its population, governmental, and economic centers.
677
John Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, in response to
a question in a press briefing suggested missile defenses have benefits before the crisis posed by an
adversary’s launch of ballistic missiles, including both deterrent and dissuasive benefits. For example,
BMD could help deter their use and provide a non-offensive option to respond to a missile launch if
deterrence failed. Citing a 2006 case in which North Korea was stacking a missile for launch, Rood
confessed the U.S. neither knew whether a munition was atop the North Korean missile nor whether
North Korean intentions were hostile or otherwise. Possessing BMD, and placing them on full alert during
that time, allowed the U.S. to avoid considering a preemptive strike or traditional “overwhelming
retaliation” options. As such, BMD provided a purely defensive escalation control tool and was essentially
a stabilizing capability (Rood, 2008). Rood’s comments are in response to a question from Mounzer
Sleiman with Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi. These are the types of benefits most likely considered by Japanese
leadership for the value of missile defenses in Japan. In addition, North Korea deems deployment of
offensive assets close to its border as provocative and has acted aggressively against such assets in the
past: the USS Pueblo naval incident; shooting at the EC121 aircraft; the killings on the ground at the
Panmunjom joint security area.
678
According to the U.S. State Department, missile defenses both complicate adversary decision-making
and work to deny his objectives for using ballistic missiles or WMD. The way BMD does this was captured
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Sohae facility in western North Korea (#6, #7 and #11),679 though testing the TD-2 in any
fashion allowed North Korea to claim success in advancing its space capabilities;
permitted operational defenses against North Korean missile threats to Japan, regardless
of North Korean intent or Japanese target (#13 and #14); it compounded North Korea’s
ballistic missile-based planning, contributing to North Korea’s pursuit of a road-mobile
solid propellant missile system that can move to the field and launch more quickly and
possibly undetected—a cost and a complication for North Korea, but if deployed a
challenge to Japan’s BMD (#15 and #30); it tempered Japanese inclinations toward
offensive or nuclear capabilities (#21);680 it gave Japan confidence in its actions

this way: “By complicating his calculation of success, these defenses add to a potential aggressor’s
uncertainty and weaken his confidence” (Department of State, 2001). See the heading entitled, “Emerging
Threats and the Need to Diversify our Approach to Deterrence.” Such calculations rely on estimates of the
probability their missiles will get through the defensive system. In this way, it could be argued Japan’s
missile defenses create such uncertainty and lower confidence in North Korean leaders’ decision-making,
possibly contributing in a significant way to alter North Korea’s choices in launching the TD-2 in 2009 and
other behaviors. See also: (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986). Pages 87-8.
679
Samson describes the features of the 2009 North Korean TD-2 missile test, providing a clear contrast
with the 2006 and 1998 launches. First, in the 2009 missile test, what it called the Unha-2 space launch
vehicle intended to place a satellite into orbit, North Korea provided prior warning and transparency of
the test, informing both the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) weeks in advance of the test and included danger areas where missile stages
could fall. It also announced it would join the Outer Space Treaty and the Registry Convention for space
objects. Second, North Korea apparently used a different trajectory in the 2009 test or a higher altitude,
such that Japan’s largest urban and economic centers were not in the missile’s flight path or were not
threatened sufficiently to pressure Japan to engage the missile with Japanese BMD available for the first
time in the 2009 test. Lastly, some assess the 2009 missile employed a new and different booster,
apparently incorporating Iranian SLV technologies to reflect a space, rather than an offensive missile,
purpose for the 2009 missile. After the launch, U.S. General Victor Renuart admitted the missile was a
space test and not an ICBM test and, therefore, was not engaged with U.S. BMD either (Samson, 2010).
Pages 13-4. Further, fear of getting even its testing missiles shot down by Japan may increase North
Korean uncertainties sufficient to warrant change in its missile testing patterns. For example, the change
in 2009, or moving its missile testing facilities to a new launch site in western North Korea so it can shoot
missiles south, may indicate North Korean preferences for greater certainty in its missile tests and
reduction in potential complications.
680
Ballistic missiles, either directly or indirectly, serve a valuable coercive purpose for North Korea against
Japan. Coercing Japan can bring several political, tangible, and psychologically emotive benefits to KJI,
though he does not act independent of the influence of multiple factors. However, an interesting dilemma
in North Korean behavior given Japan’s deterrence strategy is that to deny Japan success in deterring
North Korea is to stoke the fires inside Japan of sentiments of such erosion of effect upon North Korea
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elsewhere, including assertiveness with China over disputed islands (#24);681 and, it
demonstrated a political willingness and military capacity to defeat a limited, “cheapshot” strike with ballistic missiles if needed (#28),682 increasing Japan’s credibility
(#29).683 Other drawbacks included: the gain by North Korea of technical data of its
missile and Japan’s BMD response by testing the TD-2 (#11 and #27); pushing North
Korea to make other choices unfavorable to Japan, including BMD technical and
employment countermeasures and development asymmetric coercive capabilities, such as
competencies in cyber warfare (#30 and #31);684 and, BMD could further disincentivize

that Japan needed offensive conventional strike, and possibly nuclear, capabilities to sufficiently deter
North Korea—an unwelcome prospect inside North Korea.
681
Part of Japan’s rise in autonomy has involved an increase in its freedom of action. This is characterized
militarily by increased capabilities, longer and further deployments, and more assertive operations
including engagement with North Korean ships. But it is also shown in greater flexing politically, such as
pursuit of a UNSC permanent seat. It is difficult to gauge North Korea’s views of such Japanese
assertiveness or its causes. See also: (Crouch, Joseph, Payne, & Roehl, 2009). Pages 1, 3, and 8.
682
North Korean ballistic missile use for coercive purposes may not involve direct attacks or raids with
missiles upon targets inside Japan. If it did so, it likely has sufficient missiles to overwhelm Japan’s BMD
system but North Korea would need to use a considerable number of its missiles or empty its stores
completely. On the other hand, limited missile raids or tests used for coercive purposes could not
effectively overcome Japan’s defenses unless they were used against undefended, or under-defended,
targets. This is another area where North Korean ballistic missile production levels might offer insights
into the North’s thinking about its ability to overwhelm BMD.
683
North Korea occasionally seeks to make its opponents look the aggressor, providing it justification for
other actions or compensation. For example, North Korea claimed ROK control of certain islands the
North claims as disputed gave it the right to shell those islands with artillery. Defensive strategies,
however, give regional actors opposed to North Korea ways to confound the North’s approach as
defenses can be merely responsive in nature. Under certain circumstances, it is possible North Korea
could launch a missile toward Japan with the expectation Japan would engage it with its BMD. In this case,
North Korea would be counting on credibility of Japan’s political resolve and technical capability of its
BMD. North Korea could invite such a response possibly to isolate Japan from the U.S., give the North
cause for some other premeditated action, or claim damages for losses. Such scenarios would require
North Korean dependence upon Japan’s credibility. See Barak Mendelsohn’s discussion of this theoretic
argument in an examination of the 1991 Gulf War (Mendelsohn, 2003); pages 84-8 and 96-7.
684
One way North Korea could enhance the capability of its offensive ballistic missile force is through
development and deployment of various countermeasures on the missile to defeat an opponent’s BMD
system. While doing so involved costs, such countermeasures may pale in cost to deploying a much larger
number of BMD interceptors, new or enhanced radar systems, or developing new interceptors altogether.
Some analysts suggest North Korea has in fact developed some countermeasures. According to Philip E.
Coyle, the three easiest ways to defeat BMD are to build more offensive ballistic missiles to overwhelm
the defensive system, use countermeasures to confuse defenses, and to go around known BMD systems
with surprise methods of attack such as employing cruise missiles or terroristic strategies. The Achilles
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China from agreeing to arms control measures of its offensive ballistic missiles and
nuclear weapons in the future (#34).685

heel of BMD, however, is effective countermeasure (CM) capabilities, options North Korea has been
developing and fielding since 1999. Such North Korean CM capabilities could include: separating RVs, spinstabilizing RVs, RV reorientation, using radar-absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, lowpower jammers, chaff, and balloon decoys (Ghoshroy & Neuneck, 2010). Pages 43-8. For ideas on how
countermeasures address an adversary’s perceived costs of restraint, see: Kenneth Watman and Dean
Wilkening (Watman & Wilkening, 1995), pages 22-3; and, Roberta Wohlstetter (Wohlstetter, 1962), pages
354 and 356-7. While ballistic missiles have been a centerpiece for North Korean intimidation tactics, not
only against Japan but ROK and others, one fear is that effectively devaluing the North’s ballistic missiles
might have unintended and unpleasant side effects. For example, in addition to simply building more
missiles to overcome defenses, North Korea could rather choose to use other means of delivery of
conventional or WMD munitions, such as use of artillery or ground-based or seaborne delivery vehicles
for WMD. It used artillery attacks against ROK sites in 2009, for example. It could also seek to coerce
through other violent acts, as it did with the sinking of the Choenon ROK naval vessel. Or, it could use
cyberspace attacks, as was done against ROK networks. Of note, however, is the lack of violent coercive
attacks against Japan during the years such activity rose against ROK. See also: Julian Palmore and
Francoise Melese (Palmore & Melese, 2001), page 214; and, Raymond Franck (Franck, 2002); page 222.
685
The UK’s Ministry of Defence suggested in 2010 a high likelihood effective BMD would undermine
“some states’ nuclear deterrence” in the long-term (UK Ministry of Defence: Development, Concepts and
Doctrine Centre, 2010). See the section entitled “Hot Topic – The Future of Deterrence.” Page 77. Stephen
Cimbala argues, from an arms control perspective, missile defenses create unnecessary “friction” for
deterrence (Cimbala, 2002). Page 201. See also: John Newhouse (Newhouse, 2001); pages, 97, 101, 104,
and 109.
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Table 9: Overview of Theoretic Arguments and BMD Periods
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